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Contesting Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
Introduction
Neoliberal globalisation has swept unevenly but steadily across the
world, including Africa. Harrison (2010: 26-27) offers a definition
of neoliberalism that appears appropriate to the African experience.
In his view, the term encompasses a diverse set of  interventions
over a protracted period of time that are oriented  towards the
removal of  political control of  the economy, the free market and
the rational individual. Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has been the
dominant development agenda in Africa because of its championing
by powerful external agencies like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank and western neoliberal states that have
compelled African states to pursue this agenda (Cammack 2002;
Harrison 2004). An important contextual factor in this period was
the end of  the Cold War, which left African governments with a
deep and prolonged economic and political crisis and no obvious
alternative source of financial or political support apart from western
neoliberalism.
What is particularly striking in Africa is that neoliberal
experiments there have displayed such remarkable diversity. This
suggests that the global neoliberal agenda has had to negotiate
complex internal dynamics despite the growing influence of
international agencies (Oya 2007). Substantial differences can be
observed not only in historical, economic and political trajectories
in Africa but also, and maybe more importantly, in the degree of
resistance internal actors have demonstrated to the neoliberal
reforms imposed on them. This book focuses on Cameroon, which
has had a complex economic and political history and is currently
witnessing resistance to the neoliberal experiment by the
authoritarian and neopatrimonial state and various civil-society
groups.
2The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. The first
provides an overview of  the impact of  neoliberal policies on Africa,
showing how they have largely failed to generate the socio-economic
and political transformations they promised. The second section
examines the various forms of  resistance by the state and civil society
in Africa to neoliberal reforms, while the third offers a concise
description of the essays presented in this volume on the contestation
of the neoliberal experiment in Cameroon.
The impact of neoliberalism on Africa
The neoliberal agenda in Africa has deepened and broadened over
the years. In the early years, neoliberalism had primarily an economic
agenda that included a negative view of the state and the public
sector. ‘More market and less state’ was the prime objective of  the
macro-economic stabilisation programmes that started in the late
1970s and the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were
vigorously enhanced and extended in the 1980s (Fernández Jilberto
& Mommen 1996; Demmers et al. 2004). SAPs were effected
through the mechanism of economic conditionality and credit was
only forthcoming if  governments implemented ‘correct’ policies.
Although SAPs varied to some extent between countries, all were
based on a desire to liberalise economies. Their initial goals were to
remove price subsidies within internal markets, abolish quotas and
allow exchange rates to flow freely. Beyond these core components,
SAPs would also involve policy commitments to privatisation, tariff
reduction, the removal of state marketing boards, a reduction in
the money supply with a view to curbing inflation, the encouragement
of foreign investment, a reduction in the government payroll, and
the introduction of  user charges for public services. Following
considerable pressure on the Bretton Woods institutions to modify
their painful neoliberal economic policies, transitory social
improvement packages were attached to the core neoliberal reforms
of  the late 1980s to cushion the social costs of  structural adjustment
and give it a ‘human face’. Subsequently, a series of  ad hoc debt-
reduction and rescheduling packages were introduced, leading to
the more rigorous Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative
that was inaugurated in 1996 and enhanced in 1999. The HIPC
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scheme was premised on demonstrated commitment (if not
progress) under SAP (with a minimum of three years of satisfactory
adherence to an IMF structural reform programme) with the
incentive of attaining a debt write-down to a ‘sustainable’ level of
debt, which was expected to release money for renewed efforts in
social expenditure, especially in primary healthcare and education.
Also in 1999, and matching HIPC debt relief with a new credit
framework, SAPs were replaced by the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP) and its related funding mechanisms within the World
Bank and the IMF (Harrison 2010: 41-42).
It was not until the early 1990s that the neoliberal agenda became
more openly political. Attributing the lack of success in the first
decade of  SAPs to domestic policy issues, in particular corrupt and
inefficient governments in Africa, the World Bank introduced the
concept of ‘good governance’ as a solution to the economic and
political failures of  African states (World Bank 1989, 1992, 1994a).
In 1994, it gave its clearest generic definition of  governance reform
as the promotion of accountability and a more efficient public
administration, the establishment of  the rule of  law and a capable
judiciary, and transparency (World Bank 1994b). The discourse of
good governance emerged at a time when the promotion of liberal
democracy had already become an important element on the
development agenda of  bilateral donors. Accordingly, it has been
argued that there are in fact two governance agendas: an overtly
political agenda of bilateral donors calling for multiparty elections,
and the World Bank’s less political, managerial and administrative
agenda that focuses on efficient and accountable government
procedures (Abrahamsen 2000: 12; Rakner 2003: 21). However
while emphasising different aspects of political liberalisation, a dual
conditionality agenda emerged in the 1990s that was supported and
promoted by multilateral and bilateral donors alike. International
development aid in the 1990s therefore became conditional both
on a set of  macro-economic performance criteria and issues of
governance and democracy. Neoliberalism in Africa has clearly
evolved from a set of economic policies primarily concerned with
macro-economic stability to be part of a far-reaching agenda of
institutional, political and economic reforms aimed at transforming
African states and societies into an ‘ideal’ type that conforms with
neoliberal ideology and doctrine.
4The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
There is a vast literature criticising the neoliberal experience in
Africa on numerous counts (Mkandawire & Olukoshi 1995; Mosley
et al. 1995; Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996; Mkandawire 2005;
Ferguson 2006; Harrison 2010). Several Africanists have provided
substantial evidence that the principal tenets of neoliberal economic
reforms – a reduced role for the state and the dynamics of  the
competitive market – have largely failed to generate socio-economic
recovery and a broader social well-being, especially between 1980
and 2000.1 They point to stalled growth, low investment rates,
increasing volatility in economic performance, growing aid
dependency and a worsening income distribution (Oya 2007). The
severe social impact of economic liberalisation is stressed in
particular, and the reduction in state expenditure on health and
education and the introduction of user fees have exacerbated social
hardship. The social costs of  SAPs were so pervasive that the
various cushioning programmes (‘adjustment with a human face’),
which were reluctantly designed by the Bretton Woods institutions
to mitigate hardship, have failed to make a significant impact on
the continent’s social decline and growing poverty (Olukoshi 2003).
The impact of  neoliberal political reforms has proved
disappointing as well (Abrahamsen 2000; Ferguson 2006; Harrison
2010). The political liberalisation of many African states, which
was taken to mark an optimistic new beginning for the continent,
did, however, change Africa’s political landscape in certain respects.
Between 1990 and 2004, multiparty elections were held in 42 African
countries (Rakner & Svasand 2005: 85) and there was also a wave
of constitutional revisions that enshrined rights of expression and
association. The so-called ‘second wave of change’ or ‘second
liberalisation’ in Africa was underpinned by the establishment of
democratic conditionalities by major bilateral donors. Nevertheless,
it soon became evident that multiparty elections, where they have
occurred, have done little to alter the fundamental dynamics of
authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes in Africa (Chabal & Daloz
1999). For one thing, many African elections have been little more
than elaborately staged ceremonies that authoritarian leaders have
used to ratify their rule. Rakner (2003) convincingly shows that, in
the case of Zambia, the political practices associated with one-
party rule, such as centralisation in the presidential office and
extensive use of state patronage for political gain, were prevailing
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within the formal structures of  liberal democracy and a market
economy. There are several reasons for the relative failure of
neoliberal political reforms in Africa, including the power of
incumbency, the acquisitive nature of  opposition parties and the
lukewarm commitment to democratisation by western states. The
West’s record of  tying aid to democratisation is poor. In cases such
as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Uganda where civic rights and even
party opposition have been denied for extended periods, western
states are happy to smooth over difficult political issues regarding
democracy in order to support regimes that can boast concerted
attempts at neoliberal reform.
Some Africanists are even critical of attempts to introduce
neoliberal political reforms in Africa. Nyamnjoh (2005a), for
instance, argues that the western-derived institutional framework
for multiparty democracy overlooks the social reality of African
citizens’ multiple identities and their cultural orientation to
communal values. In the aftermath of  political liberalisation, there
has in fact been a resurgence of identity politics and overt tensions
over belonging as ethnic and regional groups seek equity, better
representation and greater access to national resources and
opportunities (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000). Curiously, these
developments are seen by neoliberal protagonists as one of the major
factors responsible for the limited progress of  liberal democracy.
One has to be extremely careful, however, when generalising
about the impact of neoliberalism in Africa. There has been
substantial diversity in the degrees of  intensity, sequencing and
manifestation of the neoliberal experiment on the continent. I myself
have carried out extensive research in two African countries, Ghana
and Cameroon, which are good examples of  this diversity.
Ghana has earned the reputation among western donors of being
one of the relative success stories in Africa regarding economic
and political liberalisation. Several authors (cf. Rothchild 1991;
Nugent 1995; Hutchful 2002; Boafo-Arthur 2007) have highlighted
the spectacular adoption of  a neoliberal economic reform package
in 1983 by the radical populist military regime, the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC), albeit without totally
abandoning its populist rhetoric. Following rigorous execution of
its SAP, there was a relatively peaceful transition from the military
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PNDC regime to the civilian National Democratic Congress (NDC)
in 1992, with Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings being promoted from
PNDC chairman to President of  Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Not only
has the Fourth Republic outlasted earlier democratic interludes, it
has even spawned the institutionalisation of  some of  the rules and
procedures of the democratic game that are manifest, among others,
in a significant degree of  autonomy for the press and the judiciary,
and the resurgence of  civil society. In sharp contrast to Ghana,
Cameroon has gained a reputation of being a disappointing ‘adjuster’
after the government of Paul Biya reluctantly agreed to implement
an SAP in 1988/89. Several authors (cf. van de Walle 1993; Konings
1996a; Gabriel 1999) have argued that the neopatrimonial nature
of  the Cameroonian post-colonial state forms a clear obstacle to
neoliberal economic and political reforms that threaten the ruling
elite’s control of  state resources and rent-seeking activities. As a
result, the process of economic and political liberalisation has been
slow and erratic in Cameroon.
This diversity, which does not contradict the immanent aspects
of  neoliberalism, is the result of  several factors. Firstly, there have
been different economic and political trajectories in the African
post-colony. Secondly, differences have emerged in the neoliberal
policies being implemented in African countries and, thirdly, there
have been different degrees of  contestation of  neoliberal reforms
by the state elite and civil-society groups in Africa.
State and civil society opposition
There is the risk that any discussion of the impact of the global
neoliberal agenda on Africa tends to be deterministic. When there
is mention of  agency, the emphasis is likely to be on external actors,
all the more so because they are viewed as having largely shaped
the continent’s neoliberal transformation. Of  course, this position
is justified to a certain extent. Nowhere else today are neoliberal
agencies like the IMF and the World Bank as influential and
determinant as they are in Africa (Oya 2007; Harrison 2010).
Despite the obvious role of external actors, that of the internal
actors who have actually contributed to the erratic and uneven
expansion of the neoliberal project in Africa should not be
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overlooked. Neoliberal progress has proven to be complex, halting,
contested and contradictory and social groups and organisations
that feel threatened or marginalised by neoliberal reforms have been
inclined to contest them in a variety of ways (Mkandawire &
Olukoshi 1995; van de Walle 2001).
Analysis of  Africa’s political economy underscores the pivotal
oppositional role of two social groups: the state elite and civil-society
groups. Remarkably, these are precisely those that are supposed to
play a significant role in the neoliberal ‘good governance’ agenda,
and are seen by external agencies as vital channels in the
implementation of  neoliberal reforms. Which of  these two groups
has been the dominant obstacle to reform seems to be a continuous
point of debate and the question is unlikely to be resolved because
of  the important variations between African states. Van de Walle
(2001), for instance, claims that few pressures have been placed on
the state in Africa by a weak civil society and that the major
opposition to neoliberal reform has come from the state elite. Bond
(2005), on the contrary, highlights the dominant role of  ‘organised
civil society’ movements in Africa in its struggle against neoliberal
reform on the continent, perhaps influenced by the peculiar South
African experience. What both scholars seem to have ignored is the
spread of mass protest movements in Africa in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the so-called ‘bread’ or ‘IMF’ riots. These often
spontaneous mass demonstrations and strikes highlight the
widespread resistance to economic reform and the growing
discontent with regimes that had given in to the demands of external
agencies. They also became a powerful tool in the democratisation
process, especially when combined with the obvious role that
external agencies were playing in using the carrot of aid flows to
demand multiparty elections from recipient regimes.
Given the neopatrimonial nature of African states (Chabal &
Daloz 1999), the external imposition of  neoliberal reforms has posed
a real challenge to the state elite. On the one hand, there was strong
pressure to comply with the measures imposed, thereby considerably
reducing their ability to nourish their clientelistic networks, which
have been of great significance in bringing about national unity and
political stability as well as obviating the need for coercion. On the
other hand, the state elite  had to fear the wrath of the population
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that was suffering from economic austerity measures. One of  the
immediate threats to these rulers was the possibility that disaffected
clients with networks of their own would tap popular discontent
and defy the regime. Faced with this dilemma, many African rulers
initially sought to evade, postpone or manipulate the reforms being
pushed on them (van de Walle 2001; Rakner 2003; Ferguson 2006).
As the crisis progressed, African leaders have increasingly sought
to instrumentalise the reform process in order to derive political
benefits from it. They have learnt to protect their own interests,
while implementing sufficient reforms to maintain donor support.
Privatisation offers an interesting example of  the state elite’s
initial oppositional role and its subsequent attempts to protect its
interests during the reform process. In the 1980s, privatisation
appeared to have been stalled by a combination of political
opposition and the technical difficulties of arranging the sale of
public enterprises. Governments were particularly worried about
the implications of large retrenchments and the possible purchase
of public enterprises by members of hostile ethnic groups or foreign
business interests. However, privatisation transactions rapidly
increased in a number of  African countries in the 1990s. According
to Bennell (1997: 1789), the period from 1980 to 1987 witnessed
some 227 privatisation transactions, while 657 occurred between
1988 and 1995, and over 300 in 1994-1995 alone. Initial resistance
to privatisation appears to have been overcome partly by the growing
unwillingness of  African rulers to bear the burden of  subsidising
loss-making parastatals, combined with the attraction of revenues
generated by the selling off  of  public assets. An even more important
factor is that transactions seem to have benefited members of the
political class, usually by demanding substantial kickbacks from
potential buyers or by significantly undervaluing assets and selling
them off at fire-sale prices (Mkandawire 1994).
One of the most spectacular recent developments is that African
rulers are increasingly calling upon another external actor, namely
China, to assist them in their attempts at economic recovery and
growth. What is particularly appealing to them is that China seems
to provide an alternative to the painful neoliberal economic and
political reforms espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions and
western states: it offers assistance without any political or economic
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conditionalities, with the exception of recognising the One-China
principle. The impact of  China’s rapidly growing presence in Africa
is still somewhat contradictory as it is affecting countries in different
ways. The question still remains as to whether its direct and indirect
consequences for African economies, states and societies will
provide the foundations for a gradual departure from neoliberalism
and the influence of neoliberal agencies (Alden 2007; Alden et al.
2008; Konings 2007b).
One of the major objectives of the neoliberal agenda is not only
to roll back oppressive and overbearing states but also to liberate
and empower civil society. Neoliberals seem to have reinvented
the notion of  civil society to serve their neoliberal doctrine, seeing
it as the missing link between citizens and the state and the prime
mover in the desired neoliberal economic and political reforms. In
their view, participation by civil-society groups and associations in
the design and implementation of  neoliberal reforms would make
African states more democratic, transparent and accountable, and
ensure ownership, credibility and sustainability of  the reform process
(World Bank 2000; Harbeson et al. 1994; Kasfir 1998). I have
recently criticised such neoliberal views in some detail (Konings
2009b, 2011) and so mention here only those shortcomings that are
relevant to the discussion in this book.
Firstly, neoliberals tend to base their argumentation on western
notions of civil society and have been inclined to define civil society
in terms that are too narrow for the African context and to demand
too much of it. Although there may be differences of opinion as to
the exact definition of  civil society, they usually agree that the core
of civil society consists of modern, largely urban, middle-class
professional associations, organisations of workers, women,
students and churches, and non-governmental organisations with
external links, such as groups advocating human rights and civil
liberties. Such formulations tend to exclude not only unorganised
protests and demands from civil society in Africa (cf. Monga 1995,
1996; Berman 1998; Mbembe 1992, 2001) but also much of
associational life. Obviously, as Abrahamsen (2000: 53) notes, civil
society in Africa and elsewhere is much more heterogeneous,
including ‘a diverse set of traditional, ethnic, professional, class,
local, regional and national interests’. In sharp contrast to neoliberal
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definitions, it is evident that ethno-regional associations may be of
even greater significance in the African context than conventional
civil-society organisations that are based on horizontal bonds and
solidarities. This is due not only to the largely underdeveloped nature
of most African economies, which has delayed the crystallisation
of class differentiation and professional groups, but to an even larger
extent to the power of ethno-regional identity in Africa. While there
is ample evidence that political liberalisation has provided more
space for ethno-regionalism and the politics of belonging, neoliberals
nevertheless continue to exclude ethno-regional groups and
associations from their definition of  civil society, mainly because
they are thought not to function according to neoliberal values, and
to present an obstacle to liberal democracy.
Secondly, neoliberal scholars, like Putnam (1995) and Harbeson
et al. (1994), seem to be convinced that civil society carries enormous
democratic credentials. Two critical remarks are in order here. Given
the importance of ethno-regional identities in Africa, civil-society
organisations are more likely to become agents of ethnic and
parochial interests than of  liberal democracy. Furthermore, although
the relatively few pro-democracy groups may have been instrumental
in pioneering and achieving democratic governance, they have often
been constrained by a host of limitations, particularly fragmentation
and divisions, extreme dependence on donor funding and internal
democratic deficit, even though they are struggling to overcome
these flaws (Hearn 2001; Tar 2009).
Thirdly, neoliberals tend to define civil society strictly in terms
of the autonomy of and confrontation with the state. This
presupposes a sharp division between the constituents of civil society
and the state, and forecloses an examination of the wide range of
relations between state and civil society, varying from confrontation
to cooperation, bargaining and mutual exchange. Several Africanists
have stressed that there is usually no strict dichotomy between the
state and civil society in Africa, but constant interpenetration and
straddling instead. According to Chabal & Daloz (1999: 21-22),
state and society are linked to sustain the vertical, intra-institutional
and neopatrimonial networks that underpin politics in Africa.
Through strategic offers of power, privilege and wealth to the leaders
of the various interest groups, the state is often successful in stifling
civil society.
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Fourthly, neoliberals are convinced that the empowerment of
civil society could constitute an important way of realising neoliberal
reforms. They seem to exclude altogether the fact that such
empowerment could have the opposite effect: civil-society groups
and organisations may contest neoliberal reforms, particularly when
prospects for improvement of their members’ marginalised position
in the short term appear bleak. This study focuses on ethno-regional
associations and movements that are fighting for recognition and
representation of their members’ deeply entrenched feelings of
communal injustices, as well as on the youth and workers and their
organisations, two groups that have been among those most seriously
affected by the economic crisis and economic liberalisation.
Since the newly created opposition parties have mostly failed to
represent the ethno-regional interests of their members effectively
during political liberalisation, ethno-regional associations have in
some cases come to serve as the new intermediaries between the
state and the electorate in Africa (cf. Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998).
Their leaders are usually determined to represent and defend ethno-
regional interests in economic and political reforms, and tend to
strongly oppose any neoliberal reforms that are seen as harmful to
their region. Moreover, they often strive for a larger degree of ethno-
regional autonomy and self-determination. And some even
champion secession.
Youth have emerged as a central concern in African Studies (cf.
Honwana & de Boeck 2005; Abbink & van Kessel 2005) and
scholars are extremely worried about them in the current period of
neoliberal reforms, referring to a ‘lost’ or ‘abandoned’ generation
(Cruise O’Brien 1996). Generally speaking however, young people
in Africa have been inclined to resist marginalisation and have reacted
either collectively by calling for political and economic change or
individually by mapping out new pathways to achieving adulthood,
finding an anchor in a context of  uncertainty. Many participated in
the struggle for democratisation, hoping that the removal of
predatory and authoritarian regimes would alleviate their precarious
existence. When such hopes failed to be realised to a large extent,
they resorted to individual survival strategies, particularly in the
informal sector, varying from those with a long history, such as
petty trade and production, prostitution, crime and smuggling, to
recent imaginative innovations like the use of motorbikes as taxis
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and transnational migration (Fokwang 2003; Jua 2003a; Nyamnjoh
2005b; Konings 2006c). One of the most politically active groups
among the youth has been university students who used to see
themselves as the elite-in-waiting and their countries’ future leaders.
By the 1980s, however, their fortunes had declined on account of
economic liberalisation. Their living and study conditions seriously
deteriorated and they had difficulty finding employment after
graduating. They have been at the forefront of  the struggle for a
democratic transition and they and their organisations have
continued to resist their growing marginalisation.
Workers, too, have suffered hugely during the economic crisis
and structural adjustment, as can be evidenced by the massive
retrenchments, job insecurity, the introduction of  flexible labour
relations and falling real wages in the formal sector, the rising cost
of  living, and the painful withdrawal of  public welfare provisions.
In addition to individual survival strategies, workers have regularly
relied on informal, collective and institutional modes of  resistance
against their increasing exploitation and subordination in the labour
process (Konings 2011). Although there has been a large variation
in trade-union performance in Africa (cf. Konings 2000; Rakner
2001; Beckman & Sachikonye 2001), Africanists tend to be
pessimistic about the unions’ representation of their members’
interests during the neoliberal economic and political reforms. Some
specialists in the field question this widespread pessimism by
referring to the role of African trade unions in the democratic
transition. Kraus (2007) has convincingly shown that trade unions
in several African countries were important in launching, sustaining
and sometimes even shaping processes of democratisation.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the role of African trade
unions has become more problematic since the democratic transition
when newly elected ‘democratic’ governments continued to
implement harsh neoliberal reforms. Zambia is a remarkable example
of the decline in union influence under a democratic regime that
came to power thanks to mass mobilisation by the unions, and was
even led by a former union leader (Rakner 2001, 2003).
Despite the transition to democracy, trade unions are likely to
continue operating in a hostile political environment. The logic of
structural adjustment is constraining their ability to defend their
13
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members’ rights, especially with mass retrenchments of labour in both
the public and private sectors that are leading to a substantial decline
in union membership and revenues. With government abolition of
legislative provisions concerning job security and participatory and
guaranteed collective bargaining rights and its outright oppression of
any opposition to union actions, trade unions have been finding
themselves with their backs to the wall (Thomas 1995). There is
little they can do for their members in these circumstances. As a
result, trade unions are facing a deep crisis of  identity, having not
yet devised any new strategies to deal with these dramatic changes.
Members are losing faith in their leadership and are seeking new
ways of  defending their interests either individually or collectively.
Organisation of the book
This book focuses on the neoliberal experiment in Cameroon. The
country offers an interesting case study as the design and
implementation of its neoliberal project has been influenced by the
nation’s complex historical socio-economic and political trajectories
(Bayart 1979; Mbuagbaw et al. 1987; Ngoh 1996; Takougang &
Krieger 1998).
Cameroon is one of  Africa’s most diverse countries with over 250
different ethnic identities, which has led to animated intra- and inter-
group relations. In addition, it has one of  the most complex colonial
histories in Africa, having been colonised and/or administered by
three European powers, namely Germany, France and Britain. There
is general agreement that the roots of what came to be called the
‘Anglophone problem’ in Cameroon can be traced back to the
partitioning of  the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate into
French and British mandates and trust territories after the First World
War. Separate colonial state formation and the development of
territorial differences in languages and cultural legacies laid the spatial
and historical foundations for the construction of  Anglophone and
Francophone identities (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
Following independence and reunification in 1961, the
predominant task of  the post-colonial regime was to construct a
nation-state and develop the country. Cameroon has proved to be
one of the few post-colonial states whose leaders have never been
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disposed by the military or civilian groups. Its leadership has instead
demonstrated long-term stability with only two presidents –
Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961-1982) and Paul Biya (1982 to the present)
– having held power. Ironically, what seems to be perhaps the
country’s greatest asset, namely stable leadership, has been to the
detriment of citizens’ public expression and participation. Cameroon
soon became a one-party state, and civil-society organisations were
either suppressed or subordinated to the state.
Cameroon’s post-colonial governments have been characterised
by authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism, and these characteristics
have remained major obstacles to neoliberal reform. Ahidjo’s
neopatrimonial policies led to a unique system of ‘ethnic balancing’
(Nkwi & Nyamnjoh 1997) in the sense that they succeeded in co-
opting the various ethnic fractions of the Cameroonian elite into
the regime. However, the political stability of these neopatrimonial
policies was negatively affected when Ahidjo’s successor, Paul Biya,
began to undermine his predecessor’s ‘ethnic balance’ policies by
favouring members of  his own ethnic group, the Beti, in political
and economic positions of  power and politicising ethnic identities.
Cameroon’s political leaders have, however, had to accept that
some of  the country’s historical legacies have contributed to its
spectacular failure in national integration. There is a widespread
feeling in Anglophone Cameroon that reunification with
Francophone Cameroon in 1961 led to a growing marginalisation
of the Anglophone minority in the post-colonial nation-state project,
which has been controlled by the Francophone political elite and
endangers Anglophone cultural heritage and identity. This has
fuelled Anglophone protests and an increasing number of the
Anglophone elite have started calling for the return to a federal
state, or even outright secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
Cameroon’s political leaders chose a variant of  statism, which
was initially called ‘planned liberalism’ (Ahidjo) and then ‘communal
liberalism’ (Biya), as the country’s development model. The state
was assigned the leading role in strategic sectors of the economy
while encouraging the development of a strong, mainly foreign-
controlled private sector. In the absence of  sufficient foreign
investment, the state, through the Société Nationale d’Investissement
(SNI), became the sole operator in much of the import-substituting
industrial sector.
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This development model, together with the country’s impressive
development potential due to its wealth of natural resources,
particularly oil, a diversified production base and well-developed,
albeit neglected, infrastructure and a favourable external
environment, made Cameroon one of the few ‘economic successes’
in Africa until the mid-1980s, with an average real growth rate of 7
per cent annually.
Despite this success, Cameroon was essentially no different from
other African countries. Its dependence on primary commodities,
especially oil, left the country vulnerable to external shocks (Hugon
1968). Moreover, the dirigiste approach to economic development,
which entailed state participation in key sectors of  the economy,
allowed Cameroonian governments to use public enterprises as
instruments of  patronage, which contributed to inefficient
management, substantial financial losses and neglect of the private
sector (Fonge 2004). The worldwide recession in the early 1980s,
combined with a sharp drop in commodity prices on the world market,
sent Cameroon’s economy into a downward spiral and eventually
forced the government to call on the Bretton Woods institutions in
1988/89 for assistance and the implementation of  a SAP.
This volume consists of eleven essays that are based on articles
I have written over the last two decades. All of  them deal in one
way or another with the impact the neoliberal agenda has had on
Cameroon and the various forms of  resistance there were against
the neoliberal experiment by the state elite and the above-mentioned
civil-society groups and associations.
Chapter 2 offers evidence that the Cameroonian state elite has
tried to contest the neoliberal economic and political reforms
imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions and western donors,
which they perceive as a direct threat to the authoritarian and
neopatrimonial foundations of the post-colonial state. The most
important reasons for their relative success in this endeavour have
been the regime’s proficiency in the game of  what van de Walle
(2001) rightly came to call ‘partial reform’ and the apparently
ambivalent and inconsistent attitude of external neoliberal agencies
towards the regime, due in large part to the fact that they had become
heavily dependent on the state elite for the implementation of their
neoliberal policies. Consequently, there would seem to be more
16
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
continuity than change and the political practices associated with
one-party rule, such as the centralisation of  power in the presidential
office and the extensive use of state patronage for political gain,
continued to prevail within the formal structures of  liberal
democracy and the market economy.
Chapter 3 assesses the role of the Social Democratic Front
(SDF), one of the largest and once most popular opposition parties
in Africa, in Cameroon’s democratic transition. Several explanations
are offered as to why the SDF has failed to seize power and effect
social-democratic change and why, even though it is based in
Bamenda the capital of  the North West Province of  Anglophone
Cameroon, it displays a lack of consensus on the Anglophone
problem. The regime’s repressive and divisive tactics, the Bretton
Woods institutions’ lack of  recognition of  the SDF out of  fear that
support for this initially militant party would upset cooperation with
the ruling regime that was vital for the implementation of  neoliberal
reforms, the party leadership’s deep divisions on future lines of
action and strategy, and its growing involvement in prebendal politics
are all discussed.
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of two key policy prescriptions
of  the neoliberal reform package, namely privatisation and global
open markets, on relations between the Cameroonian state and
private capital accumulation. It demonstrates that these relations
have become marked by both change and continuity. On the one
hand, privatisation and global open markets have enhanced the scope
of the private sector, producing a desirable change in the balance
of  power between the state and the private sector. The privatisation
of  former state-owned enterprises has strengthened the role of
foreign private capital in the most strategic sectors of the national
economy, allegedly resulting in a recolonisation of  the country. Global
open markets have given rise to the emergence of transnational
criminal networks as an avenue to rapid private capital accumulation,
particularly among Cameroon’s marginalised youth. On the other
hand, privatisation and global open markets seem not to have
altogether foreclosed the regime’s neopatrimonial logic, despite
international pressures for good governance. Well-known
neopatrimonial practices such as patronage, lack of transparency
and accountability, and a variety of  rent-seeking activities continue
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to influence the privatisation process. And, last but not least,
Cameroonian state officials have often protected new, young criminal
entrepreneurs for personal gains and have even tried to co-opt them
into the ruling regime.
Chapter 5 examines the historical process leading to the
emergence of secessionist movements in Anglophone Cameroon
in the current liberalisation process. In sharp contrast with most
other secessionist movements in Africa, the Anglophone leadership
has been trying to achieve an independent Anglophone state through
peaceful negotiation with the Francophone-dominated state rather
than by using force. Indisputably, the Anglophone movements have
booked certain successes in their struggle for international
recognition and in their regional awareness and mobilisation
campaigns. Nevertheless, the prospects of  them achieving their
ultimate aim, namely the creation of an independent state, remain
bleak because international organisations are usually opposed to
any secessionist claims, the Cameroonian government has
persistently refused to enter into any negotiations and is instead
engaged in divisive and repressive tactics, the Anglophone leadership
is split into factions, and the Anglophone community itself is
characterised by ethno-regional divisions and differences of opinion
about policies and strategies for redressing the Anglophone problem
and the nature of a future Anglophone state.
Chapter 6 explores the link between privatisation, good
governance and identity conflicts. Clearly, the external neoliberal
agencies tend to see privatisation as one of the cornerstones of
their good-governance agenda because it tries to free state enterprises
from politics, in particular from the post-colonial state’s
neopatrimonial logic that is largely responsible for their poor
performance, to introduce transparency, accountability and the rule
of law in policy-making and implementation as a precondition for
the efficient operation of market forces, and to encourage private-
sector development. However, privatisation can also trigger identity
(ethno-regional) conflict. Several ethno-regional organisations in
Anglophone Cameroon have vehemently opposed the privatisation
of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), a huge agro-
industrial parastatal that is of major importance to regional
development. They consider its privatisation a renewed onslaught
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by the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state on the cultural
and economic heritage of  Anglophones.
Chapter 7 analyses one of the most protracted border disputes
in Africa: the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over
sovereignty of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. The eventually
peaceful settlement of this conflict was hailed by the international
community as proof that African states have become more inclined
to rely on the rule of  law than on armed struggle to solve potentially
explosive interstate boundary disputes. This chapter criticises this
position in two respects. First, it provides ample evidence that the
2002 International Court of  Justice (ICJ) ruling in favour of
Cameroon faced serious implementation difficulties and that other
mechanisms of conflict resolution were needed to arrive at a peaceful
settlement between the two states. Second, it clearly shows that
the 2002 ICJ verdict overlooked the stakes of other parties in the
dispute. Two stakeholders, namely the Nigerian population and the
Anglophone Cameroon secessionist movements, both claim
ownership of the peninsula and thus create a persistent threat to
sustainable peace in the area.
Chapter 8 discusses the impact of the growing Chinese presence
in Africa in general, and in Cameroon in particular, in the era of
neoliberal globalisation. Subsequently, it evaluates the ambivalent
response of  various African stakeholders to China’s new engagement
with the continent. On the one hand, the state elite has come to
believe that China is offering Africa an attractive alternative to harsh
neoliberal reforms, namely a straightforward business relationship
between equals based on mutual interest and non-interference in
the internal affairs of  its allies. On the other hand, there are rising
concerns among certain civil-society groups and organisations,
notably business groups, labour unions and civic associations,
concerning the apparently less positive aspects of  China’s presence
in Africa.
Chapter 9 documents the protracted student strikes at the
University of  Yaoundé between 1990 and 1996. Political
liberalisation provided space for students to organise and voice their
multiple grievances about the poor living and study conditions on
campus during the economic crisis and economic liberalisation,
which blocked their pursuit of  upward mobility. The unprecedented
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degree of violence that accompanied these strikes could be attributed
not only to the persistent refusal of the university authorities and
the regime to enter into any meaningful form of  dialogue with the
students, but also to the internal divisions among the students along
party and ethno-regional lines. The major lines of  division were
between two groups: the ‘stranger’ students organised in the
Students’ Parliament who were closely allied to the radical
opposition, and the ‘autochthonous’ Beti students organised in the
Committee for Self-Defence and the Beti militia that had close
relations with the regime in power. In their fight with Parliament,
the latter groups resorted to violent forms of  ethnic exclusion to
re-establish control over what they considered their university and
to keep their regime in power.
Chapter 10 focuses on the youth of New Bell, one of the largest
yet poorest immigrant quarters in Douala, the economic capital of
Cameroon. They have devised two innovative activities to cope
with the economic crisis and economic liberalisation: one, known
as ‘bendskin’, is the use of motorbikes as taxis; the other, pousse-
pousse, is the use of handcarts to transport merchandise. These
activities not only secure a sustainable livelihood and feelings of
self-esteem but also make a significant contribution to solving the
neighbourhood’s transportation problems. Bendskin drivers and
pousseurs (handcart operators) are usually organised in small groups
along ethnic and friendship lines, and form a social and spatial
‘neighbourhood’ within New Bell. Nevertheless, they have proved
themselves capable of transcending group boundaries and will rally
round when outsiders, such as other road users and even the police,
threaten their colleagues or common interests.
Chapter 11 shows that the neoliberal economic and political
reforms appear to have weakened rather than strengthened the
political power and bargaining strength of organised labour in
Cameroon after many years of subordination to the state. The
Cameroonian trade-union movement is in deep crisis due to
continuing state intervention in unions and divisions within and
between unions that are leading to growing fragmentation, weakened
collective bargaining strength and a dramatic decline in union
membership and revenue. Given this situation, trade-union leaders
need to devise innovative strategies to revitalise trade unionism in
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Cameroon, cut existing links with the authoritarian, neopatrimonial
state, organise the unorganised, cement alliances with other civil-
society organisations, and strengthen existing contacts with
international labour organisations.
Finally, Chapter 12 deals with the profound changes in the
position of workers and trade unions during the economic crisis
and economic liberalisation on the Ndu Tea Estate, which was
established in the North West Province of  Anglophone Cameroon
at the end of  the British Trusteeship era. Local male peasants, who
were excluded from inheriting family property, used to have a high
stake in plantation labour, perceiving it as an avenue to accumulating
wealth and gaining status in the local community. They identified
strongly with the local trade union, relying on it to protect their
interests. The severe economic crisis and the subsequent SAP in
the late 1980s led to a dramatic deterioration in workers’ conditions
of  service, and they rapidly lost whatever confidence they still had
in their union leadership, accusing it of  collaborating with the
management in the planning and implementation of a series of anti-
labour measures. As a result, they now tend to bypass the union
and defend their own interests by engaging in informal, collective
modes of resistance.
Notes
  1. Of late, some Africanists have drawn more optimistic conclusions on
the basis of socio-economic developments in Africa. Dietz (2011), for
instance, points to the current high growth rates in some African
countries, like Angola and Nigeria, that are characterised by rich natural
resources, particularly oil. See also Ellis (2011).
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The introduction of neoliberal economic
and political reforms in the Cameroonian
post-colonial state
Introduction
For a long time Cameroon was lauded by many observers, including
World Bank staff, as one of  the most prosperous and most stable
countries in post-colonial Africa. Following the unprecedented
economic and political crisis in the 1980s, this rosy assessment has
been replaced by gloom. After some initial hesitation, the
Cameroonian government could not escape during the deteriorating
economic situation from calling upon the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank for the implementation of  a structural
adjustment programme (SAP). It was soon required to conform to
the new standards of  these financial institutions, linking structural
adjustment to democratisation. So, in addition to the economic
conditionality that plagued African states during much of the 1980s,
it was also obliged to accept ‘political conditionality’.
The IMF and World Bank are, in fact, the spearheads of  the
neoliberal project that has become the hegemonic ideological project
of our time following the collapse of the socialist-oriented states in
Eastern Europe. The major tenets of neoliberalism are: (a) the belief
that rolling the state back and liberalising the economy will induce
economic development, and (b) the belief that there is an intrinsic
connection between capitalism and democracy. Democracy is
thought to enhance the prospects for economic development, while
economic liberalisation is thought to enhance the prospects for
democracy (Beckman 1993: 20-33; Jeffries 1993: 20-35; Mkandawire
1994: 155-173). Several World Bank reports have been signaling a
major shift in the Western donors’ perspectives, from a preference
for technocratic-authoritarian regimes to an endorsement of
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democratic government. Democracy is said to be capable of
legitimising the imperatives of adjustment. It can also improve
governance and state capacity to implement the austere adjustment
measures. These reports, however, equally stress that sustainable
democracy cannot be achieved without the empowerment of  civil
society.
Like elsewhere in the world, the SAP imposed upon Cameroon
by the IMF and the World Bank has involved the application of  a
standard package of  measures to stabilise the domestic economy,
to minimalise state intervention in the economy, and to give the
market a freer hand in the allocation of  resources. These measures
include reduction of public expenditure, removal of public subsidies,
dismantlement of public sector, privatisation and promotion of
private enterprise (both national and foreign), trade liberalisation,
producer prices reforms, devaluation, restructuring of  state
institutions, and legal reforms aimed at supplying an enabling
environment. It is beyond dispute that the SAP has yielded some
results in Cameroon: the labour and investment codes have been
liberalised, several price controls have been abolished, many import
and export duties have been reduced, the commercialisation of
export crops has been liberalised by withdrawing the bying monopoly
of the cooperatives, restricting the activities of the National
Produce Marketing Board to quality control, and allying local to
world market prices, and, in 1994, the Communauté Financière Africaine
(CFA) franc has been drastically devalued. What is most striking in
the Cameroonian situation, however, is that most of these results
in economic liberalisation have been accomplished after initial
government opposition.
There is, in fact, ample evidence to demonstrate that the
Cameroonian government has constantly attempted to undermine
the economic and political reforms advocated by the western donors
and international financial institutions. As a result, the process of
economic liberalisation has been slow and inconsistent. The
necessary institutional reform in the public and parastatal sectors,
for example, has been largely thwarted by government delaying
tactics and half-hearted implementation. This is particularly grave
as the reform of  these sectors marked by excessive costs and
inefficiencies has been a cornerstone of  the SAP. Political
23
Chapter 2: The introduction of neoliberal economic and political reforms in Cameroon
liberalisation has hardly gone beyond the introduction of a multiparty
system and a larger measure of  press freedom. The government’s
weak commitment and limited implementation has led to protracted
conflicts with the western donors and international financial
institutions, sometimes followed by suspension of financial aid.
It will be argued in this chapter that the government’s persistent
opposition to the neoliberal economic and political reforms can be
explained by the class character of the Cameroonian post-colonial
state. In his seminal book on Cameroonian politics, Bayart (1979)
has claimed that the first President of  Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
was instrumental in creating a highly centralised, authoritarian and
neopatrimonial state and in shaping a hegemonic alliance out of
the various elite groups in society which were given access to state
resources and rent seeking activities so as to cement their loyalty to
him. This hegemonic alliance has a vested interest in the status quo
and is inclined to resist any economic and political liberalisation
measures which threaten its control over state resources and rent-
seeking activities. Apparently, its resistance has been successful:
none of  the reforms implemented so far seems to have struck at
the roots of the authoritarian and neopatrimonial state as yet.
It will be shown in this chapter that one of the reasons for this
success has been the regime’s proficiency in the game of  token
implementation of  economic and political reforms. Another is its
proven ability to play donors off against one another so that
conditionality has remained largely illusory. This was facilitated by
the fact that the major western donors and international financial
institutions have continuously displayed a rather ambivalent and
inconsistent attitude towards the regime. While they have
sometimes blamed and ‘punished’ the regime for its lack of
implementation of  economic and political reforms, they have
nevertheless continued to side with the regime against the opposition
and to provide it with financial aid, for mainly economic and political
reasons. The IMF and World Bank have never accepted the
opposition parties in Cameroon as equal discussion parties, as they
feared that any recognition of the opposition might have a negative
impact on its established cooperation with the ruling regime needed
for the implementation of  the SAP. Moreover, the opposition’s initial
boycott of  the economy, its fragmentation and its apparent
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incapacity to present a clear alternative to the ruling regime
contributed to their decision to negotiate with the ruling regime
exclusively. Given its enormous economic interests in its previous
trusteeship territory, it is not surprising that France has been even
less inclined than other western donor countries to insist on the
strict implementation of the neoliberal project.
The nature of the post-colonial state in Cameroon
From the very start, the Federal State of  Cameroon which came
into being in 1961 following the achievement of independence and
reunification of  the previous French and British trusteeship
territories, faced enormous problems (Le Vine 1964, 1971; Johnson
1970; Bayart 1979). There was the problem of underdevelopment
and dependency. The economy was largely dependent on the export
of a few agricultural products – in order of value: cocoa, coffee,
bananas and palm oil. The tiny industrial sector, dominated by
French capital, was mainly involved in the transformation of
agricultural produce for export (Hugon 1968). France’s predominant
role in the national economy was clearly indicated by import-export
statistics. In 1961 it accounted for 59 per cent of  Cameroonian
exports and 55 per cent of  its imports. Membership in the CFA
Franc Zone tied Cameroon monetarily to France; moreover, while
it had the advantage of promoting economic stability and allowing
an open trade regime, it established a tendency towards
overvaluation of  the currency and encouraged the development of
imported consumer tastes (Vallée 1989). Through the various
agreements of cooperation signed by France and Cameroon before
independence, France remained in a position to influence
Cameroon’s domestic and foreign policy strongly.
There was the problem of ethnic fragmentation and regional
divisions exacerbated by a colonial history that had split the country
into English-speaking and French-speaking groups. And, last but
not least, a civil war was going on at the time of independence and
reunification, particularly in the Bassa and Bamileke areas. This
bloody and destructive battle was the direct consequence of  the
determined efforts of  the Cameroonian government and the French
to suppress the radical nationalist party, the Union des Populations du
Cameroun (UPC) (Joseph 1977).
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The challenge of solving these problems devolved on Ahmadou
Ahidjo, the first President of  the federal state. He was a Muslim
and a Fulbe, the dominant ethnic group in Northern Cameroon
(Azarya 1978). Initially, he was considered by many to be a mere
puppet of  the French and an intermediary figure at most. Indeed,
he owned his ascendancy to power to a large extent to the French
and he enjoyed hardly any support in the southern part of the country
which had been more subject to colonial capitalism, education and
Christianity than the north (Bayart 1979). Soon, however, Ahidjo
displayed an unexpected political craftsmanship which enabled him
to strengthen his originally weak position and eventually to construct
a system of  personal rule. Centralisation, nation-building and
repression were his major strategies to concentrate political and
economic power in his office and person (DeLancey 1989).
The first strategy, centralisation, had numerous aspects. There
was the concentration and administrative decision-making in the
capital, Yaoundé, and the use of  the Constitution to funnel authority
to the President. There was the formation of  a single party, the
Cameroon National Union (CNU), which was completed in 1966
after a two-step process of forging a single party in the Francophone
area and then merging this with the remaining parties of the
Anglophone area. As Bayart (1979) has shown, the party was firmly
subordinated to the state, an arm of  the government and particularly
of the President: ‘it is the party that emanates from the person of
Mr Ahidjo, not the other way round’. There was also the dissolution
of  the federation in 1972 to form a unitary system of  government.
Centralisation was enhanced by the elimination of autonomous
forms of  organisation. Previously independent organisations became
subordinated to the political party through the party’s women’s,
youth and labour wings or through domination by or incorporation
into government agencies (as had occurred with the Anglophone
cooperative movement). Related to this were policies to destroy
any limited autonomy enjoyed either by local governments (more a
reality in Anglophone Cameroon) or by traditional governments.
The second strategy was coalition-building. In his study of  the
Cameroonian post-colonial state, Bayart (1979) highlights Ahidjo’s
pursuit of building a ‘hegemonic alliance’ out of different elite
groups on the national and regional levels. This hegemonic alliance
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comprised not only of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen but
equally the traditional elite, the chiefs. From this heterogeneous
coalition, a new dominant class was slowly emerging around the
state. Ngayap (1983) asserted that the ruling class in Cameroon
consisted of  approximately 1,000 people. But if  Bayart’s contention
that the traditional elite has also been co-opted into this alliance is
valid, I would submit that this number is rather conservative. This
hegemonic alliance was pulled together by several means, including
the development of an extensive patron-client system. Clients were
supposed to owe total allegiance to Ahidjo. Attempts by any of
them to build a power base of  their own were construed as betrayal
that sanctioned removal from office. Ahidjo selected his clients on
the basis of ethnic arithmetic or ethnic balancing (Nkwi & Nyamnjoh
1997). He was conscious that representation in the cabinet, national
assembly, and so on, would reflect the various ethnic groups in
society. As a matter of  fact, the government’s hand-picked elite or
barons served as transmission belts between the President and the
ethnic groups. Thus every important ethnic group felt represented
within the regime and thus able to exercise some influence on
government policy (Jua 1991: 162-170; van de Walle 1990).
Loyal followers in the ethno-client network were rewarded by
appointments and nominations to state offices, access to state
resources, and rent-seeking opportunities. Beyond the numerous
appointments Ahidjo could make to the cabinet and elsewhere in
the system, he had a variety of other techniques to allow individuals
to profit, even though they might not receive a lucrative
appointment. For some associates of  the President there were special
loans from the banks, loans without interest or any expectation of
repayment. Overall, the existence of  smuggling and corruption
provided a major avenue for the President to allow supporters to
receive rewards. Special efforts were also made to appease and
maintain support among the civil servants or bureaucrats. They
received excellent pay compared to the average income of the
Cameroonian citizens, as well as numerous perks such as free
housing. Despite these advantages, they were allowed to convert
their posts into monopoly rent-seeking opportunities. They
considered the state to be a resource base, from where they could
explore various pathways of capital accumulation (Geschiere &
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Konings 1993). The expansion of the state, particularly into the
economic arena, was promoted to manipulate and sustain the
alliance. It would be wrong to argue that rent-seeking and patronage
were the only reasons the state promoted state expansion after
independence and reunification. Extensive public ownership
conformed to prevailing development doctrines, was warmly
supported by the donors, and responded to real development needs.
Still, the scope that state ownership was to achieve (by 1988/89,
when the SAP commenced, the state had more than 200 parastatals
in its portfolio) was helped by the fact that it afforded leaders like
Ahidjo positions of prestige and power to distribute. In the context
of the neopatrimonial state, these parastatals were converted into
prebends for Directors-General or to serve other exclusive interests
of the hegemonic class (Joseph 1978). Given this penchant of the
parastatals to promote political rather than economic goals, it is
not astonishing at all that, for the most part, they performed
inefficiently. Their dependence upon the state for subsidies became
a permanent rather than transient feature. This furthered ischemia
at the state treasury; by 1988, annual parastatal subsidies amounted
to about FCFA 150 billion (van de Walle 1990; Konings 1993a).
While Ahidjo constantly emphasised the need for ethnic balance
and national unity, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence that
two ethnic elite groups enjoyed a privileged position in opportunities
for capital accumulation. There were, first of all, the Muslim Fulbe
elite, especially those originating from Garoua, the home town of
Ahidjo, the so-called ‘Garoua barons’. And second, the Bamileke
elite, renowned in Cameroon for their ‘spirit of  capitalism’ (Warnier
1993). The Bamileke territory was until about 1970 one of the most
important areas of UPC resistance against the regime. It is widely
believed in Cameroon that Ahidjo was ready to grant the Bamileke
elite ample room for capital accumulation on condition that they
would not meddle in politics. Ultimately, in spite of  the variety of
incentives for cooperation and agreement used by Ahidjo, the
stability of the regime was based on the widespread use of repression
and the suppression of  human rights.
Ahidjo did not only succeed in gradually and imperceptively
stabilising his regime, he was even able to achieve a certain degree
of autonomy from the French. Over the years, Ahidjo has developed
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relations with trading partners other than France. In 1985, France
accounted for only 35 per cent of Cameroonian exports and 44 per
cent of  its imports. The regime’s apparent political stability, its lack
of ideological posturing and its liberal investment code appealed to
the western donors and business milieus. With an annual growth
rate of some 7 per cent from 1970 to 1985, the Cameroonian
economy was long considered one of the success stories in Sub-
Saharan Africa. While not without foundation, this view of the
country’s economy has proved to be excessively optimistic as it
failed to take note of  several disturbing trends by the end of  Ahidjo’s
tenure. Much of  the country’s success was based on its rich resource
base, yet the agricultural sector was stagnating: the growth registered
was due mostly to increased acreage under cultivation brought about
by expensive government and donor programmes, and it disguised
the absence of sustained productivity growth. Moreover,
infrastructural problems were daunting. The most disturbing trend,
however, was the rapid growth of a costly and ineffectual public
sector, though quite understandable from political efficiency
considerations. Cameroon’s seemingly impressive growth rate until
1986 was inflated by the discovery of  oil in 1977. Strikingly, oil
output and oil revenues have remained a state secret under Ahidjo’s
administration. Apparently, the bulk of  oil revenues has been placed
in foreign banks as extra-ordinary accounts. The official justification
given by Ahidjo for this strategy was the elimination of  the boom
mentality that had crippled agricultural production in other African
countries following the discovery of  oil. Nevertheless, in conformity
with the regime’s neopatrimonial logic, the primary function of  these
extra-ordinary accounts soon became to cover parastatal deficits
(van de Walle 1990; Jua 1991: 162-70).
Ahidjo stunned the Cameroonian population on 4 November
1982 by announcing that he was resigning as President of the country
and turning his office over to his constitutionally designated
successor, the Prime Minister, Paul Biya; the transfer to take effect
on 6 November 1982. Unlike Ahidjo, Biya was a Christian from the
southern part of Francophone Cameroon. He belonged to an ethnic
group which is loosely classified as Beti. Although there were
promising signs of change at the start of the Biya regime, it soon
turned out that in all essential respects Ahidjo’s system was
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continued under Biya’s leadership. Soon after his assumption of
power, Biya promised a New Deal. He spoke of a certain
liberalisation of the political system, an internal democratisation
of  the single party, and the need of  ‘rigour, integrity and
moralisation’, thus challenging the autocratic and neopatrimonial
state (Takougang 1993: 91-101). At first, many Cameroonians were
skeptical. Biya was a product of  his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
and owed his political fortunes to him. Moreover, although Ahidjo
resigned as the Head of State, he still retained the powerful position
of  chairman of  the only party in the country, the CNU. Despite the
initial skepticism, Biya’s many speeches following his accession to
power helped to convince many Cameroonians that he was serious
about instituting change. This conviction was strengthened by a
certain relaxation of police state controls in 1983.
Whether the concept of New Deal was simple a public relations
ploy to extricate himself  from Ahidjo’s shadow, as some now argue,
or whether it was a genuine attempt to forge a new direction for the
country, the implementation of  economic and political reforms
would be extremely difficult within the existing political system.
Ahidjo had spent more than two decades as Head of State and,
during that tenure, had filled most of the top party and government
positions with loyalists or people who believed in his political
philosophy. Many in the government and the business community,
especially the Muslim Fulbe, were not only unwilling to accept the
fact that Ahidjo had handed over power to a southern Christian,
but also perceived Biya’s call for rigour, integrity and moralisation
as an effort to deprive them of the rights and privileges they had
long enjoyed under Ahidjo’s administration. Adding to the difficult
situation Biya faced, was the fact that the former President continued
to play a highly visible role in national politics until 1983-84, when
he was accused of being involved in an assassination attempt on
Biya (Bandolo 1985).
Therefore, in order to implement his New Deal programme, Biya
had to replace these men with people who were loyal to him and
committed to reform. However, it soon became apparent that he
was either unwilling or simply lacked the resolute, tough and
uncompromising leadership of  his predecessor to do so. For one
thing, any immediate wholesale replacement of experienced, albeit
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reactionary officials in the upper echelon of the government might
have seriously impeded the smooth running of  the administration.
Moreover, many of the men in these positions were colleagues with
whom Biya had served in government and who, like him, owed their
political fortunes to Ahidjo. Consequently, even though some of  them
did not believe in his New Deal, he did not immediately replace them.
Certain well-known ‘barons’ of Ahidjo were forced to resign, but
within a few years they were back in government positions again,
often as heads of  parastatals. After an attempted coup d’état by the
Republican Guard, which was still composed of Ahidjo loyalists, on
6 April 1984, the police state was reimposed in full, with censorship,
secretive government, and a powerful secret police.
Given that his hold on power had become even more precarious
after this failed coup d’état, Biya was compelled to raise the costs of
maintaining the loose ruling alliance. He needed to please the state
apparatus, notably those parts of  the army which had supported
him during the coup d’état attempt, and he wanted to meet the
heightened expectations of his fellow Beti. A direct consequence
was the acceleration of budgetary and state employment growth.
The Beti elite saw the transfer of power from Ahidjo to Biya simply
as an opportunity to, in Bayart’s words (1989), promote
ethnofascism. By implication, therefore, the fact that the President
hailed from a specific ethnic group, should automatically give his
ethnic fellowmen the right to  monopolise power. Encountering
great difficulties in consolidating his power, Biya started to give in
to these ethnic pressures and to co-opt the Beti elite in the ruling
alliance. The northern and Bamileke businessmen who had enjoyed
a privileged position during Ahidjo’s administration were
increasingly replaced by Beti businessmen, the so-called Beti Maffia.
Out of protest against their discrimination, Bamileke businessmen
withdrew their savings from the banks and transferred them to
informal saving circuits called tontines (Henry et al. 1991). This
contributed to the growing liquidity problems of  the banks. The
Biya regime increased the number of  civil servants from about
80,000 in 1982 to about 180,000 in 1988; the majority of the new
employees being recruited among the Beti. The Beti also increasingly
monopolised the pivotal positions in the government and security
organs. Takougang (1993: 95-96) reports that as of  August 1991,
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thirty-seven of the forty-seven senior prefects (heads of
administrative divisions), three-quarters of the directors and general
managers of  the parastatal corporations in the country, and twenty-
two of the thirty-eight high-ranking bureaucrats who had been
appointed in the newly created office of the Prime Minister, were
from the President’s ethnic group. The new regime’s barons appeared
to be much bolder in staking out claims on the state’s resources
than Ahidjo’s supporters had been. Corruption and rent-seeking had
always been fundamental characteristics of the regime (Joseph 1978;
Médard 1977); after 1984 they increased to the point of becoming
dysfunctional. When this political conjuncture was combined with
a severe exogenous shock, the system started to crumble.
The post-colonial state and structural adjustment
From the mid-1980s the post-colonial state was confronted with a
severe economic crisis (Körner 1988: 77-94; van de Walle 1990).
This crisis posed a severe threat to the economic base of the
neopatrimonial state as well as to the system of prerogatives and
privilege of the hegemonic alliance. A sharp downfall in commodity
prices and the slide in the value of the American dollar against the
CFA franc resulted in a 70 per cent deterioration in the country’s
terms of  trade during the period 1986-1993. The state’s oil revenues,
for example, decreased from US$ 350 million in 1985 to US$ 207
million in 1988. The crisis was aggravated by massive capital flight
estimated at FCFA 150 billion a year which was almost a quarter of
the annual national budget. The free flow of currency between the
CFA Franc Zone and France encouraged the Cameroonian elite to
transfer their capital to French banks which, moreover, supplied
higher interest rates than the Cameroonian banks. As a result of  the
crisis, several government projects proposed or started in the boom
days of the New Deal were either suspended or abandoned because
of  severe financial constraints. The deteriorating economic crisis
also forced many foreign companies that had invested in Cameroon
to leave the country, further exacerbating the employment situation.
The regime also experienced great difficulties in paying cash-crop
farmers. Cocoa and coffee farmers responded by switching from
cash-crop production to food-crop production.
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The government’s initial response to the trade shock of  the mid-
1980s was to rely on external financing in the hope of favourable
commodity prices or exchange rate changes. As a result, external
debt rose from US$ 2.7 billion in 1984 to US$ 4.7 billion in 1989.
The IMF and the World Bank had been negotiating with the
government on and off since mid-1986, without reaching agreement.
At this time, Biya staked the national prestige on refusing the tough
austerity programmes of  those two institutions. Through 1986 and
1987, he insisted that Cameroon would undertake an adjustment
of its own, and seek only non-conditional capital from bilateral
donors and the private banks. He announced a cut of  several
hundred billion CFA in the 1987 fiscal year budget, a hiring freeze,
new taxes on luxury goods and, in late 1987, the creation of a new
anti-crisis ministry, the Ministry for the Stabilisation of  Public Funds.
Notwithstanding Biya’s tough rhetoric, the crisis continued to
worsen, with expenditure overruns of  FCFA 450 billion in 1986-
87 (out of  a total budget of  FCFA 800 billion) and of  FCFA 150
billion in the next fiscal year. Recourse to the international
institutions became inevitable. Agreement was reached with the
IMF on a stabilisation plan in September 1988 and with the World
Bank on a structural adjustment loan in May 1989. The World Bank
and IMF adjustment strategies have contained the conventional
prescriptions of important cuts in public expenditures, increased
state revenues and the compression of consumption, coupled with
the promotion of  selective investments to foster long-term growth.
They have also called for the privatisation, rehabilitation or
elimination of  almost all of  the nation’s parastatals, as well as
thoroughgoing liberalisation (van de Walle 1990).
Given the nature of the Cameroonian post-colonial state and
the vested interests of  the state elites in the status quo, it is not
surprising that the Biya regime’s implementation of  the adjustment
policies tended to be half-hearted and erratic. As van de Walle (1990:
54) perceptively observes, ‘it has attempted to cut off  some fat, to
excise some of its patrimonial tendencies while maintaining its core
logic’. It had little choice but to cut public expenditures, since state
coffers were empty, but personnel expenditures were initially left
untouched. To take one example, only 5 per cent of  the Ministry of
Agriculture’s total budget of  FCFA 39 billion was set aside in the
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1988-1989 budget for non-personnel related expenditures. The
absurdity of this approach from a developmental point of view is
well compensated by the political logic of placating the
administration. Despite his constant exhortations against corruption,
Biya continued to distribute rents so as to regulate and dominate the
different factions of the hegemonic alliance. He also attempted to
delay the reform of  the costly and inefficient public and parastatal
sector, which was the cornerstone of  the World Bank’s adjustment
programme. In May 1987, he appeared to side with the World Bank
when he appointed a National Commission to review the performance
of  the parastatal sector (Tedga 1990), but, subsequently, he took no
action on the Commission’s report. It was only under constant pressure
from the World Bank that he started to restructure the parastatal
sector. In the end, five parastatals were privatised, forty-four were
liquidated, and the remaining 104 were required to sign ‘performance
contracts’ with the government in 1989-90 which aimed at their self-
sufficiency and eventual profitability. These performance contracts
often gave rise to severe cuts in workers’ wages and fringe benefits as
well as mass-lay-offs (Konings 1993a).
Cameroon’s IMF standby agreement programmes, signed in
September 1988 and December 1991, expired without having fully
disbursed authorised funds and without a follow-on programme in
place, due to the Biya government’s failure to comply with
programme conditionality. In September 1992, IMF programming,
World Bank project assistance, and Paris Club debt relief  was
suspended because of  accumulating debt arrears. It was its
continuing friendly ties with France that saved the regime from the
disastrous consequences of  falling into the status of  non-accrual,
which would have destroyed the country’s financial credibility
throughout the world: France was ready to pay Cameroon’s
accumulated debt arrears with the World Bank, amounting to FCFA
60 billion. The important role of  France in Cameroon’s structural
adjustment programme is manifest in its financial aid to Cameroon
during the period 1990-92: this totaled FCFA 181 billion,
representing 36 per cent of all aid.
For a long time, the Biya regime strongly refused to give in to the
World Bank’s demand of  laying off  about 40,000 civil servants and
state agents, the more so as most of them were Beti. It was, however,
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ready to reduce personnel costs. In 1991 it announced further cuts
in the salaries and benefits of  government employees. For instance,
there was a 50 per cent cut in out-of-station and other allowances
that civil servants could receive and a 7 per cent pay cut for most
government workers. It also eliminated free housing, except to very
high-ranking government officials such as ministers, directors and
secretary-generals. The government, however, experienced increasing
difficulties in paying its civil servants. Rather than laying off  a certain
proportion of  the ‘overdeveloped’ civil service, it decided to
implement two draconian salary reductions of respectively 30 per
cent in January 1993 and 50 per cent in November 1993. Remarkably,
in October 1993 France agreed to allocate a loan of  FCFA 15 billion
to Cameroon to help the government in coming to terms with the
salary arrears owed to civil servants.
France and Cameroon used to resist any pressures of the IMF
and the World Bank to agree upon a devaluation of  the currency in
the CFA Franc Zone. In January 1994, however, they consented to
a 50 per cent devaluation of  the CFA franc. In return, the IMF
ratified a standby credit of US$ 114 million to Cameroon on 15
May 1994 so as to support the government’s economic policies for
the next eighteen months. The disbursement of  this loan was made
conditional upon the government’s termination of  the contracts of
20,000 civil servants. The devaluation seems to have had a positive
effect on the production and exports of cash crops, especially cocoa,
coffee, and cotton (Pelzer 1994: 205-215).
In 1990 van de Walle concluded as follows about the politics of
structural adjustment in Cameroon:
The inconsistent pace of  reforms, its recurring breakdowns and
betrayals suggest Biya is manoeuvering to placate the country’s
creditors while gingerly testing the political limits of  the reform
process. Ambiguity is an asset for Biya, as it keeps potential foyers
of  opposition off  guard while cuts are made surreptitiously. Donor
pressure and threats can be used to maintain pressure on recalcitrant
allies. Still, Machiavellian machinations explain only a part of  the
reform’s uneven progress. Some of  the manoeuvering may be little
more than delaying tactics: time may after all solve some of the
problems while a rebound in world commodity prices could defer
the crisis at least temporarily (van de Walle 1990: 70-71).
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This conclusion seems still to be largely valid in 1994. In its
political manoeuvering and delaying tactics the Biya regime has
continued to be supported by France. One of  the reasons for France’s
persistent support seems to be the concentration of organised
opposition in Cameroon around a ‘hard’ Anglophone core. Another
reason seems to be the strong belief in French government circles
that the shadow of  Washington is behind the IMF, the World Bank
and the Cameroonian opposition.
The post-colonial state and democratisation
By 1990 one could observe widespread popular discontent within
Cameroonian urban areas with the regime in power and growing
dissent within the hegemonic alliance. Various internal and external
factors are responsible for this situation. The majority of the
population held the corrupt, authoritarian regime responsible for
the serious economic crisis, resulting in its loss of  legitimacy.
Moreover, straight after his ascendancy to power, Biya had started
to project himself as an advocate of greater political freedom and
democratic reforms. He, however, believed that both should occur,
at least in the short term, under the auspices of  the single party
which had been rebaptised Cameroon People’s Democratic
Movement (CPDM) in 1985. In other words, the party was supposed
to define the extent to which freedom and democracy were going to
be allowed in the country. Nevertheless, his limited political reforms
encouraged the people, waking up after years of submission, to
demand more political freedom and democracy than the Biya regime
was willing to grant. The traditional propaganda, equating a single
party with peace and harmony and a plural system with strife and
discord, fell on increasingly deaf  ears. In addition, with the end of
the Cold War and the move towards democratisation in Eastern
Europe, Cameroonians, like Africans elsewhere on the continent,
looked upon these changes as an added incentive to demand greater
political reforms, including the introduction of  multiparty
democracy. Some of  the elite, particularly those who had become
dissatisfied with the regime because of its promotion of Beti
domination, began to give expression to general discontent and even
tried to organise the urban masses into political parties. They were
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joined by some members of the middle class who had become
increasingly critical of the authoritarian and neopatrimonial state,
such as members of the Cameroon Bar Association, intellectuals
and journalists. Their critical attacks and organisational efforts,
however, met first severe repression on the part of the state which
wanted to keep the democratisation process under control.
On 19 February 1990, ten prominent Cameroonians in Douala
were arrested and charged with organising secret meetings with the
aim of  undermining state authority and forming an alternative party.
The leader of  the group, Yondo Black, a renowned lawyer, received
a three-year sentence from a military tribunal. Before and after his
condemnation there were massive protest demonstrations. Following
this event, the call for democracy and multipartyism became louder
and louder. In reply, the government staged anti-democratisation
marches throughout the national territory in which participants
shouted slogans like ‘No to Precipitate Democratisation’. On 9 April
1990, Biya said calls for a multiparty system were manoeuvres for
diversion, intoxication and destabilisation. In Bamenda, the capital
of  the North West Province in Anglophone Cameroon, a new party,
the so-called Social Democratic Front (SDF), had been founded by
then and, according to its leader, John Fru Ndi, had given details of
its formation to the authorities on 16 March 1990. When no reply
was received, the SDF organised a huge rally at Bamenda on 26 May
1990, at which police opened fire, killing six people (see Chapter 3).
During the following weeks there was a remarkable change in
President Biya’s attitude towards the growing demand for
multipartyism. In a nation-wide address in early June 1990, he
claimed that Cameroonians had nothing to learn from abroad with
regard to democracy. He himself  had initiated perestroika and
glasnost in his country long before Gorbachev did in the Soviet
Union. However, during the CPDM Congress that took place at
Yaoundé a few weeks later, he surrendered to the multiparty system
demand. On that occasion, he declared that the party must be ready
to face competition and added: ‘Consider also that other schools of
thought exist which must be taken into account, fought against or
integrated’ (Derrick 1992: 172).
What happened in those weeks? Even though that was the very
time that Cameroonians were absorbed in the good showing of their
national soccer team during the World Cup competition in Italy,
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and seemed to think of nothing but football, in fact decisive pressure
was brought to bear during these weeks. There was the pastoral
letter from the Catholic bishops at Whitsun, which attributed the
economic and political crisis mainly to the egoism, corruption and
authoritarianism of the state elites, and called for an end to single-
party rule (Konings 2009b). There was the resignation of  John Ngu
Foncha, the former Prime Minister of  Anglophone Cameroon who
had led it into federation in 1961, as an honorary Vice-Chairman
of  the CPDM. Foncha condemned the shooting during the launch
of the SDF in Bamenda and expressed the demand being made by
Anglophone Cameroonians for a return to a federal system. There
was the pressure from the IMF and World Bank as well as from
other international aid organisations. Financial assistance and loans
were suspended, leaving the Cameroonian government with hardly
any alternative but to open up grudgingly to the opposition. There
was also pressure from France, which a regime so close to France
for thirty years could not ignore. At the Sixteenth Summit of France
and African states, held on 20-21 June 1990 at  La Baule in France,
the declaration agreed on by those attending, including Biya, spoke
of ‘the need to associate the relevant population more closely with
the construction of  their political, social and economic future’.
François Mitterand, speaking for himself, went further and said
French aid would be ‘less enthusiastic to regimes which behave in
an authoritarian fashion and fail to accept the move towards
democracy’ (Derrick 1992: 172).
After the surrender in principle, months passed before a new
law was passed by the National Assembly on 5 December 1990,
formally allowing creation of  several parties on certain conditions.
But, in the meantime, there was relaxation in many other ways.
Many demonstrations and meetings were held in the Cameroonian
cities. They expressed the new-found freedom and pent-up feelings
about decades without freedom. Similarly, a free press blossomed,
until after a few months, there were about sixty newspapers in
circulation, including about fifteen dailies. The government did not
take all this unrestrained freedom and met it with repression, but
fitful repression that failed to check it. So as soon as new parties
were formed, hundreds of  thousands of  people were waiting to
rush to join them.
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In the first months of 1991 new parties received their registration.
The major new parties were:
• The Social Democratic Front. This was originally largely
an Anglophone party, but it was capable of  gradually
extending its membership to the Francophone area, notably
to the neighbouring Francophone provinces. For example,
it enjoyed great support among the Bamileke in the West
Province, an ethnic group that was closely related to the
people in the Bamenda area, the cradle of  the SDF. The
party’s chairman was John Fru Ndi, a bookseller by
profession, who had failed to win a seat in the National
Assembly on a CPDM ticket during the 1988 elections.
He soon achieved an immense popularity among the urban
masses because of his great courage and populist style of
leadership.
• The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). This
radical pre-independence party which had been suppressed
by the French and Ahidjo government, was refounded and
was capable of rewinning strong support in its original areas
of operation, Douala, the economic capital, and the
Bamileke-Bassa regions. Its leadership consisted partly of
ex-CPDM leaders and partly of old UPC leaders who had
returned from exile. The party was soon marked by internal
divisions based on personal, ideological and ethnic
considerations.
• The Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès
(UNDP). This party enjoyed most support among the
Fulbe of  Northern Cameroon, Ahidjo’s ethnic group. Its
leadership had held prominent positions in the party and
the government during the Ahidjo period and early Biya
period. It claimed the Ahidjo heritage.
These three parties were the main contenders with the CPDM
by mid-1990. Many other parties were authorised, making a total
of no less than forty-eight (with about twenty others operating but
not legally registered) by early 1992. The legalisation of many small
parties was suspected in Cameroon to be intended to split the
opposition to the government party. Strikingly, none of  the parties
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had worked out a well-defined programme, except maybe the SDF.
Most of them did not go beyond generally calling for better social
justice, cleaning up of public life, an end to secretive government,
and measures to restore the economic situation. In this respect, it is
worthwhile to mention that nearly all of them supported the
implementation of  the SAP in Cameroon. Apparently, their main
concern was to devise strategies for the seizure of power from the
ruling CPDM government. Like the ruling party, they usually tried
to recruit their members through the creation of  an ethno-client
network (Schilder 1993: 115-122). Of course, the charisma of the
leadership, too, tended to be an important asset in the expansion of
their membership.
The formation of  the new parties was accompanied by a rise in
popular protest in the cities. The growing number of  unemployed,
taxi-drivers, students and other social groups took to the streets to
air their own specific grievances and their general discontent with
the regime in power. Contrary to many other African countries, the
trade unions refused to join and lead this popular protest as they
were still state-controlled. There were several bloody clashes
between the demonstrators and the forces of law and order which
led to several people being killed in April 1991. By April 1991,
party leaders and their followers were uniting around the claim for
a national conference. This claim was inspired by the national
conferences that had been previously organised in Benin and Congo
during the transition to new multiparty regimes. Such conferences
aimed at bringing together political, religious, business, trade union
and other leaders in society, and assuming power to decide radical
constitutional and other changes. In Benin the conference assumed
sovereign power and ordered implementation of the changes
decided, and this was what the opposition wanted in Cameroon. It
wanted to force the authoritarian state to accept possibly radical
constitutional changes and to expose misgovernment and corruption
without fear. Such ideas, which were a challenge to the authoritarian,
neopatrimonial state, enjoyed massive popular support.
Unsurprisingly, the Biya regime strongly opposed the organisation
of  such a conference which was most likely to be transformed into
a national tribunal. In a broadcast on 11 April 1991 Biya said that
Cameroon did not need a national conference because ‘democracy
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is already a reality’. His refusal to consider a national conference
gave rise to a long period of confrontation between the regime and
the opposition. This confrontation was launched by a demonstration
demanding a national conference at Bamenda on 11 May 1991, and
the start of mass civil disobedience on 13 May 1991; there was also
a general strike on 16-17 May 1991, widely followed in the western
and northern provinces. From 24 June 1991 the most intense phase
began, with the opposition’s extension of  civil disobedience to
become a total shutdown in the cities, the so-called ‘ghost town’
campaign. This campaign involved the stoppage of all work, all
trade, all traffic in the cities, except for Friday evenings and
Saturdays, resulting in huge personal and public financial losses and
an aggravation of  the economic crisis. The government responded
by not giving in (Mbu 1993).
For various reasons this ghost town campaign was not successful.
It was not backed in the Beti region which remained loyal to Biya.
This brought about a dangerous polarisation on ethnic lines (the
Beti versus the rest) which nearly led to a civil war. The state
apparatus might have broken down if Biya had not had that solid
regional backing. In the event it never broke down altogether. The
government kept control over the forces of law and order and used
them regularly to clamp down on the opposition.
The IMF and the World Bank had regularly expressed their
disapproval of the ghost town campaign. Greatly concerned about the
adverse effect of  this campaign on the national economy and SAP,
they had regularly appealed to the government and opposition to arrive
at a negotiated settlement. Both sides, however, ignored these appeals
until October 1991 when it became evident that the ghost town
campaign and, above all, the strength of the sympathetic population
had exhausted themselves. Moreover, by that time there were tense
conflicts among the opposition leaders about future strategy.
The offer of talks by Biya on 11 October 1991 was accepted by
the opposition parties and the ghost town campaign petered out. A
tripartite conference held at Yaoundé from 30 October to 17
November 1991, attended by government and opposition
representatives and other prominent personalities who mediated
and advised, led to agreements on 17 November 1991 which
confirmed the government victory under a polite disguise. It was
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agreed that elections for a new National Assembly would soon be
held and that, in the meantime, all protest campaigns would be
called off. Some opposition parties even dropped the national
conference idea. This, and the failure to arrive at a programme for
change, were the main reasons why other opposition parties, like
the SDF, declined to sign the agreements.
Among those satisfied with the agreements were the IMF and
World Bank as well as the government of  France. Biya attended a
Francophone state summit in Paris soon afterwards and was said
to have had a good reception and approval from Mitterand.
Although some of  Mitterand’s Africa policy-makers seemed to
have favoured a national conference in Cameroon, a delegation
of Cameroonian opposition leaders had failed to win support in
Paris in late August 1991.
Of the major opposition parties, the SDF decided to boycott
the National Assembly elections which were held on 1 March 1992.
Its chairman, John Fru Ndi, said that the new election code, which
was promulgated on 16 December 1991, was bad and that there
was no guarantee of  just and fair elections. Moreover, the election
date was too early as most parties had not had sufficient time to
organise and to prepare themselves for the coming elections. The
government could afford to remain unmoved by such criticisms
backed up by no more than the threat of a negative and self-defeating
boycott. In the event, the elections distributed the 180 National
Assembly seats among four parties only: the CPDM won 80, the
UNDP 69, the UPC 18 and the Mouvement Démocratique de la
République (MDR) 6.
The MDR was a party not considered important before the
elections. It was headed by Dakole Daïssala, former chairman of
the city bus corporation Société des Transports Urbains du Cameroun
(SOTUC), arrested as a Northerner after the April 1984 coup d’état
and held for six years without trial. He is one of the Kirdi, the
ethnic minority groups in Northern Cameroon which were
historically subordinate to the Fulbe and remained pagan or became
Christian rather than Muslim (Motaze 1990). Most of the Kirdi
declined to join the Fulbe-dominated UNDP and, during the
elections, tended to cast their votes in favour of either the CPDM
or the MDR.
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For a party which had the full support of  the government and its
local officials, and which was the only party to field candidates in
all forty-nine constituencies, the CPDM’s showing was not too
impressive. Eventually, it was three seats short of  a majority in the
National Assembly, but after several weeks of  discussion it agreed
on a coalition with the MDR. This first coalition-government in
Cameroon was headed by an Anglophone from the North West
Province, Simon Achidi Achu. A former Minister of  Justice under
Ahidjo, he is the first Anglophone Cameroonian to be Prime Minister
of Cameroon. Biya indeed owes Anglophones many thanks, for their
following the SDF call to boycott the polls ensured the CPDM’s
victory.
Soon afterwards, Biya announced that presidential elections were
to be held on 11 October 1992 and that he would stand again as
the government candidate during these elections. During the
subsequent negotiations, the opposition parties failed to unite on
the selection of one common candidate. A mixture of personal and
ethnic animosities impeded any agreement. Eventually,
approximately thirty opposition parties decided to support the SDF
candidate, John Fru Ndi. After the elections which were marked by
massive fraud, Biya was declared to be the victor. He was said to
have won 39.9 per cent of the votes cast, 4 per cent more than
John Fru Ndi. This was far short of  the almost 100 per cent he had
received in each of the two previous elections in 1984 and 1988
respectively, when he was the only candidate running for the post.
He only won in the South, Centre and East Provinces (partly
coinciding with the Beti area), but woefully lost in the other
provinces.
After the elections, there were violent protests in Bamenda and
the entire North West Province against ‘Biya’s theft of  John Fru
Ndi’s victory’. Biya then imposed a state of  emergency on this
province for three months and John Fru Ndi was kept under military
surveillance in his house at Bamenda. Many political activists,
journalists and students, particular Anglophones and Bamileke, were
arrested and tortured. The United States, Germany and the
European Common Market had denounced the fraudulent elections
and the state of  emergency in the North West Province and
threatened to abandon their aid programmes to Cameroon until
43
Chapter 2: The introduction of neoliberal economic and political reforms in Cameroon
‘there was a clear advancement in the democratic process’.
Particularly the United States has often expressed its disapproval
of  Biya’s authoritarian regime and has openly supported John Fru
Ndi. The critical attitude of the United States towards the regime
encouraged France to display its support for Biya, who appeared to
be more likely to safeguard French interests in Cameroon than the
Anglophone, John Fru Ndi.
Biya’s victory was a pyrrhic one. Still desperately seeking for
legitimacy because of his rejection by over 60 per cent of the
population, and with the economy in shambles and the civil service
in a state of  general apathy, the President was more isolated than
ever. To broaden his base of  support, Biya formed a government of
national unity after the elections. Some individual members of  the
UNDP and the moderate faction of the UPC accepted ministerial
posts. The SDF, on the contrary, refused to collaborate with a
government of  national unity.
It would appear as if the democratisation process in Cameroon
has stagnated. The power of the President is still relatively unlimited;
the separation between the state and the CPDM party is still
insufficient, censorship of the press, violation of human rights and
military excesses are still commonplace.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to demonstrate that the neoliberal project,
which has been propagated by the Western donors and international
financial institutions and largely supported by opposition parties,
has not yet made much progress in Cameroon. This is not altogether
surprising. Given the class character of  the Cameroonian post-
colonial state, the slow and inconsistent pace of economic
liberalisation was to be expected. The neopatrimonial logic on which
the post-colonial state is built forms a clear obstacle to the
institutional changes needed to carry through a transformation to
market-oriented and private sector-led growth.
The rather limited political reforms introduced by the Biya regime
in 1990, especially the legalisation of multipartyism, seem not to
have stimulated economic liberalisation but rather to have further
eroded the authoritarian and neopatrimonial state’s capacity and
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willingness to undertake economic reforms. The Biya regime rightly
feared that the implementation of  economic reforms, such as the
dismantlement and privatisation of the costly and inefficient
parastatal sector and the reduction of  the public service, would
fuel popular discontent and augment the membership of the
opposition parties. Moreover, it was obliged to proceed with the
supply of  privileges, in the form of  rent-seeking opportunities, so
as to maintain the hegemonic alliance and to stave off opposition.
In addition, the regime’s loss of  legitimacy and the increasing political
instability encouraged capital flight and deterred foreign and national
private investments.
The Biya regime appears to have been quite successful in resisting
the internal and external pressures to speed up the process of
economic and political liberalisation. As a result, the post-colonial
state remains very much as it always has been. Several reasons have
been given in this chapter to explain the paradox of the evident
lack of  commitment to economic and political reform and the
remarkable survival of  the authoritarian, neopatrimonial state during
the present economic and political crisis. First, the Biya regime has
continued to control the (shrinking) state resources, which enables
it to buy the loyalty of the state elites and to co-opt some of the
opposition leaders into the hegemonic alliance. It also continues to
control the forces of law and order, which enables it to intimidate
and oppress the opposition. Moreover, it continues to monopolise
some pivotal mass communication media like the television, which
enables it to preclude the opposition parties from presenting their
leaders and programmes to the public. Second, the Biya regime has
continued to enjoy the firm support of  the Beti elite who feared
that their privileged access to state resources would come to an end
with the opposition parties’ seizure of  power. Third, the opposition
parties seem hardly to differ from the ruling party, using similar
ethno-client networks for the expansion of their power base. And,
above all, their leadership is divided by personal and ethnic
animosities.
And finally, the Biya regime has exploited to the full the
ambivalent and inconsistent role of  the Western donors and
international financial institutions in the execution of the neoliberal
project. The IMF and World Bank depend upon the ruling regime’s
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continuous cooperation for the successful implementation of the
SAP to such an extent that they tend to confine themselves to quiet
diplomacy, except in cases of  extreme violations of  human rights.
Conversely, they decline to negotiate with the opposition. They have
even expressed their strong disapproval of certain oppositional
actions, such as the ‘ghost town’ campaign in 1991, which they
perceived as a further onslaught on the already shattered national
economy and an obstruction of  the SAP. Undoubtedly, in its struggle
for survival, the Biya regime owes a particular debt to France. France
has tried to safeguard its economic interests in Cameroon by regularly
assisting the Biya regime in overcoming any internal and external
oppositional action. In January 1992, it did not even hesitate to
supply the Biya regime with arms for the maintenance of  public
order.
Gradually, however, there were some indications that the western
donors and international financial institutions were losing patience
with the slow and inconsistent pace of economic liberalisation in
Cameroon and becoming more determined to impose upon the Biya
regime the rough choices it had so far avoided. In 1994, the World
Bank forced the regime to lay off  20,000 civil servants and to
announce the privatisation of a first batch of fifteen important
parastatal enterprises, notably in the transport and agro-industrial
sectors.
It is most unlikely that the eventual achievement of greater
political liberalisation in Cameroon will enhance the prospects for
any thorough economic liberalisation. Political liberalisation may
even strengthen the neopatrimonial features of the Cameroonian
post-colonial state. Although most opposition parties claim to
champion economic liberalisation, their capacity to implement the
necessary economic reforms is very much open to question, since
they appear to resemble closely the ruling regime in their frequent
resort to neopatrimonial practices.
Much of the current thinking about political liberalisation in
Africa implies that institutional and economic change will be effected
via the emergence of  stronger civil societies. As a result, successful
economic reforms require not only increased levels of  state capacity
but also higher levels of ‘civil society capacity’, that is, the effective
and sustained organisation of social interests over time. Generally
46
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
speaking, however, civil society capacity tends to be weak in
Cameroon. Every organised group in Cameroonian civil society used
to be co-opted or destroyed by the post-colonial state, from ethno-
regional associations to conventional civil-society organisations.
These groups therefore still often lack the power to call the regime
to account for its policies (van de Walle 1990).
The experience in Cameroon, and elsewhere in Africa, suggests
that there is no automatic linkage between political and economic
liberalisation. In African countries where autocratic and
neopatrimonial regimes are still struggling for their political survival
during the democratisation process, economic reforms tend to be
slowly and partially implemented and political reforms tend to create
political instability which scares away national and international
investors. Indeed, at least in the short term, there may be conflicts
between the two objectives. There is thus an increasing tendency
to emphasise the longer-term relationship between political and
economic liberalisation, as well as to view democracy as an end in
itself, rather than a means to development.
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Opposition and social-democratic change in
Cameroon: The Social Democratic Front
Introduction
The functioning of  opposition parties in Africa’s current democratic
transition appears still to be understudied and the existing literature
usually presents a rather negative picture of their role (cf. Olukoshi
1998b; Mbaku & Ihonvbere 1998; van de Walle & Smiddy 2000;
van Walraven & Thiriot 2002; Salih 2003). Opposition parties are
assumed to be small, badly organised, fragmented, ethnocentric and
dominated by personal and clientelist relations of power that are
claimed to be characteristic of African politics (Chabal & Daloz
1999; van de Walle 2003). And, even more importantly, they are
said to lack any clear, well-articulated, socio-economic project that
can serve as a viable and credible alternative to existing policies
and deepen and consolidate the democratic process. Most electoral
campaigns appear to be conducted on the basis of the personality
of  the opposition leaders, and ethno-regional solidarities.
Opposition parties have to operate in what has been described
as ‘illiberal democracies’ (van de Walle & Smiddy 2000; van de
Walle 2001). In most African countries, the opposition has been
faced with incumbents who have only reluctantly conceded to a
multiparty system but have stopped at nothing in their attempts to
obstruct, weaken, harass and divide the opposition. The latter have
not hesitated to employ the public media and the various apparatuses
of the state – including the security forces – against the opposition
and to extensively rig election results. Today, the opposition is in a
state of crisis and disintegrating in the majority of those countries
where it has not yet managed to unseat the incumbent regime.
In this chapter, I focus on the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in
Cameroon that was founded in May 1990.1 Initially, this party
appeared to form a notable exception to the generally negative
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assessment of the functioning of opposition parties in Africa and
actually raised high expectations among the urban masses of
imminent political and economic change for two main reasons.2 First,
there was the charisma of  its leader, John Fru Ndi, and second,
there was its social-democratic message that seemed to be different
from the authoritarian and neoliberal economic policies of  the ruling
regime. Though never well defined, its message of establishing a
truly democratic and just society – translated into simple slogans
such as ‘Power to the People and Equal Opportunities for All’ –
was easily understood. In the early 1990s, the SDF was so popular
among the masses that many observers came to believe that it was
only a matter of  time before the party would replace the ruling
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Today, more
than two decades after its launch, prospects of a SDF takeover of
power appear bleak. Even worse, and similar to most other
opposition parties in Africa, the party has lost most of its initial
appeal and its leadership is deeply divided on policy issues and
strategy, and characterised by opportunism and ‘prebendal politics’.
In the first part of this chapter, I describe the rapid expansion of
the SDF, its message and its major actions during its heyday in the
early 1990s. In the second part, I explain the reasons for the loss of
the party’s initial momentum and its failure to capture power.
The birth and growth of the SDF
Following independence and reunification in 1961, Cameroon
moved quickly towards the establishment of a one-party state and
the concentration of power in the president that was justified by
the ruling regime in terms of  essential prerequisites for national
unity and development (Bayart 1979; DeLancey 1989; Takougang
& Krieger 1998). This political system remained largely intact until
1990 when widespread popular discontent emerged with the
deepening economic and political crisis (see Chapter 2). With the
move towards democratisation in Eastern Europe, Cameroonians,
like Africans elsewhere on the continent, began to demand political
reforms including the introduction of  a multiparty system, rule of
law, and freedom of  association and of  the press. This went far
beyond the modest political reforms introduced earlier by the Biya
government (Konings 1996a; Takougang & Krieger 1998).
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It was in these circumstances that the first opposition party, the
Social Democratic Front (SDF), was formed in Bamenda, the capital
of  North West Province in Anglophone Cameroon. Its charismatic
leader, John Fru Ndi, a bookseller by profession, defied government
orders prohibiting the founding of the party and chose 26 May 1990
as its launch date. On the same day several decades before, Martin
Luther King had led a march on Capitol Hill in Washington where
he made his famous ‘I Have a Dream’ speech, setting the stage for
the liberation of  blacks in American society. In his short speech to
the massive rally in Ntarikon Park in Bamenda, Fru Ndi declared:
Today is the most significant day in the struggle for democracy in
Cameroon.... Democracy has never been handed down to a people
on a platter of  gold...We have set as one of  our goals to rid the
Cameroonian society of a system that deprives people from being
free men or otherwise punishing them for daring to think freely,
associate freely, assemble peacefully and freely.... We call upon you
to stand up and be counted amongst those who share our democratic
ideal. You have nothing to lose but the straight jacket in which you,
as freeborn citizens, have been cast (quoted in Gwellem 1996: 12).
Following this ceremony, six young Anglophones – who became
known as the ‘May 26 martyrs’ – were killed by the security forces.
The state-controlled media tried to distort the facts and to deny
government responsibility for this bloody event and a demonstration
by Anglophone students at the University of  Yaoundé in support
of  the SDF and the introduction of  a multi-party system was brutally
suppressed (Konings 2002a). Leading members of  the ruling party,
the CPDM, strongly condemned the Anglophones for their
‘treacherous actions’ and what they considered as the premature
birth of multipartyism in the post-colonial state. Their reaction to
these peaceful demonstrations shocked many people, particularly
because alternative political parties were not prohibited by the 1972
Constitution (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003: 77-78).
The government’s overreaction to the launch of  the SDF and its
continual persecution of the party must be understood in the context
of  what is called the ‘Anglophone problem’.3 The deepest roots of
this problem can be traced back to 1961, when the political elite of
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two territories with different colonial legacies – one French and the
other British – agreed on the formation of  a federal state. Contrary
to Anglophone expectations, this did not provide for the equal
partnership of  both parties, let alone for the preservation of  the
cultural heritage and identity of each, but turned out to be merely a
transitory phase to the total integration of the Anglophone minority
into a strongly centralised, unitary state. Gradually, this has created
an Anglophone consciousness: the feeling of being marginalised,
exploited and assimilated by the Francophone-dominated state, and
even by the Francophone population as a whole.  It was not until
political liberalisation in 1990 that various associations and pressure
groups were created or reactivated by members of the Anglophone
elite to represent and defend Anglophone interests in the
Francophone-dominated state. Although the most important
organisations initially called for a return to the federal state, the
persistent refusal of the Biya government to discuss any related
constitutional reforms eventually forced them to adopt a secessionist
stand. Unsurprisingly, the government has devised various strategies
to safeguard the unitary state, including attempts to minimise or
even deny the existence of an Anglophone problem, to create
divisions among the Anglophone elite, to remunerate some
Anglophone allies with prestigious positions in the state apparatus
previously reserved for Francophones only, and to repress all actions
designed to change the status of Anglophone Cameroon (Konings
& Nyamnjoh 2003).
There is general agreement that the launching of the SDF was a
decisive factor in changing the political landscape in Cameroon.
Under considerable internal and external pressure, the government
introduced a greater measure of political liberalisation (Derrick
1992). In December 1990 it announced the advent of multipartyism,
as well as a certain degree of freedom of mass communication and
association, including the right to hold public meetings and
demonstrations. As a result, several political parties, pressure groups
and private newspapers were set up in Cameroon and began to
oppose the regime.
Like most other opposition parties that have emerged during the
current political liberalisation process in Cameroon and other
African countries (Mehler 1997; Takougang & Krieger 1998;
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Olukoshi 1998b), the SDF never appears to have developed any
elaborate political or economic programme. The charisma of the
party leader is more likely to attract a mass following than any explicit
ideology. Since the tragic death in 1958 of  Ruben Um Nyobe, the
legendary leader of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC)
(Joseph 1977; Mbembe 1996), no other politician in Cameroon has
captured the imagination of the masses with such enthusiasm as
John Fru Ndi, the chairman of  the SDF. His populist style of
leadership has had a wide appeal. Unlike most other Cameroonian
political leaders, he usually wears customary dress, he predominantly
speaks Pidgin English (the lingua franca of the masses), and is admired
for his courage and outspokenness. As a result of  Fru Ndi’s growing
popularity, the party was able to extend its membership from the
Anglophone to the Francophone area, notably in the neighbouring
West and Littoral Provinces. In fact, Francophones soon
outnumbered Anglophones in the originally Anglophone party. Most
of  the party’s approximately 60-per-cent Francophone membership
belongs to the ‘entrepreneurial’ Bamileke, who are closely related
to ethnic groups in the North West Province (Warnier 1993; Tabappsi
1999). The Bamileke are inclined to see the SDF as a springboard
to political power.
Examination of  the party’s most important initial documents,
the 1990 Constitution and Manifesto and the 1991 Proposals on Devolution
of Power, reveals an ideologically fluid mixture of populist, liberal
and social-democratic elements. The composition of  the initial party
leadership may be a significant explanatory factor for this ideological
blend. In addition to the populist Fru Ndi, the party leadership
consisted of members of the radical intelligentsia and other sectors
of the middle classes, particularly teachers and lawyers, as well as
some businessmen and entrepreneurs. The major tenets in the SDF
basic documents are the following:
• the establishment of  a ‘healthy and true’ democracy. In
this respect, the SDF has championed the achievement of
a transparent and accountable form of  governance, the
separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers,
free and fair elections, freedom of expression and
association, the rule of  law and respect for human rights.
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To introduce fair and free elections, the SDF has
continuously advocated the introduction of an
independent electoral commission.
• the need for participatory democracy. In its 1991 Proposals
on Devolution of  Power, the SDF attempted ‘to put into
concrete form and detail its avowed slogan of  Power to
the People’. By introducing a large measure of
decentralisation, the party proposed ‘to put an end to the
former system bedevilled by overcentralisation of  decision-
making with a huge bureaucracy at the centre’ and ‘to get
the common people themselves directly involved in their
own governance’.
• the promotion of  a market economy, free enterprise, and
the right to private property.
• the creation of a welfare state, with particular concern for
the underprivileged in society. The SDF promised the
introduction of free health care and education, an
improvement in the living and working conditions of urban
and rural workers (better housing, electricity and roads),
the creation of employment for the youth, and an
improvement in the position of  women in society.
Although these basic documents failed to provide a credible
political and economic blueprint for achieving these objectives, they
succeeded in attracting not only the urban masses – formal and
informal-sector workers and the unemployed – but also business
people and entrepreneurs.
The party’s message – embodied in simple slogans like ‘Power to
the People and Equal Opportunity for All’, ‘Change’ and ‘Suffer
don Finish (SDF)’, a Pidgin English expression meaning ‘your
suffering has come to an end’ – was well understood by the masses.
They came to believe that by voting the SDF into power, they would
finally obtain a say in the decision-making process and would be
freed from exploitation and oppression.
The first years of political liberalisation raised high expectations
among SDF members of an imminent change in regime and a
reconfiguration of  state power in their favour. The party’s enormous
expansion and growing confidence put the government on the
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defensive, being unsure of how to handle the sweeping force of the
new political upstarts. The SDF’s weekly rallies and demonstrations,
its fiery rhetoric and violent threats, and its bold defiance of the
regime were all phenomena unimaginable in the three long decades
of  predictable and colourless one-party politics.
The leaders of  the SDF helped to turn most of  the country, with
the notable exception of the Beti region, into a veritable hotbed of
rebellion, leading to several vehement confrontations with the regime
in power. This was particularly the case during the 1991-92 ‘ghost
town’ campaign, which was essentially a prolonged demonstration
of civil disobedience organised by the SDF and allied opposition
parties to try to force the Biya government to organise a sovereign
national conference like those previously held in other African
countries such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali and Zaire (see
Chapter 2). The slogan adopted by the opposition alliance in favour
of a sovereign national conference was ‘fait quoi, fait quoi, il y aura’
(‘nothing will prevent it being held’). When Biya replied in a speech
before the national assembly that it was ‘sans objet’ (pointless), the
whole country reportedly went up in flames.
By October 1991, however, the ‘ghost town’ campaign had run
out of steam, and the regime then found it opportune to organise
what it called a ‘tripartite meeting’ involving the incumbent
government, the opposition and well-known public figures
(Takougang & Krieger 1998: 141-42). With the meeting
masquerading as a forum in which to reach a compromise on the
main political issue – namely the holding of a sovereign national
conference – the regime used the occasion to assess the strength of
the opposition and, if possible, to divide it.
It soon became manifest that the opposition was unable to
maintain a united front in the absence of a common objective and
programme. As elsewhere in Africa (Olukoshi 1998b), the
overwhelming majority of the opposition parties in Cameroon
existed only on paper, usually having been created by political
entrepreneurs to serve personal and ethno-regional interests rather
than to mobilise popular forces for genuine change (Fonchingong
1998). As a result, the regime eventually succeeded in manipulating
and blackmailing most of  their leaders. Subsequently, it was able to
largely determine the agenda and control the meeting to its own
54
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
advantage. On 13 November 1991, no fewer than forty of the forty-
seven then legalised opposition parties signed the so-called Yaoundé
Declaration. They agreed to abandon the ‘ghost town’ campaign
and to defer the sovereign national conference demand pending
elections in response to the regime’s offer of  further discussions on
electoral and constitutional reform. The SDF was not prepared to
cooperate with the regime and refused to sign the document.
Having split the opposition during this meeting, the regime simply
refused to create an independent electoral commission, as had
constantly been demanded by the SDF. With a promised reward of
FCFA 500 million for each party participating in elections, it lured
the majority of the opposition parties into the ill-conceived
parliamentary elections of March 1992. There have been disputes
ever since about the wisdom or folly of the SDF boycott of these
elections. It is beyond any doubt that SDF participation in these
contested elections would have given the opposition a majority vote
in the national assembly, thus posing a serious challenge to the
regime (see Table 3.1).
The SDF, however, did participate in the October 1992
presidential elections. Although the opposition parties failed to agree
on a single candidate, the SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi, performed
extremely well in these fraudulent elections. In fact, many
Cameroonians and international observers believed that he had won
the presidency. It was therefore not surprising that Biya’s declared
victory was a traumatic experience for the SDF membership, resulting
in violent protests against the ‘theft of  Fru Ndi’s victory’ throughout
the North West Province. The regime then imposed a state of
emergency on the province for three months and Fru Ndi was kept
under house arrest in Bamenda.
Following the party’s failure to accede to political power through
either violent confrontation or the ballot box, a number of issues
arose that created serious divisions among its leadership, leading to
growing disillusionment among the rank and file. Moreover, having
survived the most difficult years in its existence, the incumbent
regime used all the means at its disposal to contain the SDF threat.
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Table 3.1  Results of  Legislative Elections in Cameroon
Note: The SDF and the CDU boycotted the 1992 legislative elections.
Source: Compiled from various Cameroonian newspapers.
The Anglophone-Francophone divide within the SDF
Paradoxically, although the SDF and Fru Ndi contributed immensely
to Anglophone consciousness and action, the party increasingly
presented itself  as a national rather than an Anglophone party, as is
evidenced by its growing membership in Francophone Cameroon.
As a consequence, it adopted an ambivalent attitude towards calls
_________________________________________________________
Parties Number of Seats 
                                                        _____________________________
 1992 1997 2002 
_________________________________________________________
Cameroon People’s Democratic  
Movement (CPDM)   88  116  149 
 
Social Democratic  
Front (SDF)    0    43    21 
 
National Union for Democracy  
and Progress (NUDP)   68    13     1 
 
Union des Populations 
du Cameroun (UPC)   18     1     3 
 
Cameroon Democratic  
Union (CDU)    0     5     5 
 
Movement for the Defence  
of the Republic (MDR)    6     1     0 
 
Mouvement Libéral des Jeunes  
du Cameroun (MLJC)    0     1     1 
 
TOTAL   180  180  180 
_________________________________________________________
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from the newly emerging Anglophone movements for a return to a
two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) federation. Its leadership tried
to avoid alienating either its Anglophone or its Francophone members
but this was not an easy task. The party’s Anglophone members tended
to be simultaneously supporters of Anglophone movements and were
therefore inclined to bring pressures to bear upon the party’s leadership
to place federalism on the political agenda.
Like most other Francophones (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003: 154-
62), the Francophone party members tended to oppose the
Anglophone pursuit of a federal state – often equating federalism
with secession – and strongly adhered to the preservation of  the
unitary state. They rightly pointed out that some of  the party’s basic
documents, like the 1990 SDF Manifesto and the 1991 SDF Proposals
on Devolution of  Power stressed the importance of  national unity,
allowing only for a large measure of decentralisation within the
unitary state. The Francophone position was even largely backed
by the party’s Anglophone secretary-general, Dr Siga Asanga, who
maintained close ties with the Francophone intellectuals in the SDF
leadership, most of  them, like he himself, lecturers at the University
of  Yaoundé. On some occasions, Asanga publicly stated that the
party’s embrace of  the Anglophone cause and federalism would
endanger its social-democratic ideology and national appeal.4 The
issue became even more pertinent when the Francophone majority
demanded a more equal representation in the still predominantly
Anglophone party executive. Since the party chairman was an
Anglophone, the Bamileke, who formed the largest part of  the
Francophone membership, claimed to be entitled to the post of
secretary-general, which was second in the party’s hierarchy.
The party chairman, John Fru Ndi, was under pressure from both
sides to clarify his position on the growing Anglophone-Francophone
divide in the party and he eventually appeared to yield to Anglophone
pressure. He openly declared himself to be opposed to Francophone
domination of the SDF since the party owed its existence to
courageous initiatives and sacrifices by Anglophones. He bluntly
added that ‘it was unacceptable that a Bamileke would ever become
secretary-general of the SDF’ – a statement reminiscent of a similar
declaration by Joseph Owona, one of the leading Francophone
CPDM officials, during his term as secretary-general at the
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presidency: ‘A Bamileke as President? Never!’ (Konings & Nyamnjoh
2003: 152). Fru Ndi’s clarification reinforced Anglophone influence
in the party’s decision-making organs but served to temper
enthusiasm for the party among the Bamileke elite.
At the SDF’s Bafousssam Convention in July 1993, some
Anglophones explicitly raised the issue of Anglophone
marginalisation in the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state,
and the delegates subsequently endorsed in principle the idea of a
federal form of  government. To appease the Francophones, the
party refused to adopt the two-state federation as advocated by the
Anglophone movements, leaving it instead to the people themselves
to decide on the exact form of  federation at a future sovereign
national conference. Only one year later, on 22 August 1994, the
SDF national executive committee modified the Bafoussam
declaration of federalism. It now clearly opted for a four-state
federation (an Anglophone state and three Francophone states).
Partly as a result of  his disagreement with the party’s endorsement
of federalism, Secretary-General Siga Asanga was expelled from
the party in 1995. A number of Bamileke and other Francophone
party leaders also left the party voluntarily or were forced out. One
of them, Dr Basil Kamdoum, then founded the Social Democratic
Party (SDP) that was intended to offer a social-democratic
alternative to the SDF. However, it never really got off  the ground,
nor did the Social Democratic Forum created by Siga Asanga to
protest his expulsion from the SDF. These leaders simply lacked
Fru Ndi’s charisma.
From the mid-1990s onwards, there were also repeated, and
sometimes serious, conflicts between the leadership of the umbrella
organisation of the Anglophone movements, the Southern
Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the SDF. While the SDF
continued to cling to the idea of a four-state federation, the SCNC
had in the meantime adopted a secessionist stand following the
Biya government’s persistent refusal to enter into any meaningful
negotiations about a return to a two-state federation. The SCNC’s
new objective obliged the SDF leadership to distance itself from
the Anglophone cause in order to assure the party’s survival among
its Francophone members. Evidently, it thereby ran the risk of  losing
support among its Anglophone members.
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When SCNC leaders proposed boycotting the 1996 municipal
elections, claiming that any elections called by the Francophone-
dominated state were irrelevant to an independent Southern
Cameroons state,5 the SDF leadership refused to comply. Relations
rapidly deteriorated after the proclamation of the restoration of
the independence of  the Federal Republic of  Southern Cameroons
(FRSC) by a SCNC leader, Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, on
30 December 1999. On 6 May 2000, the party executive met to
discuss the new developments on the Anglophone scene. During a
stormy debate it decided to demand the resignation of  some
important party leaders. Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor, who used to be the
chairman of  the SDF Constitutional and Political Affairs Committee,
was asked to resign because of his recent acceptance of the positions
of  vice-chairman of  the SCNC and vice-president of  the FRSC. Dr
Martin Luma, the second vice-president of  the SDF, was asked to
step down because he had chaired the historic meeting on 1 April
2000 at which Justice Ebong was proclaimed president of the FRSC
and Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor was appointed as vice-president. Albert
Mukong, a human rights activist and SDF founding member, was
also asked to resign because of his persistent militancy in
Anglophone organisations. Their departures were clear proof  of
the SDF leadership’s determination to purge the party of  ‘extremist’
and separatist elements in order to maintain the support of its
Francophone membership.6
Professor Carlson Anyangwe, another SDF founding father and
former SCNC leader who is still working abroad, also distanced
himself  from the party, identifying himself  more closely with the
SCNC struggle for an independent Southern Cameroons state. That
the SDF leadership is under strong pressure from its Francophone
membership to maintain a certain distance from the Anglophone
separatist tendencies was manifested again in June 2000 when Mr
Chrétien Tabetsing, a Bamileke member of  the SDF living in France
and who had failed to unseat John Fru Ndi as party chairman during
the SDF’s 1999 convention, called for an extraordinary convention.
The purpose of this convention, he said, was to debate the
Anglophone problem that had become such a sensitive issue in
Cameroon and was dividing the party into two opposing camps. He
claimed that the SDF would collapse and cease to exist should
Anglophone wishes prevail.7
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On 7 May 2000, the chairman of  the SDF, John Fru Ndi, openly
confessed that his party was at variance with the SCNC over the
strategic options for solving the Anglophone problem. While his
own party continues to view a four-state federation as a panacea
for the Anglophone problem, the SCNC was, he lamented, beating
the drums of  outright secession. He strongly condemned some
SCNC activists who were issuing threats against the SDF ‘in a bid
to persuade the party to dance to their independence song’. Instead
of combating the Biya regime, the SCNC, he alleged, was now
engaged in fighting the SDF.8 A few weeks later, a new clash between
the SDF and the SCNC occurred when the SDF decided to
participate in the 20 May demonstrations – to commemorate the
creation of the unitary state – while the SCNC had called for a
boycott.9
Dissatisfied with the party’s position towards the Anglophone
problem, an increasing number of both Anglophone and
Francophone members have left the party and many former
Anglophone members have committed themselves exclusively to
the Anglophone cause.
The regime’s repressive and divisive tactics and its
international support
The regime has done everything possible to control the expansion
and influence of  the SDF and other opposition parties. One of  its
main strategies has been repression and SDF leaders and militants
have found themselves continuously exposed to harassment,
intimidation and violence. A well-publicised example occurred on
3 November 1993 – the day set aside to celebrate eleven years of
Biya’s presidency – and involved a confrontation between a SDF
convoy led by John Fru Ndi and the police in Yaoundé when the
police attacked the convoy with water canons. Fru Ndi was injured
and his car damaged but he escaped and took refuge in the residence
of the Dutch ambassador, subsequently giving an ultimatum for
the release of the thirty SDF militants arrested. The police were
rumoured to have been intending to kill him (Konings & Nyamnjoh
2003: 135-36).
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Strikingly, the North West provincial governor, Bell Luc René, a
Francophone, became nicknamed ‘Bend Look Grenade’ for the
excessive use of tear-gas grenades by the security forces under his
command to disperse SDF demonstrators, especially during the 1991
‘ghost town’ campaign and the 1992 state of emergency in Bamenda
in the wake of  ‘Biya’s theft of  Fru Ndi’s victory’ in the presidential
elections. The government regularly prohibited the SDF from holding
rallies and meetings, and the security forces often broke up those
that did take place. Contrary to the SDF credo, ‘Suffer don Finish’
(SDF), the suffering was clearly not finished and another reading for
its acronym emerged ‘Suffer dey (for) Front’ (SDF).
Other strategies by the regime to frustrate SDF members’ hopes
of ever gaining power included the almost complete barring of
opposition parties from access to the public media, the constant
refusal to introduce free and fair elections, and the extensive rigging
of  election results.10 Any appeal by the SDF leadership to the courts
against such practices was likely to fail since the national judiciary
continues to serve the interests of  the incumbent regime and not
those of  the citizens. Indeed, as Nyamnjoh (1996: 20) aptly
observed, ‘Today Cameroonians have multipartyism but the one-
party logic persists’.
The regime’s most important strategy has undoubtedly been
divide-and-rule. In the Anglophone region in particular, it has
capitalised on the existing ethno-regional tensions between the
coastal forest (the present South West Province) and the Grassfields
(the present North West Province) people. As argued elsewhere
(Konings 2001), a number of factors are responsible for this
situation. First, the large-scale labour migration from the North West
to the South West where a plantation economy was created during
German colonial rule (Konings 1993a), and the subsequent local
settlement of  northwestern workers. Gradually, these settlers have
come to form the majority in many local towns and villages, proving
their reputation as entrepreneurs and achieving, along with Nigerians
of Igbo descent, a dominant position in the southwestern economy
(Rowlands 1993). Second, the transfer of political power from the
South West to the North West in 1959, when the North West-based
Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) defeated the ruling
South West-based Kamerun National Congress (KNC) meant that
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the North West elite started dominating the political scene at the
regional and national levels (Ngoh 1996). Consequently, although
supporting most of the Anglophone grievances about Francophone
domination, the South West elite have felt more disadvantaged than
their northwestern counterparts in the post-colonial state.
Political liberalisation in the early 1990s fanned the rivalry
between the South West and North West elites in their struggle for
power at the regional and national levels. The rapid growth of  the
SDF immediately alarmed the South West elite who feared renewed
North West domination over the South West as the SDF was clearly
a party organised and controlled by the North West elite. Moreover,
although the party, like the former KNDP, enjoyed less popularity
among the autochthonous population in the South West than in the
North West, it could nevertheless count on massive support from
northwestern workers and settlers in the region. In addition, it soon
became manifest that the SDF’s frequent, and often violent,
confrontations with the regime had the paradoxical effect of
advancing the political careers of  northwestern politicians. The year
1992 witnessed first the appointment of  a North Westerner, Simon
Achidi Achu, as prime minister – an apparent attempt by the
desperate regime to contain the enormous popularity of  the SDF in
the North West – and later the spectacular performance of  the
charismatic SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi, in the presidential
elections.
Given the intensification of  the power struggle between the
South West and North West elites during the political liberalisation
process, the Biya government found it increasingly lucrative and
politically expedient to tempt the ‘peaceful and conciliatory’ South
West elite away from Anglophone solidarity with strategic
appointments and the idea that their real enemy was the ‘unpatriotic,
ungrateful and power-mongering’ North West elite.
In response to South West complaints of  North West domination,
Biya began to appoint South Westerners to key positions in their
own province. For example, Dorothy Njeuma was appointed vice-
chancellor of the newly created Anglophone University of Buea
and Becky Ndive was transferred from Yaoundé to head the
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in the South West.
Nevertheless, South Westerners still felt underrepresented in higher
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government positions and constantly requested that a South
Westerner succeed the North Westerner, Simon Achidi Achu, as
prime minister. So when in September 1996, Biya appointed the
South Westerner Peter Mafany Musonge as prime minister and kept
more South Westerners than North Westerners in key cabinet
positions, ‘the South West people ... went wild with excitement and
jubilation and loudly praised the Head of State’ for having at last
listened to the cries of  despair of  South Westerners, who for over
thirty-six years had been ‘confined to the periphery of national
politics and socio-economic development’.11
Government divide-and-rule tactics culminated in the 1996
Constitution that promised special state protection for
autochthonous minorities (Melone et al. 1996; Konings & Nyamnjoh
2000). Not unexpectedly, the new constitution boosted South West
identity and fuelled existing tensions between South Westerners and
North Westerners.
The timing of its release was hardly an accident: it was
promulgated only a few days before the 21 January 1996 municipal
elections. The South West pro-CPDM elite was shocked when the
SDF won most key urban constituencies in their region. South West
Governor Peter Oben Ashu immediately blamed the northwestern
settlers, who outnumbered the indigenes in most urban areas of the
province, for the CPDM’s poor performance in the urban areas,
and on several occasions he and other members of the southwestern
elite ordered them ‘to go home’. Before the elections, Nfon Victor
Mukete, the Bafaw Paramount Chief in Kumba, had used Bafaw
vigilante groups to ‘encourage’ northwestern settlers in the Kumba
municipal areas not to vote for the SDF. The South West elite
immediately started demanding state protection for the
autochthonous southwestern minority against the dominant and
exploitative North Westerners.
Straight after the elections, the government provided the required
protection by appointing indigenous CPDM leaders as urban
delegates in the municipalities won by the SDF. It is beyond doubt
that the Biya regime also rendered assistance after the municipal
elections to the so-called Grand Sawa movement12 – an emerging
alignment of  the ethnically related coastal elite in the South West
Province and neighbouring Francophone Littoral Province on the
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basis of common feelings of exploitation by northwestern and
ethnically related Bamileke settlers who were believed to constitute
the backbone of  the major opposition party, the SDF (Yenshu 1998;
Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998).
To those who sought protection as minorities, the price to pay
would increasingly be stated in no uncertain terms: Vote for the
CPDM. This is exactly what the new prime minister, Peter Mafany
Musonge, and other members of the southwestern elite have been
telling the people in the region.
During elections, the southwestern pro-CPDM elites have
become accustomed either to excluding northwestern settlers from
voting in the South West or to bringing pressure to bear upon them
to vote for the CPDM. According to the Cameroon Electoral Code
(Republic of Cameroon 1997), every citizen may vote in a locality
where s/he has been resident for at least six months or where his/
her name is on the income-tax assessment list for the fifth consecutive
year. Despite such rules, northwestern settlers, especially those
known to be SDF supporters, were frequently barred from voting
in their area of residence and were requested to do so in their region
of origin (only to discover on their arrival that they were supposed
to vote in their place of residence). During a meeting of the South
West elite in Limbe in February 1997 it was decided that settlers
had to obtain a residence certificate as a precondition for being
registered as a voter – a decision which North Westerners
immediately condemned as favouring the party in power (Yenshu
1998).  Although this rule was in clear contravention of  the Electoral
Code, pro-CPDM officials and chiefs, like Governor Peter Oben
Ashu and Chief Mukete of Kumba, continued to insist on the
obtaining of  these permits. Northwestern workers, the majority of
whom are SDF supporters, have also been subjected to persistent
CPDM pressures to support the new southwestern prime minister
Peter Mafany Musonge by voting CPDM.
And last but not least, the regime could count at the last moment
on international support, despite the donors’ regular criticisms of
the slow progress of  economic and political reforms in Cameroon.
France in particular has continued to defend the Biya government,
seeing a takeover of power by the SDF as a severe threat to its
long-standing vested interests in the country (Joseph 1978). Its
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support for the regime was even reinforced by hostile declarations
and actions on the part of  the SDF chairman. During the SDF’s
early years, Fru Ndi regularly declared that his party was fighting
not only a local dictator but also French imperialism, even calling
upon his followers to boycott French goods. France, therefore, did
everything it could to make sure that Biya remained in power during
the controversial October 1992 presidential elections. A few months
afterwards, the French minister of interior, Charles Pasqua, justified
French actions by declaring that ‘an Anglophone cannot be
president of  Cameroon’ (Fonchingong 1998: 130). When
international donors decided to suspend their allocation of  structural
adjustment loans to the regime after these elections, Cameroon
became first on the list of French aid beneficiaries in 1993 and
France rescued the regime with two new loans.
According to Fonchingong (1998: 130-31), the French also
sought to discredit the SDF and its Anglophone leadership in various
ways. For instance, the French secret police are said to have
fabricated incriminating documents linking Fru Ndi to illegal arms
imports. Moreover, the French ambassador, Gilles Vidal, and other
French embassy officials undertook several missions to the
Francophone stronghold of  the SDF, the West Province, to persuade
the Bamileke elite and traditional rulers to distance themselves from
the SDF. In addition, they encouraged the regime to create satellite
parties with Bamileke leadership so as to weaken local support for
the SDF. There are even secret reports that France and the CPDM
regime were sponsoring a Bamileke front within the SDF in a bid
either to grab the chairmanship of  the Anglophone Fru Ndi or spark
disorder in the party.
Curiously, the other international donors have never publicly
contested French partisanship, most probably out of  consideration
for the longstanding close relations between France and Cameroon.
While continuously stressing the need for ‘good governance’, they
themselves have actually displayed a rather ambivalent attitude
towards the regime, often justified in terms of  ‘realpolitik’. The
United States is a good example in this respect. By the end of 1994,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
decided to stop its activities in the country after having concluded
that ‘the undemocratic political climate in Cameroon did not permit
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aid to be utilised in the most judicious manner’ (Fonchingong 1998:
131-32). This drastic action, however, does not alter the fact that
the United States has been of great assistance to the regime through
regular debt rescheduling agreements, without which it might have
collapsed.
The Commonwealth performance has been particularly
disappointing to the Anglophone population.13 Following Cameroon’s
application for Commonwealth membership in 1989, the SDF and
the Anglophone movements have frequently appealed to the
Commonwealth authorities to keep Cameroon out of the
Commonwealth until the Biya government had realised significant
democratic reforms, improved upon its poor human rights record
and accepted the Anglophone proposal for a federal structure. To
the consternation of the Anglophone leaders, it was announced on
16 October 1995 that Cameroon had been admitted into the
Commonwealth.
There appear to have been two reasons for its admission. First,
the Commonwealth found it hard to reject Cameroon’s application
on the basis of the 1991 Harare Declaration as there was ample
evidence that the democratic records of some of its African member
states, like Nigeria and Kenya, were even poorer than that of
Cameroon. Second, the Commonwealth generally believed that
admission would be a more effective option than non-admission in
terms of  the advancement of  the democratisation in Cameroon.
Once in, Commonwealth members would bring pressures to bear
on the Cameroonian government to introduce political reforms.
After admission, the Commonwealth has sent regular missions
to Cameroon, urging the government to speed up the
democratisation process, including the introduction of  fair elections.
All these efforts appear to have had minimal effects in spite of
repeated promises by the Biya government that it would execute
certain Commonwealth reform proposals and seek financial
assistance for their implementation.14 Nevertheless, the
Commonwealth authorities have not yet resorted to any punitive
measures, such as the withdrawal of financial assistance, to oblige
the Biya government to comply with the Harare Declaration.
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The SDF in disarray
Of late, the SDF appears to have lost much of its initial appeal.
Many party members who have continued to support the party in
the face of frequent harassment by the security forces are becoming
disillusioned with the party’s apparent abandonment of  its initial
social-democratic ideals, as well as with its leadership’s growing
disunity, opportunism and struggles for power. The party that once
stood united behind Fru Ndi is now deeply divided and in shambles.
Most observers agree that important divergences began to occur
within the party when its leadership took the controversial decision
to enter into state institutions after the fraudulent 1996 municipal
and 1997 parliamentary elections. It justified its decision in terms
of ‘opening a new front against the regime’. Many party members,
however, specifically contested the party’s entry into parliament,
which they perceived as an act of legitimisation of the very regime
that the party had continuously confronted for seven years.
Moreover, they wondered how the tiny SDF parliamentary group,
which occupied only 43 out of  a total of  180 seats (see Table 3.1),
could pretend to ‘cause an earthquake in a parliament dominated
by the CPDM’. They became more and more convinced that the
party leadership’s eagerness to enter parliament was first and
foremost motivated by its growing tendency to sacrifice vision and
principle for expediency or for what John Fru Ndi himself  has called
‘belletics’, the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1989). They claimed
that their leaders had lost hope of ever taking over power since
elections continued to be rigged by the regime, and they were
therefore seeking a share of  the ‘national cake’ as a form of
compensation for their multiple sacrifices for the sake of  the party.
In June 2000, the former SDF press secretary, Mr Larry Eyong
Echaw, charged that ‘the moral high ground on which the SDF stood
to criticise the CPDM government had been lost as its
parliamentarians are mired in the muddy nature of Ngoa-Ekelle
gombo (that is the prebendal politics in parliament)’. He even alleged
that the party’s chairman, John Fru Ndi, was involved in ‘belletics’
himself because he ‘had cast his greedy eyes on the salaries and
budgets of SDF parliamentarians’.15 His serious allegation was
supported a few years later by Sani Alhadji, the former SDF chairman
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of  the Centre and South Provinces. The latter claimed that the party
did not keep proper accounts, which facilitated Fru Ndi’s entry into
the ‘bourgeoisie’, as is evidenced by his current ownership of the
largest plantations and herds of  cattle in the North West. Sani
Alhadji also revealed how Fru Ndi spent the public subsidy of  FCFA
456 million for financing the party’s participation in the 2002
elections: he used most of the money to recover his twelve-month
salary arrears and to buy two luxury jeeps for private use while
allocating only a meagre sum of  FCFA 75,000 to each of  the
constituencies for campaigning purposes.16
There was also growing resistance to the party’s lack of  internal
democracy and tolerance towards dissenting views. Real power in
the party was increasingly concentrated in its chairman John Fru
Ndi and a small group of clients, most of them originating from the
same ethnic group in the North West as Fru Ndi, namely the Meta
(Dillon 1973). Its most prominent members include Joseph Mbah
Ndam, leader of  the SDF parliamentary group, Professor Clement
Ngwasiri, SDF founding member and since 2002 member of
Parliament, Emmanuel Yoyo, SDF questor in parliament, and Martin
Fon Yembe, SDF chairman of  the North West Province. It is widely
believed that they have been largely responsible for the party’s shift
from confrontational politics to rapprochement and have been
regularly advocating an extension of the already overwhelming
powers of  Fru Ndi, which is clearly at odds with the emphasis on
collegiality and democratisation of  power in the party’s statutes.
This group of hardliners strongly oppose any fundamental criticism
of  the party’s current power structures, policy lines and strategies.
A group of progressive party leaders condemns the increasing
concentration of  power in the hands of  the chairman and his inner
circle as being detrimental to the development of a democratic
culture within the party and the democratic image the party
advertises. The most prominent reformers originate from the South
West Province and Francophone part of  the country, including
Professor Tazoacha Asonganyi, the SDF secretary-general, Professor
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, chairman of  the SDF Foreign Affairs
Committee, Chief  Alex Taku, SDF secretary for propaganda and
education, Sani Alhadji, former SDF chairman of  the Centre and
South Provinces, and Samuel Tchwenko, former Fru Ndi’s personal
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physician and member of the SDF national executive committee.
They particularly opposed the tendency of  Fru Ndi to personally
recruit new party leaders, selecting them almost exclusively from
his group of  clients. They were shocked when he decided to violently
intervene in the election of  the party’s provincial chairmen in 2000/
2001 so as to forestall the election of  his critics. They therefore
looked for instruments to curtail his powers in these matters.
In the course of 2001 Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale tabled a
motion during a national executive committee meeting in which he
proposed the creation of an independent investiture committee
responsible for the selection of  candidates for party leadership. Not
surprisingly, Fru Ndi and his inner circle strongly disapproved of
his bold initiative. Two of  its members, Joseph Mbah Ndam and
Emmanuel Yoyo, used the North West Provincial Conference held
at Batibo on 13-14 July 2001 to expose what they called the diabolic
intentions of Professor Kofele-Kale and his group in proposing a
motion that would strip the national chairman of  his powers and
thus facilitate his overthrow.17 In an interview with Radio France
International on 20 August 2001, Fru Ndi said that the Kofele-
Kale group formed a threat to the unity of  the party and were out
to destroy it.18 During the SDF convention in Bamenda in October
2001, Fru Ndi and his group succeeded in persuading delegates to
vote against the motion.19
The conflict between the two camps exploded after the 30 June
2002 municipal and parliamentary elections. On 6 July, the party’s
national executive committee decided to boycott all the municipal
and parliamentary seats the SDF had won at the polls. This decision
was taken to protest against renewed massive rigging of  the elections
and to force the regime to conduct new elections.20 Four days later,
however, Fru Ndi unilaterally lifted the embargo and it was soon
discovered that his action was part of a secret peace accord with
the CPDM that would enable the SDF to negotiate the appointment
of some of its leaders into positions in the Biya government.21 In
protest, a number of  reformers, mostly Francophones, then decided
to resign from the party. They accused Fru Ndi of  being ‘more
dictatorial than Stalin’ and a staunch tribalist who aimed at
transforming the SDF from a national into a North West party.
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Above all, it is no longer clear what the party stands for. Members
are confused by the repeated changes in policies and strategies
propagated by the party’s chairman, Fru Ndi. A few examples will
suffice here. In the first years of  the party’s existence, Fru Ndi
condemned French imperialism and called for a boycott of French
goods. A few years later, he was eagerly seeking French support
after having painfully realised that he could not do without it in his
attempts to seize power. In 1997, he declared: ‘No good laws, no
elections’. Without having been able to revise the electoral system,
he nevertheless called for participation in the 2002 elections. During
the October 2001 party convention in Bamenda, he declared in his
policy speech that his party would resume its confrontational policies
of  the early 1990s. A year later, however, he concluded a peace
treaty with the CPDM and sought his party’s participation in a
broadly based Biya government. Party members were astonished
when, at the end of 2002, he tried in vain to enter into negotiations
with the CPDM about the creation of an independent electoral
commission despite the fact that earlier negotiations on this issue
had utterly failed in 1998.22
As a result of these developments, SDF membership has declined
catastrophically and the party’s current position is indeed serious.
Since the 2002 parliamentary elections, its influence has been largely
restricted to its traditional stronghold, the North West Province.
The huge crowds attending SDF rallies and demonstrations have
decreased in numbers considerably. Most intellectuals inside and
outside the party no longer take Fru Ndi seriously, having come to
consider him as a major obstacle to democratic change. Increasingly
they are asking for his resignation to save the party from total collapse.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that the SDF, led by John Fru
Ndi, has achieved significant success in mobilising the people for
social-democratic change in Cameroon, with the party rapidly
becoming one of the largest and most popular opposition parties
on the African continent. Paradoxically, the party has failed to either
capture power or force the Biya regime to bring about any political
transformations that could have deepened and consolidated the
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country’s democratic transition. The euphoria that characterised the
early period following the SDF’s appearance on the political scene
has been greatly reduced and has made way for disillusionment.
The party appears to have lost most of the dynamism that made it
a critical force in the country’s politics in the early 1990s (Mbaku
2002; Takougang 2003a).
Several reasons have been given in this chapter to explain the
SDF’s failure to seize power and effect social-democratic change in
the country. First, the party was unable to reach consensus on the
Anglophone problem, leading to frequent confrontations between
Anglophone and Francophone party leaders and, eventually, to
several defections, dismissals and resignations. Second, the
incumbent regime has used its control over the state apparatus to
set increasing limitations on the freedom and functioning of opposition
parties. Moreover, it has been able to divide the opposition, thereby
capitalising on existing ethno-regional tensions and conflicts. It has
also exploited to the full the ambivalent and inconsistent role of
western donors and creditors towards democratic governance in the
country. The IMF and the World Bank depend upon the ruling regime’s
continuous cooperation for the successful implementation of the
structural adjustment programme to such an extent that they tend
to confine themselves to quiet diplomacy, except in cases of  extreme
violations of  human rights. Conversely, they decline to negotiate
with the opposition. They have even expressed their strong
disapproval of certain oppositional actions, such as the 1991 ‘ghost
town’ campaign, which they perceived as a public onslaught on the
already shattered national economy, and as obstructing structural
adjustment (Konings 1996a). Undoubtedly, in its struggle for survival
in the early 1990s, the Biya regime owes a special debt to France,
which has tried to safeguard its economic interests in Cameroon by
regularly assisting the regime in overcoming internal and external
opposition to its rule.
And last but not least, following its failure to seize power, the
SDF leadership has become increasingly divided about future lines
of  action and strategy. It appears to be becoming more and more
trapped in the regime’s logic of  démocratie apaisée – the transformation
of confrontational politics into participation in state institutions –
providing ample space for opportunism and prebendal politics. In
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many respects, the party has come to resemble the ruling CPDM
party: patron-client relationships, a lack of  internal democracy,
intolerance of dissenting views, and the absence of any clear vision
or programme for Cameroon’s ‘future’ (Nyamnjoh 1999).
It is interesting to observe that two recent studies based on
extensive samples of election results have come to totally different
conclusions about the future of multiparty systems in Africa. On
the one hand, van de Walle’s study presents a rather pessimistic
view, emphasising the illiberal nature of  most of  the new African
democracies, their characteristic centralisation of power around the
presidency, and the pervasive clientelism that structures the
relationship between the state and the citizenry (van de Walle 2003).
On the other hand, Lindberg’s study offers a more optimistic view,
claiming that there have been significant improvements in the
democratic quality of  competitive elections in Africa in terms of
participation, competition and legitimacy (Lindberg 2004). In my
study, I have provided substantial evidence that Cameroon belongs
among what Lindberg calls ‘deviant cases’ in a generally more
promising trend in Africa. While Lindberg largely fails to account
for such deviant cases, my study shows that van de Walle’s
explanatory framework appears to be more helpful in explaining
why liberal democracy in Cameroon has stalled.
Notes
  1. For  recent studies of  the SDF written from a different perspective,
see  Fombad & Fonyam  (2004); Nguini (2004); and Krieger (2008).
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The neoliberalising Cameroonian state and
private capital accumulation
Introduction
Faced with deep and prolonged economic and political crises,
African governments have been compelled by international financial
institutions and donors to adopt neoliberal reform packages. Some
of the major tenets of neoliberalism are the call for less and better
government, usually framed in terms of  ‘good governance’, and the
promotion of both domestic and foreign private enterprise, which
should act as the motor of economic growth and development.
Despite converging tendencies, the outcome of this neoliberal
agenda appears not to have been uniform because of  variations in
the neoliberal policies of the different African regimes and the
existing structures of  economic and political power. This study
focuses on Cameroon and explores the continuities and changes in
the relations between state and private capital accumulation as a
result of neoliberal globalisation.
Curiously, although there is a growing body of  literature on
neoliberal globalisation in Africa in general, and Cameroon in
particular, its effects on private capital accumulation and state-
capital relations appear not to have been widely studied (Pitcher
2002). This is surprising because, since the 1970s, there has been a
lively debate on these issues in Africa, especially in Kenya, inspired
by the dependencia theory (Leys 1994). The dependistas (the
majority) sought to show that African private capital was weak
economically and politically, and that the subsequent alliance
between the African ‘comprador’ elite and foreign capital was
responsible for the drain of capital from the periphery to the
metropolis. The anti-dependistas, in contrast, argued that while
private African capital was relatively weak, it had grown significantly
and relatively quickly after independence thanks to close links with
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the state apparatus, and could be expected to become still stronger.
Although the dependency-inspired literature suffered serious
limitations in theoretical and empirical terms, it has had the merit
of drawing the attention of researchers to the importance of state-
capital relations in the process of capitalist development.
Of all the neoliberal policy prescriptions, two – namely
privatisation and global open markets – appear to have had the
greatest effect on relations between state and private capital
accumulation in Cameroon and in many other parts of Africa.
Privatisation called for a re-evaluation of relations between public
and private sectors on the continent. Under pressure from
international donors, African governments have been urged to
reduce the scope of state ownership and enhance private-sector
development. International donors tended to attribute the massive
growth of state enterprises after independence and their generally
poor performance to the ‘bad governance’ of  African neopatrimonial
regimes. They claimed that statist conceptions of  development
resulted in the widespread politicisation of economic decision-
making and the rent-seeking behaviour of the parasitic political
elite.
Their criticism is undeniably justified to a certain extent but, as
I have argued elsewhere (Konings 2004a), it tends to underestimate
the importance of a series of other factors responsible for public-
sector expansion. The view that the state should be the prime motor
of development was widely shared in the 1960s, and ownership
and intervention by the state were accepted as the dominant
development paradigm. Public-sector expansion was also
encouraged by the fact that, at independence, Africa’s economies
were characterised by a weak and subordinate domestic private sector
and foreign control. Most post-colonial governments tried to forestall
the development of a national bourgeoisie, which they regarded as
a potential political threat, and to reduce foreign dominance.
Attaining greater ownership and control of the ‘commanding
heights’ of the economy would enable them to influence the broad
direction of  national development. Subsequently, the parastatal
sector came to be viewed as ‘national patrimony’ and sales to
foreigners were regarded negatively. And, last but not least, state
expansion was an essential element in the maintenance and
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consolidation of  power of  African neopatrimonial regimes. It created
ample space for patronage politics that laid a solid foundation for
co-opting the various ethno-regional factions into the ‘hegemonic
alliance’ (Bayart 1979) and thus secured a considerable measure of
political stability for the post-colonial state.
Paradoxically, as this chapter attempts to demonstrate, most of
these factors continue to influence the privatisation process in
Cameroon. Privatisation has been slow, not only because of
numerous technical constraints but also because of  the regime’s
neopatrimonial logic. It has often been marked by a lack of
transparency and accountability, enabling the parasitic political elite
to engage in a variety of  rent-seeking activities. It has also led to
fierce conflict between ethno-regional factions within the hegemonic
alliance about lucrative takeovers. In the absence of  a well-developed
domestic capitalist class and in an effort to discourage any takeovers
by dominant ethnic entrepreneurial groups, the regime has sought
an alliance with foreign capital, which it considered to be of mutual
advantage. It has brought about a concentration of foreign capital
in the most strategic sectors of the economy and minority
participation of the Cameroonian state and private investors in
foreign concerns. While there is growing resistance in Cameroonian
society to what is called ‘recolonisation’, the government claims
that such joint ventures will make a significant contribution to
economic recovery, guarantee some measure of  national control
over the operations of transnational enterprises, and offer the
political elite and allied entrepreneurial groups new opportunities
for capital accumulation.
A second neoliberal prescription – global open markets – has
had the unintended effect of stimulating transnational criminal
activities in African countries that suffer from the nefarious effects
of the economic crisis and economic liberalisation. Engagement in
transnational criminal networks has become a new form of  rapid
private capital accumulation. Despite a lack of clear figures, it is
becoming increasingly evident that Africa’s share in transnational
criminal activity has expanded on an unprecedented scale (Bayart
et al. 1999; Shaw 2002; Bayart 2004), having conquered a substantial
part of the most profitable markets of developed economies, such
as those in drugs, diamonds, illegal immigration and high-value
76
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
minerals. International donors have often blamed the predatory
African political elite for the enormous increase in the parallel
economy and criminal activities during the economic crisis and
economic liberalisation. However, Bayart et al. (1999) allege that
the African political elite itself has become increasingly involved
in transnational criminal networks.
This chapter focuses on the emergence of transnational criminal
networks outside the state, in particular among young, poorly
educated Cameroonian men (and increasingly also women) who have
been the major victims of  neoliberal policies. Through involvement
in such networks, they have succeeded in amassing fabulous wealth
in a short space of  time. Interestingly, they are inclined to re-invest
their ill-gotten gains in a variety of legal entrepreneurial activities
and even in the pursuit of  political power. They form one of  the
exceptional examples of autonomous domestic private capital
accumulation in Africa’s post-colonial history. As Sklar (1979: 531-
52) already pointed out many years ago, politics became the primary
mechanism of  class formation in Africa, as national accumulation
was closely linked to political power. Little wonder then that the
Cameroonian regime has devised several strategies to bring this
autonomous mode of private capital accumulation under state
control, including attempts to co-opt these young entrepreneurs into
the hegemonic alliance.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
discusses the pattern of economic and political power prior to
neoliberal globalisation. The second section analyses the continuities
and changes in the structure of  economic and political power as a
result of privatisation, and the third section concentrates on
transnational criminal networks as a new avenue to domestic private
capital accumulation.
The post-colonial state and capital accumulation
At independence and reunification in 1961, Cameroon inherited an
economy characterised by foreign control, especially French capital,
and the almost complete absence of any domestic private capital
(Hugon 1968). Given this situation, those now in positions of power,
and headed by President Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961-82), soon launched
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a development strategy called planned liberalism (cf. Ndongko 1985;
Fonge 2004), which championed both an intensification of  state
intervention, notably by establishing state-owned companies, and
the encouragement of private investment. Similar development
strategies were implemented in most other African states, albeit
under different names. In this section, I intend to explore the
socioeconomic groups that became the main beneficiaries of this
planned liberalism and their relations with the state.
Like their counterparts elsewhere in Africa (cf. Grosh & Makandala
1994; Tangri 1999), the Cameroonian authorities made a formidable
effort to stimulate parastatal sector growth (Tedga 1990; van de Walle
1994; Konings 2004a). From the handful of public enterprises
inherited from the French and British Trusteeship Authorities, the
Cameroonian parastatal sector grew to 219 enterprises by the mid-
1980s, employing approximately 100,000 people. Generally, statist
conceptions of development, together with economic nationalism
and the need for political patronage, led to an excessive growth of
state-owned enterprises (Tangri 1999: 19-22).
State expansion afforded prebendal and patronage possibilities
and was, therefore, seen by the African political elite as a valuable
mechanism in the consolidation and maintenance of  political power.
According to van de Walle (1994: 155-6), public enterprise in
Cameroon ‘proved to be an ideal instrument to distribute state
resources in the form of  jobs, rents, power and prestige, enabling
the president to reward allies and co-opt opponents, and thus secure
his own power base’. A patrimonial logic existed in many African
post-colonial states (Chabal & Daloz 1999), but was particularly
forceful in Cameroon, a country with stark ethno-regional cleavages
(Gabriel 1999; Nyamnjoh 1999). State resources could be used to
forge the ethno-regional alliances among the various elite groups
necessary for national unity and political stability and to obviate
the need for coercion (Bayart 1979).
In his masterful study Who Rules Cameroon?, Ngayap (1983) notes
that the managers of the largest parastatals were rarely chosen
because of their technical competence; they were instead selected
by virtue of  their political ties. Thus, according to Ngayap, 79 percent
of managers were part of the bureaucratic-political elite, having
previously served in top government positions as ministers, senior
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members of  the president’s staff, or secretaries-general (Ngayap
1983: 248; see also Tedga 1990). If  public enterprises in Africa
have recorded mediocre results, it is almost exclusively due to the
fact that they have been systematically plundered for purposes of
enrichment and the accumulation of power by members of the
bureaucratic and political elite (Hibou 1999; van de Walle 2001).
The political importance of state-owned enterprises is evident
from the fact that the Cameroonian government used to subsidise
parastatal-sector losses to the tune of  FCFA 150 million a year
prior to the start of  the economic crisis in the mid-1980s. Though
much of  Cameroon’s oil revenue continued to be kept in secret
bank accounts, one of its major functions soon became the covering
of  parastatal deficits. In a 1987 review of  the Cameroonian economy,
the World Bank summarised its conclusion in uncharacteristically
colourful terms: ‘The good performance of  the Cameroonian
economy is badly eroded by the festering sore of the public-
enterprise sector’ (World Bank 1987: 3).
In addition to increased state intervention, Ahidjo was convinced
of the vital importance of private initiative in his pursuit of rapid
economic growth and development. Like most other African heads
of state, he came to rely more on foreign than on domestic private
capital for two main reasons. First, foreign investors were not
considered to form an alternative centre of  power to the incumbent
political elite. And second, private foreign investment was seen as
indispensable for Africa’s development in terms of  capital resources,
technology, market access, employment, management and tax
revenues. In his efforts to attract foreign private capital, Ahidjo
designed an investment code that offered foreign entrepreneurs
generous incentives to invest in Cameroon including preferential
tax treatment, subsidies for recruiting and training any necessary
manpower, government contracts, subsidised bank loans, enhanced
access to imported and domestic raw materials, and easy repatriation
of profits (Ndongko 1987; DeLancey 1989).
In many ways, a coincidence of interests developed between
the African state and foreign investors. Indeed, some authors refer
to the ‘symbiotic relationship between multinationals and state’ in
Africa (Tangri 1999: 113). On the one hand, foreign capital enjoyed
a considerable measure of autonomy and substantial benefits while
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conducting its operations in Africa. On the other hand, foreign
investment tended to contribute to economic and social progress
and enhance the political legitimacy of  African regimes. In addition,
foreign business has provided a variety of financial favours to the
African political elite in exchange for political support. Some of
the other benefits of foreign investment to the African elite include
coveted directorships, partnerships and share holdings, all of which
can be used for personal or political advancement.
From the late 1960s onwards, many African governments began
to adopt a more critical stance towards foreign capital, claiming
that it was antithetical to economic development and national
sovereignty. Some countries, like Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zaire, pursued policies of nationalisation that specifically
targeted Middle Eastern and South Asian businesses (van de Walle
2001: 113). In other African countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria,
the governments initiated policies that required specific percentages
of ownership of foreign concerns to be placed in indigenous hands
(Biersteker 1987; Tangri 1999). In sharp contrast to this widespread
resentment in Africa towards foreign domination and exploitation,
the Cameroonian government continued to court foreign investment.
Being one of the most prosperous and stable countries in Africa
(Konings 1996a), Cameroon was able to attract new foreign capital
inflows in spite of the drastic decline in direct foreign investment
rates in Africa since the 1970s. In 1960, some 17 percent of  total
direct foreign investment to developing countries went to Africa
but by the mid-1980s Africa’s share had plummeted to less than 5
percent (Tangri 1999: 116). It was not until the severe economic
crisis started in the mid-1980s that a dramatic drop in direct foreign
investment in Cameroon could be observed, and even a withdrawal
of  some foreign concerns from the country.
With a few exceptions, such as Botswana, Ivory Coast and Kenya
where local capitalists had achieved a stronghold in the state
apparatus (Kennedy 1988; Rapley 1993; Berman & Leys 1994),
African governments have failed to actively support domestic private
initiatives. The main reason appears to be political. Nearly all African
governments viewed the prospect of an autonomous domestic
capitalist class with concern, seeing it as a potential threat to their
positions of  power. Possibilities for private domestic capital
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accumulation therefore remained largely restricted to those
socioeconomic groups that maintained or developed close links with
the state apparatus. Similar to most other African countries (Forrest
1994), there were two main groups in Cameroon that took advantage
of state patronage to create or expand private enterprise.
The first group was made up of the parasitic bureaucratic and
political elite who had used their position of power to pillage state
resources. Most of  them were inclined to either squander their newly
acquired wealth in conspicuous consumption or to deposit it in
foreign bank accounts (Joseph 1987; MacGaffey 1987). Only a small
minority tended to invest in productive enterprise. Some tried to
combine political office with entrepreneurial activities, while others
resigned from office to devote themselves fully to private capital
accumulation.
The career of  Pierre Tchanque seems to be representative of
this group. From modest origins, this bureaucrat from the Bamileke
region in Francophone Cameroon rose to the pinnacles of state
administration before starting his own business. Having been
Secretary-General at the Ministry of Finance from 1966 to 1969,
Assistant-Director General in the state investment company La
Société Nationale d’ Investissement (SNI) from 1969 to 1970, and
Secretary-General of the Union Douanière des États de l’Afrique Centrale
(UDEAC) from 1971 to 1977, he left the public sector. In 1979, he
launched a major new brewery, Nouvelles Brasseries Africaines
(NOBRA), with the help of capital from the SNI and significant
tax and tariff  breaks. To reflect his new status, Tchanque was
appointed to the Central Committee of  the nation’s single party,
the Cameroon National Union (CNU) (Ngayap 1983; van de Walle
1993).
The second group consists of a relatively small number of large
domestic entrepreneurs. They initially started accumulating capital
independently but eventually developed close links with the state
and were able to expand their business activities when they were
co-opted into the hegemonic alliance by the Ahidjo regime (Bayart
1979). Although Ahidjo constantly emphasised the need for an
ethnic balance in the distribution of economic and political power,
there is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence that entrepreneurs from
two ethnic groups enjoyed a privileged position in opportunities for
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capital accumulation (Ngayap 1983; Konings 1996a). These were,
first of all, Fulbe entrepreneurs, especially those from Garoua,
Ahidjo’s hometown. And second there were the Bamileke
entrepreneurs who were given ample room for capital accumulation,
notably in the era of  the UPC rebellion within their territory, on
condition that they supported his regime (see Chapter 2).
It is certain that Ahidjo’s patronage politics have been of  great
help in allowing the Bamileke to become the leading force in
Cameroonian business. The Bamileke ethnic group is known, and
often feared, in Cameroon for its assumed dynamism and
entrepreneurial spirit (Dongmo 1981; Warnier 1993). It values a
disciplined and ascetic lifestyle, encouraging its members to re-invest
any accumulated capital in expanded production rather than squander
it in conspicuous consumption. The bibliographies of the older
generation of Bamileke businessmen are as edifying as those of the
great self-made American business magnates. Being poorly educated,
they began their careers as petty traders and artisans during colonial
rule. Through hard work and thrift they were able to save money in
rotating credit associations, the so-called tontines (Henry et al. 1991).
They used these savings for the gradual expansion of their businesses
and by the end of the colonial period they had already succeeded in
setting up their first large-scale enterprises. Following independence,
they were able to diversify their entrepreneurial activities and to
move into industrial production by establishing close links with the
state, and foreign capital.
The life-story of  Victor Fotso, one of  the biggest Cameroonian
businessmen, is a good example of the kind of business careers the
first generation of Bamileke entrepreneurs enjoyed. Born around
1936, Fotso entered the Catholic school in Baleng at the age of
seven but a year later he was forced to leave to help his father grow
manioc and bananas. As he recalled later in his autobiography (Fotso
& Guyomard 1994), it was at the nearby market in Hiala that he
was introduced to basic trading techniques. He soon migrated to
the south where he became a travelling petty trader. He spent only
a tiny part of his profits on food and clothing in order to save enough
money to expand his business. In 1956 he opened a large store in
the centre of  Mbalmayo, a town near the capital Yaoundé, offering
a variety of  imported goods. His business prospered and, after
82
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
independence, he began to diversify his activities, moving first into
transport and later into the import of wine and alcoholic drinks
after entering into a partnership with the Frenchman Pierre Castel,
the owner of  Brasseries et Glacières Internationales (BGI). A few years
later he set up his first industrial enterprise with the assistance of
another Frenchman, Jacques Lacombe, the director of La Société
Industrielle et Forestière des Allumettes (SIFA). He now owns a large
number of factories involved in the production of matches,
notebooks, batteries, packing materials, chemicals, food and agro-
industrial commodities. He also owns real estate, a hotel (Ibis
Douala) and the Commercial Bank of Cameroon (CBC), created
with the technical assistance of  Crédit Commercial de France (Fotso &
Guyomard 1994; Ngayap 1983).
Fotso and other prominent Bamileke businessmen such as Kadji
Defosso, Paul Monthé, André Souhaing and Pierre Monkam, were
co-opted into either the Central Committee or the Political Bureau
of  the single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), during
its fifth National Congress in 1980. Their close links with the state
apparatus have given them similar opportunities for private capital
accumulation as the bureaucratic and political elite, namely,
privileged access to public loans and contracts, as well as ample
space to engage in a variety of  corrupt and illegal practices including
the evasion of  taxes and import duties. Since the 1970s, this older
generation of Cameroonian businessmen has been joined by a
younger generation of  university-trained professionals.
A significant change in political power and chances for private
capital accumulation occurred in 1982 when Ahidjo suddenly
resigned from office. His successor, Paul Biya, encountered
difficulties in consolidating power (Konings 1996a; Takougang &
Krieger 1998). As a consequence, he began to appoint an increasing
number of the bureaucratic and political elite from his own ethnic
group, the Beti, to pivotal positions in the administration, security
organs and public enterprises (Takougang 1993). He also attempted
to undermine the dominant position of  Bamileke entrepreneurs and
Fulbe wholesale traders by promoting a new class of businessmen
from his own region. This was only partly successful since the Beti
generally lack the business acumen of the Bamileke and Fulbe and
tend to squander any accumulated capital (Tedga 1990; Rowlands
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1993). Moreover, it would appear that the new regime’s barons are
much bolder in staking out claims to the state’s resources than
Ahidjo’s supporters ever were. Corruption and rent-seeking had
always been fundamental characteristics of the regime but after
1984 they increased to the point of being dysfunctional (van de
Walle 1993).
Economic liberalisation has thwarted further growth in the
domestic private sector. With the removal of, or reduction in, trade
restrictions and protection, African markets have been exposed to
a flood of  foreign exports. Competition from foreign manufacturers
has undermined the fortunes of  numerous domestic businesses, and
many local manufacturing firms have experienced severe financial
distress and have had to close down.
Privatisation and capital concentration
Privatisation has become a crucial issue on the neoliberal
globalisation agenda. In 1988-89, the Bretton Woods institutions
forced the neopatrimonial regime in Cameroon to adopt a structural
adjustment programme, making privatisation a cornerstone of their
lending conditions. They claimed that divestiture would bring about
a more efficient and productive economy on the grounds that it
would depoliticise economic decisions and also end the
mismanagement and corruption endemic in enterprises controlled
by politicians. Moreover, it would solve the problem of  rising
budgetary deficits and in the process generate revenue that could
be used to pay off government debt. And, above all, it would
enhance the scope of the private sector, producing a desirable
change in the balance of power between the state and the private
sector. In this section, I explore whether privatisation has actually
led to a decline in the political elite’s neopatrimonial and rent-seeking
activities and a significant change in the chances for private capital
accumulation. In other words, which of the existing socioeconomic
groups has benefited most from privatisation?
There is considerable evidence that the Biya regime has been
extremely reluctant to sell state-owned enterprises, which it looks
upon as a threat to its patronage politics and the maintenance and
consolidation of  its power. Consequently, the initiation and
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execution of a privatisation programme has been slow in Cameroon.
In 1991, a World Bank mission expressed its dissatisfaction with
the government’s performance, pointing to the delay in establishing
effective government agencies to oversee the process, the
government’s reluctance to sell off  anything but bankrupt and
inconsequential enterprises, in-fighting over which firms would be
the first to be sold or liquidated, and foot-dragging over issuing
tenders and devising criteria against which bids could be assessed
(Walker 1998: 4). Again, in its 1994 report Adjustment in Africa:
Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, the World Bank asserted that
little progress had been made in Cameroon in the area of privatisation
(World Bank 1994a). The report rated Cameroon in the bottom
range of  economic policy and adjustment performance and pointed
out that the IMF had signed and cancelled three successive stand-
by agreements because of  the government’s failure to achieve its
negotiated targets (World Bank 1994a).
The slow progress of privatisation is clear in the number of
privatisations that took place between 1989 and 2005. Out of the
219 state-owned enterprises at the start of the process, the
government eventually decided to liquidate 87 and to privatise 30.
Despite the limited number of enterprises on the divestiture list,
no more than 20 had actually been sold by 2005 (see Table 4.1).
Compared to some other African countries, such as Mozambique,
Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and Mali (Bennell 1997; Campbell White
& Bhatia 1998; Tangri & Mwenda 2001; Pitcher 2002; Rakner 2003),
this would seem to be a disappointing result both in number and
implementation. However, one should not overlook the fact that
privatisation in Cameroon, though limited, is a complex process for
technical and political reasons. Many of  the Cameroonian parastatals
set for divestiture are large and strategic enterprises, notably in the
agro-industrial sector, transport, communications and public utilities.
Although the neopatrimonial logic of the regime tended to slow
down the privatisation process in Cameroon, it soon became evident
that privatisation itself did not altogether foreclose rent-seeking
opportunities for the parasitic bureaucratic and political elite. Indeed,
some of  its members have actually been benefiting from it. For
politicians responsible for the privatisation process, privatisation
measures have frequently been an opportunity for corrupt practices.
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Divestiture has mostly been a far from open and transparent process
and, in return for the payment of substantial kickbacks, public
enterprises have been sold at prices far below their true value. There
are even reports of embezzlement of the proceeds from sales
(Kangue Ejangue & Noubissié Ngankam 1995; Nguihé Kanté 2003;
Tsafack-Nanfosso 2004). Moreover, privatisation has not necessarily
excluded members of the bureaucratic and political elite from
occupying top positions in former state-owned enterprises: some
have been reappointed and others have been newly recruited.
Table 4.1  Privatised State Enterprises in Cameroon
Enterprise Sector of 
activity 
          Buyer Foreign 
participation 
(%) 
OCB agro- industry Compagnie Fruitière  
de Marseille (France) 
in 1991 
 
70 
SOCAMAC harbour 
handling 
CCEI Bank (France)  
in 1991 
 
51 
CHOCOCAM cocoa industry Barry SA (France)  
in 1991 
 
   70.7 
SEPBC forest reserve Delmas (France) 
in 1992 
 
70 
COCAM plywood Khoury (Lebanon)  
in 1992 
 
    87.6 
SCDM metallurgy Hobum Afrika 
(Germany) in 1994 
 
    86.6 
HEVECAM agro- industry Golden Millennium 
Group (Malaysia/ 
Indonesia) in 1994  
 
           90 
REGIFERCAM railways SAGA (France) and  
COMAZAR (South 
Africa) in 1994  
 
  77 
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Source: Tsafack-Nanfosso (2004); and Bagui Kari (2001).
ONDAPB agriculture and 
livestock 
Fadil/Daniel Yok 
(Cameroon) in 1995  
 
   34 
SOFIBEL  forestry Fadil (Cameroon)  
in 1995 
 
    45 
SPFS-SRL  agro-industry SIPH (France) 
in 1995 
 
    92 
CAMSHIP shipping several Cameroonian 
investors in 1997 
 
       48.2 
CEPER printing MUPEC Cooperative 
(Cameroon) in 1998 
 
     0 
CAMSUCO agro-industry Vilgrain (France)  
in 1998 
 
       98.1 
BICIC  banking Banques Populaires 
(France) in 1998  
 
       52.5 
SOCAPALM agro-industry PALCAM/COGEPA
RT (France) in 1999  
 
    60 
CAMTEL mobile phones MTN (South Africa) 
and Telecom (France)  
in 2000 
 
  100 
SONEL electricity AES-Sirocco (USA)  
in 2001 
 
    56 
CDC agro-industry 
(tea sector) 
Brobon Finex (South 
Africa) in 2002 
 
     65 
Douala Port  container 
terminals 
MAERSK (Denmark) 
and Bolloré (France) 
in 2004 
 
     59 
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The Biya government has regularly expressed its determination
to promote the participation of private domestic capital in
privatisations and even to give it priority in the process (Atangana
Mebara 1997: 62). For example, in a press release on 1 November
1994, the inter-ministerial Commission for Privatisation stressed
‘the need for creating instruments that could guarantee a consistent
and balanced participation of nationals in the share capital of any
enterprise set for divestiture’ (Nguihé Kanté 2003: 235). A closer
look at the privatised parastatals in Table 4.1, however, reveals
that very few state enterprises have actually been taken over by
domestic private capital.
One reason for this lack of takeovers by nationals is that the
government continues to mistrust the development of  a national
bourgeoisie and is therefore reluctant to give potential national
investors the necessary incentives. Entrepreneurs without sufficient
capital resources face many constraints, including the absence of a
well-established capital market, access to bank loans, and the high
costs of credit. But even entrepreneurs with the necessary capital
resources are often prevented by African regimes from taking over
parastatals out of fear that this might strengthen the dominant
economic position of ethnic rivals (Bennell 1997). The Beti-
dominated government of Paul Biya has persistently tried to thwart
a Bamileke takeover of state assets (Konings 1989; Hibou 1999).
For example, when Bamileke entrepreneurs succeeded in obtaining
a considerable proportion of the share capital in La Société
Camerounaise de Manutention et d’Aconage (SOCAMAC) after its
privatisation in 1991 (see Table 4.1), prominent Beti politicians
declared: ‘SOCAMAC has been a learning process for us and nothing
similar will happen again in the field of privatisations’ (Nguihé
Kanté 2003: 234; Kangue Ejangue & Noubissié Ngankam, 1995:
89). This proved not to be a mere threat. A few years later, in 1994,
the government approved the takeover of La Société Camerounaise de
Métallurgie (SCDM) by a German company, Hobum Afrika, even
though a Bamileke group, Bachirou, had put in a higher bid (FCFA
7 billion against Hobum’s FCFA 3 billion) (Bagui Kari 2001: 67).
Discouragement of Bamileke investment was accompanied by
attempts to promote Beti participation. In September 1998, the
government approved the purchase of Le Centre d’Édition et de
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Production pour l’Enseignement et la Recherche (CEPER) for the sum of
FCFA 5 billion by a former Beti Minister of  National Education
Charles Etoundi and a newly formed cooperative of  Beti teachers
(see Table 4.1).
Another reason for the striking lack of takeovers by nationals
was the failure of the parasitic political elite to purchase strategic
public enterprises as a result of conflicts between ethno-regional
factions within the ruling class. One example is the failed
privatisation attempt of La Société de Développement du Coton
(SODECOTON) in 1995, which some Cameroonian newspapers
described as the year’s greatest political scandal. SODECOTON is
a huge agro-industrial parastatal in Northern Cameroon that has
introduced a contract-farming scheme in which more than 250,000
peasants participate – a clear indication of  the company’s importance
in regional development. A French company, La Compagnie Française
pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT), manages the company
and owns 30 percent of its share capital.
In January 1995, it was announced that the majority of the
company’s shares had been transferred to a new domestic enterprise,
La Société Mobilière d’Investissement du Cameroun (SMIC), with
Cameroon’s treasury keeping its 22 percent and CFDT its 30 percent.
The SMIC turned out to be a small group of politically well-connected
elite, most of them originating from Northern Cameroon, who had
bought the company at a give-away price (about 10 to 15 per cent of
its market value). Prominent members included the lamido (chief) of
Rey Bouba, the President of the National Assembly Cavaye Yigue
Djibril, the Vice Prime Minister Mustapha Amadou, the former Prime
Minister and current National Director of the Banque des États de
l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) Sadou Hayatou, and the ruling party’s
Central Committee member Alhadji Baba Danpullo who is an
Anglophone businessman with close ethnic and religious ties to the
Northern elite. The deal had been approved by the Anglophone Prime
Minister Simon Achidi Achu and the Northern Minister of Industrial
and Commercial Development Bella Bouba Maigari.
Unexpectedly, a few months later the deal was suddenly cancelled
by the Southern Minister of Finance Justin Ndioro with the support
of other Southern and mostly Beti cabinet members and President
Biya himself. Two factors appear to be particularly relevant in
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explaining why the dominant faction in the Biya government
declared the SMIC takeover ‘null and void’. First, it wanted to protect
the government’s shaky standing with international financial
institutions and France, which were both strongly opposed to the
SMIC takeover. The World Bank immediately denounced the
disregard for the guidelines about competitive bidding, the non-
transparency of the exercise, and the ridiculously low price. France
rejected the takeover in order to safeguard CFDT interests. The
CFDT, which had not been previously consulted, was extremely
hostile to privatisation due to its major economic stake in the
Northern cotton industry in general, and in the company in particular.
Its 30-percent share capital in SODECOTON took 70 percent of
its earnings by controlling invoicing and sales abroad. Moreover, it
was afraid that a takeover by politicians would lead to the collapse
of  the Northern cotton industry.
A second reason for the dominant faction’s derailment of  the
SMIC was to maintain Southern dominance over the North and to
avoid the emergence of ethno-regional lobbies for ownership of
strategic national enterprises located in their region. If Northerners
succeeded in seizing SODECOTON, Anglophones might demand
ownership of another strategic agro-industrial enterprise located in
their region, namely the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC)
(Takougang & Krieger 1998: 169-80).
The Northern elite protested vehemently against the
government’s decision to cancel its previously approved contract
of sale. They instituted legal proceedings against the Cameroonian
state that dragged on until 7 August 2001 when a settlement was
reached and SMIC members were handsomely compensated for the
loss of  their shares. However, the final settlement could not conceal
the fact that the SODECOTON privatisation scandal had resulted
in domestic and foreign investors losing confidence in the
transparency and even the credibility of privatisation procedures in
Cameroon. Despite repeated pressure on the government from the
Bretton Woods institutions to privatise the company, the government
has so far failed to attract new investors.
Instead of promoting the development of the domestic private
sector, privatisation has led to a renewed expansion of foreign
private capital. The government has permitted a takeover of  most
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parastatals by foreign investors for reasons similar to those in the
period prior to economic liberalisation: investors such as these bring
much-needed capital resources, proven managerial capabilities, new
technology and market access. Selling to a foreign investor is also
often the only way to avoid accusations of clientelism or tribalism
(Campbell White & Bhatia 1998: 32).
Table 4.1 shows that foreign participation in the new share capital
of  sold parastatals has increased dramatically. As elsewhere in Africa
(Bennell 1997: 1794), foreign investment has been concentrated
among the larger and strategic parastatals that have been sold. A
further concentration of foreign capital in the commanding heights
of the economy is to be expected since the remaining ten parastatals
on the divestiture list belong to the same category of enterprises
and serious negotiations between the Cameroonian government and
foreign concerns about their eventual transfer are already underway.
There also appears to be a concentration of investors from particular
countries rather than a diversification of  foreign investors. The table
reveals that most parastatals in Cameroon have been taken over by
French investors, which is hardly surprising when one takes into
account the close links between Cameroon and France, and the
existing dominance of  French capital in the domestic formal sector.
One French consortium, Bolloré, with its subsidiaries PALCAM/
GOGEPART and SAGA, has made sizeable investments in the
takeover of the Cameroonian railways, agro-industry and Douala
port (see Table 4.1). What is also noteworthy is the substantial
investment by South African private capital in the privatisation
process, which reflects the increasing role of South African investors
on the African continent since the abolition of apartheid.
Although privatisation has reinforced the dominant role of
foreign capital in the domestic economy, both the government and
foreign investors favour minority participation by the Cameroonian
state and private capital in privatised parastatals. The government
hopes that such joint ventures will guarantee some measure of
national control over the policies and activities of multinationals
in the domestic economy and stimulate capital accumulation by
domestic entrepreneurs with close links to the state. Transnational
companies, too, have a vested interest in such joint ventures. These
companies have rapidly adapted themselves to the changing business
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environment and they are now actively seeking domestic alliances
for vertically integrated partnerships that are more suited to their
investment and production strategies (Pitcher 2002: 151).
This minority participation by the Cameroonian state and private
capital in the privatisation process does not prevent the vast majority
of Cameroonian intellectuals from severely criticising foreign
dominance. Resurrecting many of the arguments made by the
dependency theorists in the 1970s, they insist that the state has
relinquished its sovereignty and is now dependent on the dictates
of  foreign investors and global markets. To the extent that
Cameroonian nationals are the beneficiaries of privatisation, they
are only the ‘comprador’ agents for foreign capital, providing a façade
of  domestic involvement when, in reality, foreign investors control
the actual wealth and power (cf. Pitcher 2002: 142). Many
Cameroonian critics have, therefore, referred to the current
privatisation process as ‘neo-colonialism’ or a ‘bargain-sale of the
national patrimony’ (Bagui Kari 2001; Nguiché Kanté 2003;
Tsafack-Nanfosso 2004). Indeed, though generally in favour of
privatisation policies, Nyom (2000: 66) maintains that ‘it is unclear
why the state is selling off in the process the national patrimony to
foreign multinationals for a few dollars’.
It would even appear that resentment of the foreign takeover of
strategic parastatals has become widespread in Cameroonian society,
all the more so because a number of transnational enterprises have
performed far below expectations. A few examples will suffice here.
Since its takeover of La Société Nationale d’Électricité (SONEL) in
2001 for US$ 69 million, the American multinational, AES-Sirocco,
has blatantly failed to keep to its promise of guaranteeing an
uninterrupted supply of  electricity. Various parts of  the country
have suffered from electricity rationing and regular power cuts,
resulting in a reduction in economic output and hardship for
consumers. This, together with excessive increases in the price for
electricity and massive layoffs of workers, has led to several strikes
and boycott actions by its workers and numerous demonstrations
and court cases by consumers. Both workers and consumers have
regularly demanded the departure of  the Americans.
The privatisation of the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC), a huge agro-industrial parastatal in Anglophone Cameroon,
has been frequently postponed (see Chapter 6). This was mainly
92
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
due to fierce resistance by the Anglophones who see its privatisation
as an attempt by the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state
to sell off one of the last-remaining Anglophone economic legacies,
and by the Bakweri ethnic group in particular, which claims
ownership of  the CDC lands. To the consternation of  Anglophones,
it was announced in October 2002 that the CDC tea sector had
been sold to a South African consortium, Brobon Finex PTY
Limited, which would run it under the name of  Cameroon Tea
Estates (CTE).1
As with SODECOTON, the privatisation of  the CDC tea estates
became a national scandal when it became known how the takeover
by Brobon Finex had been effected and who was going to benefit
from the transaction. On his own admission, it became clear that
its privatisation had been masterminded by John Niba Ngu, a former
CDC General Manager and Minister of Agriculture, who is generally
known to be a close friend of President Biya. He used both his
technical knowledge and his many connections in the highest
echelons of the regime to arrange the privatisation of the CDC tea
estates. While experts had conservatively estimated the estate’s value
at about FCFA 3.2 billion, Ngu managed to bring the price down to
FCFA 1.5 billion. Less than three months later, the CTE sold tea
worth FCFA 4.6 billion. In return for his excellent services, the
CTE board allocated Ngu 5 percent of  the company’s share capital
and appointed him General Manager with a monthly salary and fringe
benefits amounting to FCFA 4 million.
It also came to light that the major shareholder in the CTE was
Alhadji Baba Danpullo, a well-known businessman with close links
to the state apparatus who, like Ngu, comes originally from the
North West Province of  Anglophone Cameroon. He had previously
been involved in the SODOCOTON privatisation scandal (see
above). Danpullo was the one who put Ngu in contact with Brobon
Finex and it is alleged that he was able to launder a substantial sum
of  money by participating in Brobon Finex’s takeover. Through this
financial transaction he acquired a powerful position within the CTE.
By becoming a member of its board of directors he was able to
replace the former CDC managers with people from his other
companies in Cameroon who were loyal to him but who lacked
experience in tea production. He also fired Ngu when the latter
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dared to dismiss for incompetence twenty-three of the newly
appointed managers. As a result of  mismanagement and its
inexperience in tea cultivation, the CTE is presently facing a variety
of  problems. On 15 January 2004, it laid off  585 workers ‘in a bid
to reduce the company’s cost of  production which has soared to an
unbearable level’.2 As a result of these developments, popular
resistance to foreign takeovers has been strengthened both in the
region and in the country as a whole.
Globalisation and new forms of  domestic private
capital accumulation
As elsewhere in post-colonial Africa, domestic private capital
accumulation has tended to be associated with the possession of
political power in Cameroon. During the process of neoliberal
globalisation, a new form of  domestic private capital accumulation
has emerged that appears to be more or less independent of the
state and is designated as feymania, a pidgin English expression
meaning to ‘fool’ or ‘cheat’ someone (Malaquais 2001; Ndjio 2006).
It came to refer to a specific mode of rapid capital accumulation as
a result of involvement in transnational networks of criminal
activities.
Remarkably, feymania emerged among a socioeconomic group that
had been badly hit by the economic crisis and economic liberalisation,
namely young men living in the slums of  Cameroon’s largest cities,
notably New Bell in Douala and Madagascar in Yaoundé (Konings
2006c). Initially, most of  them belonged to the entrepreneurial
Bamileke ethnic group. They tended to be poorly educated and they
found it hard to get a job in the formal sector during the economic
crisis and economic liberalisation. They mostly tried to eke out a
livelihood by engaging in a variety of  informal and criminal
activities, such as petty trade and production, smuggling and theft,
and some of  them formed criminal gangs that terrorised the local
population. Unsurprisingly, they were constantly on the lookout for
ways to escape poverty.
The early 1990s was the heyday of political liberalisation when
the newly created opposition parties still formed a serious challenge
to the ruling party, the CPDM, and the autocratic and corrupt Biya
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regime. Feeling, like other Bamileke, discriminated against by the
Beti-dominated regime, the young slum residents saw the overthrow
of the Biya regime and political change as avenues to socioeconomic
advancement. They were, therefore, inclined to support the main
opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) – a party based
in the North West Province of  Anglophone Cameroon where the
population is ethnically related to the Bamileke (see Chapter 3).
Many of them participated in the 1991-92 ‘ghost town’ campaign
(see Chapter 2). I have mentioned elsewhere that this civil-
disobedience action was particularly successful in the opposition
stronghold of New Bell where there were numerous violent
confrontations between demonstrators and the forces of law and
order, resulting in several deaths and numerous injuries (Konings
2006c).
When the opposition eventually failed to overthrow the Biya
regime and bring about political change, some of the marginalised
youth switched to feymania as an avenue to rapid capital
accumulation. Existing and newly formed criminal gangs of
Bamileke youth joined or created transnational criminal networks
stretching from the African continent to Western Europe, where
Paris became the main centre of feymania activities, the Middle East
and South East Asia (Malaquais 2001). For instance, one of  the
first and most powerful transnational criminal networks was created
by the renowned feyman Donatien Koagne, nicknamed the King of
Cameroon, a young Bamileke man from New Bell in Douala. His
group had at least 100 members, the vast majority of whom were
Bamileke youth. Ndjio (2006) estimates the number of young
Cameroonians involved in feymania to be about 2,000.
Feymen groups are involved in a variety of  criminal activities.
They persuade their victims that they are being offered fabulous
bargains. They are adept at selling goods, which do not in fact exist,
and propose non-existent projects to development and aid agencies
so as to defraud foreign embassies. They claim to be able to multiply
banknotes, which has become one of their most successful tricks
to dupe leading politicians and wealthy businessmen in Africa and
elsewhere. They are also engaged in the international trafficking of
drugs, diamonds, arms, works of  art, human organs, and young
girls for organised prostitution. A number of national and
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international newspapers connect Cameroonian feymen with Nigerian
drug traffickers and Congolese and Liberian diamond smugglers
who are increasingly active in Western Europe and South Africa
(Bayart et al. 1999). In addition, they are involved in counterfeiting
not only banknotes but also credit cards and passports, money
laundering, smuggling, usury, speculation, embezzlement, and the
theft of  luxury cars and other valuable items.
As a result of these and other criminal activities, they have been
able to amass fabulous wealth in a short space of time and, unlike
the older generation of Bamileke entrepreneurs, they are not
ashamed of displaying their newly acquired wealth. The attitude of
the Cameroonian population towards this new mode of capital
accumulation would seem to be ambivalent. The older generation
is inclined to question the supposedly mysterious origins of the
feymen’s sudden wealth, often associating it with sorcery and
witchcraft. In sharp contrast, the younger generation tends to admire
their achievements, seeing the feymen as role models and national
heroes (Malequais 2001; Ndjio 2006).
However, it would be wrong to assume that feymen, as the parasitic
political elite, are inclined to merely squander their accumulated
capital. While they tend to maintain a lavish lifestyle, most of them
do reinvest some of  their wealth in productive enterprises. Curiously,
an increasing number of feymen are tending to invest their ill-gotten
gains in a variety of legal entrepreneurial activities, albeit without
abandoning their criminal activities altogether. In fact, they have
come to occupy a dominant position in certain sectors of the national
economy, taking advantage in some cases of  the government’s
liberalisation policies.
Without doubt, the current boom in the gambling industry in
Cameroon has to be attributed to a large extent to the initiatives of
feymen. After the legalisation in the early 1990s of what are known
in Cameroon as ‘games of chance and hazard’, a large number of
feymen invested their illegally acquired wealth in the gambling
industry. This form of  investment has proved to be of  mutual benefit
to the new investors themselves and to the state: it has become a
major source of private capital accumulation for feymen and of tax
revenue for the state. One of the largest investors in the gambling
industry is Claude Feutheu, alias Claude le Parisien (he owes this
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nickname to his feymania activities in Paris) who is known in
Cameroon as the ‘King of Bally-Bally’. This notorious Bamileke
feyman owns several casinos and gambling houses in the country.
His company, Fortuna Cameroon, is the largest enterprise in the
country’s gambling industry, employing over 100 nationals and about
20 Europeans. His associations with a Dutch company, Holland
Casino, have enabled him to broaden his activities and to do
business in the neighboring countries of Gabon, Chad, Congo-
Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea (Ndjio 2006).
Some feymen have set up large companies that are involved in the
import and selling of new and second-hand clothes and cars, mostly
in partnership with foreign entrepreneurs. Selling second-hand
clothes has become another booming business following the
legalisation of such imports in December 1990 and the sharp fall in
the purchasing power of a large section of the population since
drastic reductions in wages and salaries in 1993 (Konings 1996a).
The expanding second-hand clothes market has even threatened
local textile manufacturing. Feymen who are involved in the car
business usually sell second-hand cars, but a few import new luxury
cars to sell to the Cameroonian upper classes and to other feymen. In
addition, almost all feymen have invested in real estate in the large
cities. Some, like Claude le Parisien, have also set up big construction
companies and a few who are based in Paris have moved into music
production and catering.
Interestingly, a growing number of  feymen have begun to use their
economic power for the pursuit of political power, standing as
candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections. No fewer than
30 prominent feymen – accounting for one sixth of all seats in the
National Assembly – were elected in the 1997 parliamentary
elections.
Confronted with this new and autonomous mode of domestic
private capital accumulation, the regime has devised a number of
strategies to bring it under state control. Initially, feymen were
presented as professional swindlers and crooks involved in
transnational criminal networks. Some leading Beti politicians were
even convinced that feymania was a new Bamileke scheme to assert
their economic dominance over other ethnic groups and to discredit
the country’s international reputation, claiming that Cameroon was
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now seen as a country of swindlers and criminals (Ndjio 2006).
Some feymen were arrested and jailed but repression proved
unsuccessful, all the more so because some powerful members of
the government, including the former Chief  of  Security Services
Jean Fochivé and the former Vice Prime Minister in charge of
Territorial Administration Gilbert Andzé Tchoungui, tended to
protect the most renowned feymen such as Donatien Koagne and
Claude le Parisien to ensure personal gains.
In reaction to the rapid expansion of feymania and the growing
economic and political power of feymen, a shift in government
strategies can be observed from the mid-1990s onwards. The first
tactic was to make the safety of feymen and their success in legal
and illegal activities dependent on their allegiance to the regime in
power. Consequently, feymen who joined the ruling CPDM party were
not only assured of state protection and the legitimisation of their
ill-gotten wealth but also given similar rent-seeking opportunities
as other businessmen with close ties to the state. These feymen were
now presented in public discourse as young, dynamic Cameroonian
entrepreneurs who were making a significant contribution to
economic revival, and as role models for the youth. The regime
even started actively promoting the emergence of a group of feymen
among the better-educated youth with close ethnic or family ties to
the ruling class. These new feymen, mostly of  Beti origin, were
regularly given lucrative state contracts or import licenses. They
became derisively dubbed as ‘fake’ feymen or feymen du Renouveau
(‘renouveau’ or renewal being the regime’s ideological label).
Conversely, feymen who refused to join the ruling party or were active
in opposition continued to be presented as criminals and to be
exposed to arbitrary arrest.
A second tactic was to co-opt the most prominent feymen into
the hegemonic alliance. Some became members of either the Central
Committee of the CPDM or were prominent among the leadership
of  one of  the ruling party’s satellite organisations. Others were
offered the opportunity to be elected as a member of parliament,
mayor or local councilor on a CPDM ticket, even at the expense of
former politicians. The co-optation of  feymen has evidently been of
benefit to both the ruling party and the regime: they have been of
great help in financing party activities and have acted as vote-banks
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during elections. Nevertheless, it would appear that the regime is
trying to keep them away from the centre of power so as not to
enhance their political influence. None of the co-opted feymen has
yet been appointed to a top position in the party or government.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to analyse the effects of two key
policy prescriptions of  the neoliberal reform package, namely
privatisation and global open markets, on the existing structures of
economic and political power in Cameroon. It has shown the
continuities and changes in relations between the Cameroonian state
and private capital accumulation.
While privatisation has been one of the cornerstones of the
neoliberal agenda, linking good governance to private-sector
development, it is evident from this study that it has not presented
as big a break with the previous dynamic of the post-colonial state
as the Bretton Woods institutions and international financiers would
have expected. Most African governments have only reluctantly
accepted the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and their
calculations as to how their political concerns can best be served
have shaped the outcome of the privatisation process in a decisive
manner.
There is ample evidence to show that privatisation has failed to
free the Cameroonian parastatal sector from ‘politics’, in particular
from the government’s neopatrimonial logic which is seen as the
basic reason for its malfunctioning. State enterprises continue to
form an essential element in government patronage politics, which
has not only helped to maintain political stability in the country’s
vulnerable political system but has also been attractive to the
political class that has selfishly used it as a clear avenue to capital
accumulation.
Privatisation has failed to introduce transparency, accountability
and the rule of  law in policy-making and the implementation needed
for the efficient operation of  market forces. Lack of  transparency
in transactions surrounding the sale of state-owned enterprises has
been a major concern among prospective investors. In part, this can
be attributed to weaknesses in the management capabilities of those
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who have been entrusted to implement privatisation programmes.
To a large extent, however, poor transparency has been the direct
consequence of the parasitic behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats
eager to cream off, perhaps for the last time, sizable rents. Pre-
emptive divestitures are particularly susceptible to the
underevaluation of assets and the preferential treatment of a
particular bidder in return for kickbacks for leading politicians and
bureaucrats (Bennell 1997).
Privatisation has equally failed to stimulate domestic private
capital. The weakness of domestic private capital and the persistent
fear of the Cameroonian post-colonial state of the emergence of a
vigorous and autonomous national capitalist class are undeniably
the major reasons for the blatant underrepresentation of nationals
in the divesture exercise. The Cameroonian government has
particularly discouraged any takeovers by Bamileke entrepreneurs,
the dominant economic group among domestic private capital, and
ethno-regional elite groups, which it perceives as a severe threat to
Beti political power and the nation-state. Privatisation has instead
strengthened the role of foreign capital to such an extent that it
now dominates the most strategic sectors of  the economy. The
economic and political benefits to be gained from foreign investment
have caused the regime to welcome it and to push aside any negative
comments. Foreign capital was expected to contribute to an
economic recovery and thus enhance the regime’s legitimacy. In
addition, through profitable joint ventures foreign investors would
promote the business interests of a number of high-ranking
politicians and bureaucrats as well as entrepreneurs with close links
to the regime. This study, however, has shown that the transfer of
the ‘national patrimony’ to foreign capital and the poor performance
of  some foreign concerns have led to further erosion of  the regime’s
legitimacy among the local population.
In sharp contrast to privatisation, global open markets have had
the unintended effect of offering chances of private capital
accumulation to Cameroon’s marginalised youth. By engaging in
transnational criminal networks and re-investing part of their newly
found wealth in legitimate entrepreneurial activities, these young
men laid the foundations for their current economic and political
power. This new and autonomous form of  private capital
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accumulation has posed a serious challenge to the existing power
structures that are based on close ties between political and
economic power. As a result, the government has tried to submit
feymen to state control by co-opting them into the hegemonic alliance,
albeit in a subordinate position.
Notes
  1. For a detailed discussion of  the privatisation of  the CDC’s tea estates,
see Konings (2011: 149-153).
  2. CTE Press Release, 15 January 2004.
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Political liberalisation and Anglophone
secessionist movements in Cameroon
Introduction
Secession has been rare in post-colonial Africa and has been strongly
opposed by newly independent states and the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) in an attempt to safeguard territorial integrity.
Secessionist claims have, however, been on the rise since the end
of  the 1980s in the wake of  political liberalisation in Africa. Eritrea’s
independence in 1993, after several decades of a national war of
liberation, is, significantly, the only example of  a formal
reorganisation of  the continent’s political map.
Of late, some Africanists have been trying to explain the reasons
for Africa’s remarkable ‘secessionist deficit’ and to identify the
various internal and external factors accounting for the failure or
success of past and on-going secessionist claims on the continent
(cf. Forrest 2004; Englebert & Hummel 2005; Keller 2007).
Curiously, in their critical review of  African secessionist movements,
they have failed to discuss Anglophone secessionist movements in
Cameroon.
This chapter tries to fill the lacuna. It will be argued that the
deep roots of current Anglophone secessionist claims can be found
in what has come to be called the ‘Anglophone problem’, which is
posing a major challenge to the post-colonial state’s efforts to forge
national unity and integration. There is a widespread feeling in
Anglophone Cameroon that reunification with Francophone
Cameroon in 1961 has led to a growing marginalisation of the
Anglophone minority in the post-colonial nation-state project that
is controlled by the Francophone political elite and endangers
Anglophone cultural heritage and identity. Although Anglophone
resistance has been a permanent feature of  Cameroon’s post-colonial
biography (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003), it was not until political
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liberalisation in the early 1990s that the Anglophone elite began to
mobilise the regional population against the allegedly subordinated
position of  Anglophones. Claims were made for self-determination
and autonomy, first in the form of  a return to a federal state and
later, after persistent refusals by the Biya regime to discuss the
federal option, for outright secession. It is important to mention
that the Anglophone secessionist movement differs from most other
secessionist movements in Africa in that it wants to achieve an
independent Anglophone state through peaceful negotiations rather
than force.
Since the Biya government is continuing to uphold the unitary
state and simply dismisses the secessionist option, the Anglophone
leadership has adopted two main strategies to achieve its aim. On
the one hand, it is trying to gain international recognition for its
cause and, on the other, it is sensitising the Anglophone population
to its objectives and strategies and mobilising it for possible action
against the Francophone-dominated unitary state.
Finally, the chapter will show why, for a number of  reasons, the
prospects of  Anglophone secession are somewhat bleak. Firstly,
the relevant international organisations continue to favour territorial
integrity. Secondly, the Francophone-dominated state has devised
a series of divisive and repressive tactics that have proved largely
successful in containing the Anglophone danger and in controlling
Anglophone organisation. One of the immediate consequences has
been that Anglophone nationalists have had to resort to less visible
and controllable forms of  protest. Anglophones in the diaspora have
quickly underscored the importance of the Internet for raising
Anglophone consciousness and promoting the virtual representation
of  the Anglophone cause within and outside Cameroon. And thirdly,
it has become increasingly evident that there are internal divisions
among the leadership of the various Anglophone movements and
the Anglophone elite as a whole about the policies and strategies
for redressing the Anglophone problem and determining the nature
of  the state’s future form. One of  the main cleavages in the
Anglophone elite can be attributed to ethno-regional divisions and
tensions within the Anglophone community itself, particularly those
between the South West Province (the coastal-forest area) and the
inland savannah area (the so-called Grassfields), today’s North West
Province.
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This chapter is divided into five sections. The first provides an
insight into the Anglophone problem; the second describes the
Anglophone historical trajectory to secessionist claims in the political
liberalisation era; the third deals with the Anglophone leadership’s
struggle for international recognition of  its secessionist stand; and
the fourth documents the leadership’s sensitisation and mobilisation
campaign. And finally, the fifth section explores the future prospects
for Anglophone secessionist claims.
The Anglophone problem
The emergence of Anglophone secessionist movements in Cameroon
during the current process of political liberalisation cannot be
explained without reference to the so-called ‘Anglophone problem’
(cf. Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997, 2003; Eyoh 1998a; Jua 2003b).
Its roots can be traced back to the partitioning between the French
and British of  the German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) after
the First World War, first as mandates under the League of  Nations
and then as trusts under the United Nations. As a result of
partitioning, the British acquired two narrow and non-contiguous
regions in the western part of  the country, bordering Nigeria. The
southern part, which is the focus of  our study, was named Southern
Cameroons, and the northern part became known as Northern
Cameroons.1 Significantly, the British territory was much smaller
than the French one, comprising only about 20% of the total area
and the population of  the former German colony.
The partitioning of the territory into British and French spheres
had important consequences for political developments, laying the
historical and spatial foundations for the construction of
Anglophone and Francophone identities in the territory. The
populations in each region came to see themselves as distinct
communities defined by differences in language and inherited
colonial traditions of  education, law, public administration and
world-view. Second, while French Cameroon was incorporated into
the French colonial empire as a distinct administrative unit separate
from neighbouring French Equatorial Africa, the British Cameroons
was administered as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria,
which led to the neglect of its socio-economic development and
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the increasing migration of  Nigerians, notably the Igbo, to Southern
Cameroons, where they came to dominate the regional economy
(Konings 2005c). There was every indication, particularly in the
period preceding reunification, that Britain intended to integrate
Southern Cameroons into Nigeria, in spite of its distinct status as a
trust territory (Awasom 1998). The dominant position of  the Igbo
in the regional economy and administration was deeply resented by
the local population and resulted in an explosive situation after the
Second World War when regional politicians started exploiting the
‘Igbo scare’ in nationalist struggles (Amazee 1990). It was not
therefore surprising that the nationalist struggles in Southern
Cameroons had more of an anti-Nigerian than an anti-colonial
character.
Southern Cameroonian nationalists started attacking the
subordinate position of Southern Cameroons in the British-Nigerian
colonial system and the dominant position of the Igbo in Southern
Cameroons. They initially claimed a larger representation of  the
Southern Cameroons elite in the Nigerian administration, and later
regional autonomy. In response to their pressure, the British
authorities gradually increased Southern Cameroonian
representation in the Nigerian administration after the Second World
War. And following successive constitutional changes, they granted
Southern Cameroons a quasi-regional status and a limited degree
of self-government in 1954, and full regional status within the
Federation of  Nigeria in 1958 (Ngoh 2001). For part of  the Southern
Cameroonian elite, organised by Dr E.M.L. Endeley in the South
West-based Kamerun National Congress (KNC) party, this was the
reason to shift from an anti-Nigerian stance to a more positive view
of Nigeria. From their perspective, regional status seemed a
satisfactory answer to the problem of Nigerian domination, the lack
of Southern Cameroonian participation in the Nigerian political
system, and economic stagnation.
Interestingly, from the late 1940s onwards, the question of
reunification had cropped up in the programmes of various Southern
Cameroonian pressure groups and newly created parties, raising the
possibility of an alternative political option for Southern Cameroons
to escape from its subordinate position in the colonial system and
Igbo domination. A number of factors underpinned their
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reunification campaign. There was the emergence of  the ‘Kamerun
idea’ among some members of the Southern Cameroonian elite and
the belief  that the period of  German rule had created a Cameroon
identity or nation (Welch 1966: 158-88; Johnson 1970: 42). It has
been pointed out that such irredentist feelings of one Cameroon
under German administration hardly corresponded with reality since
German colonial rule had simply been too short to create a
Cameroonian identity among the territory’s multiplicity of  ethnic
groups (Ardener 1967; Chem-Langhëë & Njeuma 1980; Ebai 2009).
However Kofele-Kale (1980) argued that it was not the reality of
the German experience but memories and myths (factual or
otherwise) that inspired the Southern Cameroonian elite to start
advocating reunification. To strengthen their arguments, the elite
referred to the close relationship between ethnic groups on both
sides of  the British-French Cameroon border. This boundary, they
stressed, was regarded as an unnecessary inconvenience by the
people in the area because it restricted the free movement of people
belonging to the same ethnic group.
It must nevertheless be pointed out that the idea of reunification
was much more popular among Francophones than among
Anglophones (Awasom 2000). Its loyal flag bearers were from the
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), the radical nationalist party
in French Cameroon (Joseph 1977; Mbembe 1996) and among
Francophone immigrants in Southern Cameroons who saw
reunification principally as a way of removing their second-class
citizenship in Southern Cameroons and discrimination by the British
Administering Authority (Amazee 1994; Njeuma 1995).
Significantly, the Southern Cameroons elite initially regarded the
propagation of  reunification as an effective strategy that would
encourage the British administration to grant their territory either a
larger measure of  autonomy within the Nigerian Federation or
separation from Nigeria altogether. Dr Endeley’s rejection of  this
idea in 1954 after the Southern Cameroons attained the status of
semi-autonomous region attests to the fact that it was not a genuine
concern among the people. Even John Ngu Foncha, the leader of
the North West-based Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP)
which was championing reunification, had picked up the
reunification idea merely as an electoral slogan to combat Endeley’s
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new position. And perhaps even more importantly, he saw
reunification not as an immediate goal but as an issue to be negotiated
after the territory’s separation from Nigeria and a period of  continued
trusteeship or independence. Besides being a slogan in Anglophone
Cameroon, the idea of reunification had been rejected by the French
colonial administration and most of the Francophone political elite.
With Nigeria approaching independence in 1960, the population
of  the British trust territory needed to decide on its own political
future. It soon became evident that the majority of Southern
Cameroonians did not favour joining either Nigeria or Francophone
Cameroon, but wanted to form an independent state (Awasom 2000;
Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). That this expressed wish was
eventually not honoured must be attributed to two main factors.
First, internal divisions within the Anglophone political elite
prevented them from rallying behind the majority option in the
territory. And second, the UN refused, with the complicity of  the
British, to put the option of an independent Southern Cameroons
state to the vote in the UN-organised plebiscite on 11 February
1961 (Percival 2008), on the grounds that the creation of another
tiny state was politically undesirable (and likely to contribute to a
further ‘Balkanisation’ of Africa) and economically unviable.2
Deprived of their preferred option, Southern Cameroonians were
given what amounted to Hobson’s choice, i.e. a choice they had to
accept whether they liked it or not. In this case it was independence
by joining Nigeria or reunification with Francophone Cameroon,
which had become independent in 1960 under the new name of
the Republic of Cameroon. Three smaller Southern Cameroonian
parties – the Kamerun United Party (KUP) led by Paul Kale, the
Cameroons Commoners’ Congress (CCC) led by Chief Stephen
Nyenti, and the Cameroons Indigenes Party (CIP) under Jesco Manga
Williams – immediately contested the UN limitation of plebiscite
options, insisting on the inclusion of an independent Southern
Cameroons state as a third option. They sent several petitions to
the UN, threatening to boycott the plebiscite if  their wish was not
honoured. Their protest actions did not, however, bear fruit (Ngoh
1990: 179-80). In the end, the majority of Southern Cameroonians
voted for what they considered the lesser of  two evils. Their vote
in favour of reunification appeared to be more a rejection of
continuous ties with Nigeria, which had proved detrimental to
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Southern Cameroonian development, than a vote for union with
Francophone Cameroon, a territory with a different cultural heritage
and one that was then involved in a violent civil war (Joseph 1977).
As Susungi (1991) aptly observed, reunification was far from being
the reunion of two prodigal sons who had been unjustly separated
at birth, but was more like a loveless UN-arranged marriage between
two people who hardly knew each other.3
By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone
elite had hoped to enter a loose federal union as a way of protecting
their territory’s minority status and cultural heritage (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003). Instead, it became evident that the Francophone
elite wanted to have a highly centralised, unitary state to promote
national unity and economic development. Obviously, the bargaining
position of the Francophone elite was far greater than that of the
Anglophones. The former French Trust Territory of  Cameroon, now
renamed the Republic of Cameroon, was already a much larger
independent state. Moreover, the Francophone elite received strong
support from the French during constitutional negotiations, while
the Anglophone elite were virtually abandoned by the British, who
deeply resented the Southern Cameroons option for reunification
with Francophone Cameroon (Awasom 2000). As a result, a rumour
quickly spread that Charles de Gaulle saw Southern Cameroons as
‘a small gift from the Queen of England to France’ (Milne 1999:
432-148; Gaillard 1994).
During the constitutional talks at Foumban in July 1961, the
Francophone elite were only prepared to accept a highly centralised
federation, which was regarded merely as a transitional phase
towards the formation of  a unitary state. Such a federation
demanded relatively few amendments to the 1960 Constitution of
the Republic of  Cameroon. Interestingly, Pierre Messmer (1998:
134-35), one of the last French high commissioners in Cameroon
and a close advisor to President Ahmadou Ahidjo, pointed out that
he and others knew at the time that the so-called federal constitution
provided merely a ‘sham federation’, which was ‘safe for
appearances, an annexation of  West Cameroon’ (the new name of
the former Southern Cameroons) (Anyangwe 2009). The final
version of the constitution was only approved by the Parliament of
the Republic of Cameroon on 1 September 1961, just one month
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prior to reunification. For this reason, the present Anglophone
movements declared in 1993 that ‘the union between the Southern
Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon had proceeded without
any constitutional basis’ (All Anglophone Conference 1993: 12).
Under its new constitution, West Cameroon lost most of  the
limited autonomy it had enjoyed as part of the Nigerian federation
(Ardener 1967; Stark 1976). Even worse, a few months after
reunification, President Ahidjo created a system of regional
administration in which West Cameroon was designated as one of
six regions, basically ignoring the country’s federal system. The
regions were headed by powerful federal inspectors who, in the case
of  West Cameroon, in effect overshadowed the prime minister with
whom they were in frequent conflict concerning jurisdiction (Stark
1976). In addition, the West Cameroon government could barely
function since it had to depend entirely on subventions from the
federal government that controlled its major sources of revenue
(Benjamin 1972).
To achieve his objective of  total integration by the Anglophone
minority into a strongly centralised, unitary state, Ahidjo used several
tactics. One was to play Anglophone political factions off  against
each other and eventually integrate them into a single party, the
Cameroon National Union (CNU). Another was to eliminate from
positions of power any Anglophone leaders who remained
committed to federalism, replacing them with others who favoured
a unitary state. Still another tactic was to create ‘clients’ among the
Anglophone elite. By granting top positions in the federal institutions
and in the single party to representatives of significant ethnic and
regional groups in the Anglophone region, he tried to control these
groups. Finally, he did not shrink from repressing opposition.
Through these and other tactics he succeeded in abolishing the
federation in 1972 in blatant disregard of  constitutional provisions.
His justification for this ‘glorious revolution’ was that federalism
fostered regionalism and impeded economic development.
A growing number of Anglophones were, however, inclined to
attribute the emergence of regionalism and the lack of economic
development not to federalism per se but to the hegemonic tendencies
of  the Francophone-dominated state. For them, the nation-state
project after reunification was driven by the firm determination of
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the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority
and erase the cultural and institutional foundations of Anglophone
identity (Eyoh 1998a). Several studies have shown that Anglophones
have regularly been relegated to inferior positions in the national
decision-making process and have been constantly underrepresented
in ministerial as well as senior- and middle-management positions
in the administration, the military and parastatals (Kofele-Kale
1986; Takougang & Krieger 1998). There is also general agreement
that Anglophones have been exposed to a carefully considered policy
aimed at eroding their language and institutions, even though
Francophone political leaders assured their Anglophone counterparts
during constitutional talks on reunification that the inherited colonial
differences in language and institutions would be respected in the
bilingual union. And last but not least, the relative under-
development of the Anglophone region shows that it has not
benefited sufficiently from its rich agricultural potential and its oil
resources. Oil revenues were alleged to have been used by those in
power to feed ‘the bellies’ of their allies (Bayart 1989) and to
stimulate the economy in other regions. This gradually created an
Anglophone consciousness: feelings of being recolonised and
marginalised in all spheres of public life and thus of being second-
class citizens in their own country.
To reduce the danger of  any united Anglophone action against
the Francophone-dominated state, Ahidjo decided after the
‘revolution’ of 20 May 1972 to divide the Anglophone territory
into two provinces, South West and North West Provinces. When
making this decision, he was well aware of the internal contradictions
within the Anglophone community between the coastal-forest people
in the South West Province and the Grassfields people in the North
West Province (see Chapter 3).
Lack of unity and severe repression precluded the Anglophone
elite from openly expressing its grievances about Francophone
domination until 1982 when Paul Biya took power. Following the
limited degree of liberalisation introduced by the new president
(Takougang & Krieger 1998), the Anglophone elite began to voice
their long-standing grievances (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). There
was vehement Anglophone protest when the new president changed
the country’s official name from the ‘United Republic of  Cameroon’
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to simply the ‘Republic of  Cameroon’ in February 1984. The new
name was not only similar to that of independent Francophone
Cameroon prior to reunification but also appeared to ignore the
fact that the Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct
entities. In Anglophone circles, Biya’s unilateral name change seems
to have given rise to two different interpretations. Some
Anglophones considered this action as the boldest step yet taken
towards their assimilation and disappearance as a distinct founding
community. For them, the new name was clear evidence that, as far
as Biya was concerned, the Anglophone territory and its people had
lost their identity and become an indistinguishable part of  the former
Republic of  Cameroon, thus allowing Ahidjo’s designs for absorbing
and assimilating the Anglophone minority into the Francophone-
dominated state to be fulfilled (Biya 1987).
Other Anglophones argued that, by this action, La République du
Cameroun had unilaterally seceded from the union and thus lacked
any constitutional base from which to continue ruling the former
Southern Cameroons.4 They are inclined to appeal to the UN to
assist its former trust territory in peacefully separating from La
République (Anyangwe 2008). This view was first expressed by Fon
Gorji Dinka, the eminent Anglophone lawyer and first president of
the Cameroon Bar Association. On 10 March 1985, Dinka addressed
a memorandum to Paul Biya entitled ‘The New Social Order’,5 in
which he declared the Biya government to be unconstitutional and
called for Southern Cameroons to become independent and be
renamed the Republic of Ambazonia.6 Dinka was arrested and
imprisoned without trial until January 1986, which earned him the
status of martyr for the Anglophone cause.
As the Biya government was increasingly stepping up repression
in a situation of deepening economic and political crisis, it was not
until political liberalisation in the early 1990s that Anglophones
openly started to organise in defence of  their interests.
The Anglophone movements’ struggle for secession
Anglophones have not only played a leading role in accomplishing
political liberalisation in Cameroon but have also used the
liberalisation of political space to create or reactivate various
organisations to represent their interests.
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Given Anglophone frustration with the Francophone-dominated
state, it is not surprising that the country’s first opposition party
emerged in Anglophone Cameroon in 1990. Capitalising on
Anglophone disenchantment with the regime, the Social Democratic
Front (SDF) was formed in Bamenda, the capital of  North West
Province, under the leadership of  John Fru Ndi. Paradoxically and
despite its immense contribution to Anglophone consciousness and
action, the party soon began presenting itself as a national rather
than as an Anglophone party, as was evidenced by its growing
Francophone membership of mostly Bamileke living in the
Francophone part of the Grassfields and who are ethnically related
to groups in North West Province (see Chapter 3). Since the SDF
adopted a half-hearted stand towards the Anglophone problem,
Anglophone interests came to be first and foremost represented by
associations and pressure groups created and reactivated by the
Anglophone elite with the introduction of political liberalisation in
1990. Some of  them, such as the Free West Cameroon Movement
(FWCM) and the Ambazonian Movement of  Fon Gorji Dinka,
advocated outright secession. Most, however, initially championed
a return to the federal state, especially the Cameroon Anglophone
Movement (CAM). This was the only Anglophone association
operating legally in the country and was the most important
Anglophone pressure group for some time.
In addition to these associations that aimed to represent broad-
based Anglophone interests, a large number of other associations
emerged in the hope of  representing specific Anglophone interests.
These included the Teachers’ Association of  Cameroon (TAC), the
Confederation of  Anglophone Parents-Teachers Associations of
Cameroon (CAPTAC), the Cameroon Anglophone Students’
Association (CANSA), the Anglophone Common Law Association,
the Association of Anglophone Journalists, the Cameroon Public
Servants’ Union (CAPSU), the Anglophone Youth Council and the
Anglophone Women’s League. Some of  these scored significant
success in their struggle against the Francophone-dominated state
and its subsidiaries. For example, the TAC and CAPTAC forced the
government to create a General Certificate of Education (GCE)
Board in 1993, which signified an important victory for Anglophones
in their ten-year struggle against determined government efforts to
abolish GCE exams (Nyamnjoh & Akum 2008).
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Besides the different Anglophone organisations and political
parties, various social groups in Anglophone Cameroon have played
a significant role in sensitising the local population to Francophone
domination and mobilising it in defence of its interests, notably
writers, journalists and church leaders (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003:
142-148).
A major challenge to the Francophone-dominated state was the
All Anglophone Conference (AAC) that was held in Buea, the former
capital of Southern Cameroons, on 2-3 April 1993 ‘for the purpose
of  adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reform
and of examining several other matters relating to its welfare of
ourselves, our posterity, our territory and the entire Cameroon nation’
(All Anglophone Conference 1993: 8). Its conveners were the four
Anglophone members of the technical committee on constitutional
matters that was to determine the outline of  a new constitution in
accordance with the resolutions of  the Tripartite Conference held
between 30 October and 18 November 1991 in the wake of the
protracted ‘ghost-town’ campaign. Three members, Benjamin Itoe,
Simon Munzu and Sam Ekontang Elad came from South West
Province, while the fourth, Carlson Anyangwe, was the only North
Westerner in the group.
The AAC turned out to be a landmark in the history of
Anglophone Cameroon. It brought together over 5,000 members
of the Anglophone elite and all the Anglophone associations and
organisations were represented. After two days of deliberations,
the conference issued the Buea Declaration that listed the multiple
Anglophone grievances about Francophone domination and called
for a return to the federal form of  government due to the allegedly
unbridgeable cultural differences between Anglophones and
Francophones after more than thirty years of reunification.
From then onwards, the AAC became the main Anglophone
association and its mouthpiece, and was responsible for the
representation of Anglophone interests in general. All existing and
newly emerging Anglophone associations became auxiliary
organisations of  the AAC and under its umbrella they continued to
carry out their own specific responsibilities. They were represented
in the 65-member Anglophone Standing Committee created by the
AAC, which submitted a draft federal constitution to the Biya
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government on 27 May 1993 (Konings 1999). It was simply ignored
by the regime and, in a series of  interviews in Cameroon and France,
Biya stated that federalism was inappropriate for a country like
Cameroon.
The government’s persistent refusal to enter into negotiations
on the federal option created a growing radicalisation among the
Anglophone movements. In the Bamenda Proclamation adopted
by the Second All Anglophone Conference (AAC II), which was
held in Bamenda from 29 April to 1 May 1994, it was stipulated
that ‘should the government either persist in its refusal to engage in
meaningful constitutional talks or fail to engage in such talks within
a reasonable time’, the Anglophone Council should ‘proclaim the
revival of the independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone
territory and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and
preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of  the said
country’ (All Anglophone Conference 1994).
After the AAC II, the Anglophone movements provocatively re-
introduced the name of Southern Cameroons when referring to the
Anglophone territory to ‘make it clear that our struggles are neither
of an essentially linguistic character nor in defence of an alien
colonial culture … but are aimed at the restoration of the autonomy
of  the former Southern Cameroons which has been annexed by La
République du Cameroun’.7 The Anglophone movements’ umbrella
organisation was subsequently named the Southern Cameroons
National Council (SCNC).
The Biya government’s continued refusal to entertain its federal
proposal pushed the SCNC to consider the possibility of outright
secession. The SCNC leadership actually set 1 October 1996 as the
date to declare the independence of  Southern Cameroons. However
this turned out to be a bluff since nothing happened on that day
except an ‘Independence Day’ address by the new SCNC chairman,
Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung, who called upon Southern
Cameroonians to use their National Day as a ‘day of prayer’, asking
God ‘to save us from political bondage’. He reiterated that
independence was ‘irreversible and non-negotiable’.8
After embracing a secessionist stand, the SCNC adopted the
following motto: ‘The force of argument, and not the argument of
force’. This demonstrated that it was pursuing independence for
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Southern Cameroons through peaceful negotiation and not through
armed struggle. Given the Francophone-dominated state’s unitary
approach to the post-colonial nation-state project and its
condemnation of any secessionist claims, the SCNC leadership
developed two strategies for the peaceful establishment of an
independent Southern Cameroons state: (i) to seek international
recognition, and (ii) to sensitise and mobilise the Anglophone
population.
The SCNC leadership’s pursuit of  international
recognition for its secessionist claims
The SCNC leadership has made strenuous efforts to gain formal
international recognition of the Anglophone cause through
diplomatic and legal channels. Only the most important undertakings
are mentioned here (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003; Anyefru 2010).
One of  the SCNC’s most impressive activities was to send a
nine-man delegation, including two of the main Anglophone
architects of  reunification, John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng
Muna, to the UN in New York on 19 May 1995. This mission was
to file a petition against ‘the annexation of the Southern Cameroons
by La République du Cameroun and to commit the international
community to the Southern Cameroons’ and search for a peaceful
solution to head off the dangerous conflict that was brewing between
La République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons.9 In its London
Communiqué,10 issued after this historic mission, the SCNC
delegation stated that following the Republic of  Cameroon’s
unilateral secession from the union in 1984, the Southern Cameroons
question was no longer an internal problem of La République du
Cameroun since there were now two distinct de facto entities that
were no longer bound by any legal or constitutional ties, with
Southern Cameroons having reverted to its pre-independence
situation, i.e. as a UN Trust Territory. In these circumstances,
Southern Cameroons demanded that the UN terminate its
annexation to La République du Cameroun and grant full independence
to its Trust Territory, in accordance with Article 76 of  the UN
Charter. It was only after gaining full independence that Southern
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Cameroons would enter into negotiations with La République du
Cameroun on future constitutional and bilateral links under the
auspices of  the UN.
The various missions by Anglophone leaders to the UN
undoubtedly contributed to a growing awareness of the Anglophone
problem in UN circles. There is sufficient evidence that UN leaders
had become increasingly concerned about the possible outbreak of
another violent ethno-regional conflict in West-Central Africa but
they appear not to have supported SCNC secessionist claims. During
his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, then UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between Francophone and
Anglophone leaders and at a press conference shortly before leaving
Cameroon, he said:
I leave Cameroon with the impression that there is only one
Cameroon, multilingual and multi-ethnic. I encourage a dialogue of
these stakeholders. In every country there are problems of
marginalisation. The way it has to be solved is by dialogue and not
by walking away.11
Of late, the SCNC succeeded in approaching the UN through
an intermediary channel. In 2004, it became a member of  the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in The
Hague, an international organisation of ‘nations, peoples and
minorities striving for recognition and protection of  their identity,
culture, human rights and their environment’.12 The organisation
provides a legitimate and established international forum for
members to present their grievances at an international level and
through the UNPO, SCNC leaders have been able to address certain
UN organs regarding the plight of  Anglophones. For example, in
2005 Anglophone leaders made a first representation to the 61st
session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) (Anyefru 2010: 94-99).
SCNC leaders also engaged in intensive lobbying to forestall the
Republic of  Cameroon’s admission to the Commonwealth and to
instead file an application for Commonwealth membership for
Southern Cameroons. However the Biya government duly applied
for Commonwealth membership in 1989 and, to the consternation
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of Anglophone leaders, it was announced on 16 October 1995 that
the Republic of Cameroon had been admitted into the
Commonwealth. In reaction, the SCNC strongly condemned the
Commonwealth for Cameroon’s admission, accusing it of  a blatant
lack of sensitivity in a complex and explosive situation and of
frustrating the political aspirations of  Southern Cameroonian
people. Britain in particular was blamed for its ‘second treachery’
towards the Southern Cameroons cause, the first having been in
the pre-reunification period. The SCNC then pleaded for a Quebec-
style referendum on independence for Southern Cameroons and
for separate Commonwealth membership (Konings & Nyamnjoh
2003: 96-99).
The decision by the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments to
submit their dispute over the oil-rich peninsula of Bakassi to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication in 1994 offered
Anglophone leaders the opportunity to access the legality of their
defence of Southern Cameroons statehood (Jua & Konings 2004;
Gumne 2006; Anyefru 2010). They claimed that Bakassi was a part
neither of Cameroon nor of Nigeria but that it belonged to Southern
Cameroons.
In 2001, a new Anglophone body was formed under the banner
of  the SCNC, the so-called Southern Cameroons People’s
Organisation (SCAPO) with the specific goal of pursuing legal
avenues to address ‘the claims of the peoples of Southern
Cameroons to self-determination and independence from La
République du Cameroun’. It soon filed a lawsuit against the Nigerian
government in the Federal High Court in Abuja for its continuing
disregard of the statehood and sovereignty of Southern Cameroons
(Jua & Konings 2004: 624). SCAPO had several reasons for taking
Nigeria to court in its battle for recognition of an independent
Southern Cameroons state. First, the legal representation of the
Southern Cameroons case could not be taken up in Cameroon itself.
Second, like the Cameroonian government, the Nigerian government
failed to recognise the statehood of Southern Cameroons and its
ownership of  the Bakassi peninsula. Third, the Trust Territory of
Southern Cameroons had been administered by Britain as an integral
part of Nigeria. SCAPO was thus inclined to regard Nigeria as a
co-conspirator with Britain in the process that had led to the
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annexation of Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun.
And finally, Nigeria had ratified the AU’s Banjul Charter of  Human
Rights that lays down in Article 20 the right of all colonised or
oppressed people to free themselves from the bonds of domination
by resorting to any means recognised by the international
community.
In March 2002, SCAPO scored a landmark victory when the
Nigerian Federal High Court ruled that ‘the Federal Republic of
Nigeria shall be compelled to place before the ICJ and the UN
General Assembly and ensure diligent persecution to the conclusion
the claims of the people of Southern Cameroons to self-
determination and their declaration of  independence’. It also placed
a permanent injunction restraining ‘the government of  the Federal
Republic of Nigeria from treating the Southern Cameroons and all
the people of the territory as an integral part of La République du
Cameroun’ (Jua & Konings 2004: 624-25).
This ruling was considered by the Anglophone leadership as a
significant step towards international recognition of the Anglophone
secessionist claims. However Nigeria had an interest in the court’s
ruling if  one considers the ongoing hearings on the Bakassi case at
the ICJ. This was clearly recognised by the Nigerian Federal High
Court when it ordered the Nigerian government to ask the ICJ to
rule on whether it was Southern Cameroons or the Republic of
Cameroon that shared a maritime boundary with the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.
This victory inspired the SCNC and SCAPO to start another
legal action at AU level. They made a formal complaint against the
Republic of Cameroon to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in Banjul in 2003 (Dicklitch 2010). In
addition to the historic ‘illegal annexation’ of Southern Cameroons
by Francophone Cameroon in 1961, they highlighted the political,
economic, social and cultural marginalisation of Anglophone
Cameroonians, claiming that Anglophones were a ‘separate and
distinct’ people who deserved not only the right to development,
but also to self-government.
In its 2009 ruling, the ACHPR affirmed Anglophone grievances
against the Biya government and recognised Southern Cameroons
as a distinct ‘people’, but it did not support Southern Cameroons
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secessionist claims. It was evidently bound by Article 4(b) of  the
AU’s Constitutive Act that calls for respect of  existing borders at
the time of  independence. Consequently, it recommended
‘comprehensive national dialogue’ (Ebai 2009). The Biya
government has not yet, however, shown any willingness to honour
this recommendation.
The SCNC also failed to enlist the support of  Cameroon’s former
colonial masters in its secessionist claims (Konings & Nyamnjoh
2003: 99-101). Generally speaking, France has continued to support
the Francophone-dominated regime in Cameroon during the current
economic and political crisis. Besides the various agreements of
cooperation between the two countries, there are other factors
explaining French support too, such as the emergence of
Anglophone opposition parties, in particular the SDF, during the
political liberalisation process. The growing popularity of  the
Anglophone movements was regarded as an additional threat to
France’s superior interests in Cameroon: they fuelled existing anti-
French sentiments, and their calls for federalism or secession formed
a major challenge to French control over Cameroon and its stake in
the oil industry in Anglophone Cameroon. With France’s support,
the Biya government is unlikely to concede any ground to the
Anglophones.
While the British government has shown more sympathy than
France for the Anglophone cause, it has constantly rejected the
SCNC’s secessionist claims.13
The Anglophone leadership’s sensitisation and
mobilisation campaign
From the start, the Anglophone leadership made considerable efforts
to transform Anglophone organisations from elitist movements into
mass movements. It attempted to raise the consciousness of  the
Anglophone people regarding their region’s subordinate position
within the Francophone-dominated state and to mobilise them for
action in its pursuit of  federalism and secession. To this end, frequent
meetings and rallies were organised throughout the Anglophone
territory to make the population aware of the organisations’ goals,
programmes and strategies.
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Of great importance to the sensitisation campaign were the
regular strikes, demonstrations and boycotts organised by the
leadership of the various Anglophone movements to protest against
injustices committed by the Francophone-dominated state.
Interestingly, some of  these were directed at the myths and symbols
of  the unitary state. For example, Anglophone nationalists have
refused to recognise the government’s designation of  20 May, the
date of  the inauguration of  the unitary state in 1972, as the country’s
National Day. Since the early 1990s, they have continued to boycott
celebrations, declaring it a ‘Day of Mourning’ and a ‘Day of Shame’.
They have also indicted the regime for declaring 11 February, the
day of  the 1961 plebiscite, as Youth Day, seeing the continued
failure of the government to highlight the historical significance of
this day as a conscious attempt to reconfigure the nation’s history.
They have therefore called upon the Anglophone population to mark
11 February as the ‘Day of  the Plebiscite’ and 1 October as the
‘Day of Independence’ as alternative days of national celebration.
Anglophone activists have attempted to hoist federation, UN or
independent Southern Cameroons flags on these days, but their
attempts were often challenged by the security forces.
The Anglophone leadership’s sensitisation campaign was quite
successful between 1992 and 1995 and a sense of euphoria spread
through Anglophone Cameroon when the SCNC delegation returned
from its mission to the UN in 1995. At rallies attended by large
crowds in various Anglophone towns, the delegation displayed a
huge UN flag, claiming it had received it from the UN itself to
show that Southern Cameroons was still a UN trust territory and
that independence was only a matter of time (Jua & Konings 2004).
Since 1996, however, the Anglophone leadership’s sensitisation
campaign has come to a virtual standstill as a result of a general
loss of  momentum. Following the resignation of  the founding
fathers among the SCNC leadership, the new leadership, under the
chairmanship of  Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung, has appeared
incapable of  devising a strategy to counteract the government’s
increasingly divisive and repressive tactics. Given this leadership
problem and the government’s persistent reluctance to enter into
negotiations, a conflict developed within the Anglophone
movements between the doves – those who continued to adhere to
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a negotiated separation from La République du Cameroun – and the
hawks – those who had concluded that the independence of
Southern Cameroons could only be achieved through armed struggle.
The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in particular opted
for the latter strategy, as is manifest in its motto: ‘The argument of
force’.
The SCYL emerged in the mid-1990s as one of the many
Anglophone associations operating under the umbrella of the SCNC.
Composed of ‘young people who do not see any future for
themselves and would prefer to die fighting than continue to submit
to the fate imposed on Southern Cameroons by La République du
Cameroun (Konings 2005b: 176), the SCYL soon came to be seen
by the Biya government as the most dangerous Anglophone
movement. Little wonder therefore, that the government’s reaction
to an ill-planned SCYL attack on military and civil establishments
in North West Province between 27 and 31 March 1997 was out of
all proportion when it ruthlessly killed, tortured, raped and arrested
several local men and women, and forced others into exile. Some
SCYL members died while in prison and others were not brought to
trial until 1999 when they were not treated as political prisoners
but were charged with criminal offences. Having become painfully
aware that their organisation still lacked the necessary weapons and
training to engage in regular guerrilla warfare against the large and
well-equipped Cameroonian armed forces, SCYL leaders apparently
decided after the dismal failure of the 1997 revolt to temporarily
resort to less easily controlled forms of  action, in particular the use
of  the Internet and the organisation of  symbolic actions.
Following this revolt, the SCNC leadership appeared even less
inclined to sensitise and mobilise the Anglophone population, leading
to a general lethargy and internal divisions among the leadership. It
was in these circumstances and with a sense of despair that Justice
Frederick Alobwede Ebong, chairman of  the SCNC’s High
Command Council, took over the Cameroon Radio and Television
(CRTV) station in Buea on 30 December 1999, proclaiming the
restoration of  the independence of  the Federal Republic of  Southern
Cameroons (FRSC). He was subsequently detained in Yaoundé. At
an SCNC meeting on 1 April 2000, Ebong was nominated as
chairman of  the SCNC and the first head of  state of  the FRSC.
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With a view to endowing the FRSC with all the attributes of
statehood as well as guaranteeing state continuity, the FRSC
Constituent Assembly meeting in Bamenda in May 2000 adopted
resolutions on the coat of  arms, the flag and the national anthem.
A flag was subsequently designed and the national anthem entitled
‘Freedom Land’ was released.14 These developments gave new
impetus to the Anglophone struggle as was evidenced by the fact
that after years of vehement conflict about policies and strategies,
four of the major Anglophone organisations, namely the SCNC,
the SCYL, the Ambazonian Movement (AM), and the Southern
Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM),15 agreed to form an
alliance to achieve the independence of the territory of the ex-
British Southern Cameroons in 2001. At a summit in Washington
in June 2001, representatives of the territory adopted the so-called
Washington Proclamation of  the Statehood of  the ex-British
Southern Cameroons, ‘confirming the declaration of  separate
independence already made by Justice Ebong in Buea on 30
December 1999’, and decided to set up the British Southern
Cameroons Provisional Administration.16
And last but not least, one should not overlook the indispensable
role Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora are playing in the
SCNC sensitisation and mobilisation campaign. They have not only
contributed immensely by supporting the Anglophone movements’
activities financially, but have also underscored the importance of
the Internet, especially at times when Anglophone voices critical
of the government have been largely silenced in Cameroon (Jua &
Konings 2004; Nyamnjoh 2005a; Anyefru 2008). They are
maintaining a plethora of websites such as the homepages of the
SCNC, the SCYL, the AM and the FRSC. Their online activities
clearly demonstrate the considerable differences in their political
agendas and ideologies and this has, unfortunately, resulted in
minimal cooperation between the various cyber communities.
Prospects for Anglophone secessionist claims
The Anglophone movements have booked several successes in their
attempts to gain international recognition of their secessionist claims
and in their regional sensitisation and mobilisation campaign.
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Nevertheless, the prospects for their ultimate aim, i.e. the
independence of Southern Cameroons, presently appear bleak. In
addition to the fact that the principal international organisations,
like the UN, the Commonwealth and the AU, are inclined to reject
secessionist claims on the grounds of their respect for the
sovereignty and integrity of member states, there are a number of
other factors that are hampering Anglophone chances of  success.
These include the Cameroonian government’s persistent refusal to
negotiate with secessionist movements and its tactics to contain
the Anglophone danger as well as the internal divisions among the
Anglophone leadership and the elite.
The Biya government has proved to be increasingly capable of
neutralising the Anglophone movements by employing long-
standing tactics such as divide-and-rule, co-opting ethno-regional
leaders into the regime, and severe repression. Its main strategy has
been to divide the Anglophone elite by capitalising on existing
rivalries between the South West and North West elites. Seeing
themselves as having suffered in the distribution of state power,
the South West elite have been inclined to see more political capital
in the promotion of regional identity and organisation than in
working to consolidate an Anglophone identity and organisation
(Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998). The government has found it
increasingly worthwhile to tempt the South West elite away from
Anglophone solidarity with strategic appointments and the idea that
the North West elite rather than the Francophone-dominated state
is their primary enemy (Eyoh 1998a; Mbile 2000). Following the
1996 Constitution that provided state protection to autochthonous
minorities, it became instrumental in cementing an alliance between
the South West elite and the ethnically related Francophone coastal
elite, the so-called Sawa movement, an alliance that transcends the
Francophone-Anglophone divide (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000;
Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). In addition to its divisive strategies,
the government has enhanced its repressive tactics after the SCNC’s
adoption of a secessionist programme.
Significantly, the Anglophone secessionist stand is not only
strongly opposed by the Biya regime but also faces a great deal of
resistance in the Anglophone community itself. While most
Anglophones tend to support the Anglophone movements’
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grievances about Francophone domination, they are deeply divided
over which path to take to resolve the problem. Besides the leadership
of the Anglophone movements that advocate peaceful secession with
an agreement about the sharing of assets belonging to each side, there
are a considerable number in the Anglophone elite who favour
federalism, albeit differing on the number of  states. Since the 1996
Constitution, the Cameroonian government seems to be willing to
concede to a certain degree of decentralisation. As a consequence,
the pro-government Anglophone elite are strongly in favour of
decentralisation based on the country’s ten existing provinces.
There are clear differences within and between the various
Anglophone movements. Since the resignation of  the founding
fathers (Sam Ekontang Elad, Simon Munzu and Carlson Anyangwe)
from its leadership, the SCNC has been plagued by growing
factionalisation. At times, the leaders appear to be more concerned
with contesting each other’s position of  power than promoting the
Anglophone cause. Currently, there are at least four factions in the
SCNC, with each one claiming to be authentic (Owono 2010). The
main faction is chaired by Chief Ayamba Ette Otun from the Manyu
Division in South West Province, but because of  his advancing age
and relatively low level of education, the real holder of power in
this faction is its North Western vice-president, Nfor Ngala Nfor.
Curiously, the Biya government has created its own SCNC faction
to counter the Southern Cameroons struggle. This pro-government
faction is led by Chief Isaac Oben, another chief from the Manyu
Division, and was rewarded by the regime for trying to challenge
the SCAPO representation during the ACHPR sessions in Banjul.
There has also been a lot of in-fighting over the control of the
SCNC’s relatively scarce financial resources. Apart from the
traditional financial contributions from the diaspora, the SCNC
leadership has devised an ingenious source of income-generating
activities. They offer Cameroonian migrants, regardless of  whether
they have actually participated in the Anglophone struggles,
certificates claiming they are SCNC activists in order to make them
eligible for political asylum in the host countries. Nfor Ngala Nfor
and one of his lieutenants, Prince Mbinglo Hitler, have regularly
been accused by other SCNC leaders of having appropriated part
of  the organisation’s income for personal use (Owono 2010).
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In addition, there are regular problems of disunity among the
Anglophone organisations and a certain ambiguity in their objectives.
Subsidiary organisations are developing objectives and strategies
different from those of the SCNC, the umbrella organisation.
Although most of them nowadays champion the independence of
Southern Cameroons, some appear never to have altogether dropped
the idea of the return to a federal state. This ambivalence is creating
confusion among the Anglophone population. In June 2001, four of
these organisations, namely the SCNC, the AM, SCARM and SCYL,
agreed to form an alliance to gain independence for the former British
Southern Cameroons. Strikingly, the AM immediately withdrew from
the alliance when its leader, Fon Gorji Dinka, was not elected as
head of the British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration.
And finally, there is the problem of  strategy. Although the
government has persistently refused to enter into negotiations on
either a return to a federal state or peaceful separation, the SCNC
has never been prepared to drop its motto of ‘The force of argument’
and adopt a more confrontational strategy or even armed struggle
as propagated by the SCYL. Such a strategy is unlikely to bring
about a change in government position or international recognition
and there is ample evidence that appeals and petitions of separatist
movements to the UN, the Commonwealth, the AU and other
international organisations are ineffective. The case of Eritrea is a
clear example. The right to Eritrean self-determination was never
recognised despite the fact that Eritrea had an excellent case for self-
rule based on the abrogation of  international agreements by successive
governments in Addis Ababa and the fact that they had physical
control over at least some of the land they claimed. Instead, Eritrea
was only recognised as an independent state once a military victory
had been won over the government in Addis Ababa. This is the
traditional way in which international society recognises new states.
With their tendency to make the entire Francophone community
responsible for the Anglophone predicament, the Anglophone
movements have even managed to alienate the Francophones who
had shown sympathy for their cause (All Anglophone Conference
1993). Obviously, this has been harmful to their plans and to the
formation of  alliances with Francophone groups that sympathise
with the Anglophone cause.
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Some desperate SCNC members were once heard to complain
at a meeting: ‘With no money, no foreign support, no arms, little
grassroots support and most of the fighting and activism taking
place on the Internet instead of on the ground, are we not wasting
our time?’ This may be somewhat exaggerated as the SCNC and
other Anglophone organisations are far from dead, as their various
actions show, but more unity and solidarity among Anglophones is
needed, as is also a change of  tactics.
Conclusion
The Anglophone call for secession and the concomitant
establishment of  an independent state has a long history. It was the
most popular option in Southern Cameroons in the period preceding
reunification but the local population was never given the chance
to vote for it in the 1961 plebiscite. The Anglophone call for
secession remerged in the mid-1980s when a prominent Anglophone
chief  and lawyer, Fon Gorji Dinka, demanded the immediate
promulgation of an independent Anglophone state, which he called
the Republic of Ambazonia.
Anglophone movements renewed this call during political
liberalisation in the early 1990s but unlike the pre-reunification
period, the renewed pursuit of an independent state was initially a
minority option, with most Anglophone movements striving for the
return to a federal state. It was not until the Biya government refused
to discuss the federal option that the leadership of the Anglophone
movements started championing the separation of Anglophone and
Francophone Cameroon into two sovereign states along the lines
of what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1992. It was envisaged
that this kind of peaceful separation could be accompanied by an
equitable sharing of assets and liabilities, and be supported by the
establishment of  other cross-border confidence-building institutions.
Most of the leaders of the Anglophone movements now agree that
this solution holds the best chance for peace in the long run because
any attempts to engage belatedly in democratic and institutional
reforms just to placate Anglophones and preserve international
appearances will only postpone the day of reckoning and prolong
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the misery. An increasing number of  scholars (Ghai 1998; Sandbrook
2000) also regard secession as the best solution in cases where there
are no prospects for peaceful co-existence of territorial units within
dysfunctional and deeply divided nation-states. Eritrea’s peaceful
separation from Ethiopia in 1994 following a referendum in the
previous year reassured those who feared that the secession of an
African country would automatically open a Pandora’s box of
violence and fragmentation.
The question, however, remains as to whether there is sufficient
support for the Anglophone secessionist call. In sharp contrast to
their leadership’s claim of  widespread regional support, our own
research has provided evidence that the majority of the Anglophone
elite favour a form of  federation. Even some SCNC leaders, like
the late John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna who were
Anglophone architects of reunification, appear never to have
abandoned their federalist ideal although they continued to support
the SCNC line for strategic reasons.
It is unlikely that the Anglophone movements’ call for an
independent Southern Cameroons state will receive any support
from the Francophone elite and the international community. The
majority of the Francophone elite are clearly in favour of a
decentralised unitary state and are determined to keep control of
Anglophone Cameroon’s rich natural resources in an area that has
become the country’s breadbasket and the source of  considerable
oil wealth.
The positive outcome of  some of  the Anglophone leadership’s
international representations of its cause has boosted Anglophone
national sentiments. Nevertheless, the multiple initiatives for
international recognition seem as yet to offer little prospect of
success. International organisations continue to respect the territorial
integrity of member states and disapprove moves towards any
further Balkanisation. During his visit to Cameroon in 2000, the
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made the Anglophone
movements understand in no uncertain terms that dialogue and
reconciliation rather than separation would be instrumental to
solving the Anglophone problem. A similar appeal was made in the
2009 ACHPR ruling.
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Although the struggle for an independent Southern Cameroons
state remains alive, especially as a result of the financial contributions
and Internet activities of Anglophones in the diaspora, the prospects
of  success, if  measured in terms of  achieving a sovereign state,
remain remote and Anglophone nationalists need to rethink their
political objectives as well as their strategies. Given the
Francophone-dominated state and the AU’s steadfast refusal to
consider Anglophone secessionist claims, more Anglophone
nationalists are now proposing embracing armed struggle on the
grounds that freedom is never freely given.
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  2. The British had informed the United Nations that the Southern
Cameroons would not be economically viable as an independent state.
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6
Good governance, privatisation and ethno-
regional conflict in Cameroon
Introduction
By proclaiming that a ‘crisis of governance’ underlies ‘the litany of
Africa’s development problems’, the World Bank’s 1989 report Sub-
Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth placed the concept
of good governance at the heart of the donor agenda for Africa
(World Bank 1989: 60). Painfully confronted at the time with the
relative failure of  its structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the
World Bank was inclined in this report to blame the weak, predatory
and neopatrimonial African states for the poor performance of
structural adjustment rather than to question its own neo-liberal
reform package. It therefore stressed the need not only for less but
also for better government in African states.
But what is good governance and how is it to be promoted? The
term remains rather vague. The World Bank (1992: 1) defines it in
managerial terms as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the
management of  a country’s economic and social resources for
development’. Good governance was to flow from enhanced
accountability within the public sector, transparency and openness
in decision-making, the rule of  law, and more efficient public
management. World Bank officials also added the issue of  capacity
building to enable technocrats to initiate and implement market-
based economic reforms as an essential element for good governance
(Sandbrook 2000: 10-13).
Whereas the World Bank couched its interventions in the affairs
of  African countries in governance terms that enabled it to claim
not to have preferences for particular types of regime, bilateral aid
donors felt less inhibited in linking democracy to good governance.
The latter sought to promote a liberal-democratic system through a
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combination of political conditionalities and financial support for
democratisation initiatives and capacity building, such as the
introduction of  international election observation and the
empowerment of  non-government organisations. Although bilateral
donors continuously stressed that democratisation had its intrinsic
merits, it is beyond any doubt that they saw it primarily as a vehicle
for promoting the more efficient implementation of  structural
adjustment measures. Democratisation was said to empower the
electorate by providing it with mechanisms of a parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary nature to check upon the ruling regime’s
neopatrimonial practices and to participate in the decision-making
process about necessary structural adjustment measures. This would
contribute to the legitimisation of  unpopular neoliberal reforms
among the population.
Clearly, the good governance discourse, propagated by the donor
community generally and the World Bank in particular, represents
an instrumentalist, managerial and technocratic approach to
development. It aims at promoting the emergence of a more
conducive and, in their view, more legitimate political environment,
backed by the requisite administrative capacity, for the successful
implementation of  orthodox structural adjustment (Olukoshi 1998a:
35). This approach entails an essentially depoliticised notion of
governance. It narrates the proposed restructuring of  African
societies simply as a managerial and technical problem rather than
as being contested and political. Disagreements and conflicts over
the design and implementation of  neo-liberal reforms are usually
absent from any analysis, and development emerges as a neutral
project guided by ‘technical considerations of economy and
efficiency, rather than ideological and political considerations’
(Abrahamsen 2000: 143). When the World Bank and governance
theorists do acknowledge conflict, they are usually in the habit of
treating it solely, or primarily, as the result of  ‘selfish’ and
‘illegitimate’ machinations of vested interests that are steeped in a
variety of  neopatrimonial relations. In the end, this approach tends
to insulate governance from the actual political process: persistent
struggles for power, control over resources, as well as access to the
decision-making process about the contested neo-liberal reforms.
It tends in particular to gloss over the weak and dependent position
131
Chapter 6: Good governance, privatisation and ethno-regional conflict in Cameroon
of  African states in the world capitalist system. The continent’s
strategic and economic marginalisation in the new world order and
its dependence on foreign assistance have facilitated intervention
and governance by international institutions and organisations to
the extent that more and more decisions that determine the well-
being of  Africa’s peoples are today being made outside the continent
in the Washington offices of  the Bretton Woods institutions. Power,
in other words, is increasingly located outside the political
community as conventionally defined by democratic theory, and
beyond the reach of  the democratic control of  Africa’s citizens
(Abrahamsen 2000: 146-47).
While elected African governments have frequently tried to avoid,
postpone, manipulate and dilute the imposed neo-liberal reforms,
which tend to further undermine the patronage networks on which
their power continues to rest and the limited legitimacy they still
enjoy among the electorate, their dependence on continued financial
assistance has generally led them to fall into line with the demands
of  their external constituency. Civil-society organisations that have
either emerged or obtained a large measure of autonomy during
political liberalisation are usually completely excluded from the
decision-making process about neo-liberal reforms and have often
displayed strong opposition to austere structural adjustment
measures. Interestingly, in the absence of  any powerful opposition
parties in the African democratic transition, newly created ethno-
regional associations have come to serve as the new intermediaries
between the state and the electorate in a number of African states,
including Cameroon (Kasfir 1998; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998).
Their leadership is determined to represent and defend ethno-
regional interests during structural adjustment and often strives for
a larger degree of  ethno-regional autonomy and self-determination.
In this chapter I want to demonstrate these arguments with an
extended case study of privatisation in Cameroon. Privatisation has
become one of  the cornerstones of  the public-sector reforms
imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions on Cameroon. In the
first part of this chapter, I highlight the linkage between good
governance and privatisation and its embeddedness in particular
relations of  power. In the second part, I focus on the vehement
resistance of ethno-regional associations and other civil-society
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associations, in particular the trade unions, to the government
announcement on 15 July 1994 of the privatisation of the Cameroon
Development Corporation (CDC), a huge agro-industrial parastatal
located in the coastal area of Anglophone Cameroon. These
organisations perceived the announced privatisation of this
important regional parastatal as a further step towards ethno-regional
marginalisation and a severe threat to their workers’ welfare.
Governance and privatisation in Cameroon
Privatisation has become a key instrument in the structural
adjustment programme and the good governance agenda imposed
on Cameroon by the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors.
It is an essential part of  the overall neoliberal reform package aimed
at creating transparency and accountability in the management of
national affairs as well as a favourable environment for opening up
the Cameroonian economy to market forces and private-sector
development.
As in most other African countries (Grosh & Makandala 1994;
Tangri 1999), the parastatal sector in Cameroon has grown rapidly
since independence (Tedga 1990; Van de Walle 1994; Walker 1998).
From a handful of public enterprises inherited from the British and
French Trust Authorities at independence and reunification in 1961,
the Cameroonian parastatal sector grew to 219 enterprises in the
mid-1980s, employing approximately 100,000 people. Growth in
public-sector ownership was the result of a series of economic and
political factors, in particular statist conceptions of development,
economic nationalism, and the need for political patronage (see
Chapter 4).
By virtually any measure of  economic performance, the record
of  state-owned concerns has proved disappointing. Although by no
means uniformly negative in their performance, public enterprises
have been judged inefficient and unprofitable. The Cameroonian
government itself has regularly recognised the operating
ineffectiveness of its parastatals but little noticeable improvement
in public enterprises has occurred (Konings 1993a: 27). Remarkably,
the international financiers who made a major contribution to
parastatal expansion failed to raise any serious alarm about the
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dismal performance of  Cameroonian public enterprises for a long
time. This may be explained by the fact that they, like others, were
impressed by the general performance of  the Cameroonian economy
which was viewed as one of the rare success stories in Africa,
registering a phenomenal growth rate of 7 per cent between 1970
and 1986 (see Chapter 2). It was not until the crisis in the
Cameroonian economy in 1987 that the World Bank began to
express its disillusionment with the performance of  state enterprises,
attributing their poor performance to the following factors:
The causes of the bad results of the 60 enterprises, in which the
state participates to a greater or less extent, are…the excessive size
of the initial investments and the low earning capacity of the projects,
over-employment, a too heavy administrative structure, the absence
of clearly defined objectives and concomitant criteria of
performance, and incentives for the management. These enterprises
also suffer from the usual ills of public enterprises: the pursuit of
social objectives without any direct financial compensation from
the state, the politicisation of management and the interference of
supervising ministries in the management, the slow reaction to
developments in the market and the poor financial structure (World
Bank 1987: 5).
Subsequently, in 1988/89, the Bretton Woods institutions forced
the reluctant Biya government to adopt an SAP, and privatisation
soon became an essential part of their ‘good governance’ and private-
sector development programmes (see Chapter 4).
Public enterprise reform and private-sector development have
been designed in the offices of  the Bretton Woods institutions. Like
other structural adjustment measures, they have been accepted by
virtually all bilateral donors and presented to African governments
as the only way to development and economic growth. Even since
the Biya government was compelled in 1990 to introduce a certain
measure of political liberalisation, including a multi-party system
and a limited degree of freedom of press and association, there has
been little local participation in the actual formulation of
privatisation schemes. The degree of  control exerted by donors and
creditors, especially the Bretton Woods institutions, on these new
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democracies poses a challenge to key features of liberal democracy
as commonly conceived in political theory in that it threatens to
erode the right to national self-determination and self-government.
This is a form of  democracy characterised by local political
emasculation, where the fine-tuning of externally directed policies
is the best that can be hoped for and where voices of dissent are
persistently overruled by the government’s accountability to its
financial sponsors (Abrahamsen 2000: 145). The result is what
Mkandawire (1999) has termed ‘choiceless democracies’,
democracies in which pronouncements in favour of economic
liberalisation are the only political route available.
Strikingly, the donor community has been keen to resist any
accusation of undue influence over domestic policy choices, and
has eagerly promoted the notion of  national ownership of  SAPs.
‘Ownership’ implies that the Bretton Woods institutions no longer
impose policies on African countries but merely put their superior
economic knowledge and planning skills at the disposal of
governments, which then make an autonomous decision as to
whether to adopt the suggested policy measures. Clearly, such a
discourse denies the fact that public enterprise reforms and private-
sector development programmes have been subjected to little local
debate and have usually not required legislative debate. These
programmes are normally simply imposed after secret consultations
with a few top national technocrats representing the government.
There is obviously a serious contradiction between the donors’
ardent quest for the insulation of technocracy and their calls for
greater accountability and transparency in economic affairs. There
appear to be two main reasons for their preference to deal with
insulated technocrats. First, they rightly assume that Africa’s ‘old
guard’ neopatrimonial leaders are less inclined to faithfully
implement structural adjustment because of  its potential for
undermining the clientelist networks on which their power rests.
Technocrats, in contrast, are thought to be driven purely by
considerations of competence and professionalism required for the
effective design and implementation of  economic reforms. Second,
donors seem to feel that since adjustment requires unpopular
sacrifices, in-camera negotiations with technocrats are preferable
to a participatory decision-making process by which popular
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demands can derail ‘necessary’ reforms. Most newly elected African
governments also appear to eschew popular input into adjustment
programmes. Not only do they have limited room for manoeuvre in
negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank and other lenders but
they are also expected to implement any agreements as negotiated.
Knowing that they will therefore be unable to satisfy some demands,
presidents and their lieutenants avoid consultations they cannot
control and ignore or undermine articulations of  dissent and protest,
such as opposition by civil-society organisations and independent
newspapers.
Remarkably, although the donors are able to design and impose
structural adjustment measures upon African governments, they
appear to have less control over their actual implementation. There
is considerable research and empirical evidence to suggest that
African governments may sign documents initiating a privatisation
programme without intending to ever execute it (van de Walle 1994;
Bennell 1997; Tangri 1999). For these government leaders, the need
to continue financial assistance flows demands acquiescence to
donor demands but the realities of the domestic political economy
limit what is politically feasible.
Privatisation, in fact, represented a severe challenge to (i) the
neopatrimonial logic of the Cameroonian regime which laid a solid
foundation for co-opting the various ethno-regional elite factions
into the ‘hegemonic alliance’ (Bayart 1979) and thus secured a
considerable measure of political stability in the post-colonial state;
(ii) the post-colonial state’s welfare concerns manifest, among others,
in the creation of employment and relatively good conditions of
service in the public sector; and (iii) the existing national sentiments,
looking upon the parastatal sector as part of the ‘national patrimony’
(Campbell 2001). Under these circumstances, a strategy of  initial
acceptance of  a privatisation programme followed by delay,
obstruction or, what van de Walle (2001) has called, partial reform
may be the most effective.
While African governments have often tried to postpone or dilute
the imposed privatisation programmes, civil-society organisations
have frequently opposed their implementation as being harmful to
their members’ interests and have demanded a voice in the decision-
making process (Olukoshi 1998; Konings 2002). One of the
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privatisations in Cameroon that sparked off  virulent opposition from
ethno-regional associations and pressure groups was that of the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). The CDC was the
most prominent of the 15 enterprises selected for privatisation in
July 1994, being the largest agro-industrial parastatal in the country.
Its estates are located in the coastal area of Anglophone Cameroon
and its operation has been of great importance to regional
development.
Privatisation of the CDC and ethno-regional
opposition
The CDC is the most important agro-industrial parastatal in the
country with more than 100,000 hectares of land. It is one of the
few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises in a
variety of  crops – the four major ones being rubber, palm oil, tea
and bananas. With the help of  huge loans from several well-known
financial institutions, including the World Bank, the International
Development Association (IDA), the European Development Fund
(EDF), the Commonwealth Development Corporation (COMDEV)
and the French Caisse Centrale de Coopération Économique (CCCE), it
expanded its area under cultivation from 20,000 to 42,000 hectares
following the achievement of independence and reunification in
1961. It is the country’s second largest employer, surpassed only by
the government, and formerly employed 25,000 workers. At present,
it still employs about 12,500 permanent workers and a few thousand
seasonal and casual workers (Konings 1993a).
The CDC is, furthermore, one of  the country’s oldest enterprises.
Its history is closely linked with the political and economic history
of Anglophone Cameroon. It was founded in 1946 but its roots can
be traced back to the German colonial period (1884-1916) when
many large-scale private plantations were created on the fertile,
volcanic soils around Mount Cameroon in the present South West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon. The establishment of a
plantation economy in the region led to the expulsion of the original
occupants of the land, notably the Bakweri, into prescribed native
reserves (Matute 1990; Ardener 1996). With the British occupation
in 1914/15, the property of  German planters was confiscated and
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turned over to the Custodian of  Enemy Property. When the British
took over the administration of the area shortly afterwards, the
plantations were merged and a government department was formed
to manage them. By 1922, however, the British Mandate Authority
had already decided to get rid of them, as the administrative costs
of maintaining them was said to be prohibitive. It then seriously
considered returning the plantation lands to the original owners but
dropped the idea in the end. Instead, it came to the conclusion that
it would be in the best interests of the territory and its inhabitants
to put the plantations back in the hands of foreign private enterprise.
At an auction held in London in November 1924, almost all the
estates were bought back by their former German owners.
At the start of  the Second World War, the German estates were
again expropriated by the Custodian of  Enemy Property. After the
war, a decision had to be reached, once again, on how to dispose of
the properties. The Bakweri chiefs and educated elite, organised in
the so-called Bakweri Land Committee (BLC), immediately began
agitating for the return of  its ancestral lands. It sent several petitions,
first to the British Crown and subsequently to the United Nations,
as Britain had assumed responsibility for the territory, the so-called
Southern Cameroons, under United Nations Trusteeship after the
war. However, after considerable deliberations, the British
Trusteeship Authority declined once again to surrender the ex-
German plantation lands to their original owners (Molua 1985;
Konings 1993a). Instead, it announced in November 1946 that they
would be leased to a newly established statutory corporation, the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC).
The corporation came into being with the passage of two
ordinances in December 1946. The first ordinance, the Ex-Enemy
Lands (Cameroons) Ordinance no. 38 (1946), provided for the
acquisition of  the ex-German plantation lands which had been
vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property for the duration of the
Second World War. Under the terms of  this ordinance, the governor
of Nigeria, who was responsible for the administration of the
Southern Cameroons, was to declare them ‘native lands’ and hold
them in trust for the common benefit of  all the inhabitants of  the
territory. The second ordinance, the Cameroons Development
Corporation Ordinance no. 39 (1946), provided for the setting up
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of the corporation. All the lands acquired by the governor under
the first ordinance were to be leased to this corporation for a period
of  sixty years. Significantly, the corporation was charged with a
double responsibility: it was to develop and manage the
approximately 104,000 hectares of estate lands in the interests of
the people of  the Trust Territory, and it was to provide for the
spiritual, educational and social welfare of  its employees. After
fulfilling all its obligations, the corporation was to pay direct taxes
to the government of Nigeria and all profits were to be used for the
benefit of  the people of  the Trust Territory.
The CDC has been significant in the development of the
Anglophone region. Students of plantation agriculture, such as
Beckford (1972), have blamed the persistent poverty and
underdevelopment of plantation economies on this mode of
production. In the case of the CDC, however, this thesis finds little
support. The corporation has been a major instrument of
modernisation and is largely credited with whatever socio-economic
development has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has created
employment for both men and women, has constructed numerous
roads, supplied water and electricity, built and staffed schools,
awarded a substantial number of scholarships, provided medical
care for a large proportion of the local population, and has stimulated
the supply of  goods and services to itself  and its workers. It played
a key role in the commercialisation and modernisation of peasant
production in the 1950s and in the establishment of regional
smallholders’ oil-palm and rubber schemes since the early 1960s
(Ardener 1958; Konings 1993b). Of late, it has handed over a
substantial part of  its oil-palm plantations to local contractors. As
a result, the CDC has been called the economic lifeline of
Anglophone Cameroon.
The government announcement on 15 July 1994 of the
privatisation of this important agro-industrial enterprise was all the
more shocking to the Anglophone population since the CDC (i)
had been one of the very few public enterprises in Cameroon to
perform relatively well until the economic crisis; (ii) had been able
to survive this crisis mainly because the management and workers
had agreed to adopt a series of drastic adjustment measures aimed
at reducing costs and increasing productivity; and (iii) was on the
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way to economic recovery following the 50 per cent devaluation of
the CFA franc in early 1994 that made CDC products more
competitive on the world market (Konings 1995b).
The announced privatisation of the CDC prompted vehement
protest actions in Anglophone Cameroon from various ethno-
regional associations and pressure groups that had been either
created or granted a large measure of autonomy in the wake of
political liberalisation in December 1990. The following ethno-
regional organisations have been the most active.
First, there are the various Anglophone associations that since
1993 have been operating under an umbrella organisation, the
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) (see Chapter 5).
The government announcement of the CDC privatisation was seen
by these Anglophone associations as a further step in the dismantling
of the Anglophone colonial legacy by the Francophone-dominated
state. As a consequence, they called upon Anglophones to forget
about any internal differences and form a united front against
attempts to sell the CDC to Francophone or French interests.
Besides the Anglophone associations, there were also the
associations of  the elite and chiefs in the South West Province of
Anglophone Cameroon where most of the CDC estates are located.
The most prominent South West associations were the South West
Elite Association (SWELA) and the South West Chiefs’ Conference
(SWECC). There is some overlap between these organisations, with
some important South West chiefs also being members of  SWELA
(Konings 1997; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998; Eyoh 1998b). Both
associations claim to be non-political pressure groups, with their
main aims being to promote the South West Province’s socio-
economic and cultural revival. Although both organisations
supported most of the Anglophone grievances about Francophone
domination, they equally claimed that the South West had been
more disadvantaged than the North West in the post-colonial state
in terms of  distribution of  strategic posts in the federation and the
unitary state (see Chapter 3). The South West elite and chiefs
particularly feared that the newly created Anglophone movements’
pursuit of either a return to a two-state federation or outright
secession would lead to renewed South West domination by the
entrepreneurial North West majority. They were therefore inclined
140
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
to champion a ten-state federal system based on the existing ten
provinces in Cameroon, which would retain the present separation
between the South West and the North West Provinces, thus
safeguarding the former’s autonomy.
Despite such internal rivalries and conflicts within the
Anglophone community, the South West elite and chiefs favoured
a (temporary) alliance with the leadership of the Anglophone
movements when the privatisation of the CDC was announced.
This alliance was justified on the grounds of  the corporation’s
immense contribution to the welfare and development of the
Anglophone community as a whole.
And finally there was the Bakweri Land Committee (BLC), the
organisation of the Bakweri chiefs and elite in Fako Division of
the South West Province, whose main goal has continued to be the
retrieval of their ancestral lands that were expropriated under
German colonial rule for the purpose of  plantation production and
later, in 1946, leased by the British Trusteeship Authority to the
CDC. The BLC felt particularly aggrieved by the announced
privatisation of the CDC. It felt betrayed at not having been
previously consulted about the corporation’s privatisation and it
warned the government that the CDC lands were Bakweri lands
and thus could not be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent
and compensation. The BLC is being supported in its current
struggles by both the South West and Anglophone associations.
In addition to the ethno-regional associations, there were other
civil-society organisations in the region that resisted the privatisation
of  the CDC. The most important was the Fako Agricultural Workers’
Union (FAWU) that is responsible for the representation and defence
of the CDC workers’ interests (Konings 1993a, 1995a). Its president,
Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, is one of  the most prominent trade-union
leaders in Cameroon, having played a significant role in the
achievement of a large measure of trade-union autonomy in 1992.
He insisted that the CDC could not be privatised without the FAWU
being consulted, arguing that the workers had made personal
sacrifices during the economic crisis to assist the corporation’s
recovery by accepting drastic cuts in salaries and fringe benefits
and contributing to a compulsory savings scheme. Moreover, the
union, he said, would resist any mass lay-offs and/or deterioration
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in the workers’ conditions of  service as a result of  privatisation
(Konings 1995b).
And, finally, the Anglophone press has strongly condemned the
announced privatisation. It has continued to defend the Anglophone
cause and to inform the Anglophone population of  the issues at
stake.
Ethno-regional protest actions against CDC
privatisation
During the economic crisis, starting in 1986-87, there were frequent
rumours in Anglophone Cameroon that the Biya government was
hoping to privatise the CDC and sell it to Francophone or French
interests. The government strongly denied such rumours but
Anglophones remained on the alert, ready to act if their regional
patrimony was threatened.
In June 1992, for instance, it was rumoured that the French were
interested in taking over the corporation after the Biya government,
highly dependent on French support and aid, had managed to obtain
a FCFA 7 billion low-interest loan for the ailing company from the
French CCCE. Although this loan provided much-needed capital
for investment purposes, the increased control over the corporation
by France was highly resented by CDC workers and managers, as
well as by the general public in Anglophone Cameroon. It was then
reported in Anglophone newspapers that the CCCE wanted to take
over the CDC oil-palm estates, which again resulted in widespread
protests in Anglophone Cameroon. In July 1992, SWELA began to
collect signatures for a petition against this alleged takeover.1
This outcry against expanded French control over the corporation
contrasted sharply with Anglophone sentiments regarding previous
and later transfers of the management of two major CDC crops to
Anglo-American companies. Few protests were voiced in
Anglophone Cameroon when the corporation entrusted the
management of the banana sector to the American multinational
Del Monte in 1987. And Anglophone newspapers even lauded the
agreement between the CDC and (the British) COMDEV in late
1992 which stipulated that management of  the corporation’s three
tea estates be transferred to COMDEV for a period of  ten years.
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Anglophones argued that these two Anglo-American companies had
wide experience in plantation management. Comdev had even had
experience in Anglophone Cameroon, having satisfactorily managed
the CDC from 1960 to 1974 (Konings 1993a: 41-45). Above all,
Anglophones strongly believed that Anglo-American companies
would be less inclined than French ones to dominate and exploit an
Anglophone region and that their business culture fitted in well in
Anglophone Cameroon.
When the government finally did announce the privatisation of
the CDC on 15 July 1994, Anglophones were deeply incensed. All
existing ethno-regional associations and opposition parties formed
a united front to resist the government’s decision. One Anglophone
columnist, Mr Jing Thomas, captured the essence of Anglophone
sentiments:
The CDC is unlike any other corporation. It means native lands,
especially those of the Bakweri. It means jobs for Cameroonians,
especially the Anglophones. It is a symbol of  Anglophone survival
against all odds.... If  the CDC falls....the last act of  internal colonisation
would have been completed.2
Anglophones once again alleged that privatisation of the CDC
was ‘an ill-disguised plot to hand over the corporation to the French
and the Francophones’ or ‘a plan by Biya to compensate his
“tribesmen” and allies with a slice of the parastatal cake’.3 There
were protest marches in Anglophone towns organised by SWELA
and the Anglophone associations. Protesters carried banners with
slogans such as ‘France: Hands off Anglophones’ and ‘Hands off
or we will burn the plantations’. The National Executive of the
Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), the most important
Anglophone association, met on 30-31 July 1994 and condemned
the CDC privatisation as a declaration of war against the people of
Southern Cameroons and called upon Anglophones to observe 16
August as a day of protest and solidarity with the CDC.4 SWELA
thereupon declared 12 August as another day of solidarity with the
CDC. Despite a ban on demonstrations on its solidarity day and a
heavy police presence, a determined group of  SWELA members
led by Secretary-General Martin Nkemngu marched successfully to
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the governor’s office where they presented a protest memorandum
for the attention of the head of state.5 At a press conference in
Limbe (Victoria) on 20 August, the FAWU president, Mr C.P.N.
Vewessee, declared that the union and the workers were totally
against the dubious privatisation of the CDC. Since the workers
had a joint financial stake in the corporation amounting to FCFA
5.5 billion, the privatisation could only be enforced on terms
acceptable to the majority of  the workers.6 In August, the Biya
government sent a delegation of high-ranking Anglophone allies to
the capitals of the two Anglophone provinces to try to calm the
population. They were jeered and asked whether they would ‘benefit
from the spoils’.
Unsurprisingly, the most vehement opposition in Anglophone
Cameroon came from landowners. As soon as the privatisation of
the CDC was announced, the Bakweri chiefs and elite mobilised to
revive the moribund BLC and to adopt a common position with
regard to the privatisation, which had been planned without any
consideration having been given to the Bakweri land problem. Soon
thereafter the BLC was renamed the Bakweri Land Claims
Committee (BLCC).
On 23 July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite met in Buea under
the chairmanship of  Paramount Chief  S.M.L. Endeley of  Buea and
Paramount Chief  F. Bille Manga Williams of  Victoria (Limbe) to
discuss the implications of  the government’s decision. They agreed
to voice strong opposition to the announced privatisation on the
grounds that the CDC lands were Bakweri lands and thus could not
be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent. After lengthy and
passionate discussions, an ad hoc committee was elected by
acclamation to assist the BLCC in preparing a detailed memorandum
on the Bakweri position to be presented to the government and all
other interested parties.7
Over 500 Bakweri chiefs, notables and elite gathered at the Buea
Youth Cultural and Animation Center on 4 August 1994 and
approved the memorandum drawn up by the ad hoc committee. In
the memorandum, the Bakweri agreed that, if privatisation had to
take place at all, it should be on the basis of ‘a creative and
enlightened partnership between the owners of the land on which
the corporation operates and the providers of finance capital without
144
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
which it would not be possible to run a modern, technologically
sophisticated agro-industrial complex like the CDC’. They insisted
that any privatisation plan be based on ‘terms which recognise the
ownership of land as a distinct variable which together with the
cash make plantation agriculture possible; consequently, landowners
deserve ground rent compensation in much the same way as the
CDC was liable to pay ground rents for the use of the land’.8 The
memorandum was later presented to the provincial governor for
onward transmission to President Biya. At the end of this historic
meeting, the eminent Bakweri scholar and secretary of the ad hoc
committee, Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, was designated counsel
for the Bakweri people with instructions to present their case before
the United Nations and other international fora.
The Bakweri case was strongly supported by the Anglophone
movements. A powerfully worded petition to the head of  state, co-
signed by the Anglophone movements and the Bakweri chiefs,
reiterated that the Bakweri had never relinquished ownership of
the CDC lands and that the corporation could not be sold without
Bakweri consent. It pointed out that the Bakweri had never been
paid royalties for the use of their lands since the creation of the
CDC in 1946 and also stressed that the Bakweri were not inclined
to renew the 60-year CDC lease, thus reclaiming the CDC lands
after its expiry in 2007.
Concerned about the mounting anger in the Anglophone region
in general and the Bakweri community in particular, the Biya
government decided to send a delegation of high-ranking
Anglophone allies to the South West Province to appease the
population. The delegation was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni, the
Deputy Secretary-General at the Presidency, and the Chief  of
Bakingili, a village located on the territory of  a Bakweri subgroup.
The delegation met a number of Bakweri representatives in Buea
to discuss the land problem. Though speaking on behalf of the
government, Chief Inoni appealed to the Bakweri representatives
not to forget that he was one of them. He acknowledged that there
should have been prior contact between the government and the
Bakweri before the announcement of  the corporation’s privatisation
but he denied the widespread rumours in Anglophone Cameroon
that the French and some high-ranking Francophones had
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masterminded the whole operation. While admitting that the
financial situation of the corporation had improved after the 1994
devaluation of  the CFA franc, he argued that privatisation would
enable the corporation to obtain new capital for necessary
investments in production and processing. The Bakweri Paramount
Chief  S.M.L. Endeley, who had always been a staunch supporter of
the regime until the Bakweri land issue arose,9 then took the floor.
Amid thunderous applause he declared that he as the custodian of
the ancestral lands and the Bakweri population as a whole were
against the privatisation of the CDC. He requested that Chief Inoni
report this to President Biya:
We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where
government hands decisions through dictatorship... We say no, no
[to privatisation], go and tell Mr Biya that he cannot afford to go
down in history as the man who sold the CDC.10
After the government delegation returned to Yaoundé, no further
government action took place concerning CDC privatisation but this
apparent victory for Anglophone resistance turned out to be short-
lived. In 1997 rumours of  an imminent privatisation of  the CDC
became more and more persistent. In conformity with the agreement
concluded with the IMF and the World Bank within the framework
of  the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1997,
the privatisation of the CDC was expected to be launched soon. That
the government, under severe pressure from the Bretton Woods
institutions, was preparing the ground for the privatisation of the
CDC could be seen from the speeches and interviews of  leading
government and CDC officials at the opening ceremony of the
corporation’s golden-jubilee celebration in Bota-Victoria on 1
December 1997. In his speech on that occasion, the newly appointed
Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge, a Bakwerian himself who
had been the CDC’s general manager from 1988 to 1997, said:
Since the traditional international funding agencies no longer finance
corporations like CDC, the establishment should be prepared...to
foster new business relationships to raise new money while the state
plays the role of  facilitator.... Traditional rulers within CDC’s areas
146
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
of operation, workers and other Cameroonians must understand
perfectly well and make sure that peace reigns for conclusive
investment.11
The CDC chairman, Mr N.N. Mbile, added that ‘privatisation
should not scare us as we are confident that government will protect
the interests of the Cameroonian people, the original landowners,
the workers, new investors and the state itself ’. Moreover, the CDC
deputy general manager, Mr Richard Grey, then revealed that the
highly reputable international consultancy firm Coopers and
Lybrand had already been selected by the World Bank and the
government to carry out a study into the privatisation of the CDC
that would be completed by 30 June 1998. The Bakweri chiefs who
attended the ceremony, notably Chief  S.M.L. Endeley of  Buea, were
frustrated by these statements and revelations and condemned any
future privatisation.12
The CDC was finally put up for sale in January 1999. Few protests
were heard from the now almost dormant Anglophone movements
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000). Their leadership’s only activity was
to make a strongly worded statement on 10 April 1999 warning
prospective CDC buyers to desist from investing in the purchase of
the CDC. Bakweri chiefs and elite, however, quickly rallied again.
In a meeting with South Western members of  parliament and
government, they denounced the privatisation of the CDC saying
that the latter’s acceptance of  the CDC sale ‘was tantamount to a
betrayal of their people’.13 The BLCC officially wrote to President
Biya on behalf of the Bakweri people on 3 March 1999 requesting
that it be included in the privatisation negotiations and that
compensation be paid for the use of  Bakweri lands. When rumours
spread that various multinational companies like Fruitiers/Dole,
Chiquita and Del Monte were already negotiating with individual
government officials about the purchase of the whole or parts of
the CDC at throwaway prices, the Bakweri in the diaspora once
again addressed the head of state on 1 October 1999 in support of
the BLCC position.14
Since no reply was forthcoming from the presidency, the BLCC,
strongly supported by South West associations, like SWELA and
SWECC, decided to raise national and international awareness by
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starting a high-profile public-relations campaign through the writing
of open letters, petitions and newspaper articles and the use of the
Internet. For this purpose, an interim bureau of  the BLCC was set
up in the United States in May 2000 to establish an effective, active
and visible BLCC presence within the Bakweri and Cameroonian
diaspora community and to open permanent lines of  communication
with all potential buyers of the CDC, donor agencies, NGOs and
foreign governments directly or indirectly involved in the sale of
the CDC. The BLCC-USA became very vocal, creating its own
website on the Internet.15 Its first action was to send a memorandum
to the managing director of  the IMF, Mr Horst Köhler, on 16 June
2000. In this memorandum, it warned him about the growing unrest
among the Bakweri and threatened legal action should the
privatisation of the CDC be pursued without BLCC involvement:
As the current impasse in Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrates, land
expropriated from African natives by European colonialists a century
ago is the source of  much contemporary unrest and instability. All
Cameroonians of goodwill bear witness that the Bakweri people
have over the years opted for a peaceful resolution of the CDC
Bakweri land problem. However, should the privatisation of the
CDC go ahead without the input of the Bakweri on whose land
most of  the corporation’s agro-industrial activities are located, we
preserve the right to seek legal redress against the government of
the Republic of  Cameroon, the IMF, the World Bank as well as all
lessees who derive title to the land by whatever means, in any country
of the world where such bodies are located.16
This was followed by massive pro-BLCC demonstrations in New
York and Washington during the September 2000 United Nations
Millennium Summit that was attended by a huge Cameroonian
delegation led by President Paul Biya. As a result of these
demonstrations and a flurry of other pro-BLCC activities on this
occasion, the embarrassed Cameroonian delegation, along with
leading donor agencies, were able to gauge the high levels of support
for the BLCC within the entire Cameroonian diaspora community
in the United States.
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In a press release on 5 August 2000, the BLCC revealed that it
was going to take its campaign for land restitution and compensation
‘a notch higher’ by seeking consultative status within the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It believed that
the granting of consultative status would provide it with a global
platform to proclaim its struggle for land rights, ‘bringing it into
contact with other NGOs which claim to represent the interests of
indigenous groups from around the world as well as with
sympathetic UN members who have championed the cause of
dispossessed people on the floor of the General Assembly and at
the numerous ECOSOC meetings over the years’.17 Soon afterwards,
on 21 August 2000, the BLCC counsel, Professor Ndiva Kofele-
Kale, was invited by the United Nations to make a representation
on the Bakweri lands issue to the United Nations Human Rights
Commission in Geneva.
Following the government’s renewed call for tenders for the sale
of the CDC in September 2000, the BLCC cautioned prospective
buyers in an open letter as follows:
It is our duty to advise you to think twice before you commit the
resources of your shareholders in a venture that is still mired in
controversy and whose promised financial and economic rewards
may prove to be illusory in the long run.18
It became increasingly evident that the BLCC was finding it hard
to defend Bakweri interests at the national level after ‘their own
son’, Peter Mafany Musonge, was appointed prime minister in 1996.
Without doubt, one of the main reasons for his appointment to this
position was that President Biya regarded him, being an ex-CDC
general manager and a Bakweri, as the most suitable candidate to
handle the delicate issue of CDC privatisation.
The appointment of Musonge initially raised high expectations
among the Bakweri. They were convinced that their son would pay
particular attention to the land question and take Bakweri interests
into consideration during any eventual sale of the CDC. Their
expectations appeared to have a solid foundation because, in his
former capacity as CDC general manager, Musonge had publicly
declared during a 1994 radio interview that any privatisation of  the
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CDC should be ‘not only economically effective but also socially
equitable’. For that reason, indigenous landowners, workers and
investors would be directly involved in this endeavour.19 Once
appointed prime minister however, he came under immense pressure
from the IMF and his master, Paul Biya, to champion the economic
advantages of CDC privatisation and to forget about the payment
of  compensation to Bakweri landowners. Unable to convince his
ethnic group to give up its claim to what could possibly amount to
tens of  billions of  CFA francs after more than fifty years of  CDC
existence, he is reported to have resorted to intimidation, using the
Buea sub-prefect and the Fako prefect to that end.
In March 2000, the Buea sub-prefect, Mr Aboubakar Njikam,
banned a BLCC general assembly meeting for which he had earlier
given his approval. The prime minister appears quickly to have
ordered a halt to the meeting when he learnt that compensation
was high on the agenda but he failed to intimidate the committee,
which eventually met on 15 April 2000. In June 2000, the Fako
prefect, Jean-Robert Mengue Meka, accused it of being an illegal
organisation and the committee was ordered to cease its activities.
Two of  the newly elected BLCC executives, Chief  Peter Moky
Efange (president) and Mola Njoh Litumbe (secretary-general),
responded by telling Mengue Meka that he was acting illegally
himself by claiming that the BLCC, which was founded as early as
1946, was an unlawful association. The prefect was reminded that
the BLCC was a duly incorporated organisation that had been
registered in accordance with the laws of the country and had been
received by the South West governor in 1994 and could thus not
now have its legality questioned.20
With the high profile publicity given to the BLCC both at home
and abroad, the prime minister could no longer ignore the committee
and its demands. He invited it to a working session in his Yaoundé
office and on 4 October 2000, the BLCC leadership met with
Musonge, Chief Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri deputy general secretary
at the Presidency and a number of  other government officials. During
this meeting Musonge conceded that the issues of land ownership
and the payment of ground rents were legitimate demands but urged
that these demands be pursued separately from the issue of
privatisation. He argued that a hostile environment was being
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created by the BLCC protest campaign, which was scaring off
potential investors.21
The BLCC delegation agreed with the prime minister that
privatisation would be successful only in a peaceful atmosphere
but it pointed out that the Bakweri protest actions, such as the UN
Millennium Summit demonstrations, stemmed from a lack of
government response to their pleas and representations. It stressed
that Bakweri protest actions would inevitably continue until ‘justice,
equity, and legitimate rights of  the Bakweri were met’. The
delegation then reiterated the main BLCC demands, namely:
• that the government recognise that the lands occupied by
the CDC were private property as defined by Part II of the
1974 Land Law and that the Bakweri were the legitimate
owners of these lands;
• that the Bakweri be fully involved in the CDC privatisation
negotiations to ensure that their interests were effectively
protected;
• that ground rents be paid to a Bakweri land trust fund;
and
• that the Bakweri, acting jointly or individually be allocated
a specific percentage of shares in each of the privatised
sectors of the corporation.22
While the BLCC was trying to embark on a dialogue with local
and national authorities, it continued to caution potential CDC
buyers and the Bretton Woods institutions against any privatisation
of  the corporation without the involvement of  the landowners. The
latter, in turn, brought strong pressure to bear upon the Cameroonian
government to settle the privatisation imbroglio. In the wake of  the
reluctance of foreign companies to invest in the CDC, primarily
because of the unresolved land issue, the government was
compelled to reissue the CDC bid for tenders first on 1 January
2001 and then again on 1 January 2002. Without having ever
consulted the BLCC, the government announced in October 2002
that the CDC tea sector had been sold to a South African
consortium, Brobon Finex PTY Limited (Konings 2011).
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show that privatisation has
become a cornerstone in the good governance-structural adjustment
linkage formulated by the western donors and creditors and imposed
upon African states. It is, in essence, an attempt to free state
enterprises from ‘politics’, in particular from the government’s neo-
patrimonial logic which is seen as the basic cause of their
malfunctioning, to introduce transparency, accountability and the
rule of  law in policy-making and implementation needed for the
efficient operation of market forces, and to redirect the state away
from being an entrepreneur to being a promoter of private enterprise.
Privatisation is also said to have a potentially liberating effect on
civil society: it will empower the people by creating opportunities
for private initiative and entrepreneurship.
My case study of the privatisation of the CDC in Anglophone
Cameroon has provided sufficient evidence to substantiate our main
thesis that the good governance-structural adjustment linkage,
though largely framed in managerial and technical terms, is actually
highly political, being embedded in particular relations of power,
and ironically it often contradicts the liberal-democratic principles
prescribed by the bilateral donors. In this respect, it has clearly
demonstrated that:
• Privatisation schemes imposed by the Bretton Woods
institutions tend to erode national sovereignty over basic
economic policy decision-making despite the fact that these
institutions usually try to depoliticise their interventions
in African states by referring to their superior economic
knowledge and technocratic skills. Moreover, the
installation of a technocracy to implement ‘correct’
policies is an encouragement of  authoritarian forms of
governance: accounting to external agencies takes the place
of accountability to legislatures and the electorate,
democratic decision-making processes are circumvented,
and a resulting ‘cult of secrecy’ discourages political debate
and dialogue (Mkandawire 1999).
• Government leaders have constantly attempted to
postpone and manipulate the implementation of
privatisation schemes, which challenge the patronage
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system that forms a stabilising and uniting factor in the
weak nation-state, undermine their limited popular
legitimacy, and create ethno-regional opposition.
Nevertheless, they have been eventually forced to comply
so as not to forfeit any needed financial assistance.
• The government announcement of the privatisation of the
CDC in Anglophone Cameroon has been particularly contested
by various ethno-regional associations that have emerged
during political liberalisation. Having been excluded from
the decision-making process, they have strongly protested
against their loss of control over ancestral lands and regional
parastatals, which they considered as a renewed onslaught
by the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state on the
Anglophone cultural and economic heritage.
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Good governance and border conflicts in
Africa: The Bakassi dispute between
Cameroon and Nigeria
Introduction
Africanists have developed a renewed interest in the study of
colonially negotiated borders of late due to an increase in boundary
disputes between and within African states (cf. Nugent & Asiwaju
1996; Bach 1999; Mbembe 1999; Herbst 2000; Nugent 2002;
Bennafla 2002). After independence, border skirmishes and wars
between African states were relatively rare, with governments more
or less adhering to the sacrosanct nature of boundaries inherited
from colonial times (the principle of uti possidetis jus), as laid down
in the 1963 Charter of  the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU).
At present, however, African states are involved in numerous
disputes, such as those between Ethiopia and its neighbours in the
Horn of Africa (Abbink 1998, 2003), between Nigeria and its
neighbours, and between the Democratic Republic of Congo and
its neighbours. According to Mbembe (1999: 9), most of  these
disputes have their origins ‘not in the desire to make an ethno-
cultural space coincide with the space of the state, but rather in the
struggle to control resources considered to be vital’. Moreover, the
recent political liberalisation process has created more space for
separatist and irredentist movements within African states, as is
evidenced in Senegal (Casamance), Cameroon (the Anglophone
region), Angola (the Cabinda enclave) and Namibia (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003; Forrest 2004; Englebert & Hummel 2005; Keller
2007).
This chapter seeks to analyse one of these protracted border
disputes in Africa that could have escalated into a major interstate
war had it not been settled in a unique showcase of conflict
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prevention. This dispute, which gained international attention in
the 1990s, is the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over the
sovereignty of  the Bakassi Peninsula, an area rich in oil reserves
and other natural resources. Following a series of  military
confrontations between Nigerian and Cameroonian troops, the
Cameroonian government filed a case at the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in 1994 and eight years later, in October 2002, the
court ruled in its favour.
The eventual agreement reached by the heads of state in 2006,
the so-called Greentree Agreement, on the modalities of the Nigerian
withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the 2002
ICJ verdict seems to substantiate Gerti Hesseling’s thesis (2006) that
respect for the rule of  law, which she considered to be vital in settling
the numerous intrastate and interstate conflicts in Africa and in building
up sustainable peace, has improved in some African states during the
current process of  political liberalisation. The international community,
too, hailed the agreement between the two heads of  state as proof
that African states are increasingly inclined to rely on international
law rather than on armed struggle to resolve potentially explosive
interstate boundary disputes (Udogu 2008).
This study supports Hesseling’s thesis to a large extent but also
offers some critical comments. It attempts to show that Hesseling
may not have paid sufficient attention to the complex nature of
border conflicts in Africa. She therefore fails to recognise the
following observations made in this present study:
• First, the implementation of  the rule of  law in border
disputes is likely to meet serious obstacles in Africa. The
Bakassi dispute clearly demonstrates that an ICJ verdict
may not be enough to bring about a sustainable agreement
between two parties. Other factors may also play a
decisive role in settling border conflicts peacefully
including: (i) the strategic role of an impartial mediator –
in this case, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan –
in providing an environment of  trust through their ‘good
office’ role; (ii) the importance of strong leadership and
a determination to overcome domestic reluctance; (iii)
the valuable role of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed
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Commission (CNMC) – a commission of Cameroonian
and Nigerian representatives chaired by the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for West Africa – in
monitoring the implementation of the 2002 ICJ verdict
and the 2006 Greentree Agreement; and (iv) the
importance of sustained international commitment to
preventive diplomacy and the rule of  law in compliance with
the 2002 ICJ verdict (International Peace Institute 2008).
• Second, respect for the rule of  law does not automatically
lead to the achievement of sustainable peace in border
disputes in Africa. This study attempts to demonstrate that
the international community’s view that the 2006 Greentree
Agreement was going to settle the Bakassi dispute once
and for all was too optimistic as it completely overlooked
the stakes for other parties in the conflict. Two stakeholders,
namely the predominantly Nigerian population on the
Bakassi Peninsula and the Anglophone Cameroonian
secessionist movements, have continued to contest the
2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006 Greentree Agreement in
the strongest terms. The Nigerian inhabitants allege that
the implementation of  the rule of  law fails to take into
account their overwhelming desire to remain Nigerian
citizens in the Nigerian political entity, and they vehemently
resist the idea of incorporation into the Republic of
Cameroon. Anglophone Cameroonian secessionist
movements argue that the Bakassi Peninsula should never
have been a point of issue between Nigeria and Cameroon
at all because the territory forms part of  the Southern
Cameroons, which used to be the name of the Anglophone
territory prior to independence and the country’s
reunification in 1961. The various modes of resistance of
both groups against the 2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006
Greentree Agreement raise serious doubts about the
international community’s acclamations of  a peaceful
settlement to the Bakassi dispute.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first describes
the development of the Bakassi dispute. The second discusses the
implications of the 2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006 Greentree
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Agreement, while the third documents the fierce resistance of the
Nigerian inhabitants on the peninsula and Anglophone Cameroonian
secessionist movements to the ICJ verdict and the Greentree
Agreement.
The development of the Bakassi dispute
The Cameroon-Nigeria border has been a source of regular conflict
between the post-colonial Cameroonian and Nigerian states (Anene
1961; Weladji 1974-75; Nwokedi 1984-85; Owolabi 1991; Ngoh
2001). Similar to other colonially negotiated boundaries, the border,
and especially the maritime border, has been neither unambiguously
defined nor satisfactorily demarcated (Asiwaju 1998). Sovereignty
over the Bakassi Peninsula has been a major bone of contention in
the long history of  Cameroon-Nigeria border disputes.
The Bakassi Peninsula is an area measuring approximately 1,000
km2 that is made up of mangrove swamps and half-submerged islands
protruding into the Bight of  Bonny (formerly known as the Bight
of  Biafra). It is part of  the Ndian Division of  the South West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon, with a population estimated
at between 250,000 and 300,000. The vast majority are Efik-
speaking Nigerians who eke out an existence as fishermen. The
peninsula lacks basic infrastructural provisions: there is no electricity,
no potable water (this has to be fetched from the mainland), no
roads and few educational or health facilities. At first sight, it seems
surprising that such a neglected and unpromising area should have
excited such attention from the governments of Cameroon and
Nigeria over the past thirty years, to the point where full-scale war
has at times appeared imminent (Anene 1970; Cornwell 2006).
Before the scramble for Africa, Bakassi seems to have been part
of  the ancient Kingdom of  Calabar. During the scramble, the Obong
or King of  Old Calabar signed a Treaty of  Protection with the
Queen of  England on 10 September 1884. Despite the Obong’s
protest, however, the British eventually ceded the Bakassi Peninsula
to the German Kamerun Protectorate in 1913 through a series of
bilateral treaties and other legal instruments.
Following the First World War, the erstwhile German Kamerun
Protectorate (1884-1916) was partitioned between the British and
French victors, first as ‘mandates’ under the League of Nations
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and later as ‘trusts’ under the United Nations. The British territory
was much smaller than the French, comprising about a fifth of the
total area and population of  the former German colony. It consisted
of two narrow non-contiguous regions bordering Nigeria and
stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to Lake Chad. The southern
part was christened Southern Cameroons, and the northern part
became known as Northern Cameroons. Bakassi became part of
the Southern Cameroons (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
A complicating factor for future territorial claims on Bakassi was
that the Southern and Northern Cameroons were administered as
integral parts of Nigeria. As a result, there was no real border
between the British Cameroons and Nigeria and this promoted a
free flow of  goods and labour between the two territories. During
this period, a large number of Nigerians, notably of Igbo and Ibibio
origin, migrated to the Southern Cameroons where they came to
dominate the local economy, a development that was strongly
resented by the Southern Cameroonian population and exploited
by regional politicians during the nationalist struggles after the
Second World War (Konings 2005c). This shared colonial history
encouraged the Nigerian post-colonial state to lay claim to the
Bakassi Peninsula.
In the run-up to independence in the late 1950s, the United
Nations asked Britain to organise a plebiscite in the British
Cameroons to ascertain the wishes of the local population as to
which country it would like to be part of following independence.
While the Northern Cameroons decided to join the independent
Federation of  Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons decided on 11
February 1961 to join the already-independent Republic of
Cameroon (the former French trust territory), which was to become
the Federal Republic of  Cameroon on 1 October 1961 (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003). It is worth noting here that there were 21 polling
stations on the Bakassi Peninsula during the UN-organised plebiscite
in the Southern Cameroons. Evidently, the international community
at that time was in no doubt about the fact that Bakassi was part of
the Southern Cameroons and that, following reunification, it would
become part of  the newly established Federal Republic of  Cameroon.
Significantly, sovereignty over Bakassi itself  was not an issue
between Cameroon and Nigeria for some time after independence
(International Court of Justice 2002). Several Nigerian authorities
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and scholars publicly confirmed Cameroonian sovereignty over
Bakassi, and Nigerian maps had the peninsula marked as part of
Cameroonian territory right up until the 1990s (Essombo 1995;
Mbome 1996; Mgbale 2001; Olagunju 2009). It was only after the
discovery of large amounts of oil in the Bakassi area, albeit a decade
after independence, that Nigeria started publicly claiming ownership
of the peninsula.
Initially, the post-colonial Nigerian and Cameroonian states were
more concerned with demarcating the colonially negotiated borders
than with sovereignty over Bakassi. One of the major issues was
the maritime border between the two countries, which had only
been vaguely defined in the Anglo-German agreements of  1913.
From the mid-1960s onwards, a newly created Joint Cameroon-
Nigeria Commission tried to resolve the boundary dispute, but very
little was achieved. The agreements concluded by the two
governments were either contested or denounced outright. One of
the principal factors that hampered any peaceful solution was the
mutual mistrust shown by the leaders, something that dated back
to pre-reunification days. The territorial losses suffered during the
UN-organised plebiscites in the British Cameroons had created deep
and long-lasting bitterness. Against the expectations of  the
Francophone Cameroonian and Nigerian leaders, Southern
Cameroons then voted for reunification with Francophone
Cameroon, and Northern Cameroons for integration with Nigeria.
The Cameroonian President Ahmadou Ahidjo was particularly
aggrieved by the loss of  the British Northern Cameroons, which
was of the same ethnic and religious extraction as his home region,
namely the northern part of Francophone Cameroon. Instead of
strengthening his position, the plebiscite results appeared to weaken
it. He strongly suspected that the Southern Cameroons vote for
reunification would cement an alliance between the Southern
Cameroons elite and the ethnically related opposition in the
southwestern part of Francophone Cameroon (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003). He accused the British-Nigerian colonial
administration of having manipulated the elections in the British
Northern Cameroons to its own advantage and took the matter to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague and to the
United Nations, but lost his case. For several years, he declared the
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anniversary of that verdict as a day of mourning, to the displeasure
of  Nigeria’s leaders. Ahidjo was also reluctant to improve relations
with his neighbour because he was inclined to perceive the close
cultural and historical connections between Nigeria and Anglophone
Cameroon as a potential threat to reunification and to a strong central
state and national unity. He was particularly worried that the
connection might encourage secession among the Anglophone
population, all the more so because there was a growing
dissatisfaction among the Anglophone minority with Francophone
hegemonic tendencies following reunification (Konings 2005c).
Nevertheless, Ahidjo’s support of  the Gowon regime during the
Biafran civil war did bring about a temporary improvement in
bilateral relations. This led to an intensification of  border talks,
which eventually resulted in the 1975 Maroua Declaration that
delimited the maritime boundary and recognised Cameroonian
sovereignty over Bakassi (Owolabi 1991; Mbome 1996). The
overthrow of the Gowon regime in a military coup five weeks after
concluding this accord was clearly connected with the terms of  the
agreement. The new Nigerian leader, Mohammed Murtala, falsely
accused Gowon of having handed over Bakassi, which he claimed
to be Nigerian property, to Cameroon as a gift in gratitude for the
role played by Ahidjo in the Nigerian civil war, and he refused to
ratify the agreement. He reportedly threatened that ‘rather than
accept the outrageous 1975 award, Nigeria would go to war if the
Cameroonians refused to negotiate’ (Nwokedi 1984-85: 51).
Although Murtala died in an unsuccessful coup just a year later, his
successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, held the same opinion. This
new Nigerian stance infuriated Ahidjo, who accused Nigeria of  acting
in bad faith, and he subsequently declined to enter into any further
negotiations with the Nigerian authorities as long as he remained
head of  state. Bilateral relations hardly improved under Ahidjo’s
successor, Paul Biya, mainly because of  continuing border problems.
Following these events, sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula
became more of an issue between the Cameroonian and Nigerian
post-colonial states; and tensions built up on both sides before finally
culminating in armed conflict. Bakassi has become of  enormous
economic and geo-strategic importance due to not only its rich
hydrocarbon and fish resources but also its pivotal interest in
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controlling access to the port of Calabar, which is currently being
developed as Nigeria’s Export-Processing Zone and the Eastern
Command Headquarters of the Nigerian navy (Asiwaju 1998: 254;
Ngang 2010).
The first serious skirmishes between Nigerian and Cameroonian
forces occurred on 16 May 1981 and brought the two states to the
brink of  war. Three Nigerian patrol boats came under fire in the
Bakassi area and five Nigerian soldiers were killed. Nigeria’s
demands for an apology and compensation were initially refused,
and relations between the two countries took an ominous turn for
the worse. In July 1981, however, Cameroon undertook to pay
compensation and tensions eased, with plaudits going to Nigeria’s
President Shagari for his restraint and for containing his hawkish
military. The incident led to the resurrection of  the joint commission
and discussions on the border dispute were officially reopened
(Cornwell 2006: 51-52).
These discussions had little effect, however, as the Nigerian
inhabitants of Bakassi continued to protest to the Nigerian
authorities in Cross River State about the actions of the
Cameroonian gendarmes who were demanding excessive payments
for fishing licences. Later raids by the gendarmes were evidently
more violent, involving looting, rape and the destruction of  fishing
equipment. And then in May 1991, the gendarmes entered nine
fishing villages, hoisted their national flag and announced that they
were renaming the settlements. They also promised that health and
educational facilities would be provided, though they demanded
the payment of  taxes. The new Nigerian military leader, General
Sani Abacha, then claimed that the Nigerian state had to protect
the Nigerian population on Bakassi and ordered Nigerian troops to
occupy part of the peninsula on 21 December 1993. In response,
Cameroonian troops attacked the Nigerian occupying force, which
resulted in several deaths and large-scale destruction of  property.
The fighting continued intermittently and both sides increased the
quantity and quality of their weapons in the disputed zone. Ngniman
(1996) gives a detailed report of all the military events that took
place between 1993 and 1996 and, in February 1996, the Nigerian
forces clashed again with Cameroonian troops.
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A number of initiatives were taken to prevent the dispute from
escalating and to bring the two parties to the negotiating table. These
included pressure from France which was motivated by its
determination to safeguard its interests in both states (Mgbale 2001:
175), mediation by the Togolese President Eyadéma, and the
adoption of resolutions by the United Nations and the Organisation
of  African Unity, apparently with little success. On 29 March 1994,
the Cameroonian government filed an application with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to institute
proceedings against Nigeria for using violence to contest Cameroon’s
sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula. On 5 September 2002, just
a month before the court’s verdict was due, the UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan and the two heads of state, Olusegun Obasanjo
and Paul Biya, met in Paris in the presence of the French President
Jacques Chirac and the two African leaders pledged to comply with
the court’s verdict, irrespective of  its ruling.
The implications of  the 2002 ICJ ruling and the 2006
Greentree Agreement
On 10 October 2002 and after eight years of deliberations, the ICJ
ruled in favour of  Cameroon (International Court of  Justice 2002). It
justified its verdict as follows. The land boundaries between Nigeria
and Cameroon had been established by treaties signed by Britain
and Germany, notably the Anglo-German Agreement of  11 March
1913, and the court accepted the authenticity of  these treaties. It
also stated that Cameroonian claims had been given added weight
by the 1975 Maroua Declaration signed by President Ahidjo and
General Gowon. This declaration, though never ratified by
Nigeria, clearly recognised Cameroonian sovereignty over Bakassi.
According to the court, there was also ample evidence that there
was a certain measure of Nigerian acceptance of Cameroonian claims
in the period preceding the outbreak of  the conflict in the 1990s.
The court dismissed Nigeria’s claims, which had been largely
based on the legal principle of historical consolidation and the
exercise of sovereignty after independence, with the acquiescence
of  Cameroon. During the court sessions, Nigeria’s legal experts
declared that the subjects of the chiefs of Old Calabar had occupied
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the peninsula since pre-colonial times and claimed that, following
independence, these chiefs had transferred their title to the peninsula
to the Nigerian state, which had exercised sovereignty over Bakassi
ever since without any protest from Cameroon. As proof  of  Nigeria’s
post-colonial sovereignty, they referred to a number of  practices on
the peninsula, including Nigeria’s maintenance of  public law and
order, its collection of taxes, its introduction of local governance,
the widespread use of  the Nigerian currency, the holding of  Nigerian
passports by Bakassi residents, and the presence of schools and
health centres subsidised by the Nigerian state.
The court ordered Nigeria to withdraw its administration and its
armed forces and police from the peninsula expeditiously and
without condition. However, it reminded the Cameroonian
government of its pledge at the hearings to continue to afford
protection to Nigerians living on the peninsula. It also rejected
Cameroon’s request that Nigeria be held responsible for the damage
caused by its occupation of Bakassi.
While Cameroon was obviously satisfied with the verdict, it
caused consternation in Nigeria, arousing vitriolic comments from
Nigerian officialdom and the Nigerian media alike, which went as
far as identifying a Western conspiracy against the country. For
example, Chief  Richard Akinjide, a former Nigerian Attorney-
General and Minister of Justice who had been a leading member of
Nigeria’s legal team, described the verdict as being ‘50%
international law and 50% international politics’ and ‘blatantly biased
and unfair’. He made particular reference to the fact that the
president of the court, Gilbert Guillaume, was a Frenchman who
was likely to support the claims of the Francophone-dominated
regime in Cameroon (Baye 2010). The outcome of the controversy
was a de facto Nigerian refusal to withdraw militarily from Bakassi
and to transfer sovereignty. The Nigerian government did not,
however, openly reject the judgment but instead called for an
agreement that would provide ‘peace with honour, with the interest
and welfare of our people’ (Olagunju 2009: 14).
At this critical point, Kofi Annan appealed to the two countries
to respect and implement the court’s judgment and reaffirmed the
readiness of  the United Nations to assist both countries.1 In his
relentless efforts to achieve lasting peace, he once again invited the
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two presidents to a seminal meeting in Geneva on 15 November
2002, where they agreed to his request to set up a Cameroon-Nigeria
Mixed Commission (CNMC) made up of representatives from both
countries and UN experts and chaired by a special representative
of the Secretary-General. The CNMC was to work out ways of
implementing the ruling of  the court and to move the process
forward. Its mandate covered the demarcation of the land and
maritime boundaries between the two countries; the withdrawal of
the Nigerian administration and armed forces from the peninsula
and the transfer of authority to Cameroon; an eventual
demilitarisation of the territory; protection of the rights of the
affected population; and the promotion of joint economic ventures
and cross-border cooperation. Kofi Annan’s proposal that his Special
Representative for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah from
Mauritania, chair the CNMC was accepted by both sides.
The commission began meeting every two months in the capitals
of  the two states. After a difficult start, some progress was made,
such as Nigeria’s offer to construct a cross-border road connecting
Ikom and Mamfe, and the implementation of the demarcation of
the boundary. One of  the issues that impeded a major breakthrough
was Nigeria’s refusal to withdraw troops from Bakassi until the
protection of the legitimate rights of the Nigerian population on
the peninsula was assured. Cameroon proved unwilling, however,
to accord Nigerian residents in the area special privileges or status.
Under a working plan drawn up in 2003 and approved by the
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the heads of state of both
countries during a third tripartite meeting in Geneva on 31 January
2004, Nigeria was to withdraw its forces from Bakassi by the end
of  May. But at the 11 February 2004 session of  the CNMC, Nigerian
members requested a revision of the ambitious timetable and a new
deadline of 15 September 2004 for the transfer of sovereignty to
Cameroon was agreed. Nonetheless, Nigeria failed to respect the
new deadline, citing technical problems. The Nigerian authorities
referred particularly to the vehement resistance by the majority
population on Bakassi to Cameroonian rule and on 13 September
2004, the Nigerian House of Representatives called for a UN-
organised plebiscite on Bakassi as a more democratic way of deciding
on an eventual transfer of sovereignty to Cameroon.
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Although both presidents pledged their commitment to a peaceful
solution to the problem at the meeting on 28 July 2004, Cameroon
and the United Nations began to express their impatience with
Nigeria’s foot-dragging over its withdrawal from the disputed area
during the October session of  the CNMC in Abuja. Nigeria’s failure
to respect the 15 September 2004 deadline for the withdrawal of
its administration and troops led to a complete standstill in bilateral
negotiations within the CNMC. It took the intervention of  the UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to bring the presidents of both
countries together on 11 May 2005 in Geneva, where they reaffirmed
their willingness to resolve the dispute by peaceful means and
requested the commission resume negotiations as soon as possible.
However, renewed acts of  aggression by the Nigerian army on
the Bakassi Peninsula on 5, 17, 18 and 21 June 2005, which left
one Cameroonian corporal dead, threatened the resumption of talks,
and the Cameroonian government announced on 23 June 2005 that
it would lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council. It was
only after successful mediation by Ahmadou Ould-Abdallah, the
UN chairman of  the CNMC, that bilateral negotiations were
resumed. Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria improved
following the meeting of the commission in Abuja on 13-14 October
2005, which produced a draft agreement and a new timetable for
the withdrawal of  Nigeria’s troops and administration.
These developments laid the foundations for a landmark
agreement between the heads of state on the modalities of the
Nigerian withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with
the October 2002 ICJ judgment and with due respect for the well-
being of the Nigerian inhabitants there. The agreement was
concluded on 12 June 2006 at a summit meeting on the Greentree
Estate in Manhasset, New York under the auspices of  the UN
Secretary-General and in the presence of representatives of four
witness states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and
Germany).
The Greentree Agreement, which was widely commended as a
shining example of peaceful conflict resolution in Africa, contained
the following provisions. First, Nigeria would withdraw its estimated
3,000 troops from the territory within 60 days and formally cede
the territory to Cameroon. Second, the islands of Atabong and
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Akwabana, which were inhabited almost exclusively by Nigerians,
would be administered by Nigeria for two years. Third, the Nigerian
inhabitants of Bakassi would have two years to decide whether to
remain on the peninsula as Nigerian citizens, take Cameroonian
nationality or relocate to Nigeria. Fourth, a special transitional
provision granting Nigerians free access to the Bakassi region would
be in force for five years. Fifth, a follow-up commission of  ten
representatives – two each from Cameroon, Nigeria and the United
Nations plus one from each of the four witness states – would be
set up to implement the agreement (International Peace Institute
2008; Olinga 2009).
As a result of the agreement, Nigeria began its military
withdrawal on 1 August 2006 and a ceremony on 14 August 2006
marked the formal handing over of  the northern part of  the
peninsula. Credit must be given to both presidents for recognising
that the border dispute had to be seen in the greater context of the
overall relationship between both states. One can only speculate as
to whether President Obasanjo’s administration would have been
quite so accommodating had he been preparing for a third term of
office, as many of  his supporters had wished. Certainly, the
concessions he made were not popular domestically and were seen
as an affront to the nation’s considerable pride. Nevertheless, the
settlement of the dispute did a great deal to reinforce his reputation
as a statesman whose skills seem to be in growing demand on the
African continent. His apparent concern for a peaceful solution of
the Bakassi dispute and other violent conflicts in Africa has
undoubtedly contributed to strengthening Nigeria’s candidature for
the desired  African seat on the UN Security Council.
Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria improved even further
when, on 11 May 2007, the CNMC reached an agreement on the
maritime boundary between the two countries. However, the Bakassi
issue threatened to strain relations again on 12 November 2007
when unidentified assailants attacked a Cameroonian military post
on the peninsula, killing 21 Cameroonian soldiers and wounding
many others. The Cameroonian authorities immediately held the
Nigerian army responsible for this attack, but the Nigerian
government denied involvement in the incident. Both countries
promptly agreed to work together to identify the attackers. An
168
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
initiative by the Nigerian senate a few days after the attack soured
relations between the two neighbours and on 21 November 2007,
it passed a motion requiring the Yar’Adua government to stop the
transfer of the Bakassi territory to Cameroon. Even more
importantly, it called for a review of  the Greentree Agreement on
the handover of  the disputed area, alleging that former President
Obasanjo had failed to put the agreement before the National
Assembly for ratification, as required by the Nigerian constitution.
The chairman of  the Nigerian delegation in the CNMC, Prince Bola
Ajibola, reacted by assuring the Cameroonian authorities on 29
November 2007 that Nigeria had no intention of revoking the transfer
of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.
Despite a court order ruling that Nigeria should delay the
handover to Cameroon of the remaining parts of the Bakassi
Peninsula until accommodation for the resettled Nigerian citizens
had been provided, the Yar’Adua administration decided to withdraw
from the area completely on 14 August 2008, in accordance with
the Greentree Agreement, and to bring the long-standing dispute to
an end.
Regional resistance to the 2002 ICJ verdict and the
2006 Greentree Agreement
With the Nigerian withdrawal of its administration and troops from
the Bakassi Peninsula and recognition of Cameroonian sovereignty
in the wake of the 2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006 Greentree
Agreement, the international community widely believed that the
Bakassi dispute had been resolved once and for all. This soon proved
to be wishful thinking since it had overlooked the interests of
stakeholders other than the Cameroonian and Nigerian states in
the dispute. These stakeholders were the predominantly Nigerian
population on the peninsula and the Anglophone Cameroonian
secessionist movements which, from the start, had vehemently
resisted the 2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006 Greentree Agreement.
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The Nigerian inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula
According to Professor Boniface Egboka who hails from the area,
the 2002 ICJ verdict was a tragedy of unimaginable magnitude for
the Nigerian population on the peninsula. He considered the ICJ
judgment to be ill-fated, godless and unjust as well as humiliating
and demoralising for the Nigerian inhabitants (Sama & Johnson-
Ross 2005-2006: 115). His views were shared by the Nigerian
inhabitants on the peninsula.
Their political leaders and traditional rulers repeatedly called on
the Nigerian government to maintain control over Bakassi and they
even threatened to secede from Nigeria and create an independent
Bakassi state if the Nigerian government failed to protect their
interests. For example, in November 2003, Joe Atene, the Bakassi
representative in the Cross River State House of  Assembly, publicly
declared that the Nigerian residents of Bakassi would regard a
unilateral handing over of the peninsula by the Nigerian government
to Cameroon as a serious betrayal:
We have always been Nigerians, and if  Nigeria now decides to turn
its back to us, we may not have any other option than to pursue
self-determination. We will not be part of  Cameroon.2
There appear to be several reasons for the Nigerian population’s
fierce resistance to Nigeria’s handing over of  Bakassi to Cameroon.
One is actually a continuation of the historical consolidation
argument put forward by the Nigerian state during the ICJ sessions:
that Bakassi had been part of  Nigeria since pre-colonial times.
Another was their fear of becoming strangers on their own lands
after Nigeria’s recognition of  Cameroon’s sovereignty over the
peninsula. The Nigerian inhabitants have often stressed that they
were not prepared ‘to subject themselves to Cameroonian rule and
the bondage of  Cameroonian gendarmes’.3 Another reason was their
belief that such a transfer would imply ‘complete neglect and
abandonment’ of the peninsula and that Nigeria, rather than
Cameroon, had been making a contribution to territorial
development.4
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Significantly, many Bakassi leaders considered President
Obasanjo’s widely praised respect for the rule of  law to be in conflict
with their people’s right to self-determination:
We are in support of  the declaration of  an independent state. The
United Nations should realise that we have the right to decide where
we want to be and the right to self-determination. We are Nigerians
and live on our ancestral land. You can see some of  the graves here
dating back to the 19th century. How can you force a strange culture
and government on us? We appreciate what Nigerian government
is doing but let it be on record that they have betrayed us and we
will fight for our survival and self-determination.5
For a long time, there had been no clear connection between the
rebel movements in the nearby Niger Delta and the Bakassi
resistance movements but, from early 2006 onwards, there was
growing evidence that militant activities in the Niger Delta had
spilt over into the Bakassi region. Organisations like the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger
Delta Defence and Security Council (NDDSC) joined forces with a
shadowy Bakassi militia, the so-called Bakassi Freedom Fighters
(BFF). While these movements claimed to represent the interests
of the people living in the oil-rich Niger Delta and the Bakassi
region, they were also engaged in various, often criminal, activities
to obtain a share in the region’s oil revenues. They claimed
responsibility for raids on Cameroonian military posts on the Bakassi
Peninsula that resulted in the death of several Cameroonian soldiers
and a civilian, and their sporadic attacks in the area have continued
to the present day, leaving the Cameroonian military embarrassed,
official diplomacy humiliated, the inhabitants feeling insecure and
the prospects for long-term peace in jeopardy.
Under the terms of  the 12 June 2006 Greentree Agreement,
Nigerian inhabitants of Bakassi were given three options: keeping
Nigerian nationality and remaining as foreign residents on
Cameroonian territory; taking out Cameroonian nationality; or being
resettled elsewhere in Nigeria. Soon after the Nigerian state’s
handing over of the largest part of Bakassi to Cameroon on 14
August 2006, a growing number of the Nigerian residents who were
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determined to remain Nigerian citizens and feared Cameroonian
repercussions, especially from the Cameroonian gendarmes, fled to
Nigeria. During the 15th session of the CNMC, Nigerian
representatives alleged that Nigerian citizens living on Bakassi and
in other parts of Cameroon were returning to Nigeria with stories
of  maltreatment by Cameroonian gendarmes. Between 22 and 30
August 2006, more than 6,000 Nigerians were shipped from Douala
and Limbe to Nigeria. The commission then resolved to send an
observer mission of  15 UN representatives and five delegates each
from Nigeria and Cameroon to the peninsula.
In the months leading up to the Nigerian handover of the
remaining parts of the peninsula to Cameroon on 14 August 2008,
the number of  Bakassi refugees in Nigeria increased dramatically.
Some reports estimated their number at about 100,000. Having
abandoned their homes and businesses in Bakassi, they initially
moved to overcrowded transit camps in Nigeria and, in an attempt
to appease them, the Nigerian government began constructing a
‘New Bakassi’, which is contiguous with Cameroon’s Bakassi
territory. This project has been largely unsuccessful and has even
resulted in the displacement of the original inhabitants’ homes and
property to make space for migrants from Bakassi. Given the history
of hostilities between the Nigerian residents of Bakassi and the
Cameroonian gendarmes and the violent clashes that have taken
place in the area in recent times, it is safe to assume that practically
all Nigerians will eventually leave the area.
Anglophone secessionist movements
The 2002 ICJ verdict and the 2006 Greentree Agreement have also
been constantly contested by the various Anglophone movements
that emerged during the political liberalisation process in Cameroon
in the early 1990s (see Chapter 5). Since the violent confrontations
between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula, the
umbrella organisation of all the Anglophone movements, the SCNC,
has constantly emphasised that Bakassi is neither a part of the
Republic of Cameroon nor of Nigeria but instead belongs to the
Southern Cameroons.
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The decision of the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments to
submit their dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula to the ICJ for
adjudication in 1994 offered Anglophone nationalists an opportunity
to access legal space (Jua & Konings 2004). In 2001, the newly
founded Ex-British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration
created a new body, the Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation
(SCAPO), with the specific goal of pursuing legal avenues to achieve
international recognition of  the Anglophone secessionist claims. In
its legal struggle for the recognition of  an independent Southern
Cameroons state, SCAPO filed a lawsuit against the Nigerian
government in the Nigerian Federal High Court in Abuja, accusing
it of continuing disregard of the Southern Cameroons’ statehood
and sovereignty during the Bakassi dispute (see Chapter 5).
In the end, SCAPO scored a landmark victory in March 2002
when the Nigerian Federal High Court ordered the Nigerian
government to ask the ICJ to rule on whether it was Southern
Cameroons or the Republic of Cameroon that shared a maritime
boundary with the Federal Republic of  Nigeria (Konings 2005c:
295-96). Clearly, the implication is that the ICJ cannot adjudicate
in the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi
Peninsula without first clarifying the international status of Southern
Cameroons. It is only after such a clarification that a decision can
be made about sovereignty over Bakassi. Regrettably, despite
numerous requests by Anglophone secessionist movements, this
clarification was never made. The Nigerian government was not
prepared to execute the Federal High Court’s judgment nor was the
ICJ ready to suspend proceedings on the Bakassi case pending
determination of  the international status of  Southern Cameroons.
It is interesting to note that the Anglophone leadership, which
always strongly condemned Nigerian domination of Southern
Cameroons in the pre-reunification era, was inclined to support
Nigerian opposition to the 2002 ICJ verdict. Following press reports
that the UN Secretary-General was about to discuss the ICJ decision
with the heads of state of Cameroon and Nigeria in Geneva on 15
November 2002, the then chairman of  the Ex-British Southern
Cameroons Provisional Administration wrote to him on 12
November 2002 as follows:6
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While we share your anxiety for good neighbourliness between
Nigeria and La République du Cameroun, the people of the Southern
Cameroons, under the banner of the SCNC, wish to make their
stand on the disputed territory abundantly clear…. Our problem is
undoubtedly that of  preference for the Federal Republic of  Nigeria
to continue to retain the Bakassi peninsula until the State of the
Southern Cameroons shall be restored. Then we shall ourselves
negotiate the retrieval of Bakassi from the hands of Nigeria, in a
process we believe shall be very friendly and easy as not to require
arbitration. We share a common Anglo-Saxon political culture with
Nigeria by virtue of having been governed by Great Britain together
as a single entity for half a century…. On the other hand, the people
of the Southern Cameroons do not want La République du Cameroun
to lay hands on our Bakassi inheritance.
In 2006, the chairman of  SCAPO, Dr Kevin Gumne, asserted
that there would not be peace on the Bakassi Peninsula without an
independent Southern Cameroons:
No permanent settlement can ever take place on the Bakassi peninsula
unless the Southern Cameroons is accepted as a distinct and separate
party to the settlement agreement. Furthermore, we believe that a
long-standing settlement must take due cognizance of the concern
of various parties which have legitimate interest in the peninsula
(Orisakwe 2006).
He therefore called for the Southern Cameroons to be accepted
as a third party to any talks regarding the demarcation of the
boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. Like the leaders of other
Anglophone secessionist movements, he stressed that the Southern
Cameroons would not respect any agreement between Nigeria and
Cameroon on the maritime border if it ignored the self-proclaimed
state of Southern Cameroons and its people.
The various Anglophone secessionist movements have also
constantly expressed support for the Bakassi people, claiming them
to be part of  the Southern Cameroons. They strongly condemn the
Cameroonian state for its lack of concern for the Southern
Cameroons in general, and Bakassi in particular:
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Cameroon has one single concern on the Bakassi peninsula and that
is oil. They do not care about the Southern Cameroons or the
indigenous Bakassians. They just want the oil at any cost. In order to
achieve this goal, they want to use the verdict of the ICJ to accomplish
the annexation of the Southern Cameroons (Orisakwe 2006).
Conclusion
A message from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that was read
at the official handing-over ceremony of the remaining parts of the
Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon on 14 August 2008 said: ‘This is a
day of  triumph for the rule of  law, which lies at the very core of  the
values of  the United Nations’. And the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, said that ‘the
handover should serve as a model for the resolution of  other border
disputes in Africa’.7 Undoubtedly, the respect shown by the heads
of state of Nigeria and Cameroon for the 2002 ICJ verdict that
confirmed Cameroon’s sovereignty over Bakassi was a great
achievement, especially when taking into account the huge
importance of  the peninsula for both countries. Analysing the
explosive nature of the Bakassi dispute in the 1990s, the African
magazine Jeune Afrique claimed that all the factors necessary for a
major military conflict were present and went on to stress the area’s
economic and strategic importance to both countries as being a
pivotal factor in the possible escalation of the conflict.8
This apparent success story in the peaceful settlement of African
border disputes provides some proof  for Gerti Hesseling’s thesis
(2006) that respect for the rule of  law has improved in a number of
African states following political liberalisation. The relative advance
of democracy in Cameroon and Nigeria has contributed to a climate
of confidence. Both states have wanted to be included in the
international community and to be seen to respect the rule of  law.
What Hesseling seems to have underestimated is that a verdict
based on international law may face implementation difficulties in
a complex border dispute. The Bakassi dispute underscores the
importance of  the UN’s continued engagement in the
implementation process, strong leadership and regular interactions
and consultations among the disputant states. Time and patience
175
Chapter 7: Good governance and border conflicts in Africa
also played a role in the outcome of  these negotiations. The former
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was instrumental in establishing
an atmosphere of  trust, which attests to the importance of  good
offices in resolving disputes. The leaders of  Cameroon and Nigeria
recognised the long-term benefits of  peaceful relationships between
their nations, whose geography, history and culture have been
intertwined for centuries. The CNMC, which formed an original
and innovative approach for the execution of  international law, also
played a positive role as an instrument for monitoring and
implementing the ICJ’s ruling and the Greentree Agreement. The
Bakassi resolutions took a long time to reach but the degree of
disaffection over the terms could have been higher if  the process
had not been tempered with patience and sensitive timing.
Above all, this chapter has shown that despite the Cameroonian
and Nigerian governments’ respect for the rule of  law, their attempts
to implement the 2002 ICJ verdict have not yet managed to resolve
the Bakassi dispute. Both the predominantly Nigerian population
on the peninsula and the Anglophone Cameroonian secessionist
movements continue to fiercely resist the ICJ verdict, claiming
ownership of the peninsula and declining Republic of Cameroon
citizenship. The Bakassi inhabitants remain strongly attached to
their Nigerian citizenship and the Anglophone secessionist
movements are pursuing citizenship of an independent Southern
Cameroons state. Both parties assert that there can never be peace
in the area without Nigeria and Cameroon first recognising their
claims.
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China and Africa in the era of neoliberal
globalisation with Cameroon as a case study
Introduction
The People’s Republic of  China’s renewed interest in Africa in the
era of neoliberal globalisation is one of the most significant
developments on the African continent. While there was little
evidence of  China’s presence in Africa two decades ago, hundreds
of major Chinese businesses are now active there, bolstered by tens
of  thousands of  Chinese labourers, retailers and tourists. The
growing importance the Chinese leaders are attaching to the African
continent was manifested when they dubbed 2006 to be the ‘Year
of Africa’ to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and African nations. At the
beginning of 2006, the Chinese government promulgated a White
Paper outlining ‘China’s African Policy’ (Government of  China
2006), which was followed by official visits by the Chinese Minister
of  Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing, President Hu Jintao and Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao to several African countries. The third gathering
of  the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in
Beijing at the end of 2006 and was attended by numerous African
heads of  state and ministers. The Forum expressed its wish ‘to deepen
and broaden mutual beneficial cooperation in political relations,
economic cooperation, international affairs and social development’.1
Remarkably, China’s increasing engagement with Africa went
largely unnoticed in African Studies for some time. Most of the
existing literature on Sino-African relations deals with the Cold War
era (cf. Larkin 1971; Ogunsanwo 1974; Snow 1981) and some
Africanists have aptly distinguished two phases in this period (Taylor
1998; Bräutigam 1998). The first was the Maoist era when China’s
Africa policy was primarily marked by ideological and strategic
considerations as the country attempted to export its revolutionary
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model to Africa, undermine western and Soviet influence there,
and counter the diplomatic inroads being made by Taiwan. The
second phase started with Deng Xiaoping’s economic modernisation
policies when, for pragmatic reasons, China decided to focus on
economic cooperation with the West. As a result, its interest in
Africa was starkly reduced, all the more so because of  Africa’s
growing economic stagnation (Konings 2007b).
It is only recently that Africanists have acknowledged that China’s
profile has dramatically changed since the end of  the Cold War and
that it has become a key external actor on the continent in today’s
era of  neoliberal globalisation (Alden 2005, 2007; Tull 2006;
Kaplinski et al. 2006; Holslag 2006; Broadman 2007). For some
scholars (Jaffe & Lewis 2002; Hurst 2006), the drive to secure energy
resources for the country’s rapid economic expansion is behind
China’s growing engagement with Africa. This certainly captures
an important dimension of its interests in Africa but it would be a
mistake to ascribe a single motive to this relationship.
This chapter argues that China sees Africa as a partner in the
fulfilment of  its strategic goals, namely resource security, new
markets and investment opportunities, and political support for its
expanding global interests. While China’s growing presence in Africa
is most visible on the economic front, which is a natural
consequence of its own domestic economic growth, one should
not overlook its political objectives. China is aiming at forging an
alliance with African states to combat perceived western hegemony,
especially in the United Nations and other multilateral organisations,
and to restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic space in Africa. FOCAC, which
was set up by China in October 2000, has provided the institutional
expression of a strategic China-Africa partnership in economic and
political affairs (Konings 2007b).
This chapter attempts to show that the African response to
China’s growing engagement with the continent has been
ambivalent. On the one hand, governments and business elites in
Africa are seeing new opportunities in China for trade and
investment, and ways to bolster regime stability and strategically
important partnerships (Alden 2005). What is particularly appealing
to many African rulers is that China seems to provide an alternative
to the ‘painful’ neoliberal economic and political reforms espoused
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by the West and typified by the ‘Washington Consensus’ of  the
IMF and the World Bank. They were quick to embrace the various
tenets of the development paradigm propagated by China, which
was defined by Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) as the ‘Beijing
Consensus’: non-interference in state sovereignty; freedom from
western hegemony; and an absence of any conditions on aid-giving
(with the exception of the One-China principle). China appears to
be offering Africa something new, namely a straightforward business
relationship between equals based on mutual interest and non-
interference in the other’s internal affairs (Sautman 2006).
There are, on the other hand, rising concerns in the African
business sector, labour unions and other civil-society groups about
the impact China is having on Africa. One reason for concern is
that low-cost Chinese consumer goods, which are enabling Africans
to purchase basic items formerly beyond their reach, are threatening
local manufacturing capacity and employment. Other reasons for
concern include the employment of predominantly Chinese labour
on the booming Chinese construction projects in Africa and the
poor labour and environmental standards practised by Chinese
businesses. The damage that China’s ‘no political conditions’ policy
is having on the promotion of human rights, good governance and
transparency is also a cause for alarm in some civil-society circles.
This chapter, however, intends to go further than most of the
available scholarly works on Sino-African relations that tend to treat
Africa as a homogeneous unit and gloss over national and local
peculiarities. Some of  the few exceptions to this trend include Dobler
(2007, 2008) on China-Namibia relations, Lee (2007) on China-
Uganda relations, Large (2008) on China-Sudan relations, Grion
(2007) on China-Angola relations, and Ogen (2008) on China-
Nigeria relations. These studies help us to understand the huge
variations in China-Africa relations. Following a general assessment
of  the impact of  renewed Chinese interest in Africa and Africa’s
response to China’s new engagement with the continent, I will discuss
the still largely unexplored field of China-Cameroon relations and
the responses of  Cameroonian stakeholders to these relations.
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The impact of renewed Chinese interest in Africa
China’s interest in Africa today seems to be mainly driven by its
constant search for resource security, new markets and investment
opportunities, and political support. It is necessary to examine here
the effects of ‘new’ Chinese economic and political imperatives in
Africa. This is all the more important because China’s leaders are
continuously claiming that a strategic partnership between Africa
and China would be of mutual advantage and inevitably result in a
‘win-win’ situation (Taylor 2005a; Alden 2005; Goldstein et al. 2006;
Tull 2006).
Resource security
China’s dynamic economic growth is fuelling an ever-increasing
demand for oil, minerals, timber and other natural resources.
Guaranteed long-term access to Africa’s relatively underexploited
natural resources clearly tops China’s agenda (Alden 2005; Council
on Foreign Relations 2006).
China is now the world’s second largest importer of  oil after the
US and accounts for 31% of the growth in the global demand for
oil. China’s recognition of  the dangers facing its current sources
due to political instability in the Middle East has resulted in Africa
assuming even greater prominence in its unrelenting pursuit of secure
oil supplies. China has consequently taken a number of  steps to
expand and diversify its oil supplies in Africa (Tull 2006). At present,
just under 30% of  the country’s oil requirements come from Africa,
mostly from Sudan, Algeria and, increasingly, the Gulf  of  Guinea.
Beijing has signed more than 40 different oil agreements with African
countries (Pham 2006: 243).
Most Chinese oil companies are state-owned and, as such, enjoy
a number of competitive advantages over their western rivals when
it comes to securing African supplies. Unlike their increasingly
publicity-sensitive western counterparts, the Chinese have no qualms
about making deals with Africa’s most corrupt and repressive
regimes. The Chinese government imposes no political conditions
on African governments before signing contracts for exploration or
production (Lafargue 2005; Hurst 2006) and strategic objectives
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often override commercial concerns in Chinese companies’
investments in the African oil sector. Individual investments do
not have to be profitable if  they serve China’s national goals, such
as establishing a position of influence and the staking-out of future
opportunities. The Chinese government is providing a favourable
investment climate in Africa for its oil companies through a well-
considered combination of regular high-profile visits by Chinese
government officials to Africa and the provision of economic
incentives for African governments and diplomatic backing in
international organisations. One particular instrument for currying
favour with governments in oil-producing African states is China’s
willingness to offer what is referred to as a ‘total package’: soft
loans and credit lines, gifts and bribes, development assistance, arms
deliveries, the use of its seat on the UN Security Council for the
protection of African interests and other measures to bolster a
competitive advantage for Chinese companies.
Sudan is a good example of how Chinese oil companies have
taken advantage of a situation where western sanctions against
human-rights violations and corporate-image liabilities have
prevented multinationals from committing themselves (Council on
Foreign Relations 2006; Tull 2006). Over the years, China has
invested an estimated US$ 5 billion to acquire exploration and drilling
licences and in constructing pipelines, refineries and other
infrastructure. Sudan now supplies about 7% of  China’s total oil
imports. Given its constant emphasis on state sovereignty and its
substantial investment in Sudan’s oil sector, it should not come as a
surprise that China has repeatedly frustrated attempts by the UN
Security Council to take action against Sudan after the full extent
of  Khartoum’s genocide campaign in Darfur was revealed in 2004.
More recently, China has become a significant player in the oil
sector on the west coast of  Africa, which is the continent’s largest
oil-producing area. Nigeria and Angola are the main producers and
China has increased its activities in both these countries. In 2004,
Angola became China’s largest supplier of  crude oil in Africa. And
in the same year, the Chinese state-owned Export-Import Bank
(Eximbank) provided it with a soft loan of US$ 2 billion as part of
a longer-term aid package in exchange for 10,000 barrels of  oil a
day. The deal would appear to be of  mutual interest: it enabled the
182
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
Angolan regime to circumvent pressure by western donors for
increased fiscal transparency and it strengthened China’s foothold
in the Angolan oil economy.
In addition to oil, the Chinese economy needs a range of
commodities that are available in mineral-rich African countries.
Its demand for minerals is driving up world commodity prices for
copper, zinc, aluminium and nickel, reversing a long-term decline
in prices and giving African exporters of these materials a much-
needed boost (Lafargue 2005).
Logging and timber have become a major focus of  Chinese
involvement in Africa too. China is the largest global importer of
wood products, with imports having more than tripled since 1993.
It is now importing considerable amounts of wood from the forests
of  Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Liberia. Many
of  its imports from Africa are from unlicensed loggers or companies
with environmentally suspect logging practices, which are condoned
by the Chinese. Illegal timber exports to China from Gabon have
been estimated to be as high as 70% of  Gabon’s total timber exports
(Butler 2005).
China is the world’s leading exporter of  textiles and clothing but
has to import cotton – mainly from the US – to provide for its
domestic and international production. However, the share of the
African countries that export cotton, namely Burkina Faso, Benin,
Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Togo and the Central African
Republic, has been increasing since the mid-1990s (Pham 2006).
Finally, food security is a growing concern. With its projected
increase in population, the loss of vital agricultural land to industry
and mounting consumption amongst its urbanising population,
China will have to rely more on imports of grain and other foodstuffs
in the future. Chinese investors, both public and private, have already
leased vast tracts of agricultural land in several African countries
such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and joint fish-processing
ventures have been set up in Gabon and Namibia to process catches
by Chinese industrial trawlers operating in the Gulf of Guinea, one
of  the world’s richest fishing grounds (Alden 2005; Pham 2006).
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New markets and investment opportunities
While China’s principal interest in Africa is access to natural
resources, the continent is also providing it with new markets and
investment opportunities. Imports from China, ranging from shoes
and textiles to high-tech goods, are flooding local markets there
(Kaplinsky et al. 2006). African consumers, whose purchasing power
has sharply declined with the economic crisis and economic
liberalisation, appreciate these relatively cheap goods in spite of
regular complaints about their quality compared to western products.
Zimbabweans, for example, have even coined a term for what they
consider ‘substandard’ Chinese goods, namely ‘zhing-zhong’. African
traders and manufacturers of all sizes have all been hit hard by the
flood of cheap Chinese imports, particularly those linked to the
new Chinese wholesale and retail shops that use established networks
to access goods (Haugen & Carling 2005). Traditional products and
retailers have been edged out by Chinese businesses across the
continent and a new feature of virtually all African cities is the
emergence of a ‘Chinatown’.
Besides being a dumping ground for cheap consumer goods,
Beijing increasingly sees Africa as a market for its expanding arms
industry. Today, Chinese firms rank among the top suppliers of
conventional arms to Africa (Committee on International Relations
2005; Taylor 2005b; Pham 2006).
China’s trade with Africa has increased sharply since the setting
up of  FOCAC in 2000. Two-way trade, which stood at about US$
10 billion in 2000, surged to nearly US$ 40 billion in 2005, while
China’s share of  Africa’s trade jumped from 2.6% to over 6% in the
same period, making it the continent’s third largest trading partner
after the US and France. In its recent Africa Policy Paper, the Chinese
government expressed its intention to give preferential treatment
to trade from the least-developed Sub-Saharan African countries
and has established a China-Africa Business Council with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to promote trade with
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa (Jenkins & Edwards
2006: 31). Significantly, Sino-African trade is no longer vastly in
China’s favour as growing oil imports from Africa have led to a
Chinese trade deficit since 2000.
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Direct Chinese investment in Africa rose substantially following
the government’s ‘Go-out’ or ‘Go-global’ strategy, which was
initiated in 2001 and focuses on active state support and
encouragement for domestic firms to pursue investment abroad
(Kaplinsky et al. 2006; Jenkins & Edwards 2006). While most
projects in Africa are being undertaken by Chinese state-owned
enterprises, private companies are increasingly investing there too.
The Chinese government is frequently exhorting businesses to
engage in joint ventures with African counterparts. In its 2006 Africa
Policy Paper, it pledged to support and facilitate corporate
investment in Africa with preferential loans and buyer’s credit, and
stated that some 750 Chinese enterprises were currently active in
Africa, with investments totalling US$ 1 billion.
Most African governments are welcoming direct Chinese
investment and are eager to provide the required licences for Chinese
entrepreneurs. There has been a steady deterioration in FDI in Africa
since the end of  the Cold War, especially compared to Asia.
Moreover, with the imposition of conditionalities by western donors
designed to punish any regime that violates standards and practices
of good (economic and political) governance, African regimes need
to find an alternative source of foreign support. China is willing to
invest not only in the highly competitive scramble for national
resources but also in sectors that western private investors and aid
agencies have either neglected or abandoned as being less profitable,
namely physical infrastructure, industry and agriculture (Committee
on International Relations 2005; Council on Foreign Relations 2006).
Large Chinese firms are aiming to acquire a dominant position
in key sectors of  the economy: construction, petrochemicals,
transportation, communications, electricity, water management,
industrial technology and so on. They already appear to have
achieved this objective in construction. Chinese construction firms,
which are supported by the state apparatus and employ low-cost
but highly efficient Chinese labour, have been able to outbid
contractors from other parts of the world and are winning an
increasing slice of the contracts to pave highways, build hydroelectric
dams, upgrade ports, lay railway lines and build pipelines. These
projects will all stand to help Chinese companies transport African
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resources more effectively in the future. The state-owned China
Road and Bridge Corporation alone had some 500 projects in
progress in Africa in 2005 (Pham 2006).
Not all the public works projects undertaken by Chinese
enterprises have been for financial gain. Recognising far more
astutely than most western nations the importance of large
prestigious projects to regime legitimacy, Chinese support has also
been lent to a range of less remunerative building contracts, like
the Foreign Ministry buildings in Djibouti and Uganda, the Houses
of Parliament in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Mozambique, and soccer
stadiums in Tanzania, the Central African Republic and Mali. Chinese
telecommunication companies are also making rapid inroads into
the African market. Huawei Technologies has expanded its
communication business into 39 Sub-Saharan African countries,
and has an US$ 800 million contract to build the infrastructure for
Nigeria’s lucrative cell-phone market.
Creating a political alliance with Africa
China’s renewed interest in Africa is not only economically
motivated but also stems from its political concerns with western,
and especially US, hegemony in the world since the end of  the Cold
War and the collapse of  the Soviet Union, and the persistent presence
and influence of  Taiwan in Africa.
Feeling increasingly vulnerable with the emergence of  a unipolar
world and determined to reinforce its position vis-à-vis the West,
China has tried to project itself  as the leader of  the Third World,
stressing the need for South-South solidarity and cooperation in
the pursuit of  a new, just and equitable political and economic world
order (Taylor 1998; Alden 2005). Africa has played a prominent
role in China’s search for a political alliance among developing
countries since it formed the largest single voting bloc in multilateral
organisations. By positioning itself  at the helm of  a coalition of
African states, China is hoping to use its leverage in its position on
the UN Security Council and improve its bargaining powers in other
international institutions. Constant references to the need to create
a new, equitable political and economic order reflect the country’s
competitive instincts towards the US in the international arena.
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In FOCAC’s Beijing Declaration in 2000, China and Africa agreed
to cooperate more closely in international affairs in the future, which
they claimed would result in concrete gains for both sides
(Government of  China 2000a). During the second FOCAC meeting
in Addis Ababa in December 2003, China declared that it was ready
to coordinate  its position with African countries in the process of
formulating international economic and political rules and in
multilateral trade negotiations (Government of China 2003).
On the one hand, African votes have been crucial to Beijing’s
multilateral diplomacy, both in blocking resolutions at the UN
Commission on Human Rights concerning alleged human-rights
abuses in China and in garnering sufficient support to win their bid
to host the Olympic Games in 2008. Beijing believes that its
strategic alliance with Africa will enable it to secure its long-term
interests in the WTO and other multilateral organisations at
relatively low cost.
African states have, on the other hand, equally benefited from
the new superpower’s readiness to preserve their interests in
multilateral settings. China has been willing to use its seat on the
UN Security Council to protect some of  Africa’s most egregious
regimes from international sanctions, particularly Sudan and
Zimbabwe. It offers an alternative source of support, even for some
of  the West’s closest allies, when they chafe under demands for
economic and political reform from the West. China has strongly
defended issues in multilateral organisations that are of pivotal
interest to Africa, including the lifting of  trade barriers and farm
subsidies, increased aid and debt relief, and African representation
on the UN Security Council.
Another major reason for China to establish a political alliance
with African states is to circumvent Taiwan’s diplomatic space on
the continent. Recognition of the One-China principle has remained
a basic element in Beijing’s foreign policy. In fact, it is the only
political condition to China’s cooperation with individual African
states and organisations. It has been quite successful in attracting
African support for its principle (Jiang 2003) and at present, there
are only five African countries that maintain official diplomatic
relations with Taiwan: Gambia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Swaziland,
and São Tomé & Principe.
187
Chapter 8: China and Africa in the era of neoliberal globalisation with Cameroon
Africa’s response to China’s new engagement with their
continent
The African response to China’s fast-growing involvement on the
continent used to be overwhelmingly positive, especially among
the political elite. Underlying this positive attitude by African
governments was the recognition that China was (i) providing new
sources of FDI and development assistance; (ii) actively supporting
existing regimes irrespective of their political orientation; and (iii)
serving as an important strategic partner that could counter western
hegemony on the international stage.
Of  late, growing concern can be observed in the African media
and certain sections of  civil society regarding China’s impact on
Africa. One major issue of concern is the flooding of African
markets with cheap Chinese products. African manufacturers and
retailers are complaining bitterly that they cannot compete with
their Chinese counterparts since they are unable to undercut Chinese
production costs and prices. Trade-union leaders are becoming
alarmed at the forced closure of  local industries and the resulting
catastrophic job losses.
The so-called ‘textiles tsunami’ clearly illustrates the adverse
impact of the massive Chinese export machine on local African
industries (Committee on International Relations 2005; Alden 2005;
Tull 2006). Chinese textile exports are increasingly undermining
the national and international markets of African textile
manufacturers. Until January 2005, the latter operated under special
arrangements permitted by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA),
including the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),
which allowed the US to place quotas on clothing and textile imports
from China and provided African producers with duty-free access
to the US market. These arrangements promoted a rapid growth of
African textile exports, particularly in countries like South Africa,
Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Uganda and Kenya. Unexpectedly, some
Chinese textile companies were also able to benefit from the MFA
and AGOA arrangements by setting themselves up in Africa in order
to be entitled to duty-free access to the US market. Once the MFA
expired in January 2005, however, Africa’s textile boom witnessed
a meltdown. American demands for African textiles plummeted in
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favour of  even cheaper garments made in China, and African-based
Chinese companies moved production back to China. In the process,
thousands of African workers lost their jobs or risk doing so in the
near future. Understandably, African trade unions have strongly
protested this development. In South Africa, where about 67,000
jobs have been lost in the textile industry, the unions have
successfully petitioned the government to lobby in Beijing for
voluntary restraints on textile imports.2
The emergence of growing numbers of Chinese retailers in Africa
has brought new goods to the local population and, concurrently,
threatened to undermine established retailers. Haugen & Carling
(2005) argue that the influx of Chinese trading shops (baihuo) have
been met with a mix of enthusiasm and concern, reflecting their
ambivalent impact on the local economy. Retailers from Cape Verde
to Namibia are complaining about the Chinese invasion. The
Chinese trading community in Lusaka has, for example, grown
tenfold to about 30,000 over the past decade, and this has sparked
huge resentment among the local population.
Given the high rate of unemployment in Africa, it is not surprising
that Africans resent the Chinese practice of employing their own
nationals rather than taking on local workers in Chinese-sponsored
projects. The use of  Chinese contract labour is particularly visible
in the recent flurry of  Chinese infrastructure projects. Official figures
show that there were about 82,000 Chinese labourers working in
Africa in 2005, although unofficial estimates are much higher
(Sautman 2006: 29). The use of Chinese contract labour is even
being promoted by current Chinese development assistance policies
and it is increasingly evident that Chinese loans no longer come
without any strings attached. A loan from the Eximbank, for
example, often requires the debtor to select Chinese enterprises as
contractors, who then import Chinese workers to do the work and
source at least 50% of  the equipment, materials, technology and
services needed from China.
As the Chinese presence in Africa increases, the nature of its
closed society and relative wealth may breed conflict, as has been
the case in parts of South East Asia. Cultural misunderstandings
and even racism of the kind expressed by some African students at
Chinese universities could fuel these difficulties. Anti-Chinese
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sentiments, however misguided, have already spilled over into
protests and sporadic violence in Zambia and Lesotho, as well as in
other parts of the continent.
The hazardous labour and safety standards in Chinese enterprises
in Africa are another point of concern. The privatised Chambishi
copper mine in Zambia is a notorious example (Lungu & Mulinga
2005). Following its takeover by the Chinese state-owned Non-
Ferrous Metal Industries Corporation (NFC) in 1998, the new
management hired  almost all its Zambian workers on one-year
contracts: only 72 out of the approximately 2100 local workers
were given permanent contracts. And, even more importantly, these
workers were earning the lowest salaries in the Zambian mining
industry, with the lowest-paid receiving as little as US$ 14 a month.
Moreover, safety standards in the mine were lax, which resulted in
a growing number of accidents, and the predominantly casual labour
force lacked the experience to carry out the dangerous mining
operations required. In April 2005, a blast at the NFC explosives
factory in Chambishi killed more than fifty workers. It was only
after persistent union pressure that management was eventually
prepared to raise wages to US$ 68 a month – roughly the minimum
wage in Zambia – in July 2006. The Chambishi miners nevertheless
stressed that their colleagues in other copper mines continued to be
better rewarded for similar work. On 25 July, just a few weeks after
the agreement on the new pay scales was signed between
management and the union, hundreds of miners rioted following
rumours that management was reneging on the pay increases. They
proceeded to storm the residences of  the Chinese managers,
destroying property and smashing cars. One of  the managers shot
at the rioters, injuring four of them and the riot police also injured
two other rioters before the crowd was dispersed.
NGOs are also expressing concerns about the growing Chinese
presence in Africa. Some are protesting about China’s generally
dismissive approach to good environmental practice, others are
voicing fears about its apparent support for African regimes that
ignore human rights and good governance demands, and its
continuous delivery of  arms to the continent (Shin 2006).
Significantly, the latter concerns are, at least in theory, increasingly
being supported by a number of  reform-minded Africa-wide
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organisations, such as the African Union (AU) and the New
Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), that
are contesting the long-standing Chinese principle of non-
interference in state sovereignty. The AU’s constitution allows it to
intervene in a member state should it consider that there are, for
example, gross violations of  human rights there. And NEPAD’s
peer review mechanism is structured around an independent review
process of  an African country’s adherence to good governance
criteria.
China-Cameroon relations
After independence in January 1960, the Cameroonian government
opted to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan rather than with China.
Taiwan was offering African states generous aid irrespective of  their
political inclinations, while China was then only supporting ‘socialist’
regimes and radical or revolutionary movements in so-called
reactionary African states (Konings 2007b: 344-45). Cameroon’s
President Ahmadou Ahidjo regularly criticised China’s support of
the radical nationalist party, the Union des Populations du Cameroun
(UPC), in his country (Joseph 1977), condemning Chinese conduct
in July 1965 as follows:
China is one of  the states supporting terrorism in Cameroon. We
have proof, for Cameroonian terrorists are in Communist China.
As long as that situation exists, we shall vote against China’s admission
to the United Nations (Ogunsanwo 1974: 173).
From the mid-1960s onwards, however, an important shift in
China’s Africa policies can be observed. It ceased its ideological
offensive and began to appeal to all legitimate African governments,
promising them aid on even more favourable terms than Taiwan,
but on condition that they recognise its One-China principle. One
important reason for this striking change in policy was that China
had come to the painful conclusion that most African states lacked
socialist revolutionary fervour. But even more importantly, China
needed support from as many African countries as possible in order
to be awarded the seat it so desired on the UN Security Council.
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This investment in Africa paid up handsomely in 1971 when 26 of
the 50 African states at the UN, including Cameroon, voted for an
Albanian resolution to offer Communist China a seat in the United
Nations (Hutchinson 1975; Weinstein 1975; Konings 2007b).
Cameroon severed its relationship with Taiwan on 26 March 1971
and since then has maintained diplomatic ties with the People’s
Republic of China.
Relations between Cameroon and China have been characterised
by numerous official visits involving top government officials and
these have served as a forum to reinforce ties through the signing
of  cooperation agreements. Unsurprisingly given China’s increasing
engagement with Africa in the era of neoliberal globalisation, there
have been determined efforts by the Cameroonian and Chinese
governments to strengthen both diplomatic and economic ties.
China’s Prime Minister was in Cameroon in August 2003 and
this was followed by the visit by Cameroon’s President Paul Biya to
China in September 2003. The vice-president of  China’s Eximbank
paid an official visit to Cameroon in March 2006, and President
Paul Biya again visited China in November 2006 to participate in
the third FOCAC meeting. Cooperation between Cameroon and
China was crowned by the first ever visit to Cameroon by a Chinese
president in January 2007.
The intensification of diplomatic ties has been followed by a
rapid increase in economic interaction and a wave of Chinese
migration to Cameroon. While there were only a few Chinese in
Cameroon between 1971 and 1995, a growing number of small-
and large-scale entrepreneurs, workers and even prostitutes (Ndjio
2009) have subsequently settled there. The Chinese Embassy in
Yaoundé recently claimed that there were about 1,500 Chinese in
Douala and between 2,000 and 3,000 in Yaoundé, mainly from Fujian
and Zhejiang provinces (Jansson 2009: 4). However this would seem
to be an underestimate. Although reliable statistics on Chinese
migration are missing, some observers estimate the number of
Chinese living in Cameron to be as high as 200,000, although a
more realistic figure might be between 20,000 and 50,000. Whatever
the exact number, Cameroon, like some other African countries
(Dobler 2008), seems to have reacted to the rapid increase in Chinese
migrants in recent years with consternation and even suspicion.
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Ngome (2010) found that many urban inhabitants in Cameroon were
alarmed by the apparently uncontrolled Chinese ‘invasion’. Fearing
Chinese competition, they have tended to respond with discourses
of xenophobia.
Economic relations between Cameroon and China are evolving
rapidly in today’s era of  neoliberal globalisation. It is important to
assess the benefits and risks of  Cameroon’s relationship with China
rather than take for granted the rhetoric from the Chinese leadership
about a new strategic relationship based on friendship, reciprocal
benefits and win-win economic cooperation.3 To gain an insight in
this field, it is useful to examine traditional channels of economic
interaction, such as investment, trade and aid flows.4
Chinese investment in Cameroon
The Cameroonian government has been openly wooing the Chinese
to invest in Cameroon. In a speech to visiting Chinese President
Hu Jintao in January 2007, President Biya invited Chinese
enterprises ‘to come in their numbers and invest in Cameroon in all
the sectors, especially hydrocarbons, mineral exploitation and wood
extraction’.5 He had already made a similar appeal while visiting
China in November 2006. Given a lack of data on the exact value
of Chinese investment in Cameroon, I simply describe here some
of the investment activities of the Chinese in various sectors of
the economy and discuss their possible impact on Cameroonian
society.
Oil and mining
Two Chinese firms, including the China National Petroleum
Company, are actively involved in oil exploration in the Gulf  of
Guinea. In April 2009, another Chinese oil company, Yan Chang
from Shanxi Province, signed an agreement with the Cameroonian
national oil company, the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH),
for a four-year exploration programme in two previously untouched
onshore blocks – Zina and Makare – in northern Cameroon at a
cost of  US$ 18 million. This is Cameroon’s first onshore oil-drilling
project. In Cameroon’s mining sector, the only registered Chinese
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company is Sinosteel’s subsidiary Sinosteelcam, which is looking
for iron in the Lobe concession close to Kribi. Chinese investments
in mining in Cameroon are expected to increase following the 2007
appeal from the President of Cameroon (see above).
Forestry
There are 23 logging concessions that are being exploited by nine
companies in Cameroon. Only one of these has Chinese
involvement: the Hong Kong-based Sino-French joint venture,
Vicwood, has a total of  532,537 hectares of  concessions. In addition,
a number of independent Chinese timber traders are active in Douala.
Chinese involvement in the forest sector is expected to rise as exports
of wood to China increase (see below).
Agriculture and fishing
In 2006, the Cameroonian government sold 10,000 hectares of land
to Shanxi State Farms, a big Chinese company that specialises in
the production, transformation and trade of  agricultural products.
These lands are located in Centre Province (2,000 ha in Nanga-
Eboko and 4,000 ha in Ndjoré) and in the West Province (4,000 ha
in Santchou). The cost of the project is US$ 62 million, which will
be financed by FOCAC loans from the Eximbank. The firm, which
employs mainly Chinese workers, has already begun activities, with
200 ha of  rice under cultivation in Nanga-Eboko. From the very
start, the local population and various civil-society organisations
have protested the Cameroonian state’s large-scale sale of  ancestral
lands to China and the poor conditions of  service offered to the
irregularly employed local contract workers in this newly established
Chinese company. Besides agriculture, a number of  smaller Chinese
enterprises are involved in fishing, using trawlers and more
sophisticated fishing equipment than the local fishermen who
regularly accuse them of  destructive fishing practices.6
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Infrastructure
One of  the earliest infrastructural projects undertaken by a Chinese
company was the construction of  the Lagdo Hydroelectric Dam in
northern Cameroon, which was built between 1977 and 1982 by
China International Water and Electric Corporation. Recently,
Chinese firms have started bidding for more construction contracts
and increasing numbers of  Chinese companies active in Cameroon’s
infrastructure sector are tendering for projects funded by the
Cameroonian government, the African Development Bank (ADB)
and the World Bank. It was unprecedented when the China Road
and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) won a bid to construct some 13
km of  road in Cameroon’s economic capital, Douala, in 2004. The
CRBC’s price was US$ 18 million, way below that demanded by
rival bidders who requested upwards of US$ 30 million. The
construction was successfully completed a month ahead of
schedule, which was greatly appreciated by both the Douala
municipal authorities and the World Bank that was also involved in
the project. Subsequently, several other Chinese companies have
won contracts. For example, Zhejiang Geophysical Prospecting,
which specialises in well-digging, is currently conducting a project
on behalf  of  the World Bank and the Cameroonian government.
Retailing
The activity attracting the majority of the Chinese to Cameroon today
is, however, the retailing of cheap goods from China, including
electronic appliances, textiles, travel goods, footwear and clothing.
Family-owned Chinese shops and small-scale enterprises are to be
found in almost every urban settlement across the country, sometimes
concentrated in so-called Chinatowns. Local retailers are facing stiff
competition from the Chinese, even though they also import from China.
Health
Cameroon has been witnessing an explosion in Chinese traditional
medicine and many Cameroonians are turning away from western
drugs and local traditional herbs. The phenomenal growth in the
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number of  Chinese healers, clinics, shops and even mobile drug
vendors is unprecedented. Almost every town in Cameroon now
has at least one traditional Chinese clinic and patients using Chinese
medication assert that the drugs are effective and comparatively
cheap and that these healers are more accessible than western-trained
doctors. However, western-trained doctors operating in Cameroon
have not taken the popularity of Chinese healers lying down. They
regard most Chinese healers and their associates as quacks and
Cameroon’s Medical Council, which is made up of  western-trained
and traditional doctors, has repeatedly called on the public-health
authorities to strictly regulate the health sector and expose fake
practitioners, namely Chinese healers (Ngome 2010).
Of late, the Chinese government has started promoting joint
ventures between Chinese firms and private-sector partners in
Cameroon. Eximbank has been called upon to play an important
role in this direction as it accorded the Cameroonian government a
loan worth US$ 14 million in 1997 for two joint-venture projects
between Chinese and Cameroonian businessmen. These projects
involved the production of tractors and the recycling of tyres but
both ended in failure with the factories closing and an associated
metalwork project subsequently being suspended. The Cameroonian
authorities blamed the Chinese for carrying out the feasibility studies
by themselves, while the Chinese accused their Cameroonian
partners of mismanagement. It is, however, beyond any doubt that
Chinese investment has generally brought benefits to Cameroonians
and the country’s economy. It has provided Cameroon with
alternative and relatively cheaper sources of finance and has helped
to diversify its partners.
Local labour is benefiting from employment opportunities created
by Chinese enterprises, especially as assistants in Chinese shops,
restaurants and clinics, but also as workers in Chinese-owned
construction firms. However, these jobs require no specific skills
and are not only poorly remunerated but usually also short-term.
For example, assistants may be laid off  as soon as their Chinese
owners and staff have learnt to communicate in the local language.
It is also common for Cameroonian workers not to have an
employment contract with their Chinese employer. Local labour may
also be subject to lay-offs or a cut in wages if the local enterprise
196
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
has to restructure or even collapses due to the stiff  competition
from Chinese entrepreneurs who usually possess superior technical
know-how and better managerial skills. Worse still, Chinese
enterprises are tending to import most of their own labour, even
unskilled manual workers.
The Cameroonian population as a whole is benefiting from
Chinese investment as the Chinese are contributing to the supply
of  a larger variety of  relatively cheap goods and services in the
country. However, it might stand to lose in the long run as the
quality of  goods and services supplied by Chinese entrepreneurs is
often of dubious quality compared to those supplied by western
and even Cameroonian entrepreneurs.
Trade relations between Cameroon and China
In the wake of the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1971, bilateral
trade between the two countries grew rapidly, rising from US$ 2.84
million in 1971 to US$ 813.54 million in 2009. This section describes
Cameroon’s import and export links with China, its increasingly
unfavourable trade balance with China, and the likely impact of
these trade relations on stakeholders.
Exports to China
Cameroon’s exports to China used to be relatively limited but rose
by more than 170% at the start of the new millennium to stand at
more than US$ 123 million, which represents nearly 7% of
Cameroon’s total exports. Unfortunately, Cameroon’s exports to
China took a downward trend in the same period and, by 2005,
exports to China had declined to US$ 69 million, which is only
2.5% of  the country’s total exports.
Close examination of  the structure of  Cameroon’s exports to
China reveals that they are limited to a few raw materials, which
used to include crude oil, cotton and wood. However, the export
of  crude oil, which accounted for more than 50% of  Cameroon’s
export income from China, stopped in 2003 due to declining oil
production in Cameroon, which made the quantity available for
China too small to be transported economically. Raw cotton then
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became the principal export commodity, representing almost 75%
of  all exports to China. China bought about 39% of  Cameroon’s
total cotton exports in 2005 and exports of rough timber and wood-
related products increased from 9% to about 24% of  Cameroon’s
exports to China. This represented almost 4% of  Cameroon’s total
timber exports.
Such an export performance is disappointing and demonstrates
that Cameroon is not yet earning much from China’s huge demand
for raw materials. President Biya’s invitation to China in 2007 to
invest in mineral exploitation may be a positive move and lead to
some improvement in this area.
Imports from China
Imports from China have been steadily increasing, rising from US$
39 million in 1999 to US$ 144 million in 2005. China has now
become Cameroon’s third source of  imports after France and Nigeria,
accounting for 5% of  the country’s total imports.
While exports to China are essentially limited to two commodities,
imports from China cover a wide range of  products. Before 2003
cereals (and especially rice) were the main import commodities,
accounting for almost 50% of  all imports. Following a dramatic
decline in imports of cereals, imports from China are now largely
made up of  manufactured goods (53%) and machinery, transport
and other equipment (31%).
Cameroonians, especially in the middle- and lower-income
groups, are undeniably benefitting from the cheap consumer goods
arriving from China. One clear example is the takeover of the
motorbike market by the Chinese, which has led to a 50% reduction
in prices. The availability of  cheap motorbikes has stimulated the
expansion of  motorbike taxis, the so-called bendskin, in Cameroon’s
urban centres (see Konings 2006c). There are complaints about the
quality of Chinese goods but this has not deterred people from
purchasing goods made in China.
The manufacturing sector is also benefiting from cheap capital
and intermediary inputs from China, especially those small- and
medium-sized enterprises involved in manufacturing activities that
require most of their capital goods from China. On the other hand,
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these firms may face stiff  competition on the domestic market due
to the cheaper products from China, especially if they produce
products that are being imported from China. On balance, the
survival of  Cameroonian firms depends on their ability to innovate
and remain financially competitive.
Trade balance between Cameroon and China
Cameroon used to enjoy a favourable trade balance with China when
the value of its exports of raw materials to China was greater than
its imports. Since 2001, Cameroon’s trade surplus with China has
been declining and it showed negative figures in 2004. President
Biya raised the issue of the worsening trade balance in an appeal to
visiting President Hu Jintao in January 2007, saying: ‘We wish to
benefit from export quotas for some of our products like coffee,
cotton, cocoa, banana, just to name a few, so as to re-equilibrate as
much as possible the trade balance between our two countries’.7
There is a serious risk in the current pattern of trade between
Cameroon and China. Cheap imports from China are destroying the
industrial sector while the primary sector is expanding thanks to
rising demands from China. If this pattern is not checked, the
Cameroonian economy will be locked into the production of primary
products.
Chinese aid to Cameroon
China’s aid to Cameroon has been geared towards major
infrastructural projects in the fields of  culture, sport, energy and
telecommunications. Some landmark projects include the
construction of  the Yaoundé Conference Centre, the Lagdo
Hydroelectric Dam, Yaoundé’s sports stadium and the modernisation
of the telecom network, a project undertaken by Huawei in close
cooperation with Camtel. Clearly, few traditional donors would agree
to finance prestige projects like the Yaoundé Conference Centre
and sporting infrastructural projects as China has been doing in
Cameroon.
Chinese aid has also focused on the health and educational
sectors. Some of  the major projects in the health sector include the
construction of  a 200-bed gynaecological, obstetric and paediatric
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hospital in Yaoundé, the Ngousso Clinic in Yaoundé, hospitals in
Mbalmayo and Guider, and the renovation and extension of the
hospital in Buea. Since 1975, China has regularly sent medical teams
to Cameroon and a total of 45 medical personnel were stationed in
Cameroon in June 2009. China is also providing growing educational
support to Cameroon (Nordtveit 2010), with laboratory equipment
being donated to the University of  Yaoundé and annual scholarships
(40 in 2008 and 32 in 2009) awarded to allow Cameroonian students
to study in China. In 1997, a Mandarin language-teaching centre
was set up in Yaoundé that was managed jointly by Zhejiang
University and the International Relations Institute of Cameroon.
The centre was given the status of Confucius Institute in 2007 and
currently teaches Mandarin as well as Chinese language classes and
culture. It has branches in Douala, Maroua and Buea. The Chinese
have also recently started constructing some primary schools.
There was a surge in Chinese aid in 2007 following President
Hu Jintao’s visit to Cameroon when agreements committing aid
worth US$ 130 million were signed.8 Compared to traditional donors,
Chinese aid remains limited as net western development aid to
Cameroon in 2003 stood at US$ 899 million. China is, however,
providing a new and rapidly increasing source of funding for
Cameroon that seems to be unconditional and not tied to any
political and economic reforms. But there is sufficient proof  that
Chinese aid does require the purchase of  Chinese goods and services
and that almost all Chinese aid projects are being executed by
Chinese firms with imported Chinese labour, a fact that is resented
in Cameroon.
Chinese aid to Cameroon is either in the form of  grants or interest-
free and concessional loans. It is therefore comparatively less
expensive than some bilateral aid from western donors that includes
non-concessional lending, and some multilateral aid that rarely
includes grants. It is also worth noting that Chinese aid is exclusively
project-based and China does not give Cameroon any assistance in
the form of  programme or budget support, as prescribed in the 2005
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Khan & Baye 2008: 27).
China has cancelled substantial amounts of debt owed by
Cameroon. The first amounted to US$ 34 million and followed the
FOCAC meeting in 2000. The second sum to be cancelled, worth
200
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
US$ 32 million, was agreed upon during President Hu Jintao’s visit
to Cameroon in January 2007. The third was worth US$ 30 million
and was cancelled in August 2010. Though clearly less significant
than the debt relief offered by western bilateral donors (US$ 1,200
million by the Paris Club) and multilateral institutions (US$ 1,306
million), it is significant in relation to the total debt owed to China.
These cancellations equally demonstrate China’s unwillingness to
condition debt relief, as is the case with the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative.
The fact that Chinese assistance does not come with strings
attached regarding policy reform is seen by some Cameroonian
intellectuals and civil-society organisations as detrimental for the
local population as it undermines efforts to strengthen transparency
and good governance and improve social and environmental
standards.
Conclusion
With its emergence as a significant world player in the era of
neoliberal globalisation, China has returned  to Africa on a larger
scale than ever before, and with the ideological and financial
resources to compete for political and economic influence. Some
of  the reasons behind China’s renewed interest in Africa are similar
to those that prevailed during the Cold War era when  it presented
itself  as a Third World leader in its efforts to forge alliances with
African states that would enable it to better contest the perceived
western hegemony in multilateral organisations. China also needed
African political support then in its attempt to minimise, or
preferably eliminate, Taiwan’s presence on the continent.
Nevertheless, renewed Chinese interest in Africa has been primarily
economically motivated. With the rapid expansion of its domestic
economy, China has been looking for natural resources, new markets
and investment opportunities, and its trade with Africa has risen
sharply. At the core of  China’s inclusion in African markets is its
deliberate promotion of a foreign policy with ‘no political strings
attached’ that, coupled with Beijing’s willingness to provide direct
aid and concessionary loans, has proven to be very attractive to
many African leaders.
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Strikingly, while most members of  the African political elite
continue to appreciate the establishment of strategic partnerships
between Africa and China in economic and political matters, coming
as they have on the heels of years of global neglect of the continent,
various African intellectuals and civil-society organisations have
become critical of  China’s new profile in Africa. A South African
intellectual, Moeletsi Mbeki, for instance, displayed a rather
ambivalent attitude towards China’s new engagement with Africa
when he declared that China ‘is both a tantalising opportunity and
a terrifying threat to South Africa’. On the one hand, he said that
China was ‘just the tonic’ that the mineral-rich but economically
ailing South Africa needed but added that exports from China and
Hong Kong to his country are double those from Africa, and almost
double what South Africa exports to China. He feared trade relations
between South Africa and China would be a ‘replay of the old story
of  South Africa’s trade with Europe’ as evidenced by the fact that
‘we sell them raw materials and they sell us manufactured goods
with a predictable result – an unfavourable trade balance against
South Africa’. He went on to accuse Chinese companies of flooding
the South African market with cheap products, undercutting local
firms and not hiring African labour (Shelton 2001).
Trade unions have emerged as the most vocal opponents of
Chinese business activities in Africa among African civil-society
organisations, seeing these as a serious threat to local employment
and as promoting poor labour standards. They are bringing
considerable pressure to bear on African governments to take
protective measures and to force Chinese entrepreneurs to adhere
to national labour laws.
Some civil-society organisations fear that China’s unscrupulous
support of pariah regimes, like those in Sudan and Zimbabwe, could
undermine internal and external demands for the introduction of
good governance and democracy. In their persistent efforts to contest
the long-standing Chinese principle of non-interference in state
sovereignty, they can count on support from organisations such as
the AU and NEPAD.
As Africans begin to voice concerns about some of the less
positive effects of  China’s presence in Africa, Beijing will have to
find new ways to engage the continent. They will need approaches
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that are not predicated on securing the compliance of the African
political elite alone. Otherwise, they will run the risk of  being
portrayed as an ally of  oppressive and corrupt regimes for self-
interested reasons.
Although official data is limited on the extent of China-Cameroon
relations, this chapter has provided some evidence that China is
slowly but surely gaining ground in Cameroon. As elsewhere in
Africa, the country’s growing engagement with Cameroon seems to
involve not only opportunities but also some risks and challenges.
This chapter has assessed the benefits and risks of  China’s increased
cooperation for various stakeholders in Cameroonian society, rather
than taking for granted the official Chinese discourse of ‘win-win’
cooperation.
Given that the impact of China-Cameroon relations appears to
be as ambivalent as elsewhere on the continent, Cameroon needs
to examine its relationship with China to minimise any risks involved
and exploit the advantages. Ways should be sought to increase
exports to China, especially for commodities that are currently not
being exported such as bananas, coffee and cocoa. Strategic sectors
at risk of extinction from Chinese competition should be protected
and negotiations should be started with China for some form of
voluntary restraint. Joint ventures with genuine partners need to be
encouraged as there is the potential here for transferring both
technical and management skills to the local business community.
There has to be more transparency in Cameroon-China aid
relations, not only to facilitate harmonisation with other donor
programmes but also too allow for public scrutiny. Local and
international civil-society organisations are called upon to play the
important role of  watchdog and to formulate strategies to assess
and monitor the effects of  China’s cooperation with Cameroon and
other African countries. Trade, investment and aid from China may
be good for Cameroon’s development but good policies and better
management are also important and should not be neglected in
China’s cooperation with Cameroon.
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Political liberalisation and the violent
university students’ revolt in Cameroon
Introduction
The struggle for political liberalisation, starting at the end of  the 1980s,
unleashed an unprecedented wave of student rebellion on university
campuses in West and Central Africa (Kpatinde 1991). University
students were often in the forefront of  these struggles, sometimes
with the support of secondary school students, their teachers and
other socio-professional groups (Bratton & van de Walle 1992).
Although there is a striking lack of studies on the role of students
in the ‘democratic transition’ (Buijtenhuijs & Thiriot 1995), the
reasons for their widespread revolt seem to be similar. Political
liberalisation allowed space for students to voice their long-standing
grievances about the deteriorating living and study conditions at
most African universities. The lack of  basic infrastructure needed
to cope with the massive growth in the student population since
independence resulted in rapidly falling academic standards
(Mbembe 1985; Tedga 1988; Lebeau 1997). The severe economic
crisis and subsequent Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)
aggravated the situation with an increasing withdrawal of  state
support for universities, university students and university graduates
(Albert 1995; Federici 2000). Governments were compelled to make
further cuts in university budgets, to request that students pay tuition
fees and additional levies, and to virtually stop recruiting new
graduates into already oversized state bureaucracies. As a result of
such state withdrawal, African universities no longer appeared to
be serving as centres of  elite formation. This process of  ‘institutional
liberalisation’ has been highly resented by the students in their pursuit
of  upward mobility.1 Comparing themselves with preceding
generations who could count on getting government jobs because
of their degrees, students nowadays see themselves as an
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‘abandoned’ or ‘lost’ generation (Cruise O’Brien 1996). Little
wonder that they have been inclined to see corrupt and authoritarian
regimes as responsible for their predicament and to perceive a
‘democratic transition’ as a necessary precondition for change in
society in general and in universities in particular. In Mali, students
made a significant contribution to the overthrow of the regime and
the introduction of a multi-party system (Smith 1997), but in most
other African countries student rebellions have been brutally
suppressed by the forces of  law and order.
In this chapter, I focus on the student revolt at the University of
Yaoundé – the only university institution in Cameroon until the
1993 university reforms. While Cameroonian university students
share most of the grievances expressed by their counterparts in other
West-Central African states, they appear to have played a somewhat
different, and to a certain extent exceptional, role in the political
liberalisation process. Although political liberalisation offered them
the opportunity to organise to defend their interests, it also tended
to divide them along ethno-regional lines. This led to an
intensification of the simmering tensions between two groups of
students: the ‘autochthonous’ Beti students who tended to support
the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) on
the one hand, and the Anglophone and Bamileke ‘stranger’ students
who were more inclined to support the major opposition party, the
Social Democratic Front (SDF), on the other. Given the fact that
the University of  Yaoundé was located in ‘their’ territory, the Beti
students claimed control of student politics in ‘their’ university and
were determined to combat any organisation of  ‘stranger’ students
that caused trouble on campus and strove for the overthrow of the
regime. The growing polarisation between these two groups of
students, fuelled by the regime, ethnic entrepreneurs and the press,
gave rise to an explosion of violence and the emergence on campus
of  a Beti militia engaged in various forms of  ethnic exclusion. Unlike
student rebellions in other parts of  West and Central Africa, unrest
and violence on the University of  Yaoundé campus lasted almost
uninterrupted for six years, from 1990 to 1996.
In the first section of this chapter I explore the development of
student organisation along ethno-regional lines during political
liberalisation, while the second section presents a detailed report
of the 1990-96 student revolt.2
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Political liberalisation and student organisation along
ethno-regional lines
After its creation in 1961, the University of  Yaoundé experienced
relatively few student protests until the beginning of  the 1990s.
Some were politically motivated, but most were prompted by the
students’ frequent worries about bourse et bouffe [grants and food],
especially the quality and quantity of food and the number, amount,
and timely payment of  scholarships.
The relative absence of any serious student unrest during the
first three decades of  the university’s existence is understandable.
Students undoubtedly belonged among the most privileged of the
political system and were constantly told that they would be the
future leaders soon to be co-opted into the regime. A university
degree gave almost automatic access to one of the many potentially
lucrative posts in the expanding civil service or public sector. Even
when the supply of graduates became much larger than the demand
for them in the 1970s, President Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961-82) and
his successor, Paul Biya, continued to create job openings for them
in the administration. For example, to alleviate pressures on the
labour market, the Biya government recruited 1,500 new graduates
in the already oversized state bureaucracy in 1983 and another 1,700
in 1985. Moreover, in an attempt to preserve student loyalty
following Biya’s ascendancy to power in 1982, the government
increased both the amount and the number of scholarships in 1984
(Mehler 1993: 296). And, if the ‘carrot’ did not keep the students
quiet, the authoritarian post-colonial regimes did not hesitate to
use the ‘stick’,
Several factors explain why the students’ behaviour changed so
dramatically at the beginning of the 1990s, as manifested in their
frequent and protracted strike actions. First and foremost, there
was growing dissatisfaction with the deepening crisis within the
university and the lack of employment prospects for university
graduates. Mockingly, students referred to their university as ‘the
bachelors’ cemetery’. The number of students increased from 35 in
1961 to 10,000 in 1982 and 41,000 in 1992 (Mehler 1998: 59; Mbu
1993: 82) but the university infrastructure was able to provide for
at most 7,000 students (Anonymous 1991). Lecture rooms, libraries,
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laboratories and office space for lecturers were inadequate and lacked
necessary equipment. The university hostel could offer
accommodation to a limited number of students, often on the basis
of patronage or ethnic criteria, and the vast majority of students
were compelled to look for accommodation themselves, often in
the so-called ‘mini-cities’ around the university, constructed mostly
by entrepreneurs closely connected with the university authorities
or the regime. Rooms were rented at exorbitant prices, FCFA 10,000
or more per month, very expensive for students on an average
scholarship of  FCFA 30,000. Lecturers had a heavy teaching load
but poor conditions of  service (Ouendji 1996). In addition to badly
stocked libraries, this was one of the reasons for frequent sales to
students, at vast prices, of stereotyped lecture notes dubbed polycops.
Given the inadequate infrastructure, it is not surprising that the
quality of degrees offered by the university continued to fall. Failure
rates were extremely high, reaching 80 percent in the Faculty of
Law and Economic Science (Anonymous 1991). Poor educational
standards further lowered graduates’ employment chances. Besides
this structural crisis, there was also a moral crisis: large-scale fraud
during examinations, and sexual harassment.
Above all, there appears to have been no clear separation
between politics and academics. All appointments at the university,
from that of the chancellor on down to messengers and cleaners,
were political appointments. Loyalty to the regime appears to have
been more important than intellectual merit for a university career
(Nyamnjoh 1999). A number of professors close to the regime, for
example Mono Ndjana, Fame Ndongo, Bipoum Woum, and Eno
Belinga, were regularly absent from the university, having been
recruited by the regime and the CPDM for information campaigns
throughout the country. The administration of  the university
appeared to be geared predominantly toward political control.
National security agents could be found disguised as students
constantly spying on students and lecturers. As one student put it,
‘the so-called scholarship is really a bribe in exchange for freedom
of thought and expression’ (Gobata 1993: 98-99).
The university was administered in an authoritarian manner with
little dialogue between the university authorities and the academic
staff  and students. Unlike some other West and Central African
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countries such as Senegal (Diop 1992; Bathily et al. 1995), Ghana
(Amoa 1977; Oquaye 1996) and Nigeria (Ojo 1995; Lebeau 1997),
no student union in Cameroon was allowed to represent and defend
student interests. The so-called delegates or student representatives
- those responsible for imposing the decisions of the university
authorities upon the students while taking note of those who
complain (Dibussi 1991: 16; Mbu 1993: 107) - were not elected by
the students after 1986 but were appointed by the administration.
Worse still, they tended to become informants who pointed out
subversives to the regime in times of  crisis. Lack of  participation in
university affairs created the impression among students that revolt
was the only avenue to change in the university.
While the deepening crisis in the university was a constant source
of  frustration among students, the changing economic and political
environment in Cameroon had a radicalising effect on them. The
economic crisis that hit Cameroon – once one of the most prosperous
countries in Africa – in the mid-1980s and the subsequent
implementation of  an SAP in 1988-89 aggravated the students’
predicament (Konings 1996a). There were no longer any funds
available for improving the university infrastructure. There were
regular delays in the payment of scholarships, causing many
hardships among students, and there was an almost total stop in
new recruitment into the state bureaucracy. Like other social strata,
students tended to attribute the economic ills and the concomitant
process of  institutional liberalisation to the corrupt and authoritarian
Biya regime.
The political liberalisation process that started in 1990 was a
decisive factor in the student rebellion.3 It actually appears to have
had an ambivalent impact on the students. On the one hand, it
created space for students to organise in defence of their interests
but on the other hand, it tended to divide them. The introduction
of a multi-party system and the regionalisation of political
competition (Eyoh 1998a) split students along party and ethno-
regional lines. Political liberalisation even encouraged an obsession
with autochthony among students, leading to violent forms of
exclusion of  ‘strangers’, fuelled by the Biya regime in its struggle
for survival in multi-party elections (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000;
Konings 2001). The major line of division among students became
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the following: the autochthonous Beti students who tended to support
the ruling party, the CPDM, led by President Paul Biya who was
himself a Beti versus the Anglophone and Bamileke ‘strangers’ lumped
together as ‘Anglo-Bami’ who generally supported the main opposition
party, the SDF, led by Anglophone John Fru Ndi.4
To fully understand this cleavage and the violence that
accompanied the struggle between the two groups of  students
during political liberalisation, it is necessary to point out that
animosities between the Beti and Anglo-Bami have a long historical
background, not only at the University of  Yaoundé but also in
Yaoundé and Beti territory as a whole.
There was, first of all, the large-scale migration, set in motion
during French colonial rule, from the Grassfields – the region of
the Francophone Bamileke (the present West Province) and
Anglophone ethnic-related peoples (the present North West
Province of  Anglophone Cameroon) – to Yaoundé and other Beti
towns. The Bamileke, renowned in Cameroon for their
‘entrepreneurial ethos’ (Warnier 1993), migrated in large numbers
to Yaoundé, acquiring more and more land to build their own houses
and coming to dominate the city’s commercial sector to a large extent.
Especially after independence (1960), the local population began
to express their fears of becoming overwhelmed by the Bamileke in
their own area, evoking tensions between the two groups and,
sometimes, violent clashes.
Tensions between the two groups increased when Ahmadou
Ahidjo transferred power to Paul Biya in November 1982. The Beti
elite saw the coming to power of one of their ethnic members as
simply an opportunity to seize power from the Fulbe and Bamileke,
who had enjoyed a privileged position regarding capital
accumulation during the Ahidjo regime (see Chapters 2 and 4), and
advance their own economic and political interests. Initially
encountering great difficulties in consolidating his power (Takougang
& Krieger 1998), Biya started to give in to these ethnic pressures.
In protest against the increasing Beti monopoly on economic and
political power, Bamileke businessmen then withdrew their savings
from banks and transferred them to informal savings circuits called
‘tontines’. This contributed to the banks’ growing liquidity problems
and to the economic crisis (see Chapter 2).
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The growing tensions between the Beti and the Bamileke were
also manifest in the ethnic discourse and repeated ethnic clashes at
the University of  Yaoundé. Following publication of  the book L’Idée
sociale chez Paul Biya in 1985, there was a fierce debate between its
author, Mono Ndjana, a professor of philosophy and one of the
most faithful ideologues of  the regime, and Maurice Kamto, an
eminent professor of  law. This intellectual debate between a Beti
(Mono Ndjana) and a Bamileke (Maurice Kamto) rapidly developed
into an ethnic confrontation. In the course of another debate at the
university on 11 March 1987 about the political literature in
Cameroon, Mono Ndjana accused some Bamileke colleagues of
‘ethno-fascism’ in the sense that they were exhorting their own ethnic
group to end their current marginalisation and win political power
(Collectif ‘Changer le Cameroun’ 1992: 19-25). In reaction, one of
the accused, the philosopher Sindjoun Pokam, developed his theory
of  ‘mono-fascism’. This term refers not only to the name of  his
adversary, Mono Ndjana, but also to attempts by one single ethnic
group, the Beti, to monopolise power in Cameroon (Pokam 1987).
Obviously, such debates resulted in an intensification of  the existing
tensions between the two groups in the university.
Like the Bamileke, the Anglophones were seen as another threat
to Beti power. I have argued in this volume that the Anglophone
minority deeply regrets its vote for reunification with the
Francophone majority in 1961, feeling marginalised, exploited and
assimilated by the Francophone-dominated state and Francophones
as a whole (see Chapter 5). In the wake of  Biya’s accession to power
in 1982, they began to protest openly against their allegedly second-
class citizenship in Cameroon and to call for a return to the federal
state or outright secession. The Anglophone students at the
University of  Yaoundé were the first to express Anglophone
disenchantment with the Biya regime. Their initiative can be
explained by the many hardships they experienced at the university.
Though officially a bilingual institute, the University of  Yaoundé
has clearly remained a Francophone institute. The Anglophone
students protested when, in September 1983, the Beti Minister of
National Education promulgated an order modifying the Anglophone
General Certificate of Education (GCE) examination by making it
similar to the Francophone baccalaureate. Apparently the order was
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intended to facilitate the entry of Anglophone students into the
country’s professional and technical institutes, which were
exclusively based on the French system. The Anglophone students,
however, interpreted the proposed reform as a subtle attempt by
the Francophone-dominated state to assimilate the Anglophone
educational system. They maintained that the problem of
Anglophone exclusion from the professional and technical institutes
in the country could not be solved by assimilation but rather by the
creation of institutes based on the English system. Their ensuing
demonstrations and boycott of classes met with extreme police
brutality (Nyamnjoh 1996a). The students used this protest action
to voice other grievances including the recent dismissal of Gerald
Bisong, an Anglophone lecturer in the Faculty of Law and Economics,
allegedly for offering one of the few courses in English in the officially
bilingual university.5 The situation did not calm down until eleven
days later when President Biya issued a statement calling on students
to return to classes and announcing the setting-up of a commission
composed of highly qualified and experienced Anglophones and
Francophones to look into the students’ grievances.
The greatest shock to the Beti and the regime came in May 1990
when the first opposition party in the country, the SDF, was launched
in Bamenda, the capital of  the North West Province of  Anglophone
Cameroon (see Chapter 3). The fact that the SDF rapidly spread its
influence among the Anglophones and ethnic-related Bamileke
heightened the panic in government circles and hardened Beti
attitudes towards the Anglo-Bami, perceiving the latter’s alliance
as the greatest challenge to their position of  power.
In Yaoundé and other Beti towns the autochthonous population
found it unacceptable that Anglo-Bami ‘strangers’ or ‘settlers’ would
try to help the SDF to gain power. As ‘strangers’ they should not try
to rule in the home region of  their landlords but instead should
vote CPDM or else go home and vote for their own party. Newly
founded Beti vigilante groups, such as Commando Delta, Direct
Action, and the National Front for Beti Liberation, signed highly
incendiary tracts, referring to the Anglo-Bami as ‘exploitative,
domineering, unscrupulous, and ungrateful invaders’ and calling on
them to leave or face the consequences (Collectif ‘Changer le
Cameroun’ 1992). On several occasions, Beti mobs and vigilante
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groups attacked Anglo-Bami property in Yaoundé while the security
forces stood by indifferently (Nkwi & Socpa 1997). One such
occasion was in 1991 when the so-called National Coordination of
Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA), in which the SDF
played a leading role, organised a protracted ‘ghost town’ campaign
to force the Biya regime to agree to a sovereign national conference
(see Chapters 2 and 3). Another occasion was during the 1992
presidential elections when the chairman of  the SDF, John Fru Ndi,
made significant inroads into Yaoundé, thanks to the large Anglo-
Bami diaspora: 39 per cent of the votes cast against 52 per cent for
Paul Biya. Following these fraudulent elections, John Fru Ndi
accused Biya of  stealing his victory. Yet another occasion was the
1996 municipal elections, which took place a few days after the
promulgation of a new constitution promising state protection for
minorities and the autochthonous population (Geschiere &
Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 2001).
The autochthony discourse and ethnic exclusion became part
and parcel of university life when students started organising in
1990. On the one hand, there emerged what was initially called the
National Coordination of Cameroon Students but later changed its
name to the Students’ Parliament or simply Parliament. It was by
far the largest student union on campus. While the Anglo-Bami
students formed the core of  its membership and leadership, students
from other ethnic groups outside the Beti area also formed part of
its membership. Many Parliament members lived in one of  the mini-
cities around the university called Bonamoussadi and, particularly
during the heyday of student rebellion, they tended to assemble
almost daily at their meeting-place at Bassora in Bonamoussadi.
Parliament soon came under the influence of the opposition parties,
notably the SDF. Parliament members agreed with the opposition
that an overthrow of the regime was required to bring about real
change in society at large and in the university in particular. The
Anglophone members equally championed the establishment of an
Anglophone university. Parliament leaders often presented
themselves as revolutionaries who were prepared to use all means
at their disposal, including demonstrations, strikes, and acts of
vandalism, should the regime and the university authorities fail to
listen to or to give in to their demands.
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On the other hand, a Committee for Self-Defence was called
into being by the regime to counteract the actions of Parliament.
Its leadership and membership was mainly Beti but some members
of  other ethnic groups were also part of  the Self-Defence group.
For example, one of  its principal leaders, ‘General’ Ngoufack, was
a Bamileke. He hailed from the same village as Augustin Kontchou
Kouomegni, who used to be a professor of political science at the
university before being appointed minister of  information and
culture and a government spokesman. He and other non-Beti
members were recruited by the regime to give the public the
impression that the Self-Defence group was not an exclusively Beti
affair but an organisation of  responsible students. Ngoufack was
well rewarded for his services and was given a lucrative job in the
National Ports Authority after his graduation despite the freeze in
public-sector employment.
Most of the Beti members of the Self-Defence group believed
that Parliament was out to destroy ‘their’ university and to remove
‘their’ government from power. Others perceived Parliament as a
group of vandals set to disturb the academic year and to destroy
university property while claiming that they were defending the rights
of  the responsible students. Others had just joined the group because
they were given cash and, in some cases, free lodgings by the regime
in return for their combat with Parliament. Since the Committee
for Self-Defence was made up of only a small minority of the
students, they were allowed to carry weapons, including clubs,
knives and pistols, to attack members and sympathisers of
Parliament. They were even alleged to be involved in crimes, such
as murders, to incriminate Parliament members.
The Committee for Self-Defence worked closely with the Beti
vigilante groups on campus, particularly the self-styled Direct Action
group that openly declared that the University of  Yaoundé was on
Beti land and thus should fall under Beti control. It often declared
that the Anglo-Bami students should either recognise Beti control
or go home’. Sometimes, however, the Self-Defence group
composed of Beti and non-Beti students appeared to distance itself
from this ethnic militia:
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The Committee for Self-Defence is different from the other vigilante
groups because these other groups have objectives, which are
unknown. Meanwhile, everyone knows the objectives of our
committee and it works in the interest of the majority of students
who are regularly admitted into the university (Quoted in Lisinge
[n.d.]).
Becoming increasingly aware that it constituted only a minority
among the student population, the Self-Defence group was prepared
to enter into negotiations with their colleagues from Parliament.
For instance, in a circular issued on 6 May 1992, it declared:
Together let’s save the University of  Yaoundé.
Conscious of the fact that violence cannot solve any problem,
Conscious of the fact that discord among the students is
disadvantageous to the representation of their interests, and
Conscious equally of the fact that we have got the same academic
problem,
The Committee for Self-Defence demands a dialogue, a debate,
with our friends of Parliament (Quoted  in Lisinge ([n.d.]).
Following the formation of  the Committee for Self-Defence and
the Beti vigilante groups, which received logistical support from
the forces of law and order, Parliament created its own commandos
to fight these hostile groups and to protect its members.
Political liberalisation and student revolt, 1990-96
From 1990 to 1996 the University of  Yaoundé barely functioned,
with university life being repeatedly paralysed by student protest
and revolt. During this period there were regular violent
confrontations between Parliament on the one hand and the
Committee for Self-Defence, the Beti vigilante groups, and the forces
of  law and order on the other. In this section, I focus on three such
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confrontations. The first occurred in 1991 following Parliament’s
call for a sovereign national conference. The second took place in
1993 after Parliament’s protest against the introduction of  university
tuition fees. The third occurred in 1996 following Parliament’s
resistance of the university authorities’ imposition of special levies
on students in addition to tuition fees.
Parliament and the holding of  a sovereign national conference, 1991
Relations between the students and the state and university
authorities started to deteriorate from 1990 onwards. On 26 March
1990, a number of mostly Anglophone students marched in support
of launching the SDF in Bamenda and the introduction of a multi-
party system in the country. The government press falsely accused
them of having sung the Nigerian national anthem (Ngniman 1993;
Kamto 1993).6 Subsequently, the gendarmes, usually called ninjas
by the students and other sections of the population, harassed and
brutalised the students, looted their property and arrested about
three hundred of them.7 Apparently the students’ so-called delegates,
appointed by the university authorities, were involved in this
oppression and pointed out to the gendarmes the rooms of  the
Anglophone students and even joined them in torturing their fellow
students (Dibussi 1991). Little wonder that this behaviour by ‘their’
delegates contributed to the students’ pursuit of an autonomous
organisation. This march by Anglophone students incited
disaffection and resentment among the autochthonous Beti
population on and off campus, with some Beti landlords threatening
to remove Anglophone students from their houses. To forestall any
further student protest actions, the regime stationed the ninjas
permanently on campus.
Tensions remained high on campus for the rest of  the year. In
July 1990 students lodged a complaint with the chancellor, Joel
Moulen, that a number of  them had been paid FCFA 10,000 less
than the amount stipulated in the text regulating their scholarships.
Since no further payments were forthcoming, they marched on the
Ministry of Higher Education. When the Minister failed to settle
the issue, they started mounting roadblocks on campus. Fearing that
the matter would escalate, the university authorities then decided
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to pay the students.8 In September of  the same year some second-
and third-year students in the Faculty of Law and Economics
protested against mass failures in the examinations9 and by the end
of November, Anglophone students had started boycotting classes
to press home their demands. Undergraduates in the Department
of English Language and Literature complained about overcrowding
in lecture rooms. English private law students protested about
discrimination, bitterly lamenting that some of their courses were
in French while French private law students had no courses at all in
English.10
It was in this context of growing tension on campus and the
gradual opening of space for organisation during the political
liberalisation process that the National Coordination of Cameroon
Students (the group that was soon to be called Parliament and became
allied with the SDF opposition party) was formed under the
leadership of  Benjamin Senfo Tonkam, a Bamileke student. Its first
public activity was on 15 August 1990, when it addressed an open
letter to the Head of State, stressing that higher education in
Cameroon was ‘sick and without repairs’, and characterised by
‘inadequate infrastructures, anachronism and arbitrariness’.11 It
further stated that university students in Cameroon were among
the most wretched in Africa, being faced with poor nutritional
standards, housing conditions, and transport facilities, low
scholarships, language barriers, and exploitation by their professors.
It requested that the president look into the matter of growing
unemployment rates among university graduates and the
militarisation of the university campus after the 26 May 1990
Bamenda incident. It also appealed to him to reform the university
so that it would become a school of tolerance and dialogue and
regain its lost credibility.
The emergence and increasing politicisation of Parliament
disturbed the university authorities and the regime. Their worries
appeared to be justified when, after some earlier skirmishes (Mehler
1993:297; Mbu 1993), an initially peaceful demonstration by
Parliament on 2 April 1991, formed the prelude to a two-month
explosion of  violence on campus. On that day, Parliament members
marched in support of the opposition parties’ call for the holding
of a sovereign national conference and an unconditional general
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amnesty for political prisoners and exiles. The government strongly
condemned their actions, attributing them to student manipulation
by the opposition parties. The president warned the students to
remain aloof from politics, insisting that the university was a temple
of learning and not a haven of politics: ‘La politique aux politiciens,
l’école aux écoliers’. In reaction, Parliament leaders maintained that
if the authorities were sincere about purging the university of
politics, they should start dissolving all the CPDM branches and
youth movements on campus and bar the university population from
participating in CPDM rallies and other CPDM propaganda activities
(Dibussi 1991). Moreover, they claimed that a sovereign national
conference could make a significant contribution to solving the
problems at the university and in society as a whole. As one
Parliament leader put it:
A sovereign national conference is a forum for collective self-
confession, a platform to point out past mistakes and to elaborate
new codes of conduct – a process that will inevitably lead to a
positive restructuring of our unadapted educational system and its
mediocre university and that will eventually lay the foundation for
the resolution of post-university problems such as unemployment.12
The student demonstrations on 2 April were dispersed by the
gendarmes, but the following day Parliament members marched
again, burning vehicles, including that of the chancellor, and
smashing the windows of  the Chancellery. The chancellor then
requested that the security forces protect university property and
students who refused to take part in the demonstrations.
Subsequently, the gendarmes guarding the campus were reinforced
by new troops. This combined force immediately moved into action,
spraying tear gas over students, looting their rooms, raping some of
the girls, and torturing anyone arrested. The authorities were
indifferent to such brutalities. Parliament commandos challenged
the security forces daily, throwing stones in intifada style and then
withdrawing as well as chanting liberation songs like ‘Today may
be the last day, we don’t know’. They also tried to protect students
in the residential areas against attacks by the Self-Defence group.
They developed a system of whistle signals for meeting each other,
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attacking, withdrawing and so on. Besides Senfo Tonkam, three
other Bamileke leaders of Parliament became well known to the
Cameroonian public during this period thanks to the media, namely
Corentin Talla, nicknamed ‘Schwartzkopf ’, Robert Wanto,
nicknamed ‘Colin Powell’, and Blaise Yimga Yotchou nicknamed
‘Abou Nidal’.
Assuming that the situation was more or less under control, troops
withdrew from the campus on 19 April without notifying the
chancellor. Parliament members used this opportunity to assault
those lecturers and students who were hostile to Parliament, leading
to renewed occupation of  the campus by the security forces.
Parliament leaders then decided to halt all activities on campus
until further notice and to advise their fellow students to leave.
Curiously, on 21 April, the leader of  Parliament, Senfo Tonkam,
who had been hiding in the U.S. embassy, was escorted to the campus
by U.S. marine bodyguards to announce the so-called Operation
Ghost Campus (Boulaga 1997: 92-93).
On 4 May, Parliament held a meeting approved by the chancellor
at the university sports complex. An estimated crowd of 25,000
students attended this meeting chanting the popular freedom song
of the famous Cameroonian singer Anne-Marie Ndze. Parliament
leaders reiterated their demands for the organisation of a sovereign
national conference, summed up all the students’ grievances, and
called for solidarity among students (Lisinge n.d.). After the meeting,
some Parliament members were attacked and wounded by Direct
Action, the Beti militia linked to the Committee for Self-Defence.
On Monday morning, 6 May, Parliament members marched to see
the chancellor, providing him with a report of their meeting and
requesting protection against any further attacks by the Beti vigilante
groups. In his reply, the chancellor avoided addressing any of  the
points raised by the students. The latter then decided to leave and
to assemble in the afternoon at their usual meeting place at Bassora
to devise future strategies.
One of the unexpected guests at the afternoon meeting was
‘General’ Ngoufack, the principal leader of  the Self-Defence group.
He told Parliament members that he was attending their meeting
without the knowledge of  his own group. He then declared his
willingness to enter into negotiations with the leaders of Parliament.
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Although he then left the meeting, rumours were already spreading
on campus that he had been ‘hijacked’ by Parliament, which
understandably led to commotion in Self-Defence group circles,
and among the university authorities and the government. The Self-
Defence group reacted swiftly by capturing three members of
Parliament with a view to holding them hostage until Ngoufack
was freed. In the meantime, the chancellor had notified the
government authorities of the dangerous situation and the
government then ordered an end to Parliament’s meeting.
The security forces arrived when the students were about to leave
the meeting and, without any notice, charged brutally. The Self-
Defence group, the Beti militia and the Beti inhabitants of  the nearby
quarters also attacked fleeing students. Soldiers again invaded
students’ residences in Bonamoussadi, looting property, raping girls
and arresting any student caught up in the violence. Reportedly,
218 students were arrested, but there were contradictory reports
about the number of  deaths, disappearances, and injuries. While
the private press spoke of several deaths, the government was less
than precise in its reports. The minister of  information and culture
and government spokesman, Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, began
a swift rise to prominence in the regime and notoriety in the
opposition by claiming ‘zéro mort’ [no deaths]. Realising that the
population was shocked by such an unprecedented degree of
violence on campus, the Biya government on 15 May appointed a
nine-man committee headed by Chief  Justice (retired) Sam Endeley,
an Anglophone with close ties to the regime, to investigate the
matter. In its final report, the committee was critical of  the role of
the university authorities and the forces of law and order but it
came to the conclusion that there were ‘no deaths, no rapes, no
disappearances’. While the opposition strongly contested the
committee’s conclusions, the government was clearly pleased with
the report. Soon after its publication, Endeley was appointed
Bakweri Paramount Chief – a position that had been vacant for a
considerable period of time (Geschiere 1993).
On 7 May 1991, the day after what came to be known in student
circles as the ‘Bassora Massacre’, Parliament leaders protested against
these events by declaring a boycott of classes for the remainder of
the year. On the same day, many members of  Parliament left their
rooms in Bonamoussadi and other mini-cities around the university.
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Renewed brutal charges by the security forces on student
residences followed after a student, Ndam Souley who was believed
to have been a government informant, was killed by a Molotov
cocktail on 15 May. Government and Parliament accused each other
of having committed this crime. Charged with murder and wanted
by the police, Parliament leaders such as Schwartzkopf, Colin Powell
and Abu Nidal, sought refuge in the building of the EEC
representation in Yaoundé where they were later refused political
asylum. Senfo Tonkam was arrested on 23 May and was subsequently
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.
The government was eventually prepared to make some
concessions to Parliament to induce them to end Operation Ghost
Campus. It first announced that two new universities would be
created, one of which would be an Anglophone university as
demanded by the Anglophone students. It then dismissed the
chancellor, Joel Moulen, and replaced him with Peter Agbor Tabi,
the first Anglophone to occupy this position. When this strategy
failed to yield the desired results, the government resorted to
intimidation. It threatened students by announcing that anyone not
attending lectures would be considered dismissed or having
withdrawn from the university. From the end of  May onwards
students began to return to the university. The university authorities
forced the ill-prepared students to sit the end-of-the-year
examinations so as not to lose the academic year and their own
credibility. Examinations were finally held under tight security.
Parliament and the introduction of  tuition fees, 1993
Like his predecessor, the new chancellor, Peter Agbor Tabi, appeared
not to be interested in any form of  regular consultation with
Parliament. He became almost obsessed with strengthening control
over the students. In a time of  deepening crisis when the government
claimed that there was no money to improve the university
infrastructure and to pay salaries and scholarships regularly, he
erected the so-called Berlin Wall to facilitate control over the
students by the security forces, the Committee for Self-Defence,
and the Beti militia.
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It soon turned out that his efforts to maintain control were
unsuccessful. By 12 December 1991, Parliament had staged another
prolonged strike against the delay in the payment of  scholarships.
A new round of violence and confrontation between Parliament
and its opponents occurred on campus after Parliament’s leaders
had declared a renewed Operation Ghost Campus. Violence reached
a climax in ‘The Night of the Long Knives’ on 20 January 1992,
when the ninjas stormed Bonamoussadi, again brutalising and raping
students, looting their property, and arresting over 35 of  them.
A few months later, Parliament announced that 6 May would be
a day of Ghost Campus in honour of the martyrs of the 6 May
1991 Bassora Massacre. In the days preceding 6 May the Beti militia
distributed tracts around campus, threatening the Anglo-Bami
students and admonishing them to go home. In a circular, the
Committee for Self-Defence announced that it was going to celebrate
its historic victory over Parliament on 6 May 1991.13 During the
night of  5 May, a Bamileke female student, Guiadem Ange Tekam,
the director of  the students’ newspaper the Voice of  the Student, was
molested by the security forces, forced to march naked through
Bonamoussadi, and then detained. She was accused of having
distributed tracts calling on students to march on 6 May. On Martyrs’
Day itself, some 15 Parliament members were subjected after their
arrest to dehumanising and savage treatment by the security forces.
They were severely beaten, bathed in mud, their hair shaved with
broken bottles and their faces painted with a black substance, and
then were transferred to some of  the newly established torture cells.
On 8 May, some 500 third-year female students from the Faculty
of Law and Economics staged a peaceful protest march to the
Chancellery. Their ultimatum to boycott classes until the
unconditional release of  their colleague, Guiadem Ange Tekam,
was simply ignored by the chancellor.
The new chancellor was to face an even greater student challenge
at the beginning of  1993. On 19 January, Titus Edzoa, the minister
of higher education, announced on CRTV the long-expected
university reforms, including the establishment of  six, more
manageable, university institutions in the country; the introduction
of a system of credits for two semesters of fourteen weeks each
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(students needed at least a 70 per cent pass rate to be promoted to
the next class); and tuition fees of  FCFA 50,000 a year per student,
to be paid in two instalments.
The levying of tuition fees was particularly shocking to the
students since both the prime minister, Simon Achidi Achu, and
the minister of higher education had declared during the 1992
presidential elections that university tuition fees would not be
introduced. While still engaged in the struggle for the regular
payment of their scholarships, the students were suddenly told they
had to pay for their own university education and forget about their
unpaid scholarships. In addition, the students argued that they could
not be compelled to pay fees at a time when their parents’ incomes
had been dramatically curtailed due to drastic cuts in salaries and
agricultural-commodity prices and when the living and study
conditions on campus were so poor.14
Immediately after the announcement of  the university reforms,
the members of Parliament assembled at Bassora where they decided
to stage a peaceful demonstration in town and to boycott classes.
They then marched into town, chanting anti-Biya songs and setting
a huge effigy of  Biya ablaze. When they started mounting barricades,
the gendarmes attacked them. Some students sustained injuries,
others were arrested. Forced to withdraw, they staged another
demonstration in town the following day where the gendarmes again
confronted them with water canons, tear gas, beatings, and arrests.
Back on campus, they set fire to a Faculty of Science building
housing a geology laboratory and the offices of  some fifty lecturers.
In a circular issued by Parliament, it was alleged that the
Chancellor Peter Agbor Tabi then instructed his militia on campus
to increase raids on students both on campus and in residential
areas. These raids, the circular said, ‘were intended to brutalise
students and destroy their goods so that, intimidated, fewer and
fewer students would have the courage to join the boycott of tuition
fees’. Agbor Tabi was quoted as saying ‘blood should flow, if
necessary, so that the students either pay their fees or go back to
their home provinces to do farm work’.15 Apparently, the security
forces, the Self-Defence group, and the Beti militia, which started
terrorising Parliament members and destroying or looting their
property, carried out Agbor Tabi’s instructions religiously.
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Violence reigned on campus for months. During the night of  24-
25 April, a second-year Bamileke student, Collins Djongoué Kamga,
was set on fire in his room. He was said to have paid part of his
tuition fees against Parliament’s instructions. The regime was
therefore quick to make Parliament responsible for this murder. Even
the confession by a Beti member of the Committee for Self-Defence
on Radio Africa No. 1 on 30 April that his group was responsible
for the crime did not deter the regime from punishing Parliament
members. Without further investigation, the minister of  higher
education summarily dismissed thirty-five members of Parliament
from the university. An additional list of  seventeen names was
circulating and persons on this list felt in danger (Boulaga 1997:
143). In an interview after this incident, the chancellor declared
that the Committee for Self-Defence had every right to protect the
interests of the responsible students in view of the unstable situation
on campus.
One of the consequences of the mysterious assassination was
that students started paying their fees for fear of being executed
should they fail to do so. The authorities, who were considered to
have ended this protracted strike successfully, were rewarded for
their services a few weeks later. Following a cabinet reshuffle, the
minister of higher education, Titus Edzoa, was promoted to
Secretary-General at the Presidency, one of  the most powerful
positions in Cameroon, while the Chancellor Peter Agbor Tabi
moved up into Edzoa’s former post.
Parliament and the imposition of  special levies on students, 1996
Parliament members had vehemently resisted the introduction of
the FCFA 50,000 university tuition fee in 1993. They became even
more restive when the university authorities began to impose
additional levies upon students, including FCFA 5,000 for pre-
registration, FCFA 5,000 for medical costs (supposed to cover the
costs of  X-rays that were never carried out), FCFA 1,000 for
transcripts of  examination results, and FCFA 1,500 for the use of
laboratory facilities in the Faculty of Science. In addition, the cost
of participation in the catch-up summer session in September was
FCFA 25,000 despite the fact that students could follow no more
225
Chapter 9: Political liberalisation and the violent university student’s revolt in Cameroon
than four courses during this session. The imposition of some new
levies, such as the payment of  FCFA 100 for each visit to the library
at night, FCFA 50 for studying in one of  the lecture rooms on
weekends, and FCFA 25 for the use of  toilet facilities, was seen by
the students as provocation.
It was not until 1996 that Parliament leaders laid their hands on
the 1993 university reform decrees. They then discovered that the
imposition of special levies was not covered by the decrees’ text of
application. Attempts to meet the new chancellor, Dominique
Obounou Akong, to discuss the issue failed.
Two incidents fuelled student unrest and sparked renewed strike
action. The first incident occurred on 16 April when the Dean of
the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Social Sciences, Joseph-Marie
Essomba, issued a circular cancelling the first semester results of
some third-year students who had not yet sat all their first-year
examinations. It also announced that only students who had paid
their tuition fees of  FCFA 50,000 would have their results published.
The students opposed these directives as a violation of the text
and spirit of  the 1993 university reform decrees. They emphasised
that these reforms stipulated that a 70 per cent pass mark sufficed
for promotion to the next class and that tuition fees were payable in
two instalments. Publication of  the first-semester results could
therefore not be made dependent on payment of the second semester
fees. The second incident took place on 2 May when the students
were provoked by the arrogant behaviour of the Dean of the Faculty
of Science, Amougou Akwa. During a meeting with some of his
students in front of the Chancellery he tried to conclude the
discussion by asking whether there was still another ‘sponger’
(fainéant) who wanted to pose a question. The students saw this as
further proof that the university authorities never took them
seriously.
The next day, 3 May, members of  Parliament started
demonstrating on campus. They marched to the offices of  both
deans, chased students and lecturers out of the lecture rooms,
mounted roadblocks, shattered windscreens, and finally launched
an attack on the registrar’s office while chanting anti-chancellor
songs in Pidgin English like ‘papa di suffer, Obounou di chop moni’.
This signified the start of another protracted student strike. A new
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batch of  Parliament leaders emerged (with nicknames like Chairman
Savimbi, Etienne Lautier, Fidel Castro and Thatcher) who declared
a renewed Operation Ghost Campus. In subsequent days there were
frequent confrontations between Parliament commandos and the
security forces. Any students who were seen carrying books to or
from campus were seized by members of Parliament, ‘baptised’ with
dirty water and urine, had their faces smeared with mud, and ordered
to return to their rooms.
Describing the new levies as ‘extortion’, some 3,000 members
of Parliament marched on 6 May to the office of the Chancellor
Dominique Obounou Akong. During a meeting with some of  their
representatives, the chancellor reportedly accused Parliament leaders
of wickedness and questioned why they had never gone on strike
when his predecessor, Peter Agbor Tabi, their Anglophone brother,
imposed the new levies. He was nevertheless prepared to make some
minor concessions, including a reduction of  the toilet fee from FCFA
25 to FCFA 10 and the library fee from FCFA 100 to FCFA 50. He
finally threatened to kill any student caught destroying university
property. The students were obviously not satisfied with the
outcome of the meeting and held the chancellor hostage in his office
until late in the evening when gendarmes used tear gas and water
canons to chase them back to their residential areas.16
Following his failure to resolve the dispute, the chancellor invited
the minister of  higher education, Peter Agbor Tabi, to visit the
campus and calm down the students. The following day, 7 May, the
minister went to the campus accompanied by over 200 gendarmes
but his provocative speech aggravated rather than resolved the crisis.
He warned the students to resume classes and avoid the
consequences of strike action, which he insinuated would be dealt
with ruthlessly:
You people already know me and the sanctions I can take against
any of  you caught striking. If  you want to march, go on marching,
but I advise you to run rather than to march. If you want violence,
I will teach you what it means to love it.17
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He provoked the already irate students even further with a remark
suggesting that higher education was not for the poor. The September
catch-up session was for those who could pay since it was not
compulsory, and those who could not afford to pay university dues
could ‘go back to their home provinces to do farm work’.18 After
all, university enrolment figures were still quite high. As soon as he
had left the campus, the security forces started dispersing the
students. Using tear gas, water canons, and batons they descended
on the students, beating, injuring and arresting several of them.
On 8 May, Parliament members marched in protest, chanting
liberation songs and resorting to violence ‘to teach Agbor Tabi a
lesson in humility’.19 They burnt down a section of one of the halls
used for tutorials and attempted to set one of the lecture rooms
ablaze but were chased away by the security forces that fired tear
gas at them. They then blocked the free flow of traffic in
neighbouring areas by setting tyres on fire, but were again tear gassed
into hiding.
Changing their strategy, they decided to present their grievances
to the Anglophone prime minister, Simon Achidi Achu, the following
day. A team of  three advisors in the prime minister’s office received
a delegation of  six Parliament leaders. The prime minister had
instructed the team to resolve the immediate demands of  the
students and tell them that he could receive them only after they
had resumed classes. The team assured the students that all the
arrested students would be released and that the forces of law and
order would be withdrawn from campus the day after they resumed
classes. It also promised the student delegation that the university
authorities would victimise none of  the strike leaders. Before the
delegation left, the prime minister sent in a note that said ‘After the
resolution of your immediate demands, I will personally look into
the other matters when you resume classes. The rule says obedience
before complaint’. Parliament members, however, demanded
concrete guarantees for what had been discussed. When these were
not forthcoming, they continued to boycott classes. The prime
minister, in turn, washed his hands of the matter, describing the
students as ‘stubborn kids’ who needed to be called to order by the
university authorities and the government.20
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Soon after the failure of this conciliation attempt, the Self-
Defence group and Beti vigilante groups were reactivated on
campus. In a communiqué, the Self-Defence group described the
grievances of Parliament as legitimate, but it stressed that the
authorities had made concessions that should be reciprocated by
the students. It regretted that Parliament preferred to resort to acts
of vandalism rather than to enter into negotiations with the
administration, accusing its opponent of being manipulated by the
radical opposition parties. It denounced arson on campus as an
Anglo-Bami war against the Beti. In the face of what it described
as a ‘premeditated conspiracy against the Beti and their patrimony’,
it warned the Anglo-Bami students that ‘the period of relaxation
was over’. It exhorted the latter to abandon what it referred to as
their ‘Machiavellian Dance’ and to go back and destroy property in
their own region. It also resolved ‘that for every Beti student killed,
one hundred Anglo-Bami students would be killed in reprisal’. It
finally called on lecturers who sympathised with the strike to stop
their manoeuvres, ‘for your lives will be in danger and your wives
will be raped’.21
Despite such threats, Ghost Campus continued. The regime then
employed the usual tactics of the stick and the carrot. A number of
students, who went to inform the prime minister on 14 May that
some students were still being detained, were arrested and severely
beaten by the ninjas stationed around the prime minister’s office. A
few days later, the prime minister published a press release asking
students to go back to school and calling on the university authorities
to respect the 1993 university reform decrees. Parliament leaders,
however, considered this to be a vague statement and demanded a
text signed by President Biya confirming the prime minister’s
decision.
With the situation getting out of hand, the regime and the
university authorities began to use the government-owned media
as their negotiating table, proposing all kinds of concessions in these
media without ever consulting the students. Parliament members
felt that they were being taken for a ride and resorted to renewed
violence, burning down another lecture room, beating and wounding
a captured military captain, smashing windshields of university
authorities’ cars, and disrupting the examinations of  students at
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the Advanced Teachers’ Training College which had been scheduled
to be held on the university campus on 21 May. Several arrests
were reported.
On 31 May, Parliament members assembled at Bassora, making
new demands as a condition for their resumption of  classes. Since
the various levies imposed by the university authorities after the
1993 university reform decrees had been described as illegal by the
prime minister in his press release of  16 May, they requested the
reimbursement of all such extorted monies and reiterated their
demand for a free catch-up summer session.22 They called on the
authorities to resolve their grievances within forty-eight hours or
face the consequences of  what was dubbed Operation Storm
Campus, scheduled to take place on 3 June. Quoting President Biya’s
notorious proverb that ‘if you want peace, you should prepare for
war’ (Ndjana 1997), they cautioned that they would turn into
terrorists should their grievances not be met within the deadline.
On 3 June, there were severe confrontations between Parliament
members and the security forces and the Self-Defence group.
Annoyed that the university authorities had failed to control the
situation despite previous assurances, President Biya issued a decree
on 5 June announcing the sacking of Chancellor Dominique
Obounou Akong and his replacement by Jean Messi Messi, who
was known as a hard-liner. The new chancellor immediately made a
number of  far-reaching decisions. He withdrew the various levies
and declared that the summer session that year would be free. Some
of the levies already paid would be reimbursed. Since students
nevertheless continued to boycott classes, he created a new vigilante
group composed of  non-students that started terrorising the students.
A meeting of  the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU) was to
be held in Yaoundé on 8 July, so the government and the university
authorities were anxious to re-establish control over the campus
and to organise the second-semester examinations before that date.
On 11 June, the dean of the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Social
Sciences issued a circular telling students who wished to sit the
second-semester examinations (scheduled to take place on 24 June)
to register. On the same day, a ministerial order was promulgated
dismissing six Parliament leaders from the university for their role
in the strike. The following day students stormed the campus to
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revoke the dismissal of  their colleagues. One philosophy lecturer,
Ernest Menyomo, was beaten and almost lynched. Violent
confrontations followed between Parliament members and the
security forces, the Self-Defence group and the vigilante group. One
of  the arrested students, Benjamin Mvogo, was reported to have
died the next day as a result of having been tortured. In the following
days violent confrontations continued after the vigilante group
destroyed maize fields near Bonamoussadi belonging to Anglo-Bami
and the security forces raided students’ rooms in Bonamoussadi,
arresting about 300 students.
The strikers’ morale rapidly deteriorated. The arrest and dismissal
of their leaders, the reimbursement of some of the levies and the
promise of a free summer session, the lengthy nature of the strike,
and the wish of most students, especially those in their final year,
to sit examinations were decisive factors in Parliament members’
ending their strike. As a result of the prolonged strike action,
students were to sit their examinations having attended few or no
classes at all.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the political liberalisation process
in Cameroon was marked by protracted and violent strike actions
on the campus of  the University of  Yaoundé during the period 1990-
96. Political liberalisation provided space for students to organise
and to voice their multiple grievances about the poor living and
study conditions on campus and the process of ‘institutional
liberalisation’ that blocked their entry into the circle of the elite.
While these conditions were aggravated in the 1990s with the
introduction of tuition fees and the imposition of additional levies,
the university authorities and the regime nevertheless continued to
refuse to enter into any meaningful form of  dialogue with the newly
established student union.
The unprecedented degree of violence that accompanied these
protracted strikes must be attributed mainly to the fact that the
political liberalisation process tended to divide students along party
and ethno-regional lines. The major lines of  division were between
the Anglo-Bami students organised in Parliament and closely allied
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to the radical opposition and the autochthonous Beti students
organised in the Committee for Self-Defence and Beti militia and
closely allied to the regime in power. In their fight with Parliament,
the latter groups resorted to violent forms of  ethnic exclusion to
re-establish control over ‘their’ university and to maintain ‘their’
regime in power. Allowed by the regime to be armed, they provided
invaluable support to the forces of  law and order in the brutal
repression of  Parliament strikes.
It is interesting to observe that in the aftermath of  the 1996
student revolt, the Committee for Self-Defence and Beti vigilante
groups have been replaced on campus by a new group called
PRESBY (or President Biya’s Youth). This group, which expresses
its unshakable loyalty to President Biya, is composed mainly of
university students and other sections of the educated youth either
engaged in informal-sector activities or unemployed, including a
number of  university graduates and dropouts. Although the Beti
youth appear to play a dominant role in this new movement, young
people from other ethnic groups in search of prebends have also
joined the group, thus giving PRESBY a national or multi-ethnic
outlook. Recent experience has shown that PRESBY is creating a
new recruiting ground for the formation of  ethnic militia used by
the regime to intimidate and terrorise Parliament members.
Notes
  1. I am grateful to Domenic Boyer for suggesting this term to me.
  2. The chapter is based on several interviews held at the University of
Yaoundé between 1991 and 1998. I also received written reports of
the strikes by students and consulted a large number of newspapers
and journals. Unless annotated otherwise, comments and quotations
have their sources in these conversations.
  3. There is an extensive literature on the political liberalisation process in
Cameroon. See, for instance, Banock (1992), Ngniman (1993), Konings
(1996a), and Takougang & Krieger (1998). In this chapter I focus only
on a few aspects.
  4. The name ‘Beti’, like other ethnic labels such as ‘Anglo-Bami’, is a
historical construct. Beti identity was shaped from the crystallisation
of a myriad of ethnic groups in the forest region of the Centre and
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South Provinces and, to a lesser extent, the East Province which was
provoked by Paul Biya’s accession to power in 1982 and subsequent
attempts by the opposition to unseat him. Indeed, the present regime’s
ethnic policies have been highly instrumental in creating a wider sense
of  ethnic identity and unity. See Bayart et al. (2001) and Monga (2000).
  5. Petition of  English-speaking students, University of  Yaoundé, to the
Minister of National Education, 19 November 1983, reproduced in
Mukong (1990: 26).
  6. Following the partitioning after World War I of  the erstwhile German
Kamerun Protectorate into French and English mandate/trust
territories, Anglophone Cameroon was administered as an integral
part of Nigeria until the 1950s when it attained a quasi-regional status
(1954) and later full regional status (1958) within the Federation of
Nigeria. Due to the growing dissatisfaction of the Anglophone minority
with their alleged recolonisation by the Francophone majority, the
regime regularly accused Anglophones of secessionist tendencies and
striving to rejoin Nigeria. See Chapter 5.
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Solving transportation problems in Africa
cities during neoliberal reforms: Innovative
responses by the youth in Douala, Cameroon
Introduction
It is widely recognised that young people have been among the most
seriously affected by the current economic crisis in Africa (Trani
2000; Jua 2003a). Their chances of finding a job in the state
bureaucracy and the formal sector have been drastically reduced by
economic liberalisation and state withdrawal from the economy.
While these trends have narrowed their range of possibilities for
securing a sustainable livelihood, it would be an exaggeration to
call them as a ‘lost’ or ‘abandoned’ generation (Cruise O’Brien
1996). Faced with dramatic changes in the labour market, they have
adopted a variety of livelihood strategies, varying from those with
a long history in African cities to more recent imaginative
innovations.
This study focuses on two responses by young people in
Cameroon to the transportation problems facing residents of the
enclaved and marginalised neighbourhoods in African cities (Godard
& Teurnier 1992; Godard 2002). The first such activity, ‘bendskin’,
is the use of  motorbikes as taxis. Bendskin is both a Pidgin English
expression meaning ‘bend yourself ’ (to hold on tightly to the driver),
and the name of popular music introduced in the 1960s by the
famous Bamileke singer André-Marie Talla (Nyamnjoh & Fokwang
2003:192). According to informants, bendskin originally referred to
motorbike-taxis with a higher backseat, on which the passenger’s
posture resembled that of  a bendskin dancer. Only later did the
term bendskin come to refer to the operation of  motorbike-taxis in
general. The second young people’s response is pousse-pousse, a
Francophone Cameroonian expression referring to the use of
handcarts for transporting merchandise.
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The introduction of these two-wheel vehicles for the
transportation of people and goods has been of great significance
to neighbourhood development. Firstly, these vehicles offer
employment and a reasonable, secure income for a growing number
of  young people. Second, they provide forms of  transport well
adapted to local road conditions and the people’s income levels.
Third, they stimulate growth in other local economic activities,
particularly those that, in one way or another, provide services to
bendskin and pousse-pousse.
Bendskin and pousse-pousse demonstrate the determination and
agency of marginalised urban youth, but their deepest roots and
developments cannot be fully understood without reference to the
corruption and authoritarianism of  the post-colonial state, which
characteristically strips young people of the dignity of meaningful
citizenship – with citizenship here being understood in both political
and social terms. Political citizenship may be broadly defined by
the individual’s capacity to participate in certain political institutions
and processes, notably in the election of local and national
governments. Social citizenship, which is more relevant to our
discussion, is based on the individual’s right to a decent livelihood
in society, especially through state-guaranteed access to education,
health, housing and employment (Fokwang 2003:175). It is therefore
unsurprising that in the early 1990s many Cameroonian youths were
at the forefront of  radical opposition parties’ violent struggles for
democratic change, and that they demanded a substantial
improvement in the living standards of subaltern social groups
(Takougang & Krieger 1998; Konings 2002a; Fokwang 2003). This
was a period marked by what the Comaroffs (2000: 330) have
cogently called ‘millennial optimism’ and a messianic vision - that
the radical opposition parties were about to seize power from the
ruling Biya regime and transform marginalised and powerless
people’s living conditions. This vision largely explains the appeal
of  the populist slogans propagated by the major opposition party,
the Social Democratic Front (SDF): ‘Power To The People’, ‘Equal
Opportunity For All’, ‘Change’ and ‘Suffer Don Finish’, a Pidgin
English expression meaning ‘your suffering has come to an end’
(see Chapter 3).
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Given this situation, it was a painful experience for marginalised
youth that Cameroon’s path to democracy rapidly stalled, not only
because of  the regime’s capacity to manipulate and control the rate
at which democratic reforms were introduced, but also because
members of the opposition became preoccupied more with ‘the
politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1989) than with pursuing a political
agenda that would benefit the interests of  the masses (Takougang
2003b: 427). Young people soon lost confidence in party politics as
a solution for improving their existence and started searching for
other ways to advance their position in society. Bendskin and pousse-
pousse formed a viable alternative to party politics. These forms of
self-employment provided not only a feeling of self-esteem, but
also new means of resistance against the state. Bendskin drivers
and handcart operators have constantly displayed a remarkable
capacity for evading state control, and they have managed to
maintain a large degree of  autonomy. Bendskin drivers in particular
have been engaged in frequent collective actions to protect their
interests against local representatives of the state.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I argue
that one of the unexpected consequences of oppositional activities
during political liberalisation in the early 1990s was the emergence
of bendskin and the expansion of pousse-pousse in Douala and other
Cameroonian towns and cities. In the second section, I analyse some
of the socioeconomic characteristics of bendskin drivers and
pousseurs (handcart operators). I highlight that their occupational
activities tend both to divide and unite. They are inclined to organise
themselves in small groups based on ethnic and friendship bonds.
Each group has its own parking space at a strategic position in its
neighbourhood, and its members demonstrate a large degree of
solidarity, both during working hours and in their leisure time. In
the third section, I show that these groups appear capable of
overcoming group boundaries and mutual competition when
outsiders threaten their individual and common interests. Bendskin
drivers and pousseurs tend to ignore administrative and traffic
regulations, behaving as if they are ‘masters of the road’ - which is
strongly contested by other road users and, especially in the case of
bendskin drivers, by the police. To protest persistent police
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harassment and extortion, bendskin drivers have even taken control
of the cities by chasing the police from the streets and bringing
traffic to a standstill.
This study is based on intensive research in New Bell, one of
the largest and poorest immigrant quarters in Douala (Mainet 1985;
Schler 2003), in November and December 2003. Douala is the largest
city of Cameroon, and has grown rapidly since independence, from
155,000 inhabitants in 1960 to approximately 2 million in 2006.
Being the economic capital of Cameroon, it attracts between 60,000
and 100,000 migrants every year, the majority of whom are Bamileke
(Boupda 2000), members of the largest ethnic group in Cameroon,
living in the Francophone part of  the Grassfields. Searching for
gainful employment, they have been migrating to Douala on an ever-
growing scale since the early colonial period. Over the years, they
have become the majority population in most neighbourhoods of
the city, including New Bell, far outnumbering the autochthonous
Duala. That is why some people refer to Douala as a ‘Bamileke
City’ (Mainet 1985).
Since I carried out my research in Bamileke-dominated
neighbourhoods, it is not surprising altogether that the large majority
of  interviewed bendskin drivers and handcart operators were
Bamileke (around 80 per cent). Nevertheless, I was told that the
Bamileke also tend to dominate these occupations in most other
quarters of  the city. Several factors help explain Bamileke
dominance. First, the Bamileke are known, and often feared, for
their assumed dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit (Dongmo 1981;
Warnier 1993), being always on the look-out for new ways to
accumulate capital (Geschiere & Konings 1993). Second, they have
always shown a keen interest in the transport sector, looking upon
it as a major avenue to capital accumulation. According to Warnier
(1993: 19), they own 80 per cent of all taxis in Douala and 50 per
cent of  all buses and minibuses that run from Douala to other towns
in Cameroon. They are strongly represented in the maintenance and
repair of  vehicles. Bendskin and pousse-pousse appear to have further
increased Bamileke dominance in the transport sector.
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The emergence and growth of bendskin and pousse-
pousse in New Bell
An unintended effect of political liberalisation in the early 1990s
has been the emergence of bendskin and the rapid growth of pousse-
pousse in New Bell and other neighbourhoods of Douala. In 1991-
1992, the newly created opposition parties in Cameroon organised
the so-called villes mortes (ghost town) campaign (see Chapters 2
and 3), which was particularly successful in the opposition stronghold
of New Bell. Numerous violent confrontations between
demonstrators and the forces of law and order resulted in injuries
and deaths.
The villes mortes campaign aggravated the already critical transport
situation in Douala, since the usual means of transport – buses,
minibuses, lorries, taxis, and private cars – were prohibited from
operating on weekdays. According to a New Bell motorbike-taxi
driver, this state of affairs eventually led to bendskin:
During the villes mortes campaign, owners of motorbikes were
regularly requested by colleagues, relatives and friends to assist them
in reaching their destination. With growing demand they started
charging some money for this service. However, the idea of  turning
motorbikes into taxis and making a living out of it occurred to
young people only when it became more and more evident that
bendskin could help solve the grave mobility problems in the various
neighbourhoods of Douala.1
This narrative overlooks the fact that motorbike-taxis were
already in existence in some West African countries even before
the 1990s, when the process of political liberalisation started
(Godard 2002). The so-called zémidjans had by then already become
the major means of transport in the urban centres of Benin (Noukpo
2003). Even in Cameroon, motorbike-taxis were not totally
unknown in this period; they operated on a large scale in the less-
developed northern part of  the country. Evidently, these regional
examples of  the use of  motorbikes as taxis must have served as a
source of  inspiration to bendskin drivers.
238
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
Since its introduction during the early political liberalisation era,
bendskin has expanded rapidly in New Bell, and in Douala in general.
In 1997, the number of bendskins in Douala was estimated at
10,000 (Godard & Ngabmen 2002), but their number may now
have tripled.2  Bendskin provided young people with a sustainable
livelihood and a feeling of  self-esteem, and it formed an adequate
response to the deterioration of  the city’s road networks and
transport facilities.
Like many other African cities (Godard 2002), Douala in the
1990s saw the disappearance of public bus companies that had
been created by the post-colonial state for the purpose of meeting
urban transport requirements. Since its foundation in 1973, the state-
owned Société des Transports Urbains du Cameroun (SOTUC) had been
enjoying a monopoly position in bus transport in Douala.
Understandably, its area of  operation remained largely restricted to
paved streets; nevertheless, it used to provide a necessary service
to low-income groups, because it transported passengers at a cheap
rate, thanks to state subsidies. Its great potential, however, was
thwarted by gross mismanagement and the withdrawal of state
subsidies during structural adjustment, leading to enormous
financial losses. It was never able to recover fully from the villes
mortes campaign, in which opposition members threatened to set
fire to any bus found on the roads (Ngabmen 2002; Séraphin
2000:69-70), and it was liquidated in 1995. Conscious of the
consequences of its liquidation, the government decided in 1997
to hand over the running of  large buses in Douala to a private
initiative, in conformity with its policy of  economic liberalisation.
A newly founded Cameroonian company, the Société Camerounaise
du Transport Urbain (SOCATUR) eventually received monopoly in
providing bus services in Douala, and it began operating in 2001.
At present, it lacks enough buses to carry out its mission
satisfactorily.
With the disappearance of public buses, people in New Bell came
to depend primarily on taxis, but they remain dissatisfied with the
services these taxis offer. They claim that the number of  taxis is
insufficient to meet popular demand, particularly during rush hour.
Mobility at peak times has become a painful experience: one has to
wait for hours before finding a taxi, transportation costs have risen
239
Chapter 10: Solving transportation problems in Africa cities during neoliberal reforms
to more than double the official fare, and daily traffic jams are
worsened by poor roads. Travelling in the city is therefore extremely
time-consuming, and one’s time of  arrival at work or home is highly
unpredictable.
People in New Bell maintain that taxi drivers often refuse to go
to any neighbourhood that is not easily accessible or is far from the
city centre, and they often drop passengers somewhere along the
road. This is a principal reason for the appearance of nonregistered
taxis, the so-called clandos or opeps, in these neighbourhoods (Fodouop
1985). One of  my informants aptly described them as ‘mobile
coffins’, on the grounds that they tend not to be roadworthy, are
overloaded, and are driven by drivers who have no driver’s licence
and frequently cause accidents. According to him, they continue
operating because their owners are members of the forces of law
and order, or their drivers perform the ‘countri fashion’ at police
checkpoints - i.e., they pay bribes (gombo) to policemen.
New Bell residents are feeling more and more reluctant to use
taxis because of  an alarming increase in armed robbery by taxi
drivers themselves or their accomplices, particularly at night. They
are nevertheless often obliged to take the risk in the absence of any
other option. Despite the introduction of professional badges in
2000, problems regarding personal security still prevail in the taxi
business.
Given this situation, New Bell residents greatly appreciate the
emergence of bendskin in their neighbourhood, stressing that it
forms a welcome addition to the available means of  transport and
that it is well adapted to their local conditions. In sharp contrast to
taxi drivers, they make three points: bendskin drivers charge
‘reasonable’ prices, which are always negotiable, depending on the
distance and nature of the terrain; they take passengers into the
heart of the neighbourhood, dropping them right on their doorsteps;
and they can weave in and out of  traffic jams during rush hour,
saving time.
Compared to bendskin, pousse-pousse has a much longer history
in New Bell and other neighbourhoods of Douala. Boupda (2000:
145) mentions that handcarts for the transport of merchandise have
been used in the city since the early 1960s. The villes mortes campaign,
however, led to a rapid expansion of pousse-pousse. In 2000, the
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number of handcart operators in Douala was estimated at about
3,500, and each of them were capable of transporting 300 to 800
kilogrammes of merchandise (Boupda 2000: 144). Most of them
are at the service of  any customer, but some are under a more or
less regular contract with large-scale traders and entrepreneurs. Like
bendskins, handcarts are well adapted to local conditions in New
Bell, and their expansion has been welcomed by local residents as
much as the introduction of  bendskins.  Handcarts can operate in
areas that are inaccessible to motorised forms of  transport, and can
even move inside local markets. Above all, they are much cheaper
than motorised forms of  transport, such as taxis, minibuses and
lorries. Transport prices charged by handcart operators depend on
several factors, including the volume of goods, the distance, the
density of traffic, the period of the year (rainy or dry season), and
any existing relations between handcart operators and customers.
Operators are inclined to reduce prices for regular customers.
The burgeoning of bendskin and pousse-pousse has promoted local
entrepreneurial activities in New Bell and other quarters of  the city.
Several small and medium-sized enterprises have started selling
motorbikes and handcarts. The Douala port allows for large-scale
formal and informal imports of  (second-hand) motorbikes from
Nigeria, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Recently, a new
enterprise, Cocenicam, was set up to assemble motorbikes locally.
The development of  enterprises offering services to bendskin and
pousse-pousse have emerged - for example, those that provide general
repairs and others selling spare parts, petrol, and engine oil.
Bendskin drivers and pousseurs: Some socioeconomic
characteristics
Bendskin and pousse-pousse are characterised by hard working
conditions. They demand long hours of  work and, especially in the
case of pousse-pousse, a lot of physical effort. My respondents gave
three main reasons why these occupations nevertheless attract job-
seekers. First, they create rare avenues to gainful employment for
young people during the economic crisis and structural adjustment;
many of these operators had opted for one of these occupations
only after repeated failure to find an alternative job. Second, they
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offer a relatively secure and good income. Third, they do not require
a long and expensive apprenticeship. Anybody able to acquire a
pousse-pousse or a motorbike can start working immediately or after
a few days’ practice. Although bendskin drivers are obliged by traffic
rules to pass a driving test, few of  them actually follow these rules.
A major constraining factor to start working in the transport
sector is the availability of capital resources to buy or hire a vehicle,
particularly in the case of a motorbike, which demands a substantial
investment: a second-hand motorbike costs between FCFA 250,000
and FCFA 700,000. I was told that the first bendskin drivers were
recruited mostly among victims of  mass dismissals; they were
tempted to invest their redundancy pay in this new activity. They
were later joined by others who had failed to find employment in
the state bureaucracy or formal sector; some of  them could start
bendskin with the financial support of family members or, more
often, with their personal savings in formal and informal banking
systems, particularly in tontines, traditional rotating-credit associations
(Henry et al. 1991). Most young job-seekers, however, came to rely
on hiring motorbikes. It did not take long before big businessmen
discovered bendskin as a potential form of  capital accumulation.
They bought motorbikes in large numbers, sometimes even
hundreds, and employed young job-seekers as drivers. Most of  these
businessmen were Bamileke, who dominate the transport sector in
Douala. During my research, I found that 63 per cent of bendskin
drivers in New Bell were employed by such large entrepreneurs.
Employers offer bendskin drivers various forms of  contracts,
similar to those in the taxi business. A common form requires
bendskin drivers to hand over a substantial proportion of their daily
earnings to their employer, usually around FCFA 4,000, in return
for ownership of  the motorbike after two years. Bendskin drivers
who do not come under this type of contract are obliged to hand
over a smaller amount of  money, usually between FCFA 2,000 and
FCFA 3,000 a day.
Compared to bendskin, pousse-pousse requires less capital
investment. Middle-sized enterprises, specialising in the production
of  handcarts, sell these vehicles at a price of  FCFA 70,000 to 80,000;
however, local artisans in New Bell offer handcarts at a much lower
price, between FCFA 25,000 and FCFA 35,000. Young job-seekers
242
The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
without the needed capital resources can still hire a pousse-pousse at
FCFA 300 a day (FCFA 9,000 a month) from long-established
pousseurs, many of whom own several handcarts, or from other
entrepreneurs.
In November and December 2003, I carried out a survey among
more than one hundred bendskin drivers and 50 pousseurs to explore
some of  their socioeconomic characteristics. All were male, and
most were quite young: 81 per cent were between 15 and 35 years
old, 61 per cent were single, and 76 per cent had been in the
profession for less than 5 years. They tended to be relatively well
educated: 45 per cent had attended primary school, 43 per cent had
enjoyed some secondary school education, and 7 per cent had been
university students. Only 5 per cent were illiterate. All complained
that they had to work for long hours six or seven days a week under
difficult conditions. Older men in particular stated that they suffered
from regular backaches, rheumatism, and even hernia. Most
participants in the survey (79 per cent) were therefore inclined to
look upon their present occupation as a transitional phase to a future
form of  employment, one that they considered to be less demanding
and higher rewarding. A large number of  them (56 per cent) aspired
for another job in the transport sector; bendskin drivers aimed to
buy a taxi, and handcart operators aimed to own a bendskin. The
bendskin drivers’ aspirations appear to have been based upon their
income levels, which enabled them to make higher savings in the
local tontines. Compared with handcart operators, who earned
between FCFA 30,000 and FCFA 75,000 a month, bendskin drivers
earned between FCFA 40,000 and FCFA 100,000 a month.
Variations in income within both occupations largely depended on
experience and ownership of  vehicles. The monthly income of  both
income groups tended to be well above the guaranteed minimum
wage in the formal sector, which was about FCFA 25,000 (Konings
1993a).
A certain measure of individual competition occurs, but most
bendskin drivers and handcart operators appear to be organised in
small groups. Each group constitutes a spatial and social
‘neighbourhood’ within the neighbourhood of New Bell. Members
of such groups park their vehicles at certain strategic places in New
Bell, such as traffic intersections and markets. They look upon parking
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places as spaces reserved for members only, and are inclined to
protect them against intruders or competitors. Each group is
expected to respect its zone of operation, and competition in this
zone is not tolerated. Members form a tight social community,
displaying a large measure of solidarity during and outside work
time. Most of them belong not only to the same ethnic group
(Bamileke), but also often to the same family, village or subregion.
The group does not altogether exclude members of other groups,
but non-Bamileke are usually close friends, such as ex-schoolmates
or ex-colleagues. Its members tend to spend their leisure time
together and frequent the same bars. They often participate in the
same tontines, which serve not only as savings clubs but also as social
gatherings, where they enjoy each other’s company, settle conflicts
(Henry et al. 1991), and receive moral and financial support in times
of sickness, disability or death.
Such groups tend to create boundaries among bendskin drivers
and handcart operators; nevertheless, they appear to be able to
transcend these boundaries and rally round when they see outsiders
threaten their colleagues or a common interest. By their sheer
numbers and their ability to mobilise rapidly, using their motorbikes
to warn their colleagues, bendskin drivers in particular form a
formidable power in the neighbourhood and the city as a whole.
Benskin drivers and pousseurs: Masters of the road
New Bell residents tend to display an ambivalent attitude towards
bendskin drivers and handcart operators. On the one hand, they
highly appreciate their transport services; on the other hand, they
point a finger at their generally irresponsible behaviour on the road.
Many bendskin drivers and handcart operators do not know the
most elementary traffic rules, or simply flout them. I regularly heard
people in New Bell saying ‘Bendskin drivers and pousseurs behave
as if they are masters of the road’. Some bendskin drivers and
pousseurs are convinced that they have the right of way anywhere
on the road because they perform essential public services. Handcart
operators ignore pedestrians and moving cars, forcing them to
manoeuver carefully so as to avoid being hit. Young bendskin drivers
are renowned for driving recklessly: they tend to drive at high speed,
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ignore red traffic lights, overtake on the left and the right, stop
without warning and do U turns, exposing themselves and their
passengers to untold dangers. As a result of  their recklessness,
bendskin drivers cause numerous accidents. The Laquintenie
Hospital in Douala has even given the name bendskin to a ward that
it largely reserves for victims of  bendskin road accidents. Despite
the dangers involved in bendskin driving, New Bell residents insist
that they have no other choice than to continue making use of it.
For them, bendskin driving has become a necessary evil (un mal
nécessaire).
Bendskin drivers and pousseurs are characterised not only by their
total disregard of  traffic rules, but also by their attitude to any other
road user who may cross their path or may dare to confront them,
even not hesitating to attack them physically. I once witnessed how
a bendskin driver almost collided with a smartly dressed young man
who was about to cross the road; though being shabbily dressed
himself, he shouted Dégagez, fils de pauvre (Get off the road, you son
of  a beggar).
Bendskin drivers and pousseurs are often at war with taxi drivers.
Although taxi drivers themselves also tend to disregard traffic rules,
they regularly complain that bendskin drivers and handcart operators
‘behave as if the road belongs to them’ and show an ‘almost blind
solidarity’ when one of them is reproached for his ‘misuse of power’
on the road. One of them explained:
We submit ourselves already too often to their laws, and this is
becoming more and more annoying. At the least altercation with
one of them, they come and encircle you like bees and attempt to
lynch you.3
Animosities between taxi drivers and bendskin drivers have
precluded any form of  coalition against their common enemies,
namely the state and the police. In recent years, bendskin drivers
have benefited from general strikes by taxi drivers in Douala. In
March 2004 taxi drivers went on strike against regular police
harassment and extortion, and in January 2005 they demonstrated
against the government’s excessive rise in petrol prices.4 On both
occasions, bendskin drivers took advantage of these strikes to triple
or even quadruple their fares.
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Bendskin drivers and handcart operators maintain similar relations
to other users of the road, but their relations to the police are
different: handcart operators are largely exempted from police
controls because their activities are not regulated by the state;
bendskin drivers have become subject to frequent police harassment
and extortion following government promulgation of a series of
administrative and fiscal rules concerning their occupation in 1994
(Ngabmen 1997: 261-265). Some of the most important regulations
are the following: bendskins should be painted in yellow and be
provided with a number plate; both bendskin drivers and passengers
should wear helmets; every bendskin driver should possess certain
documents, such as a tax certificate, showing that the annual tax of
FCFA 12,000 had been paid, a road-tax sticker (vignette), vehicle
insurance, and a driving licence for motorbikes. Most bendskin
drivers ignore these regulations, all the more so because the police
are usually not inclined to enforce them strictly, being more
interested in extorting money from drivers. ‘Why should you bother
to obtain these documents’, a bendskin driver wondered, ‘for even
if you have all of them, the police still request a beer’.
The relations between bendskin drivers and the police and other
state agents are extremely hostile, and the deepest roots of this
hostility appear to be a fierce contest for power and control over
the road. The police attribute the confrontations between both
parties to bendskin drivers’ persistent refusal to submit to
government regulations concerning their activities and traffic rules,
and their lack of  respect for police officers. Bendskin drivers, in
turn, claim that most confrontations are caused by their refusal to
yield to cash demands of  the corrupt police known as mange mille
(thousand-eater) because their extortions from drivers typically
amount to FCFA 1,000.  They stress that the police are quick to
pick a quarrel with road users, notably those who assert their rights,
and too quickly resort to the use of force. They are therefore inclined
to engage in collective action as soon as they see that the police are
violating the rights of one or more of them. Many examples of
such actions can be found in New Bell and other quarters of the
city. I will relate here just a few that have attracted a lot of  attention
in the media.5
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In early 2001, a heated confrontation between a policeman and
a group of  bendskin drivers occurred in the quarter of  Madagascar.
The group had come to the rescue a colleague who was being
harassed by a policeman. Feeling threatened, the policeman drew
his pistol, and at the moment that he wanted to fire, he was pushed
from behind by a group member. During his fall, he accidentally
shot and killed himself.
In November of the same year, bendskin drivers occupied the
most important traffic intersections in Douala, bringing all traffic
to a standstill. They blew their horns continuously and carried
placards protesting the corruption of  municipal agents charged with
collecting taxes from bendskin drivers. According to the
demonstrators, these agents were behaving like policemen and
gendarmes, demanding not only their tax certificates, but also other
documents, such as proof of vehicle insurance and a driving license.
If they could not produce these documents, the agents threatened
to seize their motorbikes unless they paid a bribe of  between FCFA
2,000 and FCFA 5,000. The protesters were later received by the
senior divisional officer, Laurent Mindja, who ordered the municipal
agents to restrict themselves to collecting taxes.
In March 2002, a police vehicle hit a group of bendskin drivers
standing at their parking place on the road near Tunnel Ndoketi,
killing one of them. In reaction, the group immediately set fire to
the vehicle and wanted to lynch the two policemen in it. The latter
narrowly escaped by firing several shots into the air.
On several occasions, bendskin drivers have protested against
police harassment and extortion by erecting barricades on the Wouri
Bridge, which forms the only connection between the two parts of
Douala. During a demonstration in the city on 23 February 2003,
they used sticks to chase the police away. Only a few months later,
a renewed incident between the police and a bendskin driver in
New Bell gave rise to a violent rebellion in the city.6
In the early morning of 9 July 2003, a police control post tried to
stop a bendskin driver at Nkolouloun, a Bamileke-dominated
neighbourhood in New Bell. Suspecting he would have to pay a
bribe, the bendskin driver attempted to escape. Infuriated by his
conduct, one of the policemen hit him on the head with a plank of
wood. He fell and died soon afterward. News of his death spread
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like wildfire across the city, and bendskin drivers immediately
stopped work and started mobilising for action. Being frequent
victims of police harassment, they were unwilling to tolerate the
murder of  one of  their colleagues.
Some of their representatives went to see the governor of the
Littoral Province, Gounoko Haounaye, to demand harsh sanctions
against the policemen responsible for their colleague’s death.
Probably underestimating the gravity of the situation, the governor
refused to meet and negotiate with them. This response raised the
bendskin drivers’ tempers. They began to erect barricades at the
main road junctions in the city and on the Wouri Bridge and to burn
tyres in the streets, bringing the transportation of goods or passengers
to a standstill. They then drove in a long procession to the police
commissariat at Nkolouloun, where the policeman who had caused
the incident was posted.
On their arrival, they started attacking the police with sticks,
machetes, and stones, and eventually forced them to retreat into
the building. They then began to throw Molotov cocktails in an
attempt to set fire to the building and the police vehicles parked
nearby. In response, the police started shooting at them to keep
them at a distance. A large crowd of New Bell residents watched
the scene, applauding the bendskin drivers. Some young people,
especially the unemployed and criminals, soon joined the protests,
seeing the riot as an outlet to vent their frustrations at the economic
crisis and their own harassment by the police. Together with the
bendskin drivers, they went in search of policemen in the streets of
New Bell and other quarters of  the city, chanting ‘Policemen,
murderers, where are you? Come with your rifles and we shall
welcome you with our stones’. Fearing reprisals from bendskin
drivers after the incident, the police had already disappeared from
the streets; most of them had taken refuge in police stations or in
their own homes.
In the afternoon, after many injuries and several deaths, the
atmosphere became tenser. It was then that the governor arrived on
the scene. To protect the Nkolouloun police commissariat from
further attack, he called upon the demonstrators to walk with him
to a junction called Shell-New Bell. He promised that he would
address their grievances there. On his arrival, he requested an end
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to all violent actions, stressing that the administration was already
investigating the matter. He assured the bendskin drivers that the
policemen responsible for the event were to be arrested and tried in
accordance with the law. He subsequently moved to the Wouri
Bridge, where he appealed to the demonstrators to remove the
barricades and allow vehicles to pass.
The governor’s intervention did reduce tensions, but it did not
bring an end to the riots. Armed with machetes, sticks, and stones,
groups of bendskin drivers and other young people continued to
block traffic at the city’s most important intersections. They set fire
to kiosks along the streets and wooden police posts placed at the
road junctions, and started looting shops and stalls in the market
places.
By the end of  the day, five people had been killed by police
bullets, and many others, including policemen, had been wounded.
The material damage was heavy: the police commissariat at
Nkolouloun was partly destroyed, numerous police vehicles were
burnt out, and those involved in the transport of goods and
passengers had suffered huge losses.
A fragile calm was restored in New Bell and the other quarters
of  Douala the next day. Although the revolt had generated fear in
administrative and police circles, no serious attempt was made to
resolve the problem. As a result, drivers continued to disregard the
law and the police. The senior divisional officer claimed that no
negotiations between state and bendskin drivers could take place
as long as it was unclear who the true representatives or leaders of
the bendskin drivers were. He urged administrators in Douala to
help organise bendskin drivers into trade unions, which could serve
as intermediaries between the state and the bendskin drivers.
Only two municipal administrators took up the matter, namely
the Deputy Mayor of  Douala V, Françoise Foning, and the Mayor
of  Douala II, Abraham Tchato. Both are Bamileke, and each, in
addition to other entrepreneurial activities, owned a fleet of
bendskins. They held a series of  meetings with bendskin
representatives in their municipalities. During the meeting held on
16 June 2003, they signed a ‘partnership convention’ with a newly
created organisation of bendskin drivers, the Groupement des
Associations et Syndicats de Motos-Taxis (Grasmota), led by Fongang
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Sanchang. According to the terms of  the convention, the municipal
councils were to take on the responsibility of training bendskin
drivers at professional driving schools. The bendskin drivers, for
their part, agreed to henceforth seek to resolve their problems with
the police and government officials through peaceful negotiation,
and to register their organisation with the local administration.
This new organisation seems not to have had a major impact on
bendskin drivers’ behaviour. They remain inclined to mistrust the
formation of  trade unions, which they largely view as vehicles of
state control (Konings 2003b). They therefore continue to rely on
informal modes of  organisation at any moment when they feel that
their common interests are being threatened by outsiders, especially
government officials and policemen.
On 15 January 2004, the local administration made a renewed
attempt to control bendskin drivers. On that day, the Douala II
subdivisional officer, Boniface Bayaola, signed a strongly worded
order, stipulating that bendskin drivers had until 20 January 2004
to register their vehicles at his office, to paint them yellow, and to
purchase helmets for themselves and their passengers. Refusal to
comply would be sanctioned severely. Again, bendskin drivers
ignored the order, threatening that they would confront anyone who
would ‘dare to place obstacles on our paths’.7
Conclusion
Surprisingly little interest has been paid in African studies to the
transportation problems facing inhabitants of African cities and the
agencies and actors involved in urban transportation (Godard 2002).
Clearly, bendskin and pousse-pousse were never devised in the offices
of  the Cameroonian Ministry of  Transport, or by international
development agencies. Instead, they were young men’s responses
to deteriorating transport facilities in enclaved and marginalised
neighbourhoods. They  have  proved advantageous, not only to
neighbourhood residents, but also to bendskin drivers and handcart
operators, providing a sustainable livelihood and a feeling of self-
esteem that the ruling political elite tends to deny them. Having
become a popular mode of transport in Douala, bendskin has rapidly
spread from Douala to other cities and towns in Cameroon.
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Bendskin drivers and handcart operators have displayed a
remarkable capacity for organising informally at several levels and
protecting their own interests. They usually organise in small groups
based on ethnic and friendship bonds, which protect the interests
of  each group against others. While mutual competition between
these groups tends to divide bendskin drivers and handcart operators,
they quickly group together as soon as their common interests are
threatened by outsiders. Bendskin drivers in particular have been
engaged in a series of collective actions to contest police harassment
and extortion, using revolt as a last resort in an attempt to assert
control over the road and even the city.
Although bendskin and pousse-pousse have in many respects been
advantageous to young people and other residents of  Douala’s
neighbourhoods, the picture is imperfect. Citizens and administrators
increasingly complain about the aggressiveness and recklessness
of bendskin drivers and handcart operators on the road, causing
many accidents. They tend to condemn their habit of  solving
problems through violence, rather than peaceful negotiation. There
is substantial evidence that bendskin drivers, just like taxi drivers,
have become involved in armed robbery of  their passengers.
Bendskin drivers have fiercely resisted the government controlling
efforts, which have failed dismally.
Worried about the increasingly negative image of  their occupation
among the public, some older and generally respected bendskin
drivers in Douala and elsewhere have begun to create formal
organisations, mostly in the form of  associations or trade unions,
which they claim to be independent of the state. These organisations
appear to have a double responsibility: on the one hand, the
promotion of discipline and professional conduct among their
members; and on the other hand, the representation and defence of
their members’ interests versus the state through rational discussion.
It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will be more
successful than earlier ones.
251
Chapter 10: Solving transportation problems in Africa cities during neoliberal reforms
Notes
  1. Interview with a bendskin driver in New Bell on 23 November 2003.
  2. Mutations, 26 January 2005.
  3. Interview with a taxi driver at New Bell on 27 November 2003.
  4. Le Messager,World Edition, 22 March 2004; and 1 February 2005.
  5. Le Messager, 8 October 2003, pp. 1-2.
  6. Le Messager, 15 July 2003, pp. 1-11; and The Herald, pp. 1-3.
  7. The Herald, 22 January 2004, pp. 1-2.

253
11
Trade unionism in Cameroon and neoliberal
globalisation: From crisis to revitalisation?
Introduction
Trade unions across Africa are facing similar challenges in the current
period of neoliberal globalisation but their responses to the far-
reaching economic and political reforms have varied (cf. Thomas
1995; Kester & Sidibé 1997; Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings
2006b). Some have shown a remarkable capacity to adjust to the
dramatic effects of  neoliberal reforms and even to revitalise their
organisations. They have taken a number of  innovative steps to
tackle their organisational problems in the rapidly changing
economic and political environment in order to remain meaningful
to their memberships. Others, however, are in deep crisis.
Cameroonian trade unions, as I intend to demonstrate in this chapter,
clearly belong to this latter category. I shall first describe some of
the major problems and then assess the future prospects of trade
unions in Cameroon.
Cameroonian trade unionism in deep crisis
Compared to a number of other African countries, there is a striking
absence of any detailed research on trade unionism in Cameroon.
However, existing studies agree that the long-standing crisis in the
Cameroonian trade-union movement has deepened during the
current economic and political liberalisation processes (Eboussi
Boulaga 1997; Abega 1999; Konings 2006b, 2009a). Cameroonian
trade unions appear to have failed dismally to cope with the new
situation let alone achieve a much-needed revitalisation. The
movement faces a multitude of problems and I restrict myself here
to presenting the gravest.
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Lack of autonomy
One of  the trade-union movement’s major problems is continuing
state intervention in trade-union affairs. Following independence
and reunification in 1961, the Cameroonian post-colonial state
succeeded in 1972 in merging the existing central labour
organisations in Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon into a
single body and subordinating it to the state for the sake of national
reconstruction and unity. The new, state-controlled trade-union
movement was first called the Union Nationale des Travailleurs du
Cameroun (UNTC) and later, in 1985, the Organisation Syndicale des
Travailleurs du Cameroun (OSTC) (Kendrick 1979; Konings 1993a;
Tsafack-Nanfosso 1999). Considering the fusion between state and
organised labour, it is not surprising that the OSTC leadership
refused to adhere to the growing calls in civil society by the end of
the 1980s for political liberalisation and the introduction of a multi-
party system. In May 1990, like other loyalists of  the ruling
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), the then OSTC
president, D. Fouda Sima, expressed ‘his total rejection of  what the
head of state has called political models imported from abroad’
(Konings 2000: 179). Together with other OSTC leaders, he
subsequently participated in anti-democracy marches organised by
the regime.
Following the introduction of  a multi-party system and a limited
degree of political liberalisation in December 1990, a large number
of the rank and file and even some local and regional leaders
demonstrated their growing disenchantment with the OSTC’s
continuing alliance with the ruling CPDM party and its blatant
neglect of the defence of workers’ interests during the economic
crisis by supporting the newly created opposition parties. Under
mounting pressure, the OSTC leadership finally recognised the right
of its members to join the political party of their choice on 2 April
1991. Eventually, the new Labour Code of  1992 guaranteed a large
measure of trade union autonomy to the state and abolished the
existing practice of trade-union monolithism, allowing a group of
at least twenty workers to form a union outside the OSTC (Republic
of Cameroon 1992).
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Unfortunately, although officially commending trade-union
autonomy, the Cameroonian government continued to devise a
number of strategies to keep the unions under control. First, the
1992 Labour Code clearly stated that a newly formed trade union
should be registered. This enabled the state to deny legal existence
to any trade union suspected of supporting the opposition. Second,
the government continued to intervene in the existing unions and
to harass any members and leaders engaged in ‘oppositional’ actions.
This was already manifest during the OSTC’s 1992 congress. To
mark a new beginning, the central labour organisation changed its
name again to Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs du Cameroun
(CSTC) and held new elections. In its efforts to achieve state control
over the new trade-union centre, the government succeeded in
buying the support of a number of delegates to elect Etame Ndedi,
the trade-union representative in the CPDM central committee, as
its president. However, it failed to forestall the election of some
leaders who championed trade-union autonomy, including the new
secretary-general Louis Sombès.
Government intervention in the CSTC became even more overt
in late 1993 when it engineered, with the aid of the union president
Etame Ndedi, the ousting of Louis Sombés from his post as
secretary-general for having called a general strike among civil
servants in protest at severe cuts in their remuneration, amounting
to some 70 per cent. Not even protests from the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) could dissuade the government and the union
president from unilaterally installing Jules Mousseni, a CPDM loyalist
and second vice-secretary-general of  the CSTC, as the union’s new
secretary-general. This led the ILO to rebuff Etame Ndedi and the
government at its June 1994 Annual Convention in Geneva by
refusing to accredit Mousseni. Given the stalemate Sombès’s
dismissal had caused in the union and during the Geneva debacle,
the first vice-president of the CSTC convened a meeting of the
union’s executive in July 1994 that decided to reinstate Sombès
and sack Etame Ndedi instead. A few months later, in September
1994, security forces raided the union’s headquarters in Yaoundé
and forcibly removed Sombès from office and threw him in jail
(Fondation Friedrich-Ebert 1994: 78; Eboussi Boulaga 1997: 347-
48). It was only after renewed protest actions by the ILO, the
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International Confederation of  Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and
other international organisations that Sombès was freed and
eventually re-elected.
After this painful defeat, the regime decided to sponsor a rival
trade-union centre, the Union des Syndicats Libres du Cameroun (USLC).
According to the Minister of  Territorial Administration, this state-
controlled union ‘would help counteract the activities of the leaders
of  the CSTC who, in the majority, are members of  the radical
opposition’.1 One of the prominent leaders of the new union was
Salomé Ntsogo, a well-known relative and confidant of  Chantal
Biya, the wife of  Cameroon’s head of  state. The emergence of  power
conflicts within the CSTC since 1997 has opened up new avenues
for the government to meddle once again in trade-union affairs in
an effort to exploit the situation to its advantage.
One promising development, however, was the emergence of
several autonomous trade unions in the civil service, especially in
the educational sector, during the early days of political liberalisation.
Their emergence was all the more significant because civil servants
are prohibited by law from forming trade unions, and the Biya
government has simply ignored repeated ILO demands that civil
servants be given the right to unionise in conformity with
Convention 87 signed by Cameroon. Their leaders, who soon became
victims of severe state repression, strongly condemned the inactivity
of state-controlled trade unionism and pledged to contribute to the
introduction of  militant trade unionism in the country and to serve
as a countervailing power to the ruling regime (Konings 2004c,
2005a). The first union in the educational sector, the Syndicat
National des Enseignants du Supérieur (SYNES), was formed by
university lecturers on 1 June 1991, and its foundation inspired the
creation of several autonomous trade unions in primary and
secondary education. These unions quickly transformed the
educational sector into a battlefield between the government and
teachers, calling for educational reforms and an improvement in
their living and working conditions, which had seriously deteriorated
during the economic crisis and structural adjustment. Due to
apparent government insensitivity to their plight, they have
undertaken a variety of militant actions that have tended to paralyse
the educational system, including demonstrations, the regular
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boycotting of  examinations, and intermittent strikes. Eventually,
in 1997, they forced the government to start negotiations with
organisations it considered ‘illegal’. As the results of these
negotiations proved unsatisfactory to the unions, their leadership
decided to continue the struggle.
Divisions within and between the unions
From 1997 onwards, the CSTC executive was split into two
factions, both claiming leadership. Their struggle for power appears
to have been primarily motivated by personal ambitions and material
interests rather than by pronounced differences in union policy and
strategy. Leadership positions in the central labour organisation
offered the incumbents high salaries as well as opportunities to
divert the substantial union dues to personal ends, to cement gainful
patron-clients relations with the state authorities, and to travel
abroad regularly at the invitation of international labour
organisations. The leadership struggle almost completely paralysed
trade-union activities in defence of  its members’ interests. Instead,
it gave rise to numerous court cases, the organisation of several
unity conferences held under the auspices of the ILO and
international labour organisations, and renewed government
interference in the CSTC. The then Minister of Labour, Pius
Ondoua, has persistently refused to recognise the leadership of the
faction that turned out to be the victor in the struggle and was
being backed by the ILO and the ICFTU, openly supporting the
other faction that appeared to be closer to the government and its
policies, and to meet and negotiate with the central labour
organisation.2
The leadership wrangling was not resolved until 2002 when the
government-aligned faction of Maximilien Ntone Diboté seized
power with the support of the Minister of Labour and was
subsequently recognised by the government. The defeated faction
led by Benoît Essiga then broke away from the CSTC and launched
another central labour organisation, the Confédération Générale des
Travailleurs-Liberté (CGTL). Essiga claimed that his union would be
truly independent of  the state and strongly defend its members’
interests. He was arrested twice in 2003 on charges that, in his
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capacity of president of the railway union, he was responsible for
his members’ attempts to sabotage the railway and murder the
railway corporation’s general manager. He was eventually released
after several protest actions by the ILO and the ICFTU.
After the start of the new millennium, the trade-union movement
became even further fragmented when three other central labour
organisations were formed, namely the Union Générale des Travailleurs
du Cameroun (UGTC), the Confédération des Syndicats Indépendants du
Cameroun (CSIC), and the Centrale Syndicale du Secteur Public (CSP).
Their leaders tend to display characteristics similar to those of the
older central labour organisations: opportunism and fierce
competition for power. Several of  them were deciding to form unions
of their own when their chances for gaining or maintaining power
within the mother union seemed to dwindle, and they later became
involved in regular struggles for power within their newly created
unions. They quickly discovered that open or secret alignment with
the government was most likely to advance both their careers and
capital accumulation. No wonder then that they have frequently
been accused of being bought over by the government in an attempt
to refrain the rank and file from mobilising and demanding an
improvement in their precarious living and working conditions. The
increasing fragmentation of trade unionism in Cameroon tends to
thwart any united action. Generally speaking, the various central
labour organisations are inclined to fight each other rather than form
a common front against employers and the state.
Table 11.1  Central Labour Organisations in Cameroon
Name  % of trade  
 union membership 
_________________________________________________________
 
Confédération des Syndicats  
Autonomes du Cameroun (CSAC) 38 
 
Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs  
du Cameroun (CSTC) 17 
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Source: Compiled from various files at the Ministry of Labour and
Social Security in Yaoundé.
A recent split in the CSTC would appear to be significant for the
future of trade unionism in Cameroon. This split occurred in the
aftermath of  the CSTC’s third elective congress held in Yaoundé
from 9-10 November 2005 when the incumbent president,
Maximilien Ntone Diboté, was re-elected. On the first day of the
congress, two of its most outstanding leaders, Louis Sombès and
Cornelius Vewessee who are renowned in Cameroon for their
constant championing of autonomous and militant trade unionism
(Konings 2006b), severely criticised Ntone Diboté for his refusal
to debate the causes of the crisis in trade unionism in Cameroon in
general and in the CSTC in particular. They alleged that he had
been bribed by the government on several occasions and claimed
that the CSTC was not living up to members’ expectations.3 The
outspoken Anglophone trade union leader, Cornelius Vewessee,
even had to be forcibly removed from the congress by the forces of
law and order. On 16 December 2005, Vewessee (president) and
 
Union des Syndicats Libres  
du Cameroun (USLC) 15 
 
Confédération Générale des Travailleurs-Liberté  
(CGTL)  11 
 
Centrale Syndicale du Secteur Public (CSP)  10 
 
Union Générale des Travailleurs  
du Cameroun (UGTC) 7.5 
 
Confédération des Syndicats Indépendants  
du Cameroun (CSIC) 1.5 
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Sombès (secretary-general) created a new central labour organisation,
the Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes du Cameroun (CSAC),
comprising about 65 per cent of  the CSTC membership. In the
aftermath of  its first congress in early April 2006, Sombès declared
that the new central labour organisation planned to introduce the
country to ‘an autonomous and action-oriented trade unionism so
that things will change’.4
Decline in trade-union membership
Like elsewhere in Africa, trade unions in Cameroon tend to be small
because of the low level of wage employment that traditionally
constitutes their recruitment base. Wage labour comprises about
15-20 per cent of  the country’s workforce, which was estimated to
be 6.2 million in 2001 (International Labour Organisation 2004).
There is a total absence of statistical data on trade-union density in
the country but during earlier research undertaken in the mid-1980s
I concluded that it was quite high. Union membership was around
50 per cent of the labour force during the greater part of the one-
party state (Konings 1993a), with several factors accounting for
this high level. First, there was considerable pressure put on workers
by the state and the union leadership to be both party and union
members. And second, there was the social pact concluded by the
state and its junior partner – the trade-union movement – during
this period of relative economic prosperity that led to a measure of
job security, regular salary increases and a variety of  social benefits
that appealed to the workers.
Membership numbers seem to have fallen dramatically during
the current period of  economic and political liberalisation. Trade-
union membership is now estimated by government and union
officials to be about 25-30 per cent of  the labour force (see Table
11.1). It is evident that public and private-sector retrenchments
during structural adjustment have led to heavy losses. Many workers
are now being forced to seek alternative survival strategies in the
informal sector but no attempts have ever been made by the various
central labour organisations to organise workers in this sector.
Another major factor contributing to the substantial decline in trade-
union membership is the widespread loss of confidence of the rank
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and file in its leadership during political liberalisation for the reasons
explained above, which led members to resign from the unions. The
drastic decline in trade-union membership has had far-reaching
consequences for trade unionism in the country. It has depleted
trade-union treasuries, which has created serious obstacles to
recruiting sufficient staff. This has made the unions highly dependent
on international trade-union organisations for activities such as legal
aid to challenge the dismissal of union activists in court and financial
support and expertise for holding trade-union seminars. Moreover,
it has further diminished the unions’ political power and collective
bargaining strength.
Weakened collective bargaining strength of  the unions
The 1992 Labour Code provides for collective bargaining between
workers and management locally, as well as between labour
federations and business associations in each sector of  the economy.
The problem is that trade unions’ collective bargaining strength has
been substantially reduced at both levels during the current economic
crisis and economic liberalisation. There are several reasons for this
unfortunate situation which dashes workers’ hopes of an
improvement in their deteriorating living and working conditions
and creates potential social unrest.
First, there is the serious unemployment rate. Recent surveys
have revealed that no less than 39 per cent of the labour force is
either unemployed or underemployed (International Labour
Organisation 2004). Such a large labour reserve puts pressure on
the labour market and wage levels. Second, there is the neoliberal
demand for a deregulation of labour laws, which aims at creating a
certain flexibility in the labour market. While the 1974 Labour Code
introduced during the one-party state was generally seen as labour-
friendly, the 1992 Labour Code enhanced the management’s position
when it came to hiring, firing and remunerating workers. Rules
governing employment security and minimum wages (Kendrick
1979; Konings 1993a; Sindjoun 1999) for instance, were
deregulated, withdrawing the protective safeguards and rights
achieved by the trade-union movement in the pre-adjustment era.
Employers increasingly resorted to casualisation, outsourcing and
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temporary employment contracts, which enabled them to cut labour
costs and increase their control over the labour force. Moreover,
the new Labour Code abolished the Joint National Commission for
Collective Agreements and Wages composed of  government
representatives, employers and unions, which used to set the national
minimum wage for each of the twelve established categories of
workers in the public and parastatal sectors. As a result of  these
changes, working and living conditions of Cameroonians have
become increasingly precarious. Third, collective bargaining has
actually become more decentralised, since sectoral collective
bargaining has been regularly postponed. Local unions are mostly
ill-prepared for this development, lacking the power, competence
and financial-economic information to bargain effectively with
employers. Some employers are even blatantly violating workers’
rights by delaying the implementation of  collective agreements. This
is especially the case with clauses related to wages, benefits, and
the health and safety of  workers. Even though the right to strike is
recognised in the 1992 Labour Code, the process of embarking on
a legal strike is long, frustrating and tedious.
Since the start of  the structural adjustment programme in 1987,
there has been a remarkable absence of  any form of  regular dialogue
between the government, employers and trade unions. The channels
for dialogue provided in the 1992 Labour Code, such as the National
Consultative Commission on Labour and the National Commission
for Health and Security at Work, are not functioning. And, last but
not least, the unions have never been invited by the government to
participate in the framing and implementation of  structural
adjustment measures.
Prospects for trade-union revitalisation
This chapter has shown that the trade-union movement in
Cameroon has largely failed to meet the challenges of neoliberal
globalisation, leading to widespread disillusion among the rank and
file who consider trade-union revitalisation a necessary precondition
for an improvement in their deteriorating living and working
conditions. Neoliberal economic and political reforms appear to
have weakened rather than strengthened the political power and
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bargaining strength of organised labour after many years of
subordination to the state. Given this situation, trade-union leaders
should, as a matter of  urgency, come to an agreement on the root
causes of the current crisis in trade unionism in the country and
then devise a series of innovative strategies to address them
effectively. Similar initiatives have been taken by trade unions
elsewhere in Africa (Kester & Sidibé 1997; Beckman & Sachikonye
2001; Konings 2006b), and union leaders in Cameroon could
fruitfully explore which of  these innovative strategies could be
applied in the specific Cameroonian context that is marked by
different institutional and organisational legacies. This study has
also identified a number of steps that Cameroonian union leaders
need to take to revitalise trade unionism, and shown that a
promising start has been made in implementing some of them.
A first step is to cut the existing links with the authoritarian,
neopatrimonial state that has given rise to a widespread loss of
confidence in the union leadership among the rank and file. The
emergence of autonomous and militant trade unionism, first in the
Cameroonian teachers’ unions and recently in a large part of the
central labour organisation, provides grounds for optimism that the
Cameroonian labour movement will eventually succeed in loosening
the controls of the corporatist state machine and become more
meaningful to its members.
A second step is to organise the unorganised. To make up for its
shrinking membership, the unions need to start recruiting outside
their traditional areas, especially among workers in the informal
sector, the increasing numbers of casual, temporary and contract
workers, and the young male and female workers in the formal sector.
Such a recruitment drive would help refill the union treasuries and
finance a variety of trade-union activities as well as strengthen the
unions’ bargaining power.
A third step is to cement alliances with other civil-society
organisations and social movements in pursuit of common
objectives which go beyond the protection of the vested interests
of  union membership and include political struggles for a more
democratic and just society, the advancement of  civil, human and
labour rights, and the achievement of a durable and environmentally
sound economic policy. Political struggles must also aim to include
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civil-society organisations, like the trade-union movement, in the
framing of  socio-economic policies. The achievement of  this goal
should stimulate these organisations to develop and defend an
alternative growth path that is less harmful to the interests of  workers
and other subaltern groups than the current neoliberal policies.
A fourth step is to strengthen existing contacts with international
organisations. The reassertion of  labour rights has in recent years
received fresh support at the international level. The international
labour movement has been reactivated since the end of the Cold
War and has intensified its activities globally. The Cameroonian
labour movement has already greatly benefited from the assistance
of international labour organisations in the field of capacity-building
and protection against government violations of  trade-union rights.
It is now widely acknowledged that the challenge of global capital
can only be met by international solidarity and that the forging of
strategic links between organised labour in different countries is
imperative in the era of neoliberal globalisation.
Notes
  1. Quoted in The Diasporan, 14 April 1995.
  2. Le Messager, 1 October 2001.
  3. The Herald, 21-22 November 2005.
  4. Le Messager, 4 April 2006.
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Structural adjustment and trade union
identity in Africa: The case of Cameroonian
plantation workers
Introduction
It is now widely recognised that wage workers were among the most
seriously affected by the economic crises and Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990s in Africa. SAPs conventionally
prescribed devaluation, major cuts in public expenditure,
privatisation, rehabilitation or elimination of most parastatals, as
well as liberalisation. As a result, wage workers were faced with
managerial efforts to intensify supervision and increase labour
productivity, retrenchments, curtailments in pay, suspension of
benefits compounded by soaring consumer prices and user charges
for public services.
The World Bank attempted to justify these anti-labour measures
not only in economic but also in political terms (Bangura & Beckman
1993; Adesina 1994; Gibbon 1995). They argued that the historical
influence of African trade unions has led to excessive levels of
wage employment, inflated wages and a pro-urban, pro-worker
allocation of  public funds. It is interesting to observe that this view
approximates earlier populist positions regarding ‘labour aristocracy’,
‘urban bias’ and ‘urban coalition’, all of which portrayed workers
as a privileged minority, pursuing narrow self-interests at the expense
of the urban poor and peasantry in coalition with the urban elite
(Waterman 1975, Lipton 1977, Bates 1981). Although these views
have been severely criticised by various authors (Jamal & Weeks
1993, Adesina 1994, Thomas 1995), they were nevertheless used
by African leaders, like Rawlings in Ghana, to legitimise the
implementation of SAP measures and to suppress trade union
opposition (Kraus 1991).
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Given the formidable challenge SAPs posed to trade unions in
Africa, there was a surprising dearth of studies on the actual trade
union response to SAPs. Existing studies focus mostly on the
national level. They show that some trade union centres, notably in
countries like Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria where trade unionism
managed to preserve a certain degree of  autonomy vis-à-vis the state
in the post-colonial era, attempted to oppose SAPs (Akwetey 1994,
Panford 1994, Hashim 1994). This opposition, however, proved
unsuccessful in the end. SAPs seriously weakened the position of
trade unions in African states. Mass retrenchment of  labour in the
public and private sector led to substantial losses in trade union
membership and trade union revenues, whilst government abolition
of  legislative provisions concerning job security, participatory rights
or guaranteed collective bargaining rights, and outright government
oppression of any trade union oppositional action forced trade
unions’ backs against the wall.
In these circumstances, there was little the trade unions could
do for their suffering members. Increasing job insecurity and falling
real earnings forced the rank and file to search for alternative sources
of  income, ‘straddling’ between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sectors
and subsistence farming, as well as engaging in illicit income-
generating activities such as theft, corruption, black-marketeering
and prostitution. The ‘fusion’ of  labour markets ensured the survival
of  workers, but, according to some authors (Jamal & Weeks 1993),
it also signified the virtual collapse of the wage-earning class as a
distinct entity. Consequently, trade unions faced a deep crisis of
identity. It would appear that they have not yet devised any new
strategies to deal with their dramatic loss of membership and the
fusion of  labour markets.
Even less research was done on the impact of such changes in
trade union bargaining strength and labour markets on workers’ trade
union identity. Studies of  industrial workers in Nigeria contradicted
each other. Some claimed that workers no longer had faith in their
unions and were inclined to embark instead on individual survival
strategies and income-generating activities (Oloyede 1991). Others
argued that workers often still relied on their unions to settle
individual and collective grievances (Isamah 1994). Still others
pointed out that workers combined individual survival strategies
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with union activities. For example, Bangura & Beckman (1993)
illustrate how workers attempted to pursue individual strategies via
trade union actions: their actions were directed at obtaining levels
of  termination payment that would enable them to set up farms or
petty transport and trading operations.
These studies caution against easy generalisations. There may
indeed be a considerable variation in workers’ trade union identity
under SAPs, dependent on factors such as the differential impact
of SAPs on economic sectors, the historical strength of trade
unionism, the location (urban/rural) of  affected enterprises, among
other factors. In this study the focus is on changes in trade union
identity during the economic crisis and SAP in rural Cameroon on
the Ndu Tea Estate. The estate, established in the Bamenda
Grassfields of Anglophone Cameroon in 1957, was owned by an
English-Indian multinational, the Estates and Agency Company Ltd
(EAC) until 1977, when it was transferred to the Cameroon
Development Corporation (CDC) (see Chapter 6).
Estate production and occupational change at Ndu
In 1957 the EAC began constructing a tea estate at Ndu, a small
town situated in the Donga-Mantung division of the Bamenda
Grassfields. It was at that time the only agro-industrial enterprise in
the entire Bamenda Grassfields and one of the few enterprises in
the region offering wage employment.
The local population belongs to the Wimbum, the most important
ethnic group in the Donga-Mantung division. Wimbum society, like
most other societies in the Bamenda Grassfields, is characterised
by a highly complex socio-political form of  organisation headed by
powerful, even sacred, chiefs. The chief  of  Ndu is the most
influential of the Wimbum chiefs and for this reason is seen by
some as the leader of all the Wimbum. The chief is assisted by
quarter-heads, councillors and a number of other important
(hereditary) title and office holders. Efforts to rise within existing
institutions to a position of influence and prestige are common
throughout the population and internal flexibility is thus introduced
into an otherwise stiffly stratified social system (Probst & Bühler
1990). In fact, traditional institutions have from time immemorial
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co-opted prominent members of  the community within their ranks.
The most common mechanism is to honour such persons with a
non-hereditary title. Titles and membership of titled societies become
important pieces of ‘symbolic capital’ and an object of accumulation
(Goheen 1993).
There used to be a clear sexual division of  labour. Women were
largely responsible for food farming while men hunted and traded
in livestock, kola nuts and palm products (palm oil, palm wine and
raphia). A considerable number of men were engaged in lucrative
long-distance trade in kola nuts to Nigeria. Following the example
of Fulani in the area, they also began raising cattle. After the Second
World War, there were two significant changes in men’s roles. Firstly,
there was a steady increase in male labour migration to the coastal
plantations, especially to CDC estates. Secondly, the introduction
of  arabica coffee growing provided a new, major source of  revenue
for men.
With the opening of  the estate, the EAC management began to
recruit local male labour. This was by no means accidental. It was
the outcome of two potentially conflicting factors: the capitalist
preference for female pluckers and the ‘traditional’ male control
over women’s vital productive and reproductive labour (Kaberry
1952, Goheen 1993). In prior negotiations between the chief of
Ndu and the EAC on the local community’s supply of  land and
labour for estate production, the company had proposed employing
female pluckers for various reasons. There was a general belief  in
management circles that women were naturally more suited to picking
tea (they had ‘nimble fingers’), more docile (they were accustomed
to subordination), and cheaper (their income was defined as
supplementary to that of the so-called breadwinner, namely the
husband). The company’s long experience with tea plucking in India
and Sri Lanka had strengthened this managerial belief (Kurian 1982).
The idea of enjoying similar benefits on a tea estate in Cameroon
must have been particularly attractive to management. The chief,
however, strongly opposed the company’s proposal, saying that:
women are responsible for farm work. That is why we call them
‘mothers of  the farm’. They are also responsible for feeding and
caring for the household. Women are very important people, but
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they are expected to obey male orders. Employment on the estate
would incite women to neglect food production and household
work, to behave ‘headstrongly’ and independently, and even to
become ‘harlots’.
He insisted instead on employing local male labour as a
prerequisite for allowing the estate to be set up in his area of
jurisdiction. This condition would not only halt the migration of
local male labour to coastal areas but would also avert the
construction of  labour camps, which were frequently found on the
coastal estates. In this way he hoped to safeguard not only
‘traditional’ male control over women’s productive and reproductive
labour, but also the continuing integration of male workers into the
local community and their loyalty to traditional code of ethics and
authority patterns. He finally agreed that women could be employed
on the estate for specific activities, notably weeding, on a casual or
temporary basis, provided their employment would not affect their
productive and reproductive responsibilities in the local community.
It was not until 1983 that his newly elected successor - a university
graduate - allowed the employment of women as pluckers on a
permanent basis.
The newly created estate never experienced any shortage of  labour.
Wage-earning opportunities were few in the area, and manpower
resources abundant. The local population increased from
approximately 17,000 in the mid 1960s to approximately 35,000 in
the mid 1980s. The labour force expanded from 300 in 1957 to
1,750 in 1987. It has remained predominantly male (94 per cent).
Generally speaking, estate workers are men who have failed to be
selected as the successor to the family head. In Ndu, as elsewhere
in the Grassfields, there can only be one such successor, who is not
necessarily the eldest son. After his installation as head of  the family,
he has control of  all family property. Estate work is highly valued by
the non-successors, as it enables them to escape from the successor’s
control and to build up an independent existence. It also serves as an
important avenue to social mobility in the local community.
The majority of non-successors use part of their wages to achieve
specific objectives which can ‘compensate’ them for the loss of the
successorship and enhance their status within the local community.
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One can usually observe a certain pattern in the pursuit of  these
objectives: a man first attempts to build a house and marry one or
more wives who can look after the cultivation of food; he then
tries to set up a coffee farm and raise cattle, and eventually to invest
in the acquisition of honorific titles which give the non-successors,
like the hereditary office and title holders, access to power and
wealth in the community. This is naturally a difficult project. It
takes years of hard labour for low-waged estate workers to achieve
even some of  these objectives. As a result, male workers showed
long-standing commitment to their jobs: 53 per cent of the male
labour force in the mid-1990s were employed on the estate for more
than ten years. In a situation where supply was far greater than
demand, labour was often recruited through informal channels. One
consequence of this was that jobs tended to be ‘monopolised’ by
certain families. Workers often approached their direct superiors to
recommend their sons or other relatives for employment when
vacancies occurred. The management was usually inclined to accept
such recommendations if they came from workers who were known
as being hard working and committed.
The Ndu male workers have continued to resist female
employment on the estate (Konings 1995a). Only 6 per cent of the
mid-1990s labour force consisted of women. Most of them were
pluckers who were recruited since 1983 following an agreement
between the newly elected chief  of  Ndu and the CDC on permanent
female employment. The women tended to be younger and better
educated than the men and were usually those who wanted to escape
from ‘traditional’ farm work and male dominance, but were not yet
able to find any employment other than plantation work. Hence,
they tended to be less committed to their jobs than male pluckers.
It would be difficult to describe plantation workers as ‘labour
aristocrats’ (Loewenson 1992) given the relatively low remuneration
they receive for their hard labour. Ndu pluckers were placed in
category 2 (semi-skilled workers, zone 2 of the primary sector) of
the standard national classification of occupations, being entitled
to a monthly basic wage of  approximately FCFA 25,000. Primary
sector wages were the lowest in the country; industrial semi-skilled
workers in the urban areas earned about FCFA 35,000. Primary
sector wages also appeared lower than the average household
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income in the area, estimated by Goheen (1996) at about FCFA
447, 270 a year. Goheen, however, admits that her income figures
were skewed somewhat by the fact that several households in her
sample were headed by relatively wealthy men; households headed
by men with wage/salaried jobs had substantially more income than
those where male employment was confined to farming. Moreover,
quite a number of Ndu pluckers were unable to earn the basic wage,
mainly due to the link between the remuneration of workers and
the system of  task work operating on the plantations.
Completion of the daily task set by the management entitled a
worker to the daily basic wage; non-completion was punished by a
pro rata payment. Because of their low remuneration, estate workers
usually displayed a rather ambivalent attitude towards plantation
labour. In some ways they valued it for providing them with a regular
source of income. In other ways they had an acute feeling of
exploitation and subordination in the labour process. Paradoxically,
the close links workers continued to maintain with their local
community appeared not to be an obstacle to class action. In several
ways, such ties increased workers’ inclinations to resist control and
exploitation in the labour process:
First, they seemed to stimulate workers’ efforts to resist capitalist
norms and authority and to preserve a certain degree of  autonomy
at the workplace. For instance, managerial staff  frequently
complained about the alarming rate of  absenteeism on the estate.
A few examples illustrate the close connection between absenteeism
and the continuing adherence of  workers to local norms and
authority:
During the annual harvesting period in August-September the men
are customarily obliged to assist the women in transporting the harvest
from the farm to the compound. As this period approaches, the
rate of absenteeism on the estate tends to rise.
Ndu has the largest market in the Donga-Mantung Division. Market
days are not only of great economic importance, but are also social
happenings. On market days workers are often either absent or leave
the estate before closing time.
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Second, they may have fuelled workers’ demands for better
conditions of  service because workers tried to invest any capital
derived from wage employment in their social advancement within
the local community.
Third, they could have provided workers with an ‘exit option’,
protecting them against severe managerial disciplinary action, in
the form of  dismissal.
Trade unionism on the Ndu estate and structural
adjustment
On 27 July 1958 a trade union, the Ndu Estate Workers Union1,
was founded on the estate due to the determination and
organisational skills of what Millen (1963) has called an ‘outside’
leader. This leader was Mr E.Y.K. Barthson who had been active as
a journalist in Lagos. Living in Ndu, he had been invited by senior
estate workers to organise a union.
The new union was immediately opposed by the estate
management and the chief, who regarded it as a threat to their
authority. Both continually intimidated workers to discourage them
from joining. Eventually, however, they realised they could not
impede the growing popularity of the union because it persevered
in defending workers’ interests. The union’s successful organisation
of a first strike in 1962 boosted worker confidence in its leadership
and forced the chief and the management to recognise the union.
Gradually, both came to accept the union as the ‘normal’ mediation
channel between workers and management. The union’s persistent
struggle for improvement in the workers’ living and working
conditions triggered a rapid growth in union membership. By 1968,
a year after the introduction of the check-off system on the estate,
it was estimated that more than 90 per cent of estate workers were
paid-up union members. Ndu workers at that time demonstrated a
remarkable degree of participation in union affairs:
Each time we convene an Annual Conference we get nearly every
registered and potential member present and eager to attend so that
it looks more like a general meeting than a conference as stipulated
in sections 5 to 7 of our constitution. On the other hand, previously
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we had encouraged General Meetings of workers every month. At
these meetings workers prefer to discuss not only the difficulties
facing them on the estate but all the matters that should be handled
by the Annual Delegates Conference.2
Obviously, the relatively small size of  the union allowed for close
contact between the leadership and the rank and file, as well as
more ready participation in trade union affairs. Active participation
in the union enabled Ndu workers to exercise a considerable
measure of  control over the union leadership’s representation of
their interests.
In 1972 trade unionism in Cameroon was put under state control,
with the aim of  transforming trade unionism from a vehicle of  labour
resistance into an instrument of  labour control. Unions were
henceforth expected to play a major role in national development,
especially through the education of workers on the ‘need’ for
increased production and constant ‘dialogue’ with employers. In a
subsequent reorganisation of trade unionism, the Ndu Estate
Workers Union was dissolved and its members were requested to
join a newly created Divisional Union of  Agricultural Workers of
Donga-Mantung (DUAW/DM).
State control over the union together with a virtual statutory
prohibition of  strike action formed a serious obstacle to the new
union’s representation of  workers’ interests. The situation was
aggravated by the union’s lack of  funds, as a result of  the
introduction of a new system for distributing the check-off
contributions which prevented the union from paying staff members,
holding regular meetings, and organising trade union activities. Little
wonder that the rank and file lost confidence in their leadership, a
condition that was manifest in an increasing number of ‘illegal’ strike
actions after 1972 which the union could not control (Konings
1995a). The economic crisis that hit the CDC from 1986 onwards
further weakened the union’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the
management.
There is no doubt that the sharp fall in commodity prices on the
world market and the 40 per cent increase in the value of  the CFA
franc relative to the US dollar (which made CDC commodities even
less competitive on the world market) were the principal causes of
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the virtual bankruptcy of  the corporation. The CDC suffered a loss
of  about FCFA 19 billion between 1986 and 1991. Nevertheless,
there were other factors that also contributed to the emergence and
continuation of  the crisis. First, there was the political elite’s inability
or unwillingness to stop the imports of cheap tea and palm oil,
which impeded CDC sales on the domestic market. Second, there
were frequent reports of  the managerial elite’s involvement in
massive embezzlement, reckless expenditure, waste, and power
struggles. It is therefore understandable that many workers did not
believe that the management could effectively combat the crisis
(Konings 1995b).
The government had previously subsidised parastatal enterprises
annually, irrespective of  performance, but faced with a severe
economic crisis in the second half of the 1980s, it was no longer
able to render any assistance to the CDC. To save the corporation
from total collapse, the management was forced to adopt a series
of adjustment measures aimed at cost reduction and productivity
increases, including intensified task work, drastic cuts in workers’
salaries and fringe benefits, and retrenchments. This managerial
strategy for economic recovery was reinforced in 1989 when the
government adopted a World Bank and IMF-inspired SAP which
demanded, among other things, a restructuring of  the parastatal
sector. The CDC was then obliged to sign a four-year performance
contract with the government, under which the corporation was
expected ‘to meet certain standards of efficiency and to become
self-supporting and profitable’.3 Soon after the signing of this
contract, the CDC General Manager announced a managerial crusade
against ‘undisciplined and unproductive’ workers.
The various adjustment measures brought some relief to the
company’s liquidity problems but its survival remained precarious.
It was not until January 1994, when a 50 per cent devaluation of
the CFA franc made CDC products more competitive on the world
market, that prospects for economic recovery appeared. Six months
later the government surprisingly announced the privatisation of
the corporation, prompting feelings of job insecurity among the
workers. After vehement protests by the workers and the regional
population as a whole, the actual privatisation was postponed
(Konings 1996c).
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In response to the corporation’s unprecedented crisis, the union
presidents on the CDC estates decided to assist the management in
its struggle for economic recovery. There were a number of  factors
behind this decision. Since the reorganisation of trade unionism in
1972, the unions had become accustomed to solving problems with
the management and the state through peaceful negotiations rather
than through confrontation. In this particular case, the union
presidents agreed with the management that, given the corporation’s
inability to secure any loans or public subsidies during the crisis,
cost reduction and productivity increase were absolute prerequisites
for economic recovery. Furthermore, they were assured by the
management that no one in the corporation would be exempted
from making sacrifices for the sake of  economic recovery. They
also hoped that the implementation of an adjustment programme
would safeguard the jobs of the sizeable CDC labour force estimated
at about 15,000.
On 23 August 1987 the union presidents agreed with the
management on a substantial increase in the productivity required
of  estate workers. For example, the daily quota required from tea
pluckers was raised from 26 to 32 kg of  green leaves. When the
corporation’s financial position continued to deteriorate,
management proposed further austerity measures to the union
presidents. Following negotiations, a new agreement was signed on
6 January 1990, which entailed drastic cuts in the salaries and fringe
benefits of all workers and managerial staff, amounting to some 30
to 40 per cent of  their previous incomes. The most draconian
measure, however, was the introduction of a compulsory savings
scheme, forcing workers to save at least 15 per cent of their basic
salary to aid the corporation’s recovery.
In the wake of  the political liberalisation process in the country,
the unions regained a certain degree of autonomy in 1991. The
union presidents then became more responsive to the sufferings of
the workers and began to criticise the adjustment programme they
had previously supported. At their urgent request, the CDC General
Manager organised a meeting to review the January 1990 agreement.
During this meeting on 1March 1992, the union presidents insisted
upon the termination or modification of  the workers’ financial
contributions to the corporation’s economic recovery. They justified
this remarkable change in the union’s position as follows:
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First, the union had expected that the increased output and
financial sacrifices of the workers would have forestalled, or at least
minimised, any retrenchments. This had proved to be wishful
thinking as the management had embarked upon mass layoffs of
workers. Between1986 and 1990, the labour force at the Ndu Tea
Estate had been reduced from 1,750 to 1,333. Labour retrenchment
has been facilitated by the new Labour Code of 1992 which allowed
employers to lay off workers during ‘an unfavourable economic
situation and internal reorganisation’ without previous consultation
with the Labour Office or unions.
Second, the unions had expected the government to take
appropriate measures to stabilise the prices of essential commodities
and to standardise the wages of  the agro-industrial parastatals. This
had not happened. Neither had the National Social Insurance Fund
continued to pay family allowances to the workers. In fact, prices
had skyrocketed after the political opposition’s 1991 ‘ghost town’
campaign, wages had been frozen since July 1985, and taxes had
increased by 100 per cent (see Chapter 2). As a result, CDC workers
‘would now seem to be carrying out forced labour as the majority
of the labour force has no take-home wage at the end of the month’.4
The management, however, refused to go beyond some minor
concessions in relation to the January 1990 agreement. The union
presidents then declared a collective trade dispute on 13 May 1992.
When the management tried to employ delaying tactics, CDC
workers went on strike from 21 to 26 May 1992. After this strike,
the management agreed to various amendments of the January 1990
agreement including the reintroduction of  certain fringe benefits.
Although there was a certain improvement in the relationship
between the union leadership and the CDC management after these
amendments, tensions and conflicts continued to simmer beneath
the surface. The union presidents complained regularly about the
management’s lack of  consultation with the unions and shop
stewards, while the management, in turn, constantly insisted that,
in a situation of crisis, the unions should have concentrated on an
increase in labour productivity rather than on the representation of
workers’ interests.
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Ndu workers and trade union identity under structural
adjustment
The SAP and the union’s extensive cooperation with the CDC
management in the planning and implementation of adjustment
measures had a disastrous effect on trade union membership and
the rank and file’s trade union identity.
A considerable number of workers ceased to be union members,
because they were laid off by the management during the economic
crisis and SAP. Although Ndu workers maintain close links with
the local community, which serves as a kind of  social protection
against retrenchment, retrenchment nevertheless thwarted workers’
social mobility projects in the local community. Best off  were usually
the older workers who had been able to invest part of their savings
in coffee production, cattle rearing, trade or other entrepreneurial
activities. Nonetheless, even for some of  these men, survival became
precarious during the economic crisis: by the early 1990s the
government had not paid them for their coffee for over two years.
Worst off  were usually the young men and women who lacked
the financial resources to continue building up an autonomous
existence. They were often looked upon as social failures. A man
who had not been able to establish at least a coffee farm commanded
no respect in society (Manga 1984). An educated woman who
refused to engage in ‘traditional’ farm work and to subordinate
herself to male control through marriage was seen as ‘lazy’ or ‘loose’.
In their efforts to earn some income and preserve a certain degree
of autonomy towards the family head, a growing number of young
men and women were forced to engage in petty trade - often in
smuggled or stolen goods - and to accept all kinds of  casual, menial
jobs. Some young men formed work groups offering their labour to
local farmers (Courade 1994). Others decided to migrate to urban
centres to try their luck, some returning to their hometown after a
while, having failed to secure gainful employment during the crisis
(Gubry et al. 1996). Still others started growing food, a domain
previously reserved for women, to earn some cash. They often
experienced difficulties in finding land for food cultivation in an
area where land had become an increasingly scarce commodity due
to estate production, coffee farming and cattle grazing. Being
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engaged in a traditionally female occupation, they also risked social
ridicule and consequently had to farm in the forest where land was
still available and where they could not be seen.
Educated women wishing to escape from ‘traditional’ farm work
and male control had often no other choice than to prostitute
themselves. Given the continuing male opposition to female
employment on the estate, it was not surprising that male workers
and shop stewards brought strong pressures to bear upon the
management to fire women first whenever retrenchments were
necessary.
An increasing number of union members were also inclined to
retire ‘voluntarily’ from the estate. This was mainly due to the
growing demotivation of workers with the intensified control and
exploitation at the workplace and their dissatisfaction with the
union’s defence of  their interests during the crisis. While some
workers were still reluctant to resign and thereby lost their monthly
wage income, however meagre it may have been, others were no
longer interested in keeping their job at any cost, especially having
lost confidence in the corporation’s eventual recovery. The latter
wanted to collect their long-service awards and gratuities and their
voluntary and compulsory savings, and invest the capital in farming,
trade and other potentially lucrative activities such as taxi-driving
or setting up a bar or shop.
A tiny minority of the remaining labour force continued to
identify itself  with the union, relying on it to protect its interests.
The vast majority of workers, however, lost whatever confidence
they still had in the union and employed a variety of strategies to
cope with the managerial adjustment measures. Some of  them opted
for a single strategy, others for several strategies, simultaneously or
consecutively.
A number of  tea pluckers became survival-oriented in the climate
of insecurity and tended to acquiesce in any economic recovery
measures the management introduced, however stringent, for the
sake of  keeping their jobs. They tried to impress the management
with above-average output and avoided conflicts with their
supervisors. This intensified the element of  competition in the labour
process, undermining the previously high degree of  solidarity among
workers who shared similar living and working conditions.
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Unexpectedly, most workers still seemed to cling to the strategy
they had always employed in times when the union had failed to
protect their interests and ‘deliver the goods’: engaging in individual
and collective modes of resistance. It should be noted, however,
that collective actions became more sporadic than in the past. This
is understandable, since collective actions were extremely risky in a
situation where strikes were virtually outlawed and were likely to
elicit severe managerial reprisals in the form of  summary dismissals.
When the union president, Mr Johnson Tanto Massa, informed
the Ndu workers of  the union’s agreement with the management
on an increase of task work from 26 to 32 kg of green leaves,
workers complained that the new norm was too high, as many of
them already experienced difficulties in reaching the old quota. They
protested against the agreement in various ways. They refused to
re-elect Mr Johnson Tanto Massa in the DUAW executive elections
shortly afterwards and instead voted a non-estate worker, Mr G.N.
Majam, a brother of the chief of Ndu and a clerical worker in the
local coffee cooperative, into office. In addition, they started a go-
slow in November, which resulted in all of them being paid a pro
rata rate. The pluckers agreed to raise output only after the estate
manager promised to allow some of their representatives to visit
the other CDC tea estates to investigate whether their colleagues
on these estates were also carrying out the new norm.
Promptly after the signing of the January 1990 agreement between
the management and the unions, the newly elected union president,
Mr G.N. Majam, barely escaped being beaten up by angry workers
when he informed them of  the terms of  the agreement. Because of
Majam’s total failure to obtain the workers’ consent, the CDC
General Manager himself had to come to the estate to seek their
cooperation. At a mass meeting, he stressed that non-acceptance
of the drastic cuts in their real incomes would inevitably lead to the
closure of the estate. This left the workers with no other choice but
to comply.
A year later, on 4 January 1991, workers went on strike. After
the severe cuts in their income, they were angry because their family
allowances had not been paid for eighteen months and because they
had not enjoyed Christmas advances as had their colleagues on other
CDC estates. Attempts by the Labour Department, management
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and the union to settle the strike failed. After an appeal had been
made to the chief  of  Ndu on 7 January to intervene, the latter
promised the administration that he would order the workers to
return the next day. The workers indeed came to the estate on that
day, but they left by 9 a.m. Only after family allowances were paid
on the following day did they finally resume work.
Notwithstanding the sporadic collective actions, workers had
become more inclined to resort to individual informal actions which
were more difficult for the management and state to control. The
CDC Annual Reports document managerial concern with the
increasing rate of uncompleted work, absenteeism and workers’
insubordination at the workplace. Apparently the managerial crusade
against ‘undisciplined and unproductive’ workers had not yet been
successful. In addition, workers were engaged in a variety of  informal
actions such as sabotage and involvement in illicit income-generating
activities, to protest against the reduction in their incomes. Some
pluckers did not keep to the plucking standards: they mixed bad
leaves with good ones, a practice which enabled them to complete
their task faster and to achieve more weight and income. Others
cut the tea bushes and prunings and used them for firewood, while
others stole tea from the factory and sold it to middlemen. The
management periodically complained that the theft of tea had
reached unprecedented levels since the economic crisis and had
caused serious losses to the company.
Conclusion
Economic crisis and SAP brought about a serious decline in trade
union membership and in the rank and file’s trade union identity.
Workers, no longer union members after retrenchment or ‘voluntary’
retirement from the company attempted to eke out an existence in
the local community with varied success. While young men and
women usually found it hard to survive, older workers were more
likely to be successful. In the course of their working careers the
latter had often been able to invest their savings in various forms
of  self-employment, including coffee farming, cattle raising, trade
and business, and in the purchase of honorific ‘traditional’ titles
which were potential sources of political and economic power in
the local community.
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Several authors (Lubeck 1986, Peace 1979, Oloyede 1991,
Warnier 1993) have shown that West African workers aspire very
intensely to self-employment since it commands far more social
respect and prestige than wage labour. Workers place considerable
weight on the entrepreneurial ethos prevailing in most West African
societies, and they are therefore inclined to look upon wage labour
as an unavoidably ‘transitional phase in a moment of social ascent’.
They greatly admired any of their colleagues who succeeded in
setting up some kind of business, well aware of the ‘many sacrifices
such an achievement demands from an ordinary worker’.
This entrepreneurial ethos served to fuel workers’ militancy when
their efforts for self-employment were being threatened by declining
incomes and deteriorating working conditions. Faced with a relatively
large increase in task work and a dramatic cut in their real incomes
during the economic crisis and structural adjustment, most union
members rapidly lost whatever confidence they still had in the union
leadership’s bargaining power, and became inclined to engage in
various forms of  individual and collective forms of  resistance.
As a result of these developments, the union encountered a
serious crisis of  identity. Management and state constantly tried to
impress upon the union leadership that workers should take their
due share of the sacrifices necessary for national recovery and that
it is the union’s responsibility to solicit the workers’ cooperation.
The cooperative role the state-controlled unions were willing to
play during the economic crisis and structural adjustment
compromised their representation of  workers’ interests. Moreover,
the union leaders were often not properly consulted by the
management in the planning of austere adjustment measures, but
they were nevertheless requested to assist in their implementation,
thus risking accusations by the rank and file of ‘betrayal of workers’
interests’. Workers saw it as a situation whereby they made sacrifices
for the economic recovery of the company while the political and
managerial elite ‘continued to loot the parastatals’.5
Although the union achieved a certain measure of autonomy
vis-a-vis the state during the political liberalisation process in the
1990s and became more concerned to defend workers’ interests,
the logic of  structural adjustment continued to constrain its ability
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to defend their members’ rights effectively. In only a few cases were
the unions able to challenge some of  the management’s more stringent
anti-labour adjustment measures (Konings 2006b).
In October 2002, the CDC tea estates were finally privatised.
The government sold them to a South African consortium, Brobon
Finex PTY Limited and the estates were renamed the Cameroon
Tea Estates (CTE). The unions were not consulted about the
privatisation of  the CDC tea estates. The management ignored the
unions, even refusing to enter into any negotiations with the union
leaders about the introduction of drastic measures to alter the labour
process, including growing casualisation of the labour force,
outsourcing of certain tasks to contractors, increases in task work,
a 50-percent slash of wages, and non-payment of various fringe
benefits. Given this situation, the workers had no other choice in
the defence of  their interests but to resort to a variety of  formal
and informal protest actions, notably protracted strikes (Konings
2011).
The usual management response to strike actions was summary
dismissal of  strikers. It was only after state intervention in a long
and violent strike in 2006 that the management was prepared to
pay dismissed workers their termination benefits. Little wonder that
the rank and file lost confidence in the union leadership, and new
recruits refused to join the unions, well aware of  management’s
hostile attitude towards trade unionism.
Contrary to government expectations, the privatisation of the
tea sector has not given rise to an increase in the quality, output
and sales of tea, due not only to severe mismanagement but also to
frequent labour protests against the deteriorating conditions of
service.
Notes
  1. In 1963, the union changed its name to Cameroon Union of Plantations,
Industrial and Agricultural Workers (CUPIAW)
  2. See letter of  General Secretary of  CUPIAW to Registrar of  Trade
Unions, dated 17 July 1968, in File MTPS/WCD/BU.99, CUPIAW.
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  3. See Report of the Consultation Meeting with the Ministry of Labour
and Social Insurance at Provincial level by Mr P.M. Kamga, dated 28
October 1989, in File MEPS/SWP/BU.134, Vol. 4, General
Correspondence CDC.
  4. See Minutes of the Second Appraisal Meeting of 6 January 1990
Agreement between the CDC Management and the Workers’ Union
which was held in the General Manager’s Office on 14 March 1992, in
File MTPS/IDTPS/SWP/LB.2, Vol. 27, Complaints from CDC.
  5. See Labour Day Speech by Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, President of  FAWU,
on 1 May 1991, in Messager (e), 13 May 1991, p. 4.
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